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Abstract 
This thesis works on the central question of what constitutes China ' s soft power and how and 
why it is mobilized by the People' s Republic of China. This thesis argues that soft power 
derives from the mobilization and promotion of non-material sources of power. It treats soft 
power not as a static quality but as multifaceted and dynamic. An exploration of China's soft 
power in the past (1959-1965) and present (during China's hosting of the 2008 Olympic 
Games) suggests that there is both change and continuity in the way in which China' s soft 
power has been constituted and mobilized. Further, my thesis argues that the evolution of 
China 's soft power correlates with China ' s changing national identity as perceived by the 
Chinese leadership. How the state seeks to represent itself on the world stage can shape the 
way it chooses to cultivate, interpret, mobilize and project its soft power. There are three 
characteristics that I believe make my current research significant. 
First, my research contributes to debates about the nature of soft power in International 
Relations. The existing literature tends to view soft power as a "passive," "given" and 
"latent" mode of power. This study however demonstrates that soft power is not a static 
attribute of a state but can be dynamic, which is related to the on-going process of the 
(re)production of national identity. A state's sense of identity can shape the way in which soft 
power is constituted and mobilized. The constitution and mobilization of soft power are both 
derivative of and reproductive of that representation. 
Second, my thesis casts new light on the understanding of China's soft power by taking a 
cross-disciplinary approach between history and international relations. The prevailing 
studies of China 's soft power suggest that, in the context of China ' s rise, the deployment of 
soft power represents a "new" dimension in China' s international engagement. However, my 
analysis of primary Chinese sources shows that elements of soft power were adopted in 
Maoist China. Under Mao, the Chinese state actively promoted China' s "new" proletarian 
culture, the notion of China as an exemplary model of revolution and nation-building, and 
China's -revolutionary foreign policy. These sources constituted what I call "Maoist soft 
power" and they were vigorously projected through China's cultural diplomacy and foreign 
aid programs. The research on "Maoist soft power" provides an interesting case to compare 
and contrast with China 's soft power at present, allowing us to develop a deeper 
understanding of the nature of China 's soft power, which is not static but contextual , dynamic 
and strategic. 
ll1 
The hi stori ca l study of China's soft power links to the third aspect of thi s research: although 
generally understood to be an American post-Cold War invention, the concept of soft power 
can be a useful tool for analysis of any state ' s foreign policy. 
Exploring China's evo lving soft power, my research find s that soft power is not a " new" 
dimension of power to China. It has, however, been understood and used differentl y over 
time according to China ' s evolving perceptions of its national identity and rol e in the 
international system. My research aims to contribute to our understanding of China 's soft 
power and to debates about the nature of soft power in Internati onal Relations. 
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1 Introduction 
Power is a key but contested concept in the discipline of International Relations (IR). 
Conventional conceptions of power focus on material formulations , such as military build-up 
and economic disparities between nations. However, the dissatisfaction with this simplistic 
conceptualisation of power has spurred investigations into other forms and facets of power. 
The development of the concept of soft power is one snch endeavour. In contrast to material 
conceptions of power, soft power emphasizes non-material aspects of power rooted in a 
country 's cultural, institutional and ideational appeal to others. 
The American political scientist Joseph S. Nye coined the term "soft power" in 1990 and has 
developed his notion of soft power in his later works in the 2000s. 1 The term has caught on 
among politicians, academics, as well as policy analysts and commentators in the social 
media. Having observed the fast economic growth of the People's Republic of China (PRC) 
since the inception of the "refonn and opening-up" policies at the end of 1978, scholars and 
policy analysts have picked up the term "soft power" to study China's international behaviour 
and evaluate China's global impact concerning its soft power practices. 2 Their studies 
suggest that the deployment of soft power is an emerging strategy of the PRC in the context 
of its rise, and scholars now ask whether China's soft power poses a threat to the dominant 
West, particularly the US unipolar liberal international order.3 Whilst there is disagreement 
regarding how much global influence the PRC has in terms of soft power, the consistent 
1 Joseph S. Nye bas mainly developed his concept of soft power in his three books, Bound to Lead: 
The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990), The Paradox of American 
Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone (Oxford, UK; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), and Soft Power: Th e Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public 
Affairs, 2004). Based on his notion of soft power in these three books, Nye has further developed his 
argument of power. He maintains that in the information age, it is crucial to pay attention to the 
multiple dimensions of power and that success in world politics reli es on the ability to combine hard 
and soft power, that is, "smart power." See Joseph S. Nye, Power in the Global Information Age: From 
Realism to Globalization (London; New York: Routledge, 2004) and 17,e Future of Power (New York: 
Public Affairs, 2011). 
2 For instance, Joshua Kurlantzick, Chann Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the 
World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007); Congressional Research Service, China 's Foreign 
Policy and "Safi Power " in South America, Asia, and Afi-ica (Washington D.C.: US Government 
Printing Office, 2008); Sheng Ding, The Dragon's Hidden Wings: How China Rises with Its Safi Power 
(Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2008); Mingjiang Li ed ., Safi Power: China :s Emerging 
Strategy in Intemational Politics (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2009); Carola McGiffert ed., 
Chinese Safi Power and Its Implications Jo,' the United States: Competition and Cooperation in the 
Developing World, A Report of the CSIS Smart Power Initiative (Washington D.C.: the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, March 2009). 
3 In particular see Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive; Congressional Research Service, China's Foreign 
Policy and "Safi Power" in South America, Asia, and Aji-ica; McGiffert ed., Chinese Safi Power and 
Its Implications for the United Stales. 
assumption underl yi ng such debates is that the deployment of soft power is a new dimension 
of China ·s international engagement. 
I have two main concerns regarding the above approach to studying China's soft power. The 
first concern is the utility of Nye's notion of soft power in contexts beyond the United States 
(US).4 Since Nye 's conception of soft power has primarily developed in the context of the 
debates about maintaining American hegemony in the post-Cold War liberal international 
order, this empirical preoccupation leaves an open question of the extent to which his notion 
of soft power can be applied to contexts beyond the US . Is it really the case that soft power 
relies on a democrati c regime? The second concern re lates to the assumption that a "soft 
power" approach represents something "new" in the PRC's international engagement. Can 
thi s assumption actually hold up? Can we see elements of what we now call "soft power" that 
were mobili zed and projected in the early period of the PRC? If there were such efforts, how 
do they contribute to the understanding of PRC's soft power? 
Addressing these two concerns suggests that it may be valuable to distill the essential 
theoretical underpinnings of the concept of soft power from its primary historica l context -
the US unipolar era. It a lso prompts me to explore whether "soft power" is "new" to China. 
This introduction is divided into four sections. The first section describes the context of this 
research. It reviews the literature of soft power wi th particular attention paid to the di scussion 
of Chi na 's soft power. This broad literature review leads me to the research puzzles that have 
dri ven thi s study. Following thi s, the second section of this introduction articulates the centra l 
question that I sha ll work to answer and provides my argument in brief. The third section 
explains methodology and research design. It outlines the case studies that are the empirical 
focus of the thesis and provides the reasons for the case selection. Fina lly, this introduction 
gives a brief sketch of the structure of the thesis. 
1.1 Literature review: soft power and the PRC 
This section di scusses the origin of the concept of soft power in the disci pline of IR and the 
popularity of appl yi ng thi s concept to study China 's international behaviour. I argue that 
current debate on China 's soft power is driven but also dominated by the phenomenon of 
China·s ri se and th e question of whether China 's soft power will he lp the PRC's peaceful ri se 
or pose a threat to the li beral international ord er. While China's soft power is a hot politi ca l 
and academic topic, most work treats soft power in the PRC as a recent phenomenon in close 
relation to its economic rise. This seems to imply th at soft power is only possible after 
4 In thi s regard. some other analysts have the same concern, see Ding, The Dragons Hidden Wings , 2; 
Geoffrey J. Randal , The Seduction of Soft Power: Diplomacy in Modern Times (The Australian 
National University (ANU) Thesis, 2008), 1-3. 
2 
attainment of potent hard power. This is a problem because it ignores the hi story of the PRC's 
soft power-based foreign policy practices, especially during eras of relatively weak materi al 
power. As such, current research on China's soft power lacks a deeper hi storical perspecti ve 
on son power as an aspect of China's internati onal engagement and is short of analysis of 
what shapes that soft power. The remainder of thi s section reviews the context in which Nye 
developed the concept of soft power and the debate on China 's soft power. 
The concept of soft power was invented by Joseph S. Nye in 1990. He sought to use thi s 
concept to counter the then-prevalent but pessimistic view that the US was in decline at the 
end of the 1980s.' Nye defines soft power as a co-optive or attractive power that operates 
through the appeal of culture, political values and agenda-setting in a way that shapes others' 
preferences in world politics.6 Exemplified by America 's case, soft power is associated with 
intangible assets including "a universa li sti c culture," political values such as "democracy," 
"internati onal institutions (working with others)," and "fo reign policy (promoting peace and 
human ri ghts)."7 Nye regards that thi s dimension of power presents a striking contrast to the 
hard command power usuall y associated with tangible resources such as military and 
economic strength.8 In the age of infonnation and globalization characterised by "complex 
interdependence," Nye argues that hard power is not unimportant. but its application and 
utility can be limited. At the same time, soft power has played an increasingly important role 
in begetting cooperation to deal with transnational issues. 9 Soft power for Nye is significant 
for America in the post-Cold War era because this power would help to maintain American 
primacy in the liberal international order. 
Nye 's concept of soft power, which contests the conceptualizati on of power as simply 
military or economic power resources, has gained wide currency since it was introduced into 
diplomatic and political vocabulary.10 However, whil st hi s works on soft power provide a 
useful platfonn to think more about the concept of power and soft power in international 
relations, it should be noted that Nye 's notion of soft power is primaril y located in the post-
Cold War era with the US as the onJ y superpower in world politics. It thus leaves an open 
question of whether hi s idea of soft power can be applied to contexts beyond the US. 
5 Nye, Safi Power, xi. 
6 Nye, Bound to Lead, 31. 
7 Nye, Safi Power, 5, 6, 14. 
8 Ibid. , 32. 
9 Ibid., 20. 
10 See Nye, Safi Power, xi. 
3 
Nye's work of soft power was introduced into China in 1992. 11 Since then , the concept o f 
soft power has become popular among Chinese political leaders, scholars and commentators. 
For instance, in his report to the I 6"' Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress in 2002 , 
President Jiang Zemin stressed the more prominent role cu lture played in the competition for 
comprehensive national power. 12 At the 17'" CCP Congress in October 2007, President Hu 
Jintao used the term "cultural soft power" (wenhua ruanshili) to hi ghlight the importance of 
developing culture for enhancing national cohesion and competitiveness in overall national 
strength. 13 In the meantime, recent years have witnessed a rapid growth of the number of 
art icles that discuss (China's) soft power in Chinese journals and newspapers (see Chapter 
Three). While the definition of soft power - the abi lity to get what a country wants through 
attraction rather than coerc ion - has not been substantially questioned by most Chinese 
analysts, th ere are different meanings given to it wi th regard to what constitutes soft power 
and how to generate attraction. 
Chinese intell ectua ls are interested in exploring the most like ly sources generating China 's 
soft power and how to use these sources in conducting Chinese foreign policy and enhancing 
China 's global image. There is an emerg ing consensus on three key "sources" of China 's soft 
power: (I) Chinese culture, (2) China as a model for development, and (3) Chinese foreign 
pol icy and dip lomacy. These are regarded as the most important in promoting a dynamic 
image of a "New China" and enhancing China's global appeal (Chapter Three provides a 
more detailed anal ysis of the Chinese discourse of soft power) . 
China 's embrace o f th e concept of soft power is largely dri ven by three factors. First, Chinese 
elites increas ingl y vi ew soft power as constituting an indi spensable part of "comprehensive 
national power (CNP, zonghe guoli)." 14 A lthough China 's economic power grows quickl y, 
11 Nye's book Bound ro Lead was translated into Chinese by He Xiaodong and Gai Yuyun as ;f 
fi!JE!Jtff@P'Jtllf'i!fl!J (Is America Bound ro Lead the World} , published by China 's Military Translation 
Press in l 992. 
12 
'"-i:im~ ~,J,Mift~, JffWi· OO!J#e.:/H,_i:J'..)Jl:"-lcg-fr/aJim-IT~l:lcJci.J;'t:a::l'Ut-J I-/,;:l,J::.Jn 
fHll -it·~)( (20021:f. l l R 8 B) " (Build a well-off society in an al l-round way and create a new 
situation in building socialism with Chi nese characteri stics. fu ll text of Jiang Zemin 's report to 16'" 
Party Congress on Nov 8, 2002), Renmi11 Ribao (People's Daily, lat er RMRB) (November 18, 2002), l . 
" '·/iJi,;ey., OOfl @.H~ ~'.x'.. fl;;:l;:/Jit~.R 7'.l ~f ltt-i:1flifJl"ill: 1J,JilH±~Wi/l'HIJ im{il'1.J-- Nltlilitr l;.;J;ct:(E 
rt>l-¥1~F:it~ l·-tl1'-i: lfH~c&x4i.J::.ll~tlH's· C2007 'f- 10 Ji 15 n) " (Hold high the great banner 
of Sociali sm wi th Chinese characteristics and stri ve for new victories in building a well-off society in 
an al l- round way, Hu Jin tao 's report to the 17'" Party Congress on October 15, 2007), RMRB (October 
25, 2007), 3. 
14 Hu Angang and Men Honghua, '·The ri sing of modem Chi na: comprehensive national power and 
grand strategy,'· paper presented to '·Rising China and rhe East Asian Economy" International 
Conference by KIEP, Seoul , March 19-20, 2004. 
4 
they recognize that China's soft power lags far behind the West and the US in particular 15 
and argue that China should urgently focus on catching up in this regard. Second, China 's soft 
power provides a way of enhancing national cohesion. In the context of American "cultural 
hegemony," identifying and promoting China's soft power helps define the PRC's unique 
identity and restore Chinese pride in it. 16 Third, conscious of the international suspicion and 
concern about China 's fast economic and military development, Chinese political elites 
emphasize that soft power is particularly important to allay international worries about 
China's rise and to facilitate its "peaceful development" in the global community. Therefore, 
it is argued that it is necessary for the Chinese government to take active steps to enhance its 
attractiveness and to reassure the rest of the world that China's development generally is 
beneficial and does not pose any tangible threat to the existing international order. 17 In 
summary, Chinese intellectuals tend to view soft power as something that needs to be actively 
cultivated and promoted by mobilizing sources of non-material power such as culture, 
developmental model and foreign policy and diplomacy. 
However, compared to their Chinese counterparts, China observers in the West are generally 
negative regarding China's soft power. To begin with, they point to deficiencies that detract 
from China' s capacity to develop soft power. These include the PRC's one-party authoritarian 
regime, poor human rights record, and weakness in international institutions including 
capacities in regards to agenda-setting and active shaping of these institutions. 18 Second, 
15 See for instance "iil'tli 't' IIJ '1'!(3i:;;/J"' (Analysing China's soft power), #1$'¥Bffe (People 's 
Liberation Army (PLA) Daily), October 3, 2005 ; Fang Changping, " 't'~t,31:;;!J l:t 1Y.&;l't.xi't' III Erl !a 
:ir" (A comparison between China 's soft power and that of US and its implications for China), ff!J'f'-if 
6'f-1;JJ!jf:lf! (World Economics and Politics) no.7 (2007), 21-27; Yan Xuetong and Xu Jin, "'t'~!fk:,).;;/J 
l:t 1Y " (A comparison of soft power between China and the United States), f!l'Jf & f!,ij(; JJ{ 
(Contempora,y International Relations) no.I (2008), 24-29. 
16 Huang Renwei, " !fj(:,).; ;iJ__ljlI]*3e3':" (Soft power and national security), "f!JJ.#f!J (Study 
Monthly) no.I (2003), 23-28. Also see The State Council of the People 's Republic of China, "Outline 
of the National Plan for Cultural Development During the Period of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan," 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) of the PRC 
<http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/hot/t20060529 71334.htm> (May 29, 2006). 
17 For instance see Zheng Bijian, "'t' II] 'fD-'frt/:il)@,/iJiil! li!l\'fDiJfii·MErJ* *" (China 's new road towards 
its peaceful rise and the future of Asia, speech at Bo 'ao Asian Forum in 2003), Xinhuanet. com 
<http://news.xinJ1uanet.com/newscenter/2003-l l /24/content 1195240.htm> (November 24, 2003); 
Zheng Bijian, "Ten views on China's development road of peaceful rise and Sino-European relations," 
The Foreign Policy Centre <http://fuc.org.uk/fsblob/664.pdf> (December 15, 2005); Zheng Bijian, 
"China's 'peaceful rise ' to great-power status," Foreign Affairs 84:5 (Sep/Oct 2005), 18-22; Yan 
Xuetong, "The rise of China and its power status," The Chinese Journal of International Politics 1 :1 
(2006), 5-33; Shi Yin.hong, "China's peaceful _rise is all about soft power," China Daily (June 14, 2007), 
10. 
18 Nye, Soft Power, 89; Joseph S. Nye, "American and Chinese power after the financial crisis," n,e 
Washington Quarterly 33:4 (2010), 143-153; Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, "Sources and limits of 
Chinese 'soft power'," Survival 48:2 (2006), 17-36; Ingrid d'Hooghe, "The limits of China's soft 
power in Europe: Beijing's public diplomacy puzzle," Clingendael Diplomacy Paper No.25 (The 
Hague, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael' , January 2010); Jonathan 
5 
some point out that China 's soft power practices are a not so subtle ploy on the part of the 
PRC to contain Taiwan 's international po liti cal infl uence as well as to gain access to va luable 
natural resources in regions such as Africa. 19 These practices are in effect attempts to achieve 
"hard" ends rather than produce attractiveness. Third and more alarmingly, some see soft 
power as representing a "new domain" for zero-sum games in international politics. They 
view the ri se of China's soft power as being at the expense of Western/US soft power, 
because Beijing propagates its authoritarian model of economic growth as a source of 
attraction in order to create a sphere of influence among illiberal states. 20 As a report 
prepared fo r the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations states, " the perceived decline in 
American soft power is relati ve - largely a comparative decline based on the rise of other 
powers- in particular the rapid emergence of China as a US ' peer competitor"'.21 
Regardless of the di fferent implications that can be generated fro m the studies of Chi na's so ft 
power between Chinese and Western analysts, most see that soft power constitutes a "new 
sphere" of power fo r the PRC to expand its global influence. Much of the interest in China's 
soft power is a by-product of the obsession (both within China and internationally) with the 
phenomenon o f China's ri se and the question of whether China's soft power will help Ch ina's 
peacefu l ri se or pose a threat to the liberal internationa l order. 
Despite thi s intense focus on China·s soft power and its impl ications, there are important 
questi ons about the nature of China's soft power that are as yet not being full y addressed. 
The first question 1 rai se is what the nature of soft power is and what consti tutes so ft power. 
In much academic writing on the topic, soft power is viewed as an objective resource that can 
be accumulated, measured , or maintained to gain or retain a superior position in international 
competition. Such resource-based definitions of soft power fa il to develop a deeper 
understanding of the multifaceted and fluid nature of soft power. For instance, Nye says that 
American liberal culture constitutes American soft power. Whi le many Europeans admire 
Ameri ca 's devotion to individuali sm and personal li bert ies, societi es in the Middle East or 
Asia may not be attracted to such va lues.22 In this simple case, we can see that soft power is 
McClory, The New Persuaders: An International Ranking of Soft Power (UK: Institute for Government, 
December 7, 20 1 OJ ; Jonathan McCJory, The New Persuaders 11: A 2011 Global Ranking of Soft Power 
(UK: Institute for Government , December 1, 2011 ). 
19 See Hongying Wang and Yeh-Chun g Lu, "The conception of so ft power and its policy impli cation s: 
a comparative study of China and Taiwan," Journal oJContempora,y China 17: 56 (2008), 425-447. 
'° Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 43 , 56-5 7. 
" Congressional Research Service, China s Foreign Policy and "Sqfi Power " in South America. Asia. 
and Aji-ica, 3. 
" See Nye, Soft Power, 55-56. 
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quite subjective and relational: whether it is "soft power" depends upon not only the actor, 
but also the recipient. 
Therefore, it is necessary to develop a deeper understanding of soft power rather than focus 
merely on measuring this power and gauging its impact. It is important to ask, for example, 
who projects "soft power," who the targeted audience is, and who it is not. 23 In this sense, 
empirical case studies are needed to explore what constitutes a country 's soft power and how 
the state mobilizes this power to attract whom and for what purpose. It is necessary not only 
to consider the subjectivity of the state, but to take account of the targeted audience - to 
whom it is "soft power." In other words, the study of soft power needs to pay attention to the 
role(s) of the state which projects soft power and its intentions as well as to the targeted 
audience. 
Secondly, available research on China 's soft power inspired by China's economic growth 
since the late 1970s leads to a big puzzle: is soft power a "new" dimension in the PRC's 
international engagement? Recent studies of China's soft power are not historically tenable: 
they are not based on a rigorous examination of the possible "soft power" efforts in pre-1978 
China. In this sense, do these studies imply that soft power is a "given" and is solely 
determined by the rise of China's hard material power? Or can we actually see elements of 
what we now call "soft power" that were mobilized and promoted in the early period in 
PRC's international engagement? These questions raised by reviewing the current debate of 
China's soft power suggest that, in order to more full y understand the nature and role of soft 
power in the PRC, a historical perspective is fruitful to study whether the PRC made attempts 
to mobilize and promote the elements of what we now call "soft power" in the past. What is 
the nature of such efforts at present? These puzzles have driven my study to investigate the 
PRC's "soft power" in the past and present. In so doing, it allows me to compare and contrast 
the degree of change and continuity of China 's "soft power" in different eras of the PRC. 
1.2 The central question and the argument in brief 
From reading the available literature on soft power and particularly China 's soft power, the 
central research question I shall work to answer is: 
How has soft power been constituted and mobilized by the PRC? 
And the secondary question this study seeks to investigate: 
23 Ying Fan, "Soft power: power of attraction or confusion?" Place Branding and Public Diplomacy 
4:2 (2008), 148. 
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How has the constitution and mobilization of the key sources of Chinas soft power varied 
across time and what factors shape the way that it is constituted and mobilized? 
This study treats soft power as ideational, relational and social. Ideational factors include 
culture, ideologies, values, perceptions, and intentions - all subjective aspects of political 
elites ' understanding of such elements . Soft power is relational. This means that soft power is 
defined by the relationship. Whi lst some may be attracted by particular culture, ideologies, 
va lues and policies, some others may fee l repelled. Soft power depends on whom the actor 
wants to attract and how the actor defines the relationsh ip between itself and the recipient. 
Soft power is also a form of social power, which is constituted not simply by the resources of 
the actor but through the processes of engaging with others including the existing 
international system.24 Soft power thus is a dynamic and multifaceted rather than a static 
attribute of the state. 
This study argues that soft power deri ves from the mobilization and promotion of non-
material sources of power. lt demonstrates that whil st there are specific qualities of the 
constitution and mobilization of China's soft power today, such efforts to project its attraction 
through the mobili zation of non-material sources of power are not new. 
It also argues that China's soft power is multifaceted and dynamic . It demonstrates both 
changes and continuities in Beijing's efforts to attract targeted audiences through the 
mobilization and promotion of non-material power sources at different historical moments. 
How China 's soft power is constituted at particular historical moments strongly reflects 
Chinese poli ti cal eli tes' evolving sense of their national identity and the PR C's ro le in rel ati on 
to others in the international system. 
Thi s study of China's soft power seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the nature of 
China·s soft power. It has the following three objectives: 
1) Contributing to academic debate on the concept of soft power - an originall y American-
centric and post-Cold War concept - by exploring the form ulation and practices of ··soft 
power"· in PRC's two historical contexts. 
2) Critically evaluating Chinese political elites ' understanding of the key sources of China·s 
soft power, in pan by an exhaustive collection of data penaining to it and analysis. A further 
point here is to demonstrate how the constitution and mobilization of soft power is closely 
'
4 Christian Reus-Smit. American Power and World Order (Cambridge, VK; Malden, MA: Polity 
Press, 2004), 44. 
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related to perceptions and representations of China's national identity and of its role in the 
international system. 
3) Demonstrating how these understandings and interpretations, which evolve according to 
the PRC's evolving national identity and international self-positioning, have manifested in 
concrete soft power practices. I seek to make an empirical contribution especially regarding 
the empirical case studies through exploring primary Chinese data. 
Whilst it acknowledges the value of measuring China's soft power, as the research questions 
suggest, this thesis focuses primarily on the efforts and strategies that the Chinese 
government made to mobilize soft power in the global stage and for what purpose of doing so. 
It does not provide an analysis of the effectiveness of these measures nor of the reception of 
these measures in target audiences. This is beyond the scope of the thesis but suggests an 
important area for future research building on this project. 
1.3 Design of this study: methodology and case studies 
In order to answer my research questions I decided to do a longitudinal historical analysis. A 
longitudinal historical approach allows this project to investigate whether there is antecedent 
to contemporary soft power and to compare the mobilization · of soft power in the 
contemporary era with that at a significant juncture in the past. 
The subject of this longitudinal analysis is the PRC. In the past six decades since its founding 
in 1949, the PRC underwent significant changes in its economic and political structure, 
wealth and power, and foreign policy posture. However the regime remains constant with one 
single party - the CCP - in power. At the same time, the international system has evolved 
from a bipolar system in the Cold War bifurcated by capitalist and socialist camps to an 
increasingly multipolar but integrated one in the post-Cold War, which in recent years is 
experiencing power shift from one dominant superpower to emerging forces. Under these 
changes, we have seen different "Chinas" with different images projected on the international 
stage. A longitudinal historical approach therefore enables this study to explore "soft power" 
the PRC may have mobilized in the past and to compare that with China 's contemporary soft 
power.-This allows this project to analyse the continuity and variation in the constitution and 
mobilization of China's soft power; how the configuration of China 's soft power has 
contributed to China's international engagement; and the formation of China's national image 
at different times of the PRC. 
In addition, the focus of the PRC allows me to address whether it is the case that soft power 
relies on a particular form of political regime that is essentially democratic. It pushes the 
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boundary beyond Nye 's work in forcing us to rethink what soft power reall y means and how 
it is shaped and acted upon by a different political regime. 
1.3.1 Analytical framework of this study 
To advance an analytical framework to study China's soft power, it is important to step 
outside preconceived notions of the sources of soft power identifi ed in the American context. 
This is because of the multifaceted nature of soft power pointed out above: soft power is 
ideational , relational , and social, and thus may vary when the subject or the relationship 
changes.25 The sources of soft power Nye has identified, such as American liberal political 
culture and values , and agenda-setting in international institutions, are very much US-based. 
China, a different political entity from the US, may have a different story of soft power. 
Consequently, I examine the Chinese discourse of soft power to di scover how soft power has 
been conceptualized by the Chinese intelligentsia since this term was introduced into Chinese 
vocabulary in 1992. I used the China Academic Journals Full-text Database (CAJFD), 
currently the largest and most comprehensive database of Chinese journals and periodica ls, 26 
to obtain a Chinese understanding of (China's) soft power. I searched four sections in this 
database - "literature/h istory/philosophy," "poli ti cs/mi li tary affairs/law,'" "education & social 
science" and "economics & management" - with "$.']};YJ" (ruan sh iii), "$.';/xYJ" (ruan 
quan/i) , "ff.';j;jff" (ruan liliang) and ·· 1}:tfl;j;" (ruan guoli) the four popular translations of 
the term of "soft power"27 as ·'keywords" and used the "or" function in the "advanced 
search'' with "precise matching" in the range of ·'core journals.''28 My analysis of Chinese 
di scourse of soft power indicates that there are three central components treated by Chinese 
intellectuals as the key "sources" of China 's soft power. They are: (!) Chinese culture, (2) 
China as a model for deve lopment, and (3) Chinese foreign poli cy and diplomacy. The key 
sources of soft power identified from the Chinese di scourse fonn the foundat ion of 
operational framework for this project. It will explore how the three key sources of soft power, 
" Joseph S. Nye. "Foreword ... in Watanabe Yasushi and David L. McConnell eds., Soft power 
s11pe1powers: c11l111ral and national assets of Japan and the United Stales (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 
2008). xi ii: Nye. n,e Future of Po11·er. 10, 21. 
" See the ··introduction·· of 'P tlfl jp /if (China National Knowledge Jnfrastniclllre} 
<http://www.cnki.oethvcnki/1!Vcnki.htm> 
,- It shou ld be noted that ··man shi/i"' ( ftJi;;/J) now is much more often used than the other three 
translations in Chinese. 
" There are 4.664 Chinese journals collected by the CAJFD, of which 733 journals are regarded as 
··core journals·· in the fou r sections of literature/h istory/philosophy. politics/military affairs/law. 
education &social science. and economjcs & management. See 
http://ckrd85.cnki.net/kns50/Navi!rntor.aspx?ID=I. Due to the large quantity of Chinese journals. this 
survey was restricted to the ··core journals:· 
IO 
namely, Chinese culture, China as a model for development, and Chinese foreign policy and 
diplomacy, have been conceptualized and mobilized by the PRC in different contexts. 
A review of the articles on soft power in CAJFD also helps this study propose an operational 
definition of soft power, which is, "the purposeful efforts to attract targeted audiences through 
the mobilization of non-material sources of power." Highlighting "purposeful efforts" is 
based on the observation that countries with rich non-material power resources do not 
necessarily have "soft power" at their disposal. There is a distinction between having the 
sources of soft power and the willingness and efforts to mobilize these to convert into soft 
power. 
This understanding of soft power shares elements of national image projection in so far as 
both engage in an active and purposeful way of operation - consciously using power 
resources to project a positive national image to attract others. National image projection is 
defined by Shaun Breslin as "a concerted effort" by the state to promote a positive image. In 
the case of China, it is "a deliberate state-led project to promote the preferred idea of China' s 
underlying values, cultures and principles" in the hope that this will attract others.29 There 
are then parallels in what Breslin calls "national image promotion" and the conception of the 
mobilization of soft power in this thesis. However, it recognizes that national image 
projection comprises only one important aspect of soft power. The conceptualization of soft 
power in this project is a more integrated one in so far as it examines the relationship between 
the identification and cultivation of "sources" of soft power with their mobilization in China's 
engagement with particular audiences. In so doing soft power is conceptualized as not only 
ideational but also social and relational. 
This thesis will demonstrate that the key sources of China's soft power have not only been 
mobili;ced to promote a dynamic image of a "New China." But more importantly, the way in 
which these sources were interpreted and mobilized tells us much about how China seeks to 
29 Shaun Breslin, "The soft notion of China 's ' soft power '," Asia Programme Paper: ASP PP 2011 /03 , 
Chatham House (February 2011 ), 9-11. In this article, Breslin identifies "four interrelated" but 
"separate varieties" of China 's "non-hard" power. The first is "soft power, understood as the latent 
power of attraction." This relates to what I call the sources of soft power. The second variety is 
"proactive national image promotion," which crosses the idea of the mobilization of soft power in this 
thesis. The third is "normative power promotion," relating to how China understands its role in the 
international system and the distinctiveness of this approach, based on its world view, which in turn 
draws on its cultural predi lections. The concept of nonnati ve power promotion perhaps is linked to my 
conception of soft power in two ways: it encompasses the dimension of China's cultural identity which 
will be discussed in Chapter Three, and also shares elements of the active promotion of China 's role in 
the international system. The last dimension of China's "non-hard" power Breslin conceptualizes as 
"imagined power," derived rrom perceptions of China by others of growing material power and 
influence, particu larly its economic power. The idea of "imagined power" relates to audience 's 
perceptions of China 's economic power, although to some extent it speaks to what I identify as one of 
the sources of soft power - the developmental model (see Chapter Three). 
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represent itself to the world , as well as in fonns us of conceptions of how the state should use 
its growing material power, and of Chinese ideas as to how international relati ons should be 
conducted by the state. Additi onally, these sources have served as vehicles to represent and 
project particular ideas and va lues that encapsulate what China stands for, and that reflect 
China's national identi ty and global role in the international system. ln thi s sense, it suggests 
that soft power is related to the concept of national identity. 
National identity, as argued by Samuel S. Kim and Lowell Dittmer, seeks to define not only 
"what the state is (as represented by the myths , rituals, flag, constitution, and anthem that 
relate how the nation-state came to be and what it stands for)," but also "what the state does 
(via role perfonnance in domestic and foreign policy)."3° From thi s definition, national 
identity matters because it provides the values for the state and helps identify the state's 
credibility and its appeal to others (through defining "what the state is") . It also "provides a 
cognitive framework for shaping its [a state 's] interests, preferences, worldview and 
consequent foreign policy actions."3 1 The significance of national identi ty in China's case 
has been acknowledged and analysed by a number of China scholars. For instance, Yongjin 
Zhang argues that " fe w nations have embarked upon a more turbulent quest than that of 
China in its search of its rightful place in the universal international society" in the post-1949 
world .32 Allen Carlson notes that "a deep sense of national identi ty plays, in fac t, a cruci al 
rol e in shaping fundam ental aspects of China's ri se and aspirations .. .. underlying the game of 
interest-based calculations lies the more fundamental issue of what kind of national sense of 
se lf will predominate."33 
Fo llowing these understandings of natio nal identi ty, this thes is argues that soft power is 
closely rel ated to na tional identi ty in the following ways . First, national identity helps shape 
the configuration and the practice of soft power in the international relati ons. Thi s is because 
national identity infonns the values upheld by the state, suggests the credibility and appeal of 
the state in the intern ational arena, and frames the state's interests and fo reign policy 
behaviour. "[B]eing the psychologica l foundation for the role and behaviour patterns of a 
country in the internati onal arena,'' national identi ty thus " influences attitudes and poli cies 
30 Samuel S. Kim and Lowell Dittmer, "Whither China's quest for national identity?,'' in Lowe ll 
Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, eds. , Chinas Quest.for National Identity (Ithaca: Cornell Uni versity Press, 
1993), 240. 
31 Samuel S. Kim, "Northeast Asia in the loca l-regional-global nex us: multiple cballenges and 
contending explanations," in Samuel S. Kim, ed., i nternational Relations of Northeast Asia 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield}, 41 . 
31 Yongjin Zhang, China in International Sociery since 1949: Alienation and Beyond (Basingstoke: 
Macmi llan Press in associa tion with St. Antony's College, Oxford}, 4. 
33 Allen Carl son. --chi nas conflicted Olympic moment," Current Hisro,y 106:701 (2007), 254. 
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alike." 34 National identity thus can affect a state 's behaviour patterns including soft power 
practices. Second, the configuration and practice of soft power reflects and enhances the 
national identity, as soft power projects particular ideas and values that encapsulate what the 
state is and stands for. 
It is now widely recognized that national identity does not emerge naturally, nor does it 
remain constant. Rather, it is forged through education and sometimes inculcation to reinforce 
a collective sense of self, and engaged in "an ongoing process or journey rather than a fixed 
set of boundaries, a relationship rather than a free-standing entity or attribute."35 This means 
that national identity is no static attribute but dynamic. 'There is no guarantee that national 
identity at one time will be the same as at another."36 The state involved in the (re)production 
of national identity experience an open-ended process of cultivation, adjustments, 
reinterpretations and inventions regarding what the nation is and stands for. Constructivists 
argue that change in a state's identity can cause considerable changes in its interests, which 
shapes national security/foreign policy and international behaviour. 37 The variability of 
national identity thus can have an impact on a state's international behaviour in regards to the 
constitution and projection of soft power. The issue of national identity is especially relevant 
to the case of China's soft power, given China' s abiding concern for cultural and political 
integrity. Following the recognition of the close relationship between soft power and national 
identity, this study pays attention to China's national identity in order to understand the way 
in which China's soft power is constituted and mobilized. 
To recap, this subsection illustrates the analytical framework of this study. The key sources of 
soft power identified from the Chinese discourse, namely, Chinese culture, China as a model 
for development, and Chinese foreign policy and diplomacy, fonn the foundation of 
analytical framework for this project. In the case studies, I will explore how these three key 
sources of soft power have been conceptualized and mobilized by the PRC in different 
contexts. Additionally, this subsection examines the relationship between the concept of soft 
power and another two related concepts - national image projection and national identity. 
While it recognizes the parallel between the ideas of soft power and national image projection, 
it points out that national image projection relates to the idea of the mobilization of soft 
34 Robert A. Scalapino, "China 's multiple identities in East Asia," in L. Dittmer and S. Kim eds., 
China Quest for a National Identity, 215. 
35 Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, "In ·searching of a theory of national identity," in Lowel l 
Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, eds., China's Quest for National Identity, 13. 
36 Carlson, "China 's conflicted Olympic moment," 254. 
37 Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter L Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in 
National Security," in Peter J. Katzen stein ed., The Culture of National Security (Columbia: Columbia 
University Press, 1996), 60-61. 
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power but may not contain the dimension of how soft power is constituted - the identi fi cation 
and cultivation of "sources" of soft power. From the exploration of the relationship between 
soft power and national identi ty, it highlights that understanding China 's national identity is 
important to understand the way in which China's soft power is constituted and mobili zed . 
1.3.2 Case studies 
In order to develop a more historically nuanced understanding of China's soft power, and to 
test whether soft power is a new phenomenon in China, I employ a longitudinal historical 
approach. It entails not only giving attention to soft power promoted by the PRC in recent 
years, but also investigation of whether the three key sources of China 's soft power as 
described above were utilized in the early period of the PRC's international engagement. The 
case studies help me refine the parallels and differences between the ideas and practices of 
"soft power" in the PRC across time. In so doing, this study will lead us to see the different 
"Chinas" as it were. It also allows me to study soft power "by whom," "over whom" and in 
what context. As such, it will support my argument that soft power is ideational , relational 
and social. A state may "intentionally choose" what soft power it wants to represent itself on 
the world stage. The articulation and promotion of its "chosen" soft power is actuall y both 
derivative of and reproductive of a state 's national identity. 
The best way to undertake thi s longitudinal approach I believe is to employ a paired 
comparison between two periods of the PRC in the past sixty years. The significant change 
politically and economically in the late 1970s demarcated thi s state into one which prioriti zed 
"revo luti on" and the other orientated towards "reform ." As pointed out earlier that prevailing 
research into China 's soft power largely focuses on that in the refonn era , thi s project 
therefore employs a "before" and "after" study to explore and compare soft power ideas, 
policies and practices in the different contexts of the PRC. This approach helps investi gate 
China's di fferent views of the international system and China 's role in thi s system and how 
international relations should be conducted as well as how the iden tifi ed soft power of China 
has influenced its behavior in international arena at different historical moments. Different 
perceptions of China 's national identi ty are evident in these two periods, as explained by N i 
Feng from Chinese Academies of Social Sciences (CASS) in hi s analysis of the shaping of 
China·s foreign po li cy, "China is repositioning itsel f from a revo lutionary country that 
rejected the existing international regime to a responsible power within the system." 38 The 
study of Chi na 's soft power in the two eras will help us understand China 's repos itioning role 
in the internati onal system. 
38 Ni Feng, "The shapi ng of Ch ina 's fo reign policy," in Kokubun Ryosei and Wang Jis i eds., Th e Rise 
of China and A Changing East Asian Order (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2004), 
146. 
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The operational definition of soft power in this study, "the purposeful efforts to attract 
targeted audiences through the mobilization of non-material sources of power," leads this 
thesis to focus on the specific episodes as "campaigns." The extraordinary campaigns are 
particularly helpful to advance the "purposefulness" of the state in strategically mobilizing 
the sources of soft power to project China's national image, reshape national identity and 
convey certain messages about what China is and stands for. The study of these campaigns in 
the two periods also provides valuable points of comparison to each other. 
Two distinctive moments in the PRC's engagement with the rest of the world attracted my 
attention and provide the basis for this study. They are: China in the first half of the 1960s 
and China in the 2008 Beijing Olympic period. 1n both cases , the PRC was very outward 
looking though China 's national image and posture differed greatly. The first is located at the 
peak of revolutionary China and the second represents the culmination of reformist China to 
date. Claiming itself as a "revolutionary" power and aligning itself with the Third World, the 
PRC in the first halfofthe 1960s was very active and distinctive on the world stage. 39 Due to 
the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relationship from the late 1950s, China shifted its socialist-
camp line of the 1950s, in which it was allied with the USSR against the US, towards an 
attempt to build a broad coalition of radical forces in the Third World against the two 
superpowers - the US and the USSR. Given that the young PRC was materially weak, why 
and how did it pursue a policy to challenge the two superpowers? Can we see non-material 
sources of power such as culture, model effect, and foreign policy that were mobilized and 
projected by the PRC to enhance its global appeal on the world stage? If Mao's China did so, 
then who did it seek to attract? It is generally regarded that the PRC's revolutionary period 
was characterized by an aggressive international posture that privileged hard coercive 
power.4-0 Some China scholars argue that the revolutionary period stands in strong contrast 
with the reformist era when soft power becomes a new feature in China's international 
engagement. The case of revolutionary China is chosen as a hard case to test whether the 
hypothesis that soft power is necessarily new to the PRC can hold up. It also provides an 
interesting site to explore continuity and variation in the constitution and mobilization of soft 
power and the factors that shape this. 
39 Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars o_(National 
Liberation (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1970). 
40 For instance, see Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin Press, 2011), ch.6 and ch .7; 
Robert S. Ross, "China's three rises, regional power transitions, and East Asia security: 1949 to the 
Twenty-First Century," in William C. Kirby ed., The People's Republic of China at 60: An 
111fernational Assessment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011), 92-95; Andrew 
Bingham Kennedy, The 111femational Ambitions of Mao and Nehni : National Efficacy Beliefs and the 
Making of Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
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Here I clarify why I choose the PRC from 1959 to 1965 to examine China's soft power. 
Firstl y, it is because 1959 signifies the point at which China emerged as an independent 
international actor (due to the deteriorating Sino-Soviet relationship) and as a potential "third 
pole" in the international arena. The Sino-Soviet colli sion in some respects provided the 
Beijing regime with a space within wh ich to build its status as a model and a leader in the 
community of post-colonial states. However, with the inauguration of the so-ca lled "Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revo lut ion" in 1966, Mao 's China pulled away substantiall y from 
international involvement. This domestic political campaign damaged the PRC's diplomatic 
relations with various governments to the point that only one ambassador was left in 
residence abroad. Additionally, in developing a deeper historical understanding of non-
material sources of power, I draw extensively within this case study on the declassified 
Ch inese Diplomatic Archives (CDA) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC from 
1959 to 1965. The empirical data on that period - the declassified CDA - are at present on ly 
avai lable through 1965 . For these two reasons , the study of Maoist soft power is largely 
confined to the years from 1959 to 1965. In addition to the CDA , I also use many primary 
Chinese sources, such as the Ch inese leaders' coll ected works, sources rel eased by the 
Ministry of Education and Ministry of Finance, Chinese official documents and newspapers, 
and published memoirs. 
The second case this project selects is the 2008 Beijing Olympics, which marked the 
culmination of the PRC's reform era to date . After three-decade material build-up resulting 
from the implementation of economic-driven refonns since the late 1970s, China has become 
increasingly outward looking and concerned about how it is perceived by the others and how 
China should 01ientate itself in the international system . Therefore , China 's soft power that 
was premised on the mobili zati on of the elements of Chinese culture, development and its 
vision of itself and the relations with others in the international community are of particular 
importance. The projection of these can tell us much about conceptions of what contemporary 
China is and what it stands for - its nationa l identity and global ro le, which is re-oriented in 
China 's reform era. The principal element of China's national identity and globa l role in this 
era, identified from both Chinese intellectua l and official di scourse, is that of China as a 
responsible great power engaged in the internationa l system and cooperation with other great 
powers, rather than a lone social ist global power in a post-Cold War and post-communist 
world .41 This anal ysis is further developed in Chapter Three. 
41 \Vang Ji si, ·'China 's changing role in Asia.'· in Kokubun Ryosei and Wang Jisi , eds., The Rise of 
China and A Changing East Asian Order (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2004), 6; 
Li Baojun and Xu Xiyuan, "/ttdi;J§rjiJI!ftt:,)Iff;:l,l'fil!iall!}BJ~fiJ" (Chinas sel f-identity construction 
as a responsible power in the post-Cold War era), f;tif[:.!:;fi//Jl (Teaching and Research), no. I (2006), 
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The mobilization and projection of soft power in the 2008 Beijing Olympics is the archetypal 
example of the way in which China made enonnous efforts to enhance and project its soft 
power in its refonn period. The Games provided China with a unique opportunity to build a 
global presence, earn admiration from other countries and intensively engage with the outside 
world through massive exercise of soft power and public diplomacy. The global significance 
of the Games turned the Beijing Olympics into a powerful platfonn for China to present what 
China is through the projection of its culture, development, and foreign policy posture in 
front of the largest audience it had ever had access to. China's contemporary soft power 
therefore is globally oriented: it not only targets at the "Global South," but is mobilized to 
also attain recognition from the "Global North." 
The hosting of the 2008 Olympic Games thus represented a milestone in China's cultivation, 
reinterpretation, and mobilization of its key soft power resources - Chinese culture, 
development model , and modem foreign policy and diplomacy in contrast with those in 
revolutionary China. In this sense, the Beijing Games as an extraordinary campaign is not 
only illustrative of China's contemporary soft power but also provides an interesting case to 
compare and contrast the soft power that was conceptualized and projected in Maoist China. 
This case study will examine how the Chinese interpreted their culture and defined their 
country 's development as well as their relationship with the rest of the world in this campaign. 
First, I will use Chinese and English narrations of the historical relationship between China 
and the Olympic movement to identify in what sense hosting an Olympiad matters to the 
Chinese people and state. Second, I will investigate what kind of soft power China sought to 
mobilize when hosting the Games and for what purpose. To do this, I will refer to Chinese 
official and scholarly publications. The analysis of the two cases demonstrates that sources of 
soft power found in the contemporary era resonate with those in the Maoist case. However, 
the way in which these sources are constituted has changed markedly across the two cases. 
In short, the two case studies are located in different contexts: the first one in the 
revolutionary period of the PRC and the second one in China 's reform era. In both empirical 
studies, I seek to explore the international role(s) the Chinese authorities intended China to 
assume and the configuration of national identity they sought to project. I will identify 
consistency and variation in perceptions of China's international role in the two different eras, 
addressing the question of "soft power by whom." The two case studies also allow me to 
explore consistency and variation in who this audience was and how they were addressed. 
49-56. The Chinese leaders' statements of "China being a responsible power" (/u 'ze 'ren de daguo) 
emerged from China 's response to the Asian Financial Crisis and became more explicit from their 
engagement with the discourse of "China 's peaceful rise" in the early 2000s. 
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This in tum will tackle the issue of "soft power over who m." Using the "three sources of 
China 's soft power'· as a framework to compare and contrast the constitution and 
mobili zation of non-materia l sources of power in two different eras of the PRC allows me to 
explore the degree of change and continuity of the constitution and mobilization of China 's 
"soft power" between the past and present. It also allows me to investigate the factors that 
shape these processes. It wi ll support my argument that the nature of China 's soft power is 
hi storical, contextual, dynamic and strategic. It wi ll further lead to my argument that the way 
in which soft power is constituted and mobili zed is shaped by Chinese political elites' 
evolving sense of China's national identity and of China's globa l role in relation to others in 
the international system. In addition, the comparison of the constitution and mobilization of 
China 's "soft power" also wi ll hel p us to reconsider the concept of soft power by address ing 
cultural, political and historical assumptions in current scholarship. 
1.4 The layout of this study 
Chapter Two of thi s study explores the understanding of the concept of soft power in rR. It 
begins with a close review of Nye's key works of soft power. Whilst his works on soft power 
provide a useful platfonn to think more about the concept of power and soft power in 
international relations, it should be noted that Nye's notion of soft power is developed 
primarily in an American context. It thus leaves a question of whether his notion of soft 
power can be applied to contexts beyond the US. It thereafter examines the concept of soft 
power by locating it in the broad literature of power to identify where Nye's concept of soft 
power fits in with the conceptualization of power in JR. In doing so, it leads me to introduce 
the working concept of soft power that will be used in thi s study by focusing on the nature 
and operational definition of soft power. Soft power in thi s study is treated as relational , 
ideational and social. This chapter concludes with an operational definition of soft power to 
steer the empirical study of China's soft power, that is, the purposeful efforts the government 
makes to attract targeted audiences through the mobili zation of non-material sources of 
power. 
Following the theoretica l di scussion of the concept of soft power in IR, Chapter Three goes to 
contemporary Chinese di scourse on thi s concept. Rather than limiting the concept to Nye 's 
use of it, Chinese intellectuals strongly advocate building a Chinese perspective on soft power. 
They focus in their analysis on the most likely sources of Ch ina·s soft power and on how 
these should be applied to faci li tate China 's peaceful ri se and to shape China 's iden tity as a 
responsible great power. Participants in thi s debate argue either for utilizing key elements of 
China's soft power to make China appealing, or for assuaging the fears of particular societies 
about China·s intentions in world affairs. By reviewing Chinese contemporary di scourse, 
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identify three central components that are treated as the key " sources" of China 's soft power. 
They are: (1) Chinese culture, (2) China as a model for development, and (3) Chinese foreign 
policy and diplomacy. I utilize these sources of China 's soft power to build an operational 
framework in order to examine how "soft power" is constituted and mobilized by the PRC in 
different contexts. 
Chapter Four, the first empirical study, is located in the context of the first half of the 1960s -
the peak period for revolutionary China on the world stage. This chapter exam.ines the PRC's 
soft power projection from 1959 to 1965, when the Chinese government actively carried out 
its "revolutionary" policies and sought international prestige in world affairs more 
independently resulting from the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations. The key feature of 
China's national identity projected in the international arena was that it represented as a 
revolutionary leader with respect to the developing world. Drawing on the abundance of 
primary and secondary sources on the foreign policy of Maoist China, I chart the key 
elements of what I call "Maoist soft power." First, China's success in throwing off colonial 
shackles and founding a new nation made the country attractive to the post-colonial states. 
China's experience in this regard provided a model for these Third World states and societies 
to emulate. In addition, Maoist China's projection of an economic model which was different 
from the Soviets as well as the West was part of enhancing its attractiveness to those 
emerging societies, because, like the PRC, they did not have a sophisticated industrial 
structure. Second, the political culture it presented was a new "proletarian culture" and non-
Western in a way that appealed to the Third World audience. Third, Chinese revolutionary 
foreign policies - the "double anti" and the " united front" to enhance the solidarity of the 
Third World - provide both models and vehicles through which the ideas and the leadership 
of China were projected. Additionally, the Chinese government employed instruments 
including cultural diplomacy and foreign aid. This chapter argues that although it was 
materially weak, in these early years the PRC derived a great deal of influence from its 
projection of "Maoist soft power," although it left a controversial legacy for post-Mao China. 
Chapter Five studies China's soft power projection in its hosting of the 2008 Olympic Garnes. 
The Games presented a key opportunity to demonstrate China's socio-economic 
achievements resulting from the " reform and opening-up" policies which began in the late 
1970s. They also provided a powerful platfonn for China to project its emerging national 
identity as a responsible great power. This chapter illustrates China 's soft power projection in 
the 2008 Beijing Games through (1) the rehabilitation of traditional Chinese culture but with 
modernized elements ; (2) China 's economic vitality and the model it provides for achieving 
modernization; and (3) the employment of an omn.id.irectional diplomacy to demonstrate its 
"good global citizenship." By mobilizing and projecting these key sources of China's soft 
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power, China sought to seize its Olympic moment to be seen as a rejuvenated global power 
that is an emerging power but does not pose tangible threats to the existing international 
system. Soft power, fo r contemporary China, not only represents a "charm offensive" to 
attract the "Global South," but also has been used to allay Western fears of the "China threat·· 
and shape China's image as a responsible global power. 
After the two empirical studies , Chapter Six examines the change and continuity m 
constitution and mobili zation of China 's "soft power" in different historical contexts. It 
compares and contrasts the key sources of soft power and the way the PRC has mobili zed 
them in two different eras. It compares the fo llowing factors: the context, the sources of soft 
power, the tools of mobili zation and the target audience in the two case studies. The changes 
and continuities are evident across all these factors. It concludes that the change and 
continuity of China's soft power is rooted in thi s country's evolvi ng sense of its national 
identity, the role it seeks to project in the world and its relations with the international system. 
It demonstrates that so ft power in the PRC's context is not something "new." It is 
multifaceted and fluid. The dynamic feature of China's soft power to a large extent is derived 
from changing Chinese perceptions of national identity, or what the PRC seeks to use to 
represent itself in the world. China's orientation of itself in relat ion to others and the 
international system enable it to shape its soft power. 
The conclusion of thi s thesis provides an overview of this study. It reviews the theoretical 
framework and summari zes the main empirical findings. This thesis demonstrates that soft 
power has been purposefull y chosen and promoted by the Chinese government not only in the 
present but also in the past. It answers the research question - how "soft power" has been 
constituted and mobili zed by the PRC, and what factors have shaped these processes - by 
comparing and contrasting soft power promotion through the two empirical studi es within the 
PRC's recent hi story. In addition, it argues that China's evolving identity in the past decades 
is the key to understandi ng the change and continui ty in China 's soft power. In so doing, the 
thesis both deepens our understanding of the nature and role of soft power in China, and also 
contributes to the development of a more nuanced conception of soft power. 
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2 The Concept of Soft Power in IR 
The concept of soft power, developed by Joseph S. Nye from the late 1980s, has garnered 
worldwide attention from politicians to scholars . Despite its popularity, soft power remains a 
contested concept. My goal in this chapter is to provide an analysis of the concept of soft 
power. The first section reviews the concept of power discussed in the discipline of IR, so as 
to identify where the concept of soft power fits in with broad conceptualization of power. It 
then goes to Nye ' s key works on soft power to grasp a deepening understanding of this 
concept - why he coined thi s concept, where thi s concept is located in the literature of power 
in JR, and the issues surrounding it. Whi lst hi s works on soft power provide a useful platform 
to think more about the concept of power and soft power in international relations, it should 
be noted that Nye ' s notion of soft power is cultivated primarily in an American context. It 
thus leaves unanswered question of whether his notion of soft power can be applied to 
contexts beyond the US. The third section provides a working concept of soft power as used 
in this study, focusing on the nature and operati onal definition of soft power. Soft power in 
this study is treated as relational, ideational and soc ial. It is therefore important to see it as 
dynamic rather than static. What then becomes particularly important for the study of soft 
power is by whom it is practi sed, whom it is targeted at, and in what context. A working 
definition of soft power this study employs is, "purposeful efforts the government makes to 
attract targeted audiences through the mobili zation of non-material sources of power." 
2.1 Three approaches of power conceptualization in IR 
Power is widely recognised by IR scholars as a contested concept. This section reviews the 
broad literature of the concept of power in political science, in particular, the major 
approaches to the conceptualization of power in IR. My goal is to find out where soft power 
fit s in with the conceptualization of power in IR. In so doing, it facilitates a di scussion of the 
nature of soft power and helps to develop a working concept of soft power in this study. 
There are various approaches to defining power in IR. I identi fy three dimensions of 
conceptualizing power by referring to Steven Lukes' s book Power: A Radical View. They are 
power perceived as (I) the strategies, struggles and practices that characterize the deci sion-
making process to win conflicts; (2) the actions and inactions involved in the shaping of the 
agenda for the decision-making process (agenda/institution setting); and (3) the actions and 
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inactions similarly implicated in the shaping of perceived interests and political preferences 
(shaping nonnality). 1 
The first dimension of power views power as obtaining dominance in confli cted si tuations.' 
The classic definition of power from thi s perspective is made by Robert Dahl : "A has power 
over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B wou ld otherwise not do. " 3 
Michael Barnett and Raymond Duval note the "sheer influence" and "compulsory" facet of 
power in Dahl's definiti on, particularly in international relations.' This dimension of power 
implies that before its application, power should be assessed by power resources including 
material and other elements.5 David Baldwin calls thi s approach of defining power the 
"power-as-resources approach,"6 which roughly fits into a reali st perspective in which states 
compete for resources and fi ght to win wars. "To be powerful is to win: to prevail over others 
in conflict situations," Lukes argues that thi s dimension of power has two "fallacies": one is 
the "exercise fallacy," that power can only mean the causing of an observable sequence of 
events; another is the "vehicle fallacy ," that power is only equated with· resources for the 
convenience of measuring power.7 
The second dimension of power draws upon Baclu·ach and Baratz's "second face" of power 
that invo lves in the "mobili zation of bias" and agenda shaping. 8 We may call it "inst itutional" 
or "structural" power.9 This perspective of power looks at deci sions designed to avoid the 
emergence of interests contrary to those of the deci sion-maker by "manipulat ing the 
dominant community va lues, myths, and political institutions and procedures." Th is 
dimension of power prevents "potential" or " latent" issues from becoming actual. '0 It 
1 Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (2"d edition) (Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2005). 
2 Ibid., 60. 
3 Roben A. Dah l, "The concept of power." Behavioral Science 2:3 (1957), 202-203. 
4 Michae l Barnett and Raymond Duvall, "Power in International Pol it ics ," International Organization 
59: I (2005), 49-50. 
5 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: the Struggle/or Power and Peace (51h edition) (New 
York: Knopf, 1978), 117-155 ; Ray S. Cline, World Power Assessment (Boulder: Westview, 1977); 
Dennis Wrong, Power: Its Forms, Bases and Uses (Oxford: Blackwell , 1979), 124-145. 
6 David A. Bald\\;n, "Power and internationa l relati ons ." in Wa lter Carl snaes, Thomas Ri sse and Beth 
Simmons eds., Handbook of Imemational Relations (London: Sage Press, 2002), 179. 
7 Lukes, Power, 70. 
8 Peter Bachrach and Monon S. Baratz, ·'Two faces of power;' American Political Science Review 
56:4 (Dec. , 1962), 947- 952; Peter Bachrach and Monon S. Baratz, "Dec isions and nondecisions: an 
analytica l framework ," Th e American Politica l Science Review 57:3 (1963), 641-651. 
9 See Barnett and Du vall , "Power in International Politics,'" 52-55. 
10 Bachrach and Baratz. "Decisions and nondecisions: an ana lytical fra mework." 632. 641 . 
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suggests the need to locate decision-making within the context of agenda-setting, with power 
exercised through systematic "mobili zation of bias" to limit choices or to disadvantage 
others. 11 Antonio Gramsci's idea on how international inst itutions help stabi lise and spread 
hegemony falls into this perspective of power and has been widely referred to by political 
scientists. 12 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye were the first to argue that to make or change 
international regimes (rules, nonns and procedures) could be a source of power in a world 
featuring complex interdependence. 13 The importance of agenda-setting power matters in that 
it can affect how people would understand " legitimacy" as agendas can could frame what is 
legitimate or not. 14 Whilst the first dimension of power emphasizes direct influence, the 
second highlights the indirect effect. However, in Lukes 's eyes, these two dimensions of 
power share one similarity: they both focus on power as related to observable conflict 
between power wielder and recipient. 15 This leads to his discussion of a third dimension of 
power. 
The third dimension of power, Lukes proposes, is "active" or " inactive power" which does 
not necessarily focus on power in conflicted situations. 16 For him, power can consist of the 
securing of consent through the shaping of thoughts, desires and beliefs to the extent that 
ensures the acceptance of a certain role in the existing order or the status quo since no 
alternative appears to exist, or because it is seen as natural and unchangeable, or indeed 
beneficial. 17 Lukes argues that thi s dimension of power moves beyond limiting choices in 
observable conflicts, but it "may be at its most effective when least observable" as it shapes 
perceptions. 18 As a consequence, when taken to the utmost extreme, power can control the 
meaning of "normality." 19 This power "deri ves from status, inducing deference, relieves 
those who are secure in their posi ti ons from the need to focus on acting to preserve them."20 
This dimension of power, in Felix Berenskoetter's words, "revolves around the view that 
11 Ibid. , 641. 
12 For example Robert Cox, "Gramsci, hegemony and internat ional relations: an essay in method", 
Millennium: Journal of !111emationa/ Studies 12:2 (1983), 162-175; Nye, Bound to l ead, 32; Barnett 
and Duvall, "Power in international relations," 60. 
13 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 19-21. 
14 Felix Berenskoetter, "Thinking about power," in Felix Berenskoetter and M.J. Williams eds., Power 
in World Politics (London; New York: Routledge, 2007), 8. 
15 Luke;, Power, 58-59. 
16 Steven Lukes, "Power and the batt le for hearts and minds," Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies 33:3 (2005), 479-481. 
17 Ibid., 482-484. 
18 Lukes, Power, 1. 
19 Lukes, "Power and the battle for hearts and minds," 49 J. 
20 Ibid., 480-481. 
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power is not only ai work where there is a confl ict of interests but also where there is (an 
apparent) consensus."21 
Lukes 's ana lys is of the multi-dimensional nature of power provides three ways to define 
power by focusing on (1) power resources; (2) agenda-setting (to limit others' choices in 
conflicted situations); and (3) shaping of perceived interests and political preferences (to fonn 
consensus). 
After reviewing the broad literature on the concept of power in IR, it is worthwhile to review 
Nye's conception of soft power, because it is the foundation of the concept of soft power and 
has been widely debated and critiqued. The following section first outlines how Nye develops 
this idea and then critically reviews it. Built upon this critical review, the third section 
provides a worlcing concept of soft power for this thesis. 
2.2 Review of Joseph S. Nye's concept of soft power 
Nye ' s development of the concept of soft power can be traced primarily through hi s three 
books: Bound to l ead: The Changing Nature of American Power (1990), The Paradox of 
American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone (2002) and Safi 
Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (2004). This section begins with his vision of 
world politics before it illustrates Nye' s idea of soft power developed in these three books. 
This helps build an understanding of the broad context in which Nye coined the concept. It 
then cri tically reviews hi s notion of soft power, which facilitates a development of a worlcing 
concept of soft power for thi s project. 
2.2.1 Nye's vision of the world politics 
I consider Nye ' s vision of world politics to be most clear ly stated in his earlier book Power 
and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition ( 1977) co-authored with one of the 
leading theorists of neoliberal institutionalism Robert Keohane. This book provides an 
institutionalist alternative to the realist perception of international politics that mainly focus 
on the di stribution of material power among states. In hi s later works, we can see that Nye·s 
notion of soft power is established through the understanding of the contemporary world as a 
world of ··complex interdependence .'" This warrants loolcing at the main ideas in the book of 
Po,rer and Interdependence to understand how the world politics was envisaged by Nye 
before it explores his notion of soft power. 
21 Berenskoetter. "Thinking about power.'· in Beren skoetter and \,\l i\liams eds., Power in World 
Politics. I 0. 
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In order to provide a more satisfactory theory than realism to explain the changes in world 
politics , Keohane and Nye advanced a concept of "complex interdependence" in the 1970s. 
This concept to a large extent was derived from the thinking about the crises America 
experienced in the 1970s: America's withdrawal from the Vietnam War, the oil embargo by 
the members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), and the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system. Keohane and Nye observed that in those crises the use 
of military force and power balancing became inefficacious, due to the various and complex 
transnational connections and interdependencies between states and societies. They argued 
that complex interdependence was characterized by three features: (1) the multiple channels 
of action between societies, and trans-governmental and transnational relations, (2) the 
absence of a hierarchy of issues with changing agendas and linkages between issues 
prioritized, and (3) a decline in the use of military force and coercive power in complex 
international relations.22 
Under these characteristics of complex interdependence, the authors suggested that it would 
be difficult for states to control outcomes by merely using material means. Owing to issue 
linkages in world politics, they contended that measures such as military operations and 
economic sanctions to resolve global issues would be less effective. They thus proposed that 
agenda setting would be more important in international relations in the context of complex 
interdependence. In short, international relations under complex interdependence require 
attention to the importance of agenda setting and produce strong incentives for international 
actors to foster cooperation in world politics. 
Viewing world politics through the lens of "complex interdependence" is the key for Nye to 
develop the concept of soft power. This is because under the situation of complex 
interdependence, Nye envisages that there are increasing issues outside the control of states 
as the result of "the diffusion of power from states to non-state actors."23 Nye considers that 
utilizing soft power is an economical and effective strategy to let others follow your way or 
foster internationa l cooperation in dealing with transnational issues which have been 
intensified in the information age.24 In his later works, Nye has repeatedly reminded his 
readers .that today' s world politics resemble a complex three-dimensional chess game: 
22 Roben Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdep endence: World Politics in Transition 
(Boston: Little Brown, 1977), 24-29. 
23 Joseph S. Nye, The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), xvi . 
24 Nye, Soft Power, 5. 
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On the top chess board, military power is largely unipolar .. the United 
States is the only country with both nuclear weapons and conventional 
forces with global deployment. But on the middle chessboard, economic 
power is multipolar, with the United States, Europe and Japan 
representing two-thirds of world product, and with China's dramatic 
growth likely to make it the fourth big player .. on this economic board, 
each power must often bargain with each other as an equal. The 
bottom chessboard is the realm of transnational relations that across 
borders outside government control. On this bottom board, power is 
widely dispersed amongst diverse actors such as states, non-states, 
multinational corporations and individuals. In this three-dimensional 
game, it is very important to notice the vertical connections among 
them.25 
It is on the bottom transnational board that the significance of soft power is highlighted as it 
is important to accomplish goals that involve power with others.26 The remainder of this 
section reviews Nye's narrative of soft power to develop a deeper understanding his way of 
conceptualizing soft power. 
2.2.2 Nye's conception of soft power 
As discussed above, Nye's understanding of world politics through the perspective of 
"complex interdependence" is important for him to develop the concept of soft power. Nye is 
in an attempt to expand thinking about power from one face, "coercive power", namely, to 
push others to do otherwise not to do by military or economic might, to a second face , "co-
optive power", that is to foster cooperation through attraction or persuasion in the realm of 
transnational relations. He seeks to prompt a debate on power, which is not confined to the 
"high politics" such as security and economic issues but extends to the "low politics" 
including values, cultures and rules. He also attempts to stimulate thinking about the means to 
success for the state-actors, the US in particular, in world politics. This subsection elaborates 
Nye 's concept of soft power by looki ng at the context where this concept has been developed , 
the approaches to defining this concept and how to use thi s power in Nye's view. 
25 Joseph S. Nye, "The changing nature of world power," Political Science Quarterly 105:2 (Summer 
1990), 183; Nye, n,e Paradox of American Power, 39; Nye, Safi Power, 4: 
26 Nye, 771e Future of Power, xvii. 
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2.2.2.1 Context of developing soft power concept 
Nye ' s principal motive for coining the term relates to concerns about America' s global status 
from the later stage of the Cold War onward. In the 1980s, it was the debate that American 
had been declining that triggered Nye' s invention of soft power in order to revisit American ' s 
role in the international politics from the dimension of non-material power. In the 1990s the 
debate about the decline of American power ebbed; there developed a certain triumphalism in 
the US and US foreign policy due to the end of the Cold War and US's pre-eminent power in 
the liberal international order further strengthened by its lead in technology revolution. The 
terrorist attacks in 2001 however provided a new and profound challenge that led Nye to 
warn Americans against the triumphalism of their hard power and recommend using soft 
power to work with others dealing with transnational issues. However, this does not suggest 
that Nye saw soft power as a substitute for hard power. Rather he thought that soft power 
could support hard power and soften the US image projected through its coercive hard power. 
The following provides details of the context within which Nye develops this concept. 
Toward the end of the 1980s, the prevalent conventional wisdom was that the US was losing 
its preponderance as a consequence of the over-stretching of its material power. Scholars 
such as Paul Kennedy argued that the US had exceeded its available military resources at the 
expense of its economic durabili ty, as previous great powers in world history had also done.27 
Nye however put forward the concept of soft · power to counter this pessimistic view of 
American power and position in international affairs. 
The serious challenge to American power at the time, in Nye' s view, did not come from its 
economic competitors, such as Japan, whose economic rise evoked heated debate in those 
years, nor the decline of American material power, but from the "transformation of power." 
Trends in world politics such as the diffusion of power, the deepening of complex 
interdependence and the emergence of non-state actors in world politics had been making 
power "less fungible, Jess coercive and Jess tangible."28 Under these circumstances, hard 
command power in terms of military and economic strength was losing its edge. Therefore, 
Nye contended that the problem at the end of the 1980s for America was not that it was in 
decline; but whether or not it would be willing to take on the "political leadership and 
strategic vision" by using "co-optive power", which can foster cooperation and persuade 
27 Paul Kennedy, Th e Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Milita,y Conflict from 
1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987). 
28 Nye, Bormd to Lead, 175-1 76, 188. 
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others to want what the US wants.29 The co-optive power, with the ab ility to bring others to 
work with and fo llow the example set by America , deri ved from its capacity of agenda-
se tt ing and the appeal of American culture and va lues, becomes the essenti al fo undation of 
the idea of soft power. 
When entering into the new mill ennium, Nye's worry abo ut US ' s globa l status resulted not 
only from the challenges of ten-ori sm such as the Al Qaeda attack on Sept 11 , 200 I, but also 
from America's air of triumphalism as a result of its " unprecedented power" in the " unipolar 
moment" with the demise of its great rival the Soviet Union in 199 1.30 Nye warned American 
politicians to refrain from responding to ten-orism by military means and "a fo reign poli cy 
that combines unilaterali sm, arrogance, and parochiali sm", for it would "erode the soft power 
that is often part of the so lution."31 He proposed an outline for America ' s internationa l 
engagement through the means of soft power including a "strategy based on globa l public 
goods," " rules of prudence for humani tar ian interventions," a "check.list for multil ateral 
versus unilateral tactics," and "accountabi li ty of global institutions." 32 The principal focus of 
his 2002 book is to encourage a foreign policy by mobili zing soft power to meet the global 
cha ll enges such as fro m the ten-orism. 
Later Washington ' s application of unilaterali sm in the "war on terrorism" prompted Nye ' s 
further sharpening of the idea of soft power. In hi s 2004 book, Nye cri ticises the unilateral 
foreign policy employed by the Bush government and proposes practical measures as how the 
US could improve its internati onal attractiveness in the aftennath of the Iraq War. 33 He 
reaches a conclusion that it is necessary to combine soft and hard power, which he calls 
"smart power," in implementing foreign policy. Nye also reminds policy makers and 
pract itioners that it is equally important to work with others paii icu larly America 's alli es 
rather than unilatera lly, and to consider some of their interests in making and implementing 
American foreign po licy. 
From the discussion of the context that Nye develops the idea of soft power, we can see that 
his principal moti ve relates to the concerns about Ameri ca ' s global status in and after the 
Cold War. He used thi s idea to dispute the declinism, a prevalent view about America in the 
29 [bid., 260. 
30 Nye, 171e Paradox of American Power, xvi. For the di scussion of the "unipolar moment" see for 
instance Charles Krauthammer, "The unipo lar moment," Foreig n Affairs 70: I (1990), 23-33 ; William 
Wohl fo rth , "The stabi lity of a unipolar world," lntemationa/ Security 24: 1 (Summer 1999), 5-41. 
31 Nye, The Paradox of American Power, xiv and xvi. 
30 Ibid. , 141-168. 
33 Nye, Soft Power, xi i-xiii. 
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1980s, and to caution against triumphalism surged throughout the 1990s. In the course of this , 
it is apparent that this idea of soft power is closely associated with American context and 
interests. 
2.2.2.2 Nye's approaches to defining soft power 
Having reviewed the context in which the concept of soft power emerged, the following 
section considers in more depth Nye's approaches to defining soft power. To define soft 
power, Nye divisied power into two forms: one is the directive or command method of 
exercising power, which can rest on inducement ("carrots") or threats ("sticks"); the other is 
the indirect way to exercise power, which can entail co-opting others rather than coercing 
them . He called the fonner "hard power," and the latter "co-optive power" or "soft power" 
which was equated with the "second face of power" identified by Luckes. His explanation of 
the two forms of power is worth quoting in length: 
A country may achieve the outcomes it prefers in world politics because 
other countries want to follow it or have agreed to a system that 
produces such effects. In this sense, it is just as important to set the 
agenda and structure the situation in world politics, as it is 1o get others 
to change in particular situations. This aspect of power - getting others 
to want what you what - might be called indirect or co-optive power. It 
is in contrast to the active command power behaviour of getting others 
to do want you want. Co-optive power can rest on the attraction of one' s 
idea or on the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the 
preferences that others express.. The ability to establish preferences 
tends to be associated with intangible power resources such as culture, 
ideology, and institutions. This dimension can be thought of as soft 
power, in contrast to the hard co=and power usually associated with 
tangible resources like military and economic strength.34 
From this we can see that soft power defined by Nye follows two approaches: soft power as 
resources and behaviour. 
1) Soft power as resources 
34 Nye, Bound to Lead, 31-32. 
29 
The '·power-as-resources approach," as pointed out earlier, assesses power by power 
resources including material and non-material elements and fits into realist approach to 
measuring power. This constitutes a "shortcut' ' and "useful" way to define power because 
possession of resources is concrete and practica l and thus could be more appealing to policy-
oriented ana lysts and practitioners.35 Defining soft power through a "power-as-resources 
approach" leads to a focus on non-material resources. Nye articulates that a country' s soft 
power lies in: 
its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values 
(when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies 
(when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).36 
In America ' s case, Nye elaborates that the crucial resources of soft power for the US are 
"values of democracy, personal freedom, upward mobility, and openness" and they all 
contribute to American attractiveness .37 Nye argues that the US has an advantage in soft 
power: the values on which it is built, such as democracy and libera li sm, have global appea l; 
it has built itself leadership in international institutions; and it has global credibi li ty in how it 
operates domestic and international politics by promoting democracy and human ri ghts at 
home and abroad.38 To measure America' s soft power, Nye deve lops a lot of indicators such 
as the spread of English, Americans' achievements in science, technology and the arts, the 
number of foreign students and immigrants attracted to the US, and America ' s role in 
multil ateral institutions (see Table 2.1). Whist he reckons that America had plenty of soft 
power resources that contributed to America 's leadership in world politics in hi s 1990 book, 
he urges Washington to increase investment in soft power one decade later. 39 
35 Ibid., 26. 
36 Nye, Soft Power, 11. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid ., 68-69. 
39 Nye. 801111d 10 Lead; Nye, Soft Power. 
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Soft power Conditions of Soft power Indicators of soft power 
resources attractiveness of mechanisms/ 
these resources tools 
Political values/ Regimes or political Democratic politics Democratic forms and outcomes ( e.g. 
ideology beliefs that overlap indicators of social justice, human 
development, trust in government) 
Process and practices deliver good 
results for human rights, consistent 
Human rights issues with rhetoric 
Acceptance of immigrants, religious 
tolerance, race relations, tourism 
flows 
Credibility and Consistency of 
reputation domestic and Leadership 
external actions Pol itical stability 
Economic prosperity 
Responsiveness to the changes 
Opinion polls? 
Culture When it includes Cultural diplomacy Numbers of foreign students, Nobel 
universal values or ( education, high cultural prize winners, volume and numbers of 
when cultures are contacts, academic and educational and cultural contacts and 
similar scientific exchange, exchanges, trade in cultural products, 
spread of popular culture, tourists, foreign broadcasts, sport as 
sport, diasporas etc.) transmitter of positive values, 
popu lation statistics 
Foreign policies, When seen as Participation in Standing in international organizations 
international legitimate and multilateral diplomacy, ( e.g. membership, financial status, 
institutions and having moral agenda-setting or issue active/passive, agenda-setting) 
norms authority by their framing 
audiences Promotion of public goods, broadly 
shared values, inclusion of others (e.g. 
revie\v positions taken internationally; 
Foreign policy substance foreign aid performance; 
and style peacekeeping contributions). Opinion 
polls? 
Participation in alliances, coalitions, 
regional and ad hoc groups 
Cooperation with others 
Avoidance of arrogance, isolationism, 
unilateralism. Deal with history ( e.g. 
Confront difficulty Germany, Japan). Opinion polls? 
Table 2.1: Soft power template from Nye' s books in 1990, 2002 and 200440 
As Nye has pointed out lately, "whether the capacity that those resources imply can actually 
be converted into preferred outcomes will depend upon the contexts and the country' s skill in 
40 Thanks for Geoffrey J. Randal sharing bis work with me. This table is revised by referring to 
Randal, The Seduction of Soft Power, 72. 
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converting resources into strategies that will produce preferred outcomes."41 Accordingly, the 
analysis of soft power also needs to address the context in which the soft power develops and 
the strategies that the state uses to promote its soft power. That means the behavioural 
approach which exams the behaviour that mobili zes soft power also matters. 
2) Soft power as behaviour 
Nye is aware of the sho11comings of defining power as simply a set of resources, so he looks 
at soft power in behavioural tenns as well. As noted above, Nye also pays attention to the 
ability of a state to change others ' perceptions and preference through attraction, persuasion 
and agenda-setting. ln this sense, soft power is judged by the outcomes of the object ' s 
preferences that are shaped by the subject' s efforts. The power wielder thus has to know 
audience' s initial preferences, and to assess how much the target's behaviour will be altered 
by the actor's soft power exercises. Nye's interests in preference shaping or attraction clearly 
relate to his institutionalist approach of international relations. 
Considering Nye's approaches to defining soft power - one as non-material resources and the 
other as attraction through preference shaping or agenda-setting - I suggest that hi s 
conceptua lization of soft power combines the first and second dimensions of power 
illustrated by Lukes. Nye' s idea of soft power implies a convergence of reali sm and 
1 iberalism but leaves out the third dimension of power discussed by Lukes - how soft power 
contributes "normality" or "consensus."42 His interest in the practical application of so ft 
power in international politics leads him to insufficientl y deal with the "normati ve" 
di scussion of soft power, such as "what makes something or someone alluring to some and 
not to others" and "how does attraction happen."43 But we should understand that the 
"normative" dimension of soft power is not Nye's primary interest.44 Nevertheless, it does 
point to important issues concerning how we conceptualize and define soft power that 
warrant further attention. 
'
1 Nye, T11 e F11t11reof Power, 10. 
" Lukes, "Power and the battle for hearts and mind s," 477-493 ; John Gaventa, "Level s, spaces and 
forms of power: analysing opportunities for change," in Berenskoetter and Williams eds. , Power in 
World Politics, 217. 
'
3 Janice Bially Mattern, ·'Why 'soft power isn' t so soft ," Mi/le1111iu111 : Journal of International 
Studies 33:3 (2005), 584 . 
.µ Nye has admitted that he treats soft power as a descriptive rather than a normative concept, in Nye, 
.. Notes for a so ft-power research agenda'", in Berenskoetter and Williams eds. , Power in World 
Politics, 169. 
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2.2.2.3 How to use soft power and its relationship with hard power 
Nye is hardly the first scholar to discuss the "soft" side of power, but his contribution lies in 
the way that he treats soft power as something that can be applied in implementing foreign 
policy. He bas caught policy practitioners ' attention with the idea that soft power resources 
can and should continue to be used and deployed through "concerted effort" to achieve 
political aims. 45 Nye thus draws readers ' attention to the practical issues of soft power such as 
how to utilize soft power in foreign policy as well as the relationship between soft and hard 
power. 
An important instrument of soft power pointed out by Nye is public diplomacy. Public 
diplomacy, as understood by Nye, not only includes broadcasting and selling a positive 
image, but also involves "building long-term relationships that create an enabling 
environment for government policies."46 In other words, public diplomacy, by mobilizing soft 
power resources, helps build a positive image or shape a favourable international 
environment for the state to achieve its goals. Whilst Nye recognizes that it is not new for the 
state to promote a positive image, in the infonnation age, public diplomacy becomes 
particularly important to shape public opinion. Technological advance_has led to a great flood 
of information and people incur difficulties discerning what to focus on and believe. Public 
diplomacy seeks to utilize such information to shape a positive image of the state. For Nye, 
effective public diplomacy requires not only broadcasting, but more importantly, listening as 
well as genuine conmrnnication. In this "two way street," Nye argues that, "it is crucial to 
understand the target audience" and be consistent between words and actions. 47 
Secondly, Nye notices the complicated relationship between hard and soft power in politics. 
On the one hand, bard and soft power may go in tandem. Military and economic success 
could bring about admiration and attract others through the myth of invincibility built on the 
state ' s material strength. Hard power could increase one ' s ability to establish and shape the 
international agenda according to its preferences which in turn might enhance status and 
power. Complementing hard power, soft power could lead a state to consume less hard power 
by channelling or limiting other activities and hence produce lesser resistance .48 On the other 
hand , hard and soft power might not develop cooperatively. Nye warns that imprudent use of 
4 5 Matter, "Why ' soft power' isn 't so soft," 588. 
'° Nye, Soft power, 107. 
47 Ibid. , 111-112. 
48 Nye, The Paradox of American Power, 10. 
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hard power might undermine soft power. He cites examples such as the Soviet '· imperi ous 
poli cies" in the Cold War and Washington ' s applicati on of unil aterali sm in the "war on 
terrmism."49 In both situations, hard power opera ti ons eroded both countries' credibili ty and 
reputation . However, in spite ofNye's attention to the complex rel ationship between hard and 
soft power, he says little about the conditions under which one cou ld reinforce the other and 
when one might undennine the other. 
Additionally, Nye ana lyses the significance and limits of soft power in world politics. The 
significance of soft power, he argues, lies in that the state, by wielding its soft power, could 
obtain its desired outcomes from others due to their "admiring its values, emulating its 
example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness."50 In contrast, compared to coercion 
that comes from the use of military power or economic sanction , shaping preferences would 
"last longer" and "cost less" to develop leadership in world politics and thus be more 
effective than coercion. 51 In the meantime, he addresses the limits of soft power. He argues 
that soft power "does not touch everyone."52 Some va lues, such as individualism and liberty, 
may be attractive to some but may repel others.53 The appeal of such values was contextual. 
Add itionally, he reminds readers that soft power is diffi cult for govermnents to "control and 
employ." 54 He suggests that soft power in the infonnati on age is more a by-product of society 
than of de liberate government actions. The chall enges for governments' applying and 
controlling soft power in world politics could, for example, come from the internet and non-
state actors operating transnationally. 55 The latter are less restricted by conventional factors 
such as territorial borders but they can provide adverse infonnation or opinions against 
governments. 
In sum, thi s section rev iews Nye's idea of soft power through the illustration of the con text 
where he develops the idea, the approaches he defines soft power, hi s di scussion of the 
relationship between hard and soft power as well as view of the signifi cance and limits of soft 
power. These aspects all hi ghlight the complex ity of the concept of soft power, which leads 
me to a refl ecti on on hi s idea of soft power. In the next subsection 1 undertake a critical 
49 Ibid, I 0, 35. 
50 Ibid. , 8. 
51 Ibid., 8-9. 
52 Ibid., 9. 
53 Ibid., xi. 
54 Ibid., 9. 
55 Ibid., 73-75 . 
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review of Nye ' s evolving idea of soft power and use this to develop a working definition for 
this study. 
2.2.3 A reflection on Nye's concept of soft power 
Nye ' s discussion of soft power reflects an intricate picture of world politics by drawing 
readers' attention to the non-material dimension of power in the context of "complex 
interdependence" in the infonnation age. Yet, there are certain points of ambiguity in his 
notion of soft power, which could be further clarified or strengthened. 
The first important question this study brings forward is the utility of Nye ' s concept of soft 
power beyond the context of the US. As pointed out earlier, Nye sometimes regards soft 
power as possessive and measurable resources and tends to endorse a form of "universali stic" 
soft power based upon American culture and liberal political values. 56 On the other hand, he 
at times holds that soft power is conditional, contextual and dependable on its recipients, 
which could be out of the control of the state. 57 In this regard, he does not provide readers as 
satisfying and consistent an analysis of soft power as might be desired . As di scussed above, 
Nye's development of the concept is for the purpose of arousing American practitioners ' 
attention as how to strengthen US power in the information age in whi_ch the nature of power 
has been changing. In the course of this his concept of soft power is cu ltivated primarily in an 
American context. It is this that raises the question of the degree to which this is a model of 
power that is particular to the US or one that can be applied to other states and societies. 
Second, it is unclear in Nye ' s works what factors contribute to the fonnation of soft power. 
He has repeatedly referred to American democratic politics and liberal culture and favoured a 
universal form of soft power based on the example of America. Does he imply that soft 
power requires a particular form of political regime that is essentially democratic? ls it really 
the case that only democracies have soft power? However, given that in 1990 Nye argued that 
America was "bound to lead" because of its abundance of hard and soft power resources, but 
ten years later he started to warn that there was a "sharp drop in the attractiveness of the 
Un ited States,"58 it suggests that soft power does not solely rely on the existence of a 
particular regime; other factors may also influence the shape of soft power. 
Third, a problem arises in measuring soft power. As we can see from Table 2.1 , there are a 
number of indicators extracted from Nye ' s works on soft power, but some of them are 
56 Ibid. , 11. Also see Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order, 42. 
57 Nye, Th e Future of Power, 9-10, 21. 
58 Nye, Soft Power, xii. 
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difficult to quantify and analysts often have to rely on opinion poll s.59 However, is it a precise 
way to measure soft power by opinions? Opinions are vo latile and they cannot tell us to what 
extent they relate to the application of soft power. In fact, the history of international relations 
has told us that states ' preferences, intentions and perceptions change constantly based on 
issues or contexts.60 Therefore, it is difficult to tell that the changing perceptions of the target 
result from soft power projection. As Ian Hall and Frank Smith note, we do not know the 
counterfactual scenario: what perceptions of the country would have been if soft power was 
not employed by the state goverrunent .6 1 Nye recently admits that the effectiveness of soft 
power depends on other variables, such as context, the skills of the power wielder and the 
di sposition of the audience.62 Thus students of soft power have to understand and ana lyse 
how these variables affect soft power practices in international politics. 
In short, this section provides an analysis of Nye ' s conception of soft power and examines 
where his concept is located in the broad conceptuali zation of power in IR. It points out that 
Nye 's motive for developing this concept is to attract politicians' attention to the changing 
nature of power in the infonnation age and how to reinforce America power by mobilizing 
soft power against such a background. Given this, thi s thesis raises the question of whether 
hi s model of soft power can be applied to contexts beyond the US. Addi tionally, thi s section 
has di scussed Nye 's approaches to defining soft power. It has suggested that the way Nye 
defines the concept combines the first and second dimensions of power identified by Lukes -
"power-as-resou rces approach" and power defined by behaviour. His concept of soft power 
implies a convergence of realism and liberali sm but fail s to address in any depth the question 
of what factors contribute to the fonnation of soft power. 
The analysis of three approaches of power conceptualization in the field of IR and Nye's 
concept of soft power leads to the following discussion of the nature of soft power and the 
working concept of soft power in this study. 
2.3 Concept of soft power in this study 
Building upon the analysis of the approaches to conceptualization of power in TR and a 
crit ical review of Nye ' s idea of soft power, thi s section elucidates a working concept of soft 
59 Also see Nye, Soft Power, 36-42, 69-72. 
60 Robert Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in /nternational Politics (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1976); Alexander Wendt, Social Th eo1y of !111ernatio11a/ Politics (Cambri dge: 
Cambridge Uni versity Press, 1999). 
61 Ian Hall and Frank Smith, "The struggle fo r soft power in As ia : pub lic diplomacy and regional 
com petit ion,'" Asian Security 9: I (2013), 8. 
61 Nye, n,e Future of Power, 21. 
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power that this study will use by focusing on the nature and an operational definition of soft 
power. 
As pointed out in the second section, Nye ' s concept of soft power is cultivated primarily in 
an American context. It is this that raises the question of the degree to which we can apply his 
concept to study soft power of other states particularly with different political systems and 
cultural traditions. Therefore, this study shift the focus of analysis of soft power from the US 
to the PRC, a country that is distinct from the former culturally, socially, politically and 
economically, to examine how soft power has been conceived and practised. The remainder 
of this section proposes a working concept of soft power to steer an empirical study of 
China' s soft power. It first elaborates the nature of soft power. The nature of soft power is 
essential for us to have a clear understanding of this concept, in particular, what can 
constitute soft power, or the sources of soft power. This section then proposes an operational 
definition for the study of China' s soft power. 
2.3.1 The nature of soft power 
In his discussion of power, Chris Reus-Smit refers to Barry Hindess ' s two conceptions of 
power. One takes "power as a simple capacity" ; another takes _ "power as legitimate 
capacity."63 Accordingly, Reus-Smit introduces two ideas of power. The first is that, when 
looking at "power as a simple capacity," power is regarded as possessive, primarily material, 
subjective and non-social. In his view, Nye's conception of soft power faUs into this 
category.64 Reus-Smit suggests that "soft" power resources are discussed by Nye as if they 
are material resources could be possessed and counted. American culture and values are 
deemed as universal and having the ability to be reproduced, interpreted and endowed with 
meaning only by American agency. This understanding, that the universality and legitimacy 
of American power is self-ordained and independent regardless of social interaction and 
process , therefore, is subjective. Reus-Smit thus concludes that such a perception of power is 
a "neo-conservati ve theory of power." 65 
Following Reus-Smit ' s suggestion of taking "power as legitimate capacity," this study treats 
that the nature of soft power is ideational, relational and social. 66 Soft power is multifaceted 
and context based, and indeed is difficult to measure. It is very important to note the 
63 Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order, 42. 
64 Ibid. , 64-65. 
65 Ibid. , 42, 45-49, 65. 
66 Ibid., 41-45. 
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multifaceted nature of soft power. Otherwise, soft power could be taken as possessive, 
primarily material , self-ordained and independent.67 This perspective of soft power is 
dangerous, because it could lead to myopia, vi ewing soft power in a conflicted situation ,68 
within which states imagine a " war of soft power" to " fight" for global favourable op inions 
by "building up" soft power resources which are regarded as "possessive," "material" and 
"self-ordained." This view of so ft power actually misses the point that soft power is shaped 
and reshaped by on-going social interactions in the global community. 
Firstly, soft power is ideational. ldeational factors include culture, ideologies, values, 
perceptions, and intentions. By projecting these factors, it can enhance what the state is and 
stands for, and gamer support of its policies from the international community. As David 
Lampton suggests, ideational factors frame and infonn what a state "stands for" and "stands 
against", either rhetoric or policies to advance on a particular standpoint.69 According to a 
state's standpoint, actions and announcements have the ability to appeal to spec ific countries, 
societies or groups. Equally important , ideational factors can guide or shape the way of 
wielding hard power. For instance, when military forces are used for aggression or conquest, 
can generate resentment , but respect for countries is enhanced when they send annies to 
peacekeeping or disaster relief missions. 
Secondly, soft power is relational , rather than a "fixed reali ty." Whether it is "soft power" 
depends not only on the actor, but al so on the recipient. For instance, Nye describes that 
American liberal culture constitutes American soft power. While many Europeans admire 
Ameri ca 's devotion to individualism and liberties, societi es in the Middle East or Asia may 
not be attracted to such values.70 In this sense, the recipient matters in defining soft power. 
Soft power may vary when the subject changes. For exampl e, China ' s soft power can be 
diffe rent fro m America·s. Even the same actor, its role can change over time. For instance, 
Ame rica·s sense of itself in the post-War era was different from what it was in the early 2011, 
century. In the fonne r period, America saw itself as a leader of the world , whil st in the early 
20'h century it was a rising power but marginali zed by European powers such as Britai n and 
France in world politics. The role of itself plays on the world stage can affect the way it 
67 fb id. , 42-43. 
68 Actually, a few studies have treated soft power in thi s way, for instance see Ku rlantzick, Charm 
Offensive; Congressional Research Service, China 's Foreign Policy and '"S~fi Power " in South 
America, Asia, and Afiica; McGiffert ed. , Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United 
States. A '·war" of soft power wou ld ensue when viewing soft power in a conflicted situation. 
69 David Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2008), 118. 
70 Also see Nye, Soft Power, 55-56. 
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defines and projects power. This role is not purely self-ordained, but perceived and shaped in 
relation to others. This point of view leads to the third dimension of soft power, which is 
social. 
Thirdly, soft power is social. Social power " is not simply dependent on the existence of more 
than one actor, it is a product of a society ' s defining practices and institutions."71 Defining 
practices and institutions happens in a multi-directional process through various forms of 
social interaction. Both actors and targeted states may engage in a process of exchange of a 
set of ideas, such as the nonnative understanding of the world order, the rules or institutions 
which should guide state actions, and the practices or the change of policies. Also, learning 
from others and one' s own mistakes and adaptation into new global contexts plays a 
significant role in shaping soft power practices. 72 These factors may lead actors to shape and 
reshape soft power strategies. From this point of view, it is important to analyse how soft 
power is constituted and mobilized as a conscious strategy of governments in on-going social 
interactions. 
In brief, soft power is multifaceted and fluid. Due to its ideational, relational and social 
nature, it is inaccurate to represent it as fixed and "universalisti c" power. Soft power can 
come from different dimensions of power resources. Referring to Steven Lukes 's 
multidimensional analysis of power, Sheng Ding suggests soft power can come from the 
following realms. First, it can rest on the "soft" attributes of a state, such as a country' s 
culture, political values and foreign policies. Second, it can arise from relational attributes 
such as the attractiveness of its culture and values, and the acceptabil ity of its foreign 
pol icies. Third, it can be deri ved from the structural dimension comprised of a country' s 
favourab le international norms, rules and institutions .73 Therefore, owing to its relational, 
ideat:ional and social nature, soft power should be understood as dynamic. It can come from 
multidimensional power resources rather than one-dimensional and static " soft" attributes of 
a state. 
To sum up, the nature of soft power is that it is ideational, relational and social. AB such, soft 
power is context based, dynamic and thus difficult to measure. What is particularly important 
for the study of soft power is by whom it is practised, whom it is practised on, and in what 
71 Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order, 44 
n Charles E. Ziegler, Foreign Policy and East Asia: Learning and A dap[ta] tion in the Gorbachev Era 
(Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993 ), 12 -13. 
73 Ding, n,e Dragon 's Hidden fVings, 39-47 . 
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context. Drawing on some of this conception of soft power allows me to apply it to contexts 
beyond the US to study China's soft power. 
2.3.2 Operational definition of soft power in this study 
Soft power is treated in thi s thesis as purposeful efforts the government makes to attract 
targeted audiences through the mob il ization of non-material sources of power. As it is 
analysed earlier, the concept of soft power in Nye's works sometimes is treated as 
"universali stic" and an underl ying assumption is that soft power requires a particular form of 
political regime that is essentially democratic. At other times, soft power is regarded as 
conditional , contextual and dependable on its recipients, which could be out of the control of 
the state. !J1 th is regard, Nye does not give readers as satisfying and consistent an analysis of 
soft power as might be desired. To clarify the confusion, thi s study pays particular attention 
to a government's efforts to mobilize and project soft power. This focus on the efforts of 
government does not consider that non-state actors are insignificant, but in the case of the 
PRC - an authoritarian regime - this state government has far-reach ing control over 
resources and instruments in order to manage its foreign relations. 74 This operational 
definition also highlights the following aspects. 
First, this definition of soft power attaches importance to "the purposeful efforts" of 
mobilizing sources of soft power. Tbe concept of "purposefu l efforts" emphasizes that, 
although the existence of non-material sources of power provides resources, the state must be 
wi lling to mobi lize them by putting them into policies and practice to let them speak to the 
audience. There is a distinction between having the sources of soft power and the wi llingness 
and capacity to mobili ze these to generate soft power. 
Second, this definition focuses on the "attraction" effect produced by mobilizing non-material 
sources of power. Concurring with Nye, soft power is not synonymous to influence, but more 
a fonn of power exercised through the capacity to attract. The concept of influence is much 
broader than the more specific concept of attraction - indeed attraction is only one element of 
influence. Influence includes elements such as coercion, threat and seduction. With reference 
to ··influence, .. it is unclear what the specific nature of that influence is. However, soft power 
wo rks by attraction: by convincing others to follow based on the appeal of one's ideas. 
Stressing the '·attracti on" effect, the concept of soft power not only is prem ised on the 
74 See for instance. Bri an Hocking, "Rethinking the ·new' public diplomacy"'; Jngrid d ' Hooghe, 
·'Public diplomacy in the People s Republic of China." both in Jan Melissen ed .. Th e New Public 
Diplomacy: Safi Power in !111ematio11al Relations (Basingstoke Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 29, 96; 
Ying Fan. ··Soft power: power of attraction or confus.i on?'", 150. 
40 
capacities and activities of the projector of power influence - its intention to make itself 
attractive, but also depends on the attitudes of the receiver, or "audience" to these influences. 
The third important issue I address is the sources of soft power and their mobilization. This 
study regards the main sources of soft power as ideational elements , such as culture, 
ideologies, perceptions, intentions and policies that advance a state ' s stance regarding 
particular issues . However, it is worth noting that societies and their political cultures are not 
static. Change can be due to domestic factors, such as material, ideational or normative 
changes within that society. For instance, in China's case, an obvious example is the 
revolutionary shifts in the 201h century, from imperial to republican and then a communist 
system. These changes can be impelled or linked to changes in the broader international 
system they are in association with. Changes are not necessarily endogenous, but can also 
evolve as societies interact with other societies and cultures. 
Regarding the sources of soft power, it again needs to be pointed out that there is a distinction 
between having the sources of soft power and mobilizing these sources. Sources of soft 
power are potential soft power and cannot equate with soft power per se. The state needs to 
have the will, intention, and efforts to mobilize and promote these soft power sources and to 
let these sources speak to its targeted audience. The state government needs to utilize tools or 
vehicles to convert these non-material sources of power into soft power. Cultural exchange, 
propaganda, media, international events such as the Olympics, and the various forms of 
diplomacy including public diplomacy and multilateral diplomacy can be used as tools to 
project soft power. 
To sum up, this section first elaborates the nature of soft power, which is regarded as 
ideational , relational and social. Understanding soft power in this way is essential to develop 
the thinking on what may constitute soft power, or what I refer to as the sources of soft 
power. Due to the dynamic feature of soft power, what is particularly important to focus on 
soft power is practised by whom, on whom and in what context. Second, this section provides 
an operational definition for this study of China's soft power, that is, the purposeful efforts 
the govermnent makes to attract targeted audiences through the mobilization of non-material 
sources · of power. The key aspects of this definition are the "purposeful efforts," the 
"attraction" effect, and the relations between the sources of soft power and their mobilization. 
2.4 Conclusion 
This conceptual chapter provides an analysis of the concept of soft power and introduces a 
working concept for my study of China' s soft power. I first review the three approaches to 
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defining power in IR, which helps understand where Nye' s concept of soft power fits in . His 
"power-as-resources approach" and power defined by behaviour - agenda-setting or ability to 
attract suggest a convergence of reali sm and liberalism. Whilst hi s efforts to develop a 
concept of soft power provide a useful platform to think more about power in world politics, 
there are certain points of ambiguity in hi s notion of soft power which could be further 
clarified or strengthened, for instance, where "attraction" comes from, and "what makes 
something or someone alluring to some and not to others." This study suggests that the study 
of one ' s soft power needs to pay particular attention to the subject (who practises thi s power 
and for what purpose) , its identity (as identity infonns what thi s subject stands for and against 
thus shapes its behaviour), the object (whom it is practised on) , and in what context. 
After the review of the ideas of (soft) power in IR, thi s chapter concludes with a working 
concept of soft power for thi s study of China ' s soft power. It pays at1ention to the nature of 
soft power, which is ideational , relational and social , and the "purposeful efforts the 
government makes to attract targeted audiences through the mobili zation of non-material 
sources of power." 
Following the discussion of the concept of soft power in IR in Engli sh literature, the next 
chapter explores the Chinese discourse of soft power in recent years. I wilJ examine Chinese 
thinking about the concept and the key aspects of soft power which interest Chinese 
intellectuals. 1 will then have a full analytical framework for the empirical study of China ' s 
soft power. 
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3 The Changing Colour of Soft Power in Contemporary Chinese 
Discourse 
After Nye introduced his concept of soft power in 1990, it quickly travelled to China. Nye ' s 
book Bound to Lead was translated into Chinese and published in China in 1992.1 Since then, 
his perspective on power has increasingly attracted attention from Chinese policy makers, 
Chinese scholars, and policy analysts and commentators. The phrase "soft power" (ruan shili) 
frequently appears in Chinese public discourse and the Chinese uses this term to discuss 
China' s soft power. 
While the previous chapter discussed the concept of soft power in English literature, this 
chapter explores Chinese thinking about the concept and which of its key aspects Chinese 
intellectuals are interested in. In so doing, it seeks to develop an operational analytical 
framework to steer case studies of the constitution and mobilization of China ' s soft power in 
the PRC's international politics. 
This chapter is organized into four sections. The first section provides .a broad context within 
which the debate on soft power in China takes place. The following section traces the 
emergence of the "soft power" discussion within Chinese discourse since this concept was 
introduced to China. In contrast to the illustration of soft power in Nye's writings, Chinese 
elites ' interest in "soft power" arose neither from a concern to maintain hegemony, nor from 
any preoccupation with the "war on terror." Rather, it initially came from concerns about how 
to cope with American hegemony in the post-Cold War era and protect China ' s unique 
cultural identity. Subsequently, two themes have dominated the Chinese discourse on soft 
power. _First, there has been an interest in its application as a possible tool to counter the 
"China threat" theory. Secondly, Chinese scholars and policy makers have explored how soft 
power ca·n contribute to China ' s own national development strategies and to China' s national 
identity as a responsible great power. This evolving understa!}ding of soft power suggests that 
the Chinese relate soft power closely to national identity. They believe that China ' s soft 
power can enhance China' s cultural identity, an essential dimension of its national identity, as 
well as build China as a responsible global power in contemporary world politics. Based on 
1 As mentioned in the Introduction Chapter, Nye ' s book Bound to Lead was translated into Chinese 
and published in 1992. 
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the review of the emergence of soft power di scourse in China, the third section investi gates 
the Chinese understanding of the key elements of China' s soft power. A survey of China 
Academic Journals Full-text Database (CAJFD) shows that particular attention has been paid 
to three sources. They are (I) Chinese culture, (2) China as a model for development, and (3) 
China ' s foreign policy and diplomacy. These sources all point to the realization of China 's 
great power status and international responsibilities in particular to achieve China 's peaceful 
rise. Finally, the chapter suggests an operational analytica l framework for the empirical 
studies of China 's soft power in the PR C's international politics. 
One important caveat however needs to be added here. China ' s power in international 
rel ations is multi-dimensional by nature, and soft power is only one of the dimensions. Whi le 
the discussion of soft power has recentl y intensified in Chinese discourse, this does not mean 
that soft power is dominant in the Chinese ideological realm or that hard power is regarded as 
less important in Chinese thinking. 
3.1 Context of the emergence of the Chinese discourse of soft power 
The emergence of a Chinese di scourse of soft power is the result of the interaction between 
the ever changing international environment and China ' s domestic situation. The dynamics of 
world politics as well as those in the Asian-Pacific region have had a significant impact on 
the Chinese view of power. Events such as the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the 
USSR, the observation of the US dominance in the 1990s, the Asian financial crisis, and the 
"war on terror" have all had important influence on Chinese thinking about power and more 
particularly on what makes a great power. The fa ll of the USSR is illustrative: Chinese elites 
recognized that military strength alone does not make an enduring great power (as di scussed 
below). America 's leading rol e in the technological revo lution in the 1990s made its power 
more prominent and consequently contributed to its international influence. The severe 
financ ial crisis experienced by many Asian countries in 1997-98 served as a good example of 
economic interdependence and led China to ponder what role China (or big powers) needed 
to play in the process of globalization . Last but not least. the uncertainties of today 's world 
are magnified by non-traditional securi ty issues, such as terrorism, epidemics and climate 
change. These challenges cannot always be resolved by coercive material power but highlight 
the significant role of communication and cooperation between international actors that plays 
in meeting the challenges. A wide array of global and regional events in the post-Cold War 
era, therefore, has affected the Chinese vision of the world and of China it self. 
The striking changes in China' s refonn period since the late 1970s have also shaped the 
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Chinese world view. The most profound event was the 1989 Tiananmen cri sis. Chinese 
political elites interpreted this crisis as the consequence of a conspiracy initiated by Western 
cap itali sts to expand American politica l values. Consequently, Chinese ideological elites 
became more hostile to American liberal values, and the discussion of political refonns was 
shelved. Instead, they further stressed the importance of developing "Chinese soc iali st culture" 
and studying Chinese traditional culture to maintain Chinese unique identity. Furthennore, 
with China's continuing economic growth, lead ing to the international debate on "China ' s 
rise" and "China threat" dating from the mid-l 990s, Chinese elites have increasingly paid 
attention to other forms of power in addition to military and economic power. ln the 
meantime, as more scholars from various di sciplines of social sciences such as culture, 
hi story, economics and international studies have participated in the discussion of soft power, 
Chinese understanding of soft power has become more comprehensive and sophisticated. 
However, it needs to be pointed out here that this review of the Chinese discourse of soft 
power pays more attention to the views from Chinese lR specialists than those from other 
di sciplines of social sciences. 
3.2 The evolution of the Chinese discourse of soft power 
Chinese discussion of soft power started in the early 1990s and has become increasingly 
intense since the beginning of the 2 I" century. In this section , I identify four phases of soft 
power di scussion in Chinese di scourse to provide a comprehensive understand ing of Chinese 
perspectives on soft power in the last two decades. To begin with, immediate ly after Nye ' s 
concept of soft power was introduced into China in 1992, the Chinese elites adopted a quite 
cautious view of the concept, since soft power represented the expansion of American 
hegemony in ten11S of culture and political values. 1n a second phase, from the mid-1990s, 
however, more positive views of soft power began to emerge as soft power was incorporated 
into the ·discussion of how to develop China's "comprehensive national power" (CNP, zonghe 
guoli). ln a third phase, soft power became viewed as a tool for national image building to 
allay foreign fears derived from the international di scourse of the "China threat." In a fo u11h 
phase, and most recently, intell ectual interest has focused on whether China might provide 
alternati ve fonns of soft power as a developmental model to other societies. 
Identifying how the discourse of soft power has evolved in contemporary China helps to 
distinguish what are seen as the most important constituent elements of China ' s soft power, 
and how they could be employed in China's international strategy. However, it needs to be 
kept in mind that although I identify four phases in the emergence of the Chinese soft-power 
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discourse, the development of Chinese interest in soft power does not strictly follow thi s 
four-phase trajectory; sometimes various concerns mix together or one particular interest 
overshadows the others. 
Before the anal ys is of the development of the Chinese discourse of soft power, I provide a 
picture of the surging popularity of the term "soft power" in Chinese journal articles from the 
CAJFD.2 When using "soft power" as a keyword searching in the "core journals," there were 
only 15 articles in the CAJFD in the entire decade of the 1990s. 111 contrast, the overall 
number of such articles skyrocketed to 2,143 in the new century (see Table 3. 1). This search 
demonstrates that there has been a rapid development of Chinese research interest in soft 
power in the new century, and the pace of growth particularly has increased after 2005.3 
Coincidentally, the vocabulary of "soft power" has appeared in speeches made by the 
Chinese leaders since 2006.4 
Year 92-99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 
Number 15 9 10 9 14 34 43 86 155 9 221 507 517 529 
Table 3. 1: Number of articles from core journals in the database of the CAJFD with "soft 
power" as a keyword from l 992 to 2012 
Whilst the first di scussions of soft power were from the field of International Relations ,5 there 
have been more and more Chinese intellectuals from other di sciplines of social sciences 
joining in the di scussion of soft power. As a result, firstl y, Chinese writings on thi s topic have 
expanded to different issues and aspects other than international rel ations; and secondl y, 
various Chinese organi zations and institutes have been set up to meet the increasing interest 
' for the search method, see Introduction. 
3 Although this ··core journals'· sea rch in the database of the CAJFD showed 9 articles in 2008, using 
the '·all journals" function gave a result of 1.589. 
4 See Shen Zhuanghai. ··y:{t~::J;;;/Ji'.EJ't' l!i ~ijL 1+100 ~ :@-"i't'OOifll!JI·· (Cultural soft power in 
Chinese discourse. its state and future path in China), in Zhang Guozuo ed., t/-'/JJJ?:f./;$1.'3!/Jfiff:ft/fi 
Ff (2010 ) (A1111ual Report 0 11 China 's Cultural Soft Pmrer Research (2010)) (Beijing: Shehui Kexue 
Wenxian. 2011). 305. 
5 The first Chinese articles on soft power were written by Wang Hun ing in 1993 and 1994, when he 
was a professor of international politics at Fudan University in Shanghai. It is worth noting that Wang 
Huning was hand-picked by the former president Jiang Zemin as the Deputy Director of the Policy 
Research Office of the CCP (1998-2002) and was then director of this organizati on (2002-2007). He 
acted as Secretary of the Central Committee Secretariat from 2007. Wang became a member of the 
Politburo of the CCP Central Comminee at the 18th Party Congress in November 2012. He is the fi rst 
Chinese high-level official with an educational background in International Politics. 
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in soft power by organizing conferences and conducting research projects. 6 Therefore, 
Chinese understanding and interpretation of soft power has become more comprehensive and 
sophisticated. 
3.2.1 Phase one: "cultural sovereignty" vs. "cultural imperialism" 
In the early 1990s, when the term "soft power" first appeared in Chinese discourse, it was 
interpreted as a synonym of "cultural imperialism." As discussed in the last chapter, in his 
book Bound to Lead, Nye argued that America's soft power derived from American culture, 
values and institutions, and due to this soft-power strength the US was bound to lead the 
world. However, for many Chinese, this argument represented American government's new 
strategy of exporting American culture and values to expand its dominance beyond military 
and economic affairs to the field of culture and international institutions; such a strategy 
would eventually undermine China's unique cultural identity if China did not take any 
measures. 
This interpretation was made in the wake of the Tianarunen tragedy in June 1989, and the 
collapse of the communist bloc in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in 1989 and 1991 , 
respectively. China subsequently had to cope with sudden changes in the West's China policy 
and international isolation. Ideological elites of the CCP believed that these changes resulted 
from the Western capitalist implementation of "peaceful evolution." This strategy was seen to 
be designed to cause the · worldwide collapse of socialism, by intentionally promoting 
Western values and bourgeois culture. As Deng Xiaoping stated at the time, Western 
countries after the Cold War were "staging a third world war without gunsmoke. By that I 
mean they want to bring about the peaceful evolution of socialist countries from socialism to 
capitalism."7 He maintained that Western capitalists intended to impose on the peoples of the 
world t~eir set of values, such as "human rights, freedom and democracy," which were 
"designed to safeguard the interests of the strong, rich countries ... to bully weak countries, 
and ... pursue hegemony and practise power politics." 8 He warned that "the spread of 
bourgeois liberalization" would bring "turmoil" in China, and stressed that stability and the 
6 For instance, see Zhang Guozuo, "2009 £jeep ~:>e1t1=X~fl~YHHfr" (Chinese cultural soft power 
research of 2009), in Zhang Guozuo ed., Annual Report on China's Cultural Soft Power Research 
(2010) , 3-4. 
7 Deng Xiaoping, " 1JHH±~:l:::Y. , M .lt'.fll-'f'j]il1,: ( - :hJU1{f+- Jl =:. + -= B) " (Adhere to 
socialism and prevent peaceful evolution towards capitalism, September 23, 1989), Selected Works of 
Deng Xiaoping (Beijing: Renmin, 1993), vol.3: 344. 
8 Ibid., 345. 
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adherence to sociali sm was of "overriding importance."9 
ln its reaction to the Tiananmen crisi s, the CCP spurred Chinese nationalism by launchin g a 
series of patriotic campaigns, to advance "socia li st spiritua l civilisation" against '·bourgeois 
liberal ization," 10 and to "enhance pol itica l awareness, and guide the Chinese people to 
establish correct ideals and convictions, and a proper perspective on life and val ues." 11 
Through these national patriotic campaigns, the CCP mobilized domestic support, discredited 
Western poli tical values and helped itself through the crisi s after June 1989. 
1n the meantime, Western criticism and isolation of China provoked a strong wave of 
nationalism and "anti -imperiali sm" among the Chinese public. This kind of popular reaction 
has its origins in the phrase "bainian chiru" (one hundred years of humiliation) , which 
expresses the feeling among Chinese people that Ch ina has been a "victim" of the 
international system ever since the period between 1839 and 1945 , when China was invaded 
by European and Japanese imperial powers. The phrase continues to resonate strongl y in 
discussions of nationali sm and anti-imperialism. Many Chinese intellectuals believe that, in 
the 19°' century, imperiali sm appeared in China in the form of gunboats; after China won its 
independence in 1949, Western imperialism adopted a new fonn of power rooted in Western 
culture and values, attempting to transfonn China culturally and politically. This kind of 
thinking became more consolidated in the wake of the fall of the USSR. Chinese intellectuals 
reached the same conclusion as the CCP leaders, that these events were the consequence of 
" peaceful evolution" and "cultura l imperialism" from the West .U This phenomenon confinns 
9 Deng Xiaoping, "'ilFf;fiJffj ltJtJl/fJiHk::&:ffi'.f,i]/ifil'' (Seizing the opportun ity to solve the problems of 
development, December 24, 1990), Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol.3: 364-5. 
'
0 
"rri'l i'l';~i7.I **~n 11.H~~ ~lltr Ji-Zilli'T~ 00 .:!:. .Sl:/1 ~ .:!:..Sl R:ii.¥- I:! J.';[,c., (t-J;J'& w· (Jiang 
Zemin ' s talk to the cadre of Communi st Youth League, we must carry out the education about 
patriotism, socialism and national sel f-esteem), RMRB (Ju ly 17, 1989), 1. Adhering to the "Four 
Cardinal Principles" was of the utmost importance in the ·'sociali st spiritual civilisation." namel y, (I) 
to uphold the social ist path, (2) to uphold the people's democratic dictatorship, (3) to uphold the 
leadership by the CCP, and (4) to uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. 
11 Jiang Zem in, ·'tE/xtJ/. 't' $)\ fl; :Jt;fU 00 i,Ji; :f[ 11] + /lij '¥ J;::4U: (r-J iJh!'' (Speech at the 40'h 
anniversary of the PRC, September 29, 1989), RMRB (September 30, 1989), 1. 
12 For example, Gao Sip in, "J:l\l5:J\&;fD-'f/Jii'.ltB''.J~Pi!'r~:i;l'. (Strengthening strategic awareness ofanti-
peaceful evolution), ;r:;tflJ!f!ifJ-liff!ift (77,eoretical From In Higher Education) , no.5 (1991 ), 18-22; Dan 
Chun, ·'OOl\,r-{!1illl't'if.J#i00 t .x'..J!l'.i-(!;' · (Imperialism in international communication), ili!iil!ift!ift (News 
Front), no.8 (1992), 44; Wen Xi. "11t V. , .±.i'X;fD:l,i:)R'· (lndependence, sovereignty and development), 
~ ff/Jji//1 (Prese111 Ideological Trends), no.3 (1993), 37-53 ; Luo Yuchao, "jllj1J A&~Ji!~],t;JtJti-ttiJ 
~ -t.Sl*l'tiE .. (The concept of human rights in the West and its characteri stics of cultural imperialism), 
iif!!mfililii;f;:"Jf:ltficf.41(:"j{:jfi (Journal of Social Science of Hunan Normal University) , no.3 (I 995), 
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David Lampton ' s observation, that "perceived intervention in Chinese internal affairs and 
strident attempts by Washington or others to foster political change in China can actually 
increase popular support for the regime." 13 
In this context, American soft power, generated from American culture and values, was 
associated with "cultural imperialism." The first Chinese discussants of the concept of soft 
power were [R scholars. They suggested that the real danger from American soft power and 
"cultural imperialism" was the erosion of China ' s own "cultural sovereignty" in the post-
Cold War era which witnessed American primacy in world affairs . Wang Huning, then 
professor of international politics in Shanghai , published the first Chinese articles on "soft 
power" (ruan quanli), arguing that culture was the key source of a state ' s soft power. He 
posited that in international politics there was a "power shift" from the reliance on violence 
and wealth to a knowledge-based power structure. He contended that control over knowledge 
would become the focal point in future global power politics. 14 1n his second article related to 
soft power, Wang maintained that as culture has assumed increasing importance in 
international politics, "Western countries have stepped up their efforts to control or influence 
international affairs and the development of developing countries by using cultural forces." 
Instead of getting other countries to change by using carrots and sticks, he added , the West 
was switching to a softer method of exercising power, namely, inducing others to want the 
same things that people in the West want. China, he warned, must not jump on this 
bandwagon but must hold on to it s "cultural sovereignty" and respond to this new cultural 
stratagem for political hegemony by "maintaining its own position and orientation." 15 
The key question, following this thinking, was how to respond to American "cultural 
hegemony" and the policy of "peaceful evolution," and how to keep China's cultural 
sovereignty in the era of globali zation. Wang proposed that the Chinese govenunent should 
adhere to an independent foreign policy, uphold the principle of sovereignty and not succumb 
to Western concepts such as human rights. He insisted on the importance of maintaining the 
26-31. 
13 David Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power, 145. 
14 Wang Huning, "ftJ,1 ~*~fi(tJ;tft , 1'Xtll.fi" (Culture as a country ' s power: soft power), J;lll 
:k"f:"f:jfl (ii:#/f!f) (Journal ofFuda11 University (so cial sciences edition)) , no.3 (1993), 91-96. 
15 Wang Huning, "XfUf" l'kEJXft clc tX , X1 ± lX~.!1l~ (t,J~Elill " (Cultural expansion and cultural 
sovereignty: challenge to the concept of sovereignty), ;Jt EJ_;k!!f:!!f:ffl (i±#!f!f) (Journal of Fudan 
University (social sciences edition)), no .3 (1994), 9-15. 
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diversity of the world including China's own contribution to it. 16 He realized , however, that 
Chinese culture, in order to exercise "soft power" on the global stage, must rejuvenate itself 
and be transfonned into a culture that represents universal human values. 17 
In effect, Wang' s proposition is j ust one example demonstrati ng the confli ct between some 
sort of exceptionalism and universali sm in the minds of Chinese intellectual s. They often feel 
caught in a conflict between emotions of hatred towards the expansion of the West, and a 
rational dedication to modemization. 18 On the one hand, they feel antipathy to the global 
domination by Western culture and the marginalization and denial of China, and want to 
preserve China's unique identity in the aspects of culture and politics. On the other hand , they 
come to realize that it is necessary to reconstruct Chinese culture according to international 
standards ifit is to have any chance of being seen as a legitimate universal culture. 
To summarize, the early Chinese thinkers about soft power associated thi s concept with 
"cultural imperialism" from the West and envisaged that there would be a fierce international 
competition over the aspect of culture. They perceived that there was an unequal cultural 
relationship between the West and the rest. This way of seeing soft power has a significant 
impact on China's thinking about security and bui lding China 's own soft power. The research 
on cultural secutity and cultural soft power emerges in the following decade, which is 
discussed later. 
3.2.2 Phase two: the concept of "comprehensive national power (CNP)" 
Whilst the first Chinese intellectuals took a rather cautious approach toward Nye's concept of 
soft power, later discussants engaged with his concept in a more positive way. This section 
explores how soft power discussion in China fits into the endogenous Chinese concept of 
CNP. 
The research into CNP aims to answer the question of what makes a great power and to 
fonnu late China's strategy to become such a power. 19 Systemati c research into CNP has 
16 Ibid., 13-14. 
17 \Vang Huning. "Cu lture as a country 's power. 1• 96. 
18 Chen Xiaoming et al. ".lJ; 7FE.:X.Ei J§!1fl'ic:X:: ft '· (Orientalism and post-colonial culture), f1'1/J 
(Zho11gSho11), no .I (1994), 138. 
19 Huang Shuofeng, ·· i§l: ~s'ff. -G- 00:n'· (A random talk on CNP), t!tf'i'-fttif! ( World Affairs), no.24 
(1987). 12-13. 
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developed since the end of the Cold War.20 In general , the tenn refers to the combination of 
many different elements of a sovereign state ' s capacity for survival and development, 
" including material and ideational ethos and international influence."21 For example, Huang 
Shaofeng, a pioneer of CNP research, distingui shes three categories within CNP: "hard" 
components (i.e. economic power, scientific and technological power, national defence power, 
and natural resources), "soft" elements (i.e. political power, diplomatic power, and cultural 
and educational factors) and "coordinating power" (i.e. political structure, leadership, 
decision-making, management and coordination capabilities)." Therefore, CNP is a multi-
dimensional and multi-issue linked concept. Chinese strategic analysts have adopted both 
qualitative and quantitative approaches to calculate and estimate China ' s CNP in relation to 
other big powers over the next few decades. Although there have been debates on exactly 
what elements should be included in CNP and how to weigh the different elements, it is 
generally recogni zed that there are "soft" and "hard" components, and the "soft" ones are 
equally as important as the "hard" ones.23 
Whilst the early development of the CNP concept did take into account elements of what we 
now see as soft power, it was not until the mid-l 990s that analysts expli citly put the tenn 
"soft power" into the CNP toolbox." These analysts drew readers ' attention to the fall of the 
USSR. They considered that despite the large scale of its economy and military, the USSR 
had not paid sufficient attention to the cultivation and development of soft power. The Soviet 
loss in the Cold War was attributed to its unbalanced development of hard and soft power.25 
20 It involves the research institutes such as Chinese Academy of Social Science, Chinese Academy of 
Military Science and China Institute of Contemporary International Relations. 
21 Hu Angang and Men Honghua, "The ri sing of modern China: comprehensive national power and 
grand strategy," paper presented to "Rising China and the East Asian Economy" Internat ional 
Conference by KfEP, Seoul, 19-20 March 2004, 2. 
22 Huang Shuofeng, A'ix:/l'L 00.1J1*7J n': (The Great Combat: National Power and Global Power) 
(Changsha: Hunan Press, 1992), 12-19. 
23 Yan Xuetong, "The rise of China and its power status," The Chinese Journal of International 
Politics 1: 1 (2006), 16. 
24 For example, Xi Runchan, "±'i,m,t¥-ir 00 7J 1ol Jl2 Er-J l&ali'r ,\l:!,;\j-" (Strategic thinking on strengthening 
CNP), tflJ'f-iNJf (World Economics) , no.12 (1996), 11-1 3&25 ; Ma Jiangyuan, "ro'\liNJst'.&IR~g,¥-if l°EI 
7J %s ¥ifr:!f;lt f-t7Hfi'.fll t]).[il)j" (The development of high-technology and the anal ysis and prediction of 
CNP), "f:;;,fj'f. (A cademia), no.I (1997), 79-85; Sheng Jiru, ",F ~t-%'H!\\~Iffi:flt008''.J'!v:~ 7J "' (China 
must not neglect strengthening its "soft power"), l!tfill (Outlook), no.41 (1999), 12-13; Mei Qiyou, "tfs 
ir007Jtf'lijg"!v;'Z.-5t" (There are "hard" and "soft" ingred ients in CNP], f!&I ff!fflij;i,f; (Political 
Research Trends) , no.22 (1999), 1. 
25 Zhu Tingchang, "t!:!:~c.Z.X'P 00 (f,J~i;-[;!,jjJ'i-'i'fi1i" (The assessment of China 's CNP at the cross of 
the century), t!f:f'i!f:NJPL7ifkif,f1;J:i; (Forum of World Economic and Politics), no.3 (1999), l ; Sheng 
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The Soviet example of developing CNP was perceived negatively and was used to remind 
Chinese policy-makers that CNP was an ever-changing index due to the various tangible and 
intangible indicators and that attention needed to be paid to the coordinated development of 
hard power and soft power. 26 
The prominence of soft power in CNP thereafter has intensified. Soft power has come to be 
considered as an important factor in China 's national power and strategy. One outstanding 
example comes from Jiang Zemin ' s political report to the 16'" CCP Congress in 2002, where 
he pointed out that " in today' s world, culture intertwines with econom ics and politics, 
demonstrating a more prominent position and role in the competition for comprehensive 
national power. " 27 In China 's lnternmional Status Report 2005, more specifica ll y, 
researchers introduced the strengthening of soft power as one of the criteria to estimate the 
increase of China ' s CNP.28 
The CNP di scussion in China demonstrates that before Nye's soft-power concept was known 
to the Chinese intelligentsia, some Chinese scholars had already identified elements of what 
we now know as "hard power" and "soft power." This probably constitutes a reason why the 
concept of soft power has become so popular in China, as it resonates in academic circles. 
Additionall y and more importantly, Chinese scholars take the CNP as a "system," in which 
"soft" elements are as imponant as "hard" ones and a balanced development of all the aspects 
of CNP needs to be noted. This leads to the issue of the relation between hard power and soft 
power. The development of soft power indicators steers researchers to questions such as what 
constitutes China's soft power, how to evaluate it and how to develop it. Unlike the defensive 
posture in its first phase, soft power at thi s stage is endowed with positive meaning in China 's 
national development. 
3.2.3 Phase three: China's peaceful rise 
The third impol1ant phase of the emergence of soft power in Chinese di scourse is related to 
China ' s image building, known as "China' s peaceful ri se/development ." Alongs ide its rapid 
economic growth , China has been pursuing international recognition for its achievements and 
Jiru, "Chin a must not neglect strengthening its ' soft power '," 12. 
26 Xi Runchan, "Stra tegic thinking on strengthening CNP,' ' 12. 
" '·Jiang Zemin ·s report at 16th Party Congress on Nov 8, 2002.'' RMRB (Novem ber 18, 2002), I. 
" Zhang You wen et al. , rt> 00 00 fjj; ±-t!Jf,L :IR 'i!r 2005 (China ' s International Status Report 2005) (Beijing: 
Renmin, 2005). 
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growing international influence. The di scourse of China ' s peaceful ri se serves two functions 
for China: at first, it was a reaction to the theory of "China threat"; subsequentl y the 
discourse has incorporated the concept of soft power to demonstrate or suggest how China 
can achieve its rise by peaceful and benign means. This discourse shows Chinese sensitivity 
to China's international image and reputation, and its eagerness to obtain international 
recognition and respect for what it has achieved. What is more, this process, from reaction to 
initiative, in which Chinese scholars have shown empathy, learning and adaptation in 
response to the "China threat" thesis, undercuts reali st propositions which have shaped that 
theory. 
The di scourse of "China threat" occurs in the context of international concerns about the 
implications of China' s fast and phenomenal economic and military growth, particul arl y 
since the latter part of the 1990s. Generally, there are two explanations of "China threat" in 
JR. First, according to the "democratic peace theory," non-democratic regimes are potential 
threats to world peace, and thus China 's one-party political system always alarms the liberal s. 
The experience in the Cold War further demonstrated that it was difficult for the two different 
types of ideological regimes - communist and capitalist - to live together in world politics. 
Secondly, particularly from the pessimistic view rooted in the power-transition theor/9 and 
offensive realism,3° China' s increas ing material capacity is perceived as a threat to the extant 
regional and international systems. There will be, it is feared , a high possibility of a conflict 
between a more demanding China and those who would resist the changes China desires . 
These perceptions and theories lead to the conclusion that China poses a threat to those who 
have benefited from the existing international order underpinned by American power, and 
thus China needs to be countered and restrained. 
Chinese political elites they have all along been aware of the Western theories of "China 
threat." For example, after the Tiananmen crisis, Chinese leaders were conscious that leading 
advanced democracies had singled out China as a problematic power. 31 Many Chinese 
intellectuals came to know that the rapid growth of China' s economic power in the 1990s 
confounded many conservatives in the West who were worried how the Chinese Communist 
29 For a brief review of power-transition theory regard ing China's rise, can see Avery Goldstein, 
"Power transitions, institutions, and China's ri se in East Asia: theoretical expectations and evid ence," 
Th e Journal of Strategic Studies , vol.30, no.4-5 (2007), 639-82. 
JO The best example is John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 200 1 ). 
JI Qian Qichen, :Nx-hc (Ten Episodes in Diplomacy) (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi , 2003), ch.6. 
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government would use its growing material power. 32 These intellecruals complai ned that the 
"China threat" discourse was deri ved from a "Cold War mentality," which featured 
confrontational or zero-sum game thinking. They also fe lt it unfa ir that the West was 
unwilling to recogni ze China 's achievements in enhancing domestic li ving standards and as a 
pos itive force in the region. Tlu·oughout the 1990s, although many di scussed and refuted 
"China threat" theories, there was no major response as to how to alleviate those concerns. It 
was not until 2003 that fonner Vice President of the Central Party School and Chairman of 
the China Refonn Forum, Zheng Bijian, made a breakthrough by putting forward the idea of 
"China' s peaceful rise."33 
In essence, the " peaceful ri se" thesis posits China 's grO\vth by means of an alternative path to 
the strategies described by traditional power transition, such as hostil e balancing, escalating 
zero-sum competition and expansionist war. Zheng explains that "China ' s rise through 
peaceful development" had tv,o aspects: (I) engagement rather than isolation from economic 
globalization and (2) effo rts to "achieve a wi n-win si ruation with the international 
com munity." As such, China 's ri se strategy does not seek to challenge the existing 
international system but rather attempts to increase cooperati on within the system. The goal is 
basicall y to complete China's modernization and to make China become a medium-level 
developed country.34 This explanation suggests that China' s rise is domesti cally focused and 
represents a two-way process of interaction between its domestic and international 
environments. The term "peaceful ri se" was soon acknowledged and embraced by Chinese 
leaders in their international speeches. 35 It can be seen that this topic ini tia ll y was not a 
32 See Wa ng Zhongren, ",\!!,:cl:, 't' OO &lt®i.-(:;" (Thinking about the theories of "China threat"), fli:ff.Jitl if? 
(World Affa irs), no.12 (1997), 6-7. 
33 Zheng Biji an, "<pl;isl;¥1l'P:ijljlit!lffiilii11'\;l'll_i[[,iJll({,J**" (Chi na ' s new road toward s its peacefu l rise 
and the future of Asia. speech at Bo·ao Asian Forum in 2003), accessed at: 
http: //news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2003-l l /24/co ntent 1195240.htm. 
34 Zheng Bij ian, "Ten views on Chi na 's development road of peaceful rise and Sino-European 
relations," Dece mber 15 , 2005 , accessed at: hnp://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/664.pdf; Zheng Biji an, "China 's 
' peaceful rise ' to great-power statu s:· Foreign Affairs 84:5 (Sep/Oct 2005), 18-22. 
35 For example, Wen Jiabao. "1E i':j :l't:l!J:Jtl '11 l'isl'' (Tum eyes to China, speech at Harvard University on 
December 11 , 2003), in which he remarked that "China today is a big power ded icated to reform and 
opening up and peaceful rise," accessed at: http ://www.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/ 1061 /2241298.htm l; 
Hu Jintao, '·liJH:ll/1.U+:!:c:,t-'E;~!J,[f,J;tili!)l.: 110 f.i]if:J.'liikft..l:i'!Ji.Jti:?i" (Hu Jintao's speech at the 
11 0th birth ann iversary o f Mao Zedong, December 27, 2003), in which he stated that "to adhere the 
road of socialism wi th Chinese characteri stics" requires us to follow "a developmental road of peacefu l 
rise." accessed at: http: i/cpc.people.com.cn/GB/69 11 2/70190/70 193/1 4286125.html ; Zeng Qinghong, , 
'·1 :'fllf'./it/iij:Uj\ , ·i!Ol'.},fli[f,J~'*" (Peaceful development : for the prosperity of the Asia Pacifi c, 
speech at the UN Economic Commission for the Asia Pac ific, April 26, 2004), accessed at: 
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rigorous academic one but was a political and historical theme based on necessity and 
China ' s hi storical obligation of reali zing "great power" status. 
Neve rtheless, the leadership ' s an ention provided academia with a great deal of impetus for 
investigating the subject. Scholars , institutes and publications began discussing the ·'theory of 
China's peaceful rise" at considerable length, although at first they focused on its 
shortcomings and problems. Many felt that the word " rise" (jueqi) sounded a bit aggressive, 
wh ich went against the doctrine of "hiding one 's brightness and keeping a low profile" (tao 
guang y ang hui) and would make its neighbours and the US uneasy. 36 Some argued that it is 
premature to talk about a rise, as China largely remains a developing country. 37 A few policy 
analysts rai sed the Taiwan issue, pointing out that the use of force against "Taiwan 
independence" should not be constrained by a pledge to pursue a peaceful international 
strategy. 38 In the middle of thi s debate, the Chinese government changed the term " ri se" to 
"development" in a white paper entitled "China' s Peaceful Development" at the end of 
2005. 39 However, "peaceful ri se" is sti ll being widely used in government as well as 
academic circles across China. 
Despite the problems in the theory, discussions about how China can_ achieve its goal of a 
peaceful rise gradually have pointed at soft power. At the domestic level, scholars suggest 
that China needs to properly handle domestic issues and mobili ze national cohesion to 
maintain its economic development and preserve domestic stability. 40 At the international 
level, a grand strategy is recommended, incorporating moves to gain regional acceptance for 
China ' s expanding sphere of influence and a self-conscious image building to counter fears 
http://www. peop I e.com. cn/G B/shizhen g/24 70260. htm I . 
36 Wang Jisi, '";fn"f ~il!l ' t>'llttlB'J~5C' (The significance of advancing "peaceful ri se"), !/Jf{:!jt.1=Jli}f7[ 
(Teaching and Research) , no.4 (2004), 7. 
37 Liu Xige, ";fll ' l'·dliil/8lB'JJ11' l<iJ/1fil" (A few questions of peaceful rise), tf!f{:!jt.!jli}fyt (Teaching and 
Research) , no.4 (2004), 17. 
38 Shi Xiaohu and Si Yintao, "'t' 00 ;flPl': d/iil;m ml 1\ii B11\1' '.t:3':#EI&" (The six security challenges 
facing China's peaceful rise), accessed at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004-
06/0l/content 1503173.htm; Meng Xiangqing, ";fD "f ~js).!sij'tz:3':~~" (Peaceful rise and security 
rise), f!f::!jt.!;;li}fyt (Teaching and Research), no.4 (2004), 15. 
39 lnformation Office of the State Counci l of the PRC, cpff[J$<;;fflfi;t)Ni!tJ!ff (China 's Peace(i,I 
Development), Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, December 2005. 
40 Wang Yizhou, "'t'OOtllf~~B'JOOe'-J ;/;Elitli" (Domest ic basis for China 's peaceful ri se), ,t/(¢.!jlilf 
f ;; (Teaching and Research), no.4 (2004), 10. 
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that equate this expansion with the emergence of a "China threat. "41 Characterized as non-
violent, graduall y implemented and mutually beneficial , "China· s peaceful ri se," according to 
the Chinese [R specialist Shi Yinhong, largel y depends on soft power.42 Chinese scholars of 
international studies envisage that soft power can contribute to China ' s peaceful rise by 
shaping a favourable international environment th.rough two instruments. One is diplomatic 
engagement, particularly tlu·ough multilateralism, to deliver Chinese ideas on addressing and 
handling global issues; and the other is cultural promotion to foster cultural affinity with 
other regional actors.43 These two instruments will be discussed further in the next section. 
Soft power, in this regard, exercises " persuasi ve power," persuading other regional powers to 
accept China' s ri se. 
This third phase of the Chinese discussion of soft power has been addressed in the context of 
China' s rise. This reflects that the foc us of soft power has shifted to China' s foreign policy 
and great strategy - how soft power can be developed and enhanced to help China reali ze 
peaceful rise . 
3.2.4 Phase four: China as a model for development 
Having reviewed how the concept of soft power is related to the interest in protecting 
Chinese cultural identity, enhancing CNP and achieving China's peaceful ri se, the rest of thi s 
section explores . another strand of Chinese soft-power di scourse - the "China model" 
(Zhongguo moshi). 
China's economic and social achievements in its reform era have prompted substanti al 
academic research into the explanations of China' s successes. The 2004 publication Beijing 
Consensus by Joshua Cooper Ramo, which demonstrates the alternative development model 
41 Li Jie, "t'l[JJ· !@(tJl.jJX')';kI~'fltli l;fO -'j"~me/&W/'r(J'0f'Ffll" (The role of enJ1ancing soft power in 
China 's strategy of peacefu l ri se), ;/,:5f#,J!:tf1 (Pacific Journal), no .12 (2005), 64 -71 ; Luo Jianbo, "i:£: 
'PilJ;¥O-'f' 1->t!Plt!.t!l!l' 1't'o<J000'.)~~1i'1~" (China image building in the view of peaceful development), 
i!Jiifi.!E (New Thinking), no.9 (2007), 45-59; also see the wri ti ngs under the ti tle of "rj, Jctil;fO-'!"J41ffime-L 
llrt" (The road of Ch ina's peacefu l rise) in the website of 't'tfl/!(g (Mvw. c/1ing. com.cn), which involves 
distinguished Ch inese schol ars from IR, politics, hi story, strategy and security studies, accessed at: 
http://www.china.com.cn/chi nese/zhuant i/ hp/530363.htm. 
42 Shi Yinhong, " China ' s peaceful ri se is all about soft power," China Daily (June 14, 2007), 10. 
43 Chen Zhirui , " ::is 'f ;fllf~~Jl(J)(ftt&IB/I " (Cultural strategy in peaceful ri se), J!1!fr .!:.jli}f!fi: 
(Teaching and Research) , no.4 (2004), 20: Song X iaofeng, " ·iA -IIT'+'OO.:flJ1' ~ml'PO~'i!ktJl.)J'31#" 
(Soft-power fa ctors in China 's peaceful ri se), ;sjt:f)( (Truth Seeking) , no.8 (2005), 76 -79; Yu Xintian, 
·· t:l::1J :l:;!: ,;J;j9:-'--]rt, "1,lx,J':$1r/&DJ/!, '' (Soft power building and Chinas external strategy), tfl/f,f./a]/,fffif;izj 
(Forum of International Studies) (autumn 2007), 15-25 ; Zhao Quansheng and Liu Guoli , "The 
cha ll enges of a risi ng China," Journal of Strategic Studies, vol.30, no.4-5 (2007), 596. 
56 
China has used to achieve its successes, has provoked international interest in this 
development model and its implications. 44 Ramo attributes China' s accomplishment to 
" innovation-Jed growth," "sustainability and equality," "self-determination" and continuous 
refonns in a dynamic society. 45 The term "Beijing Consensus" is eye-catching because it 
draws attention to the comparison between Chinese approaches to development and the 
"Washington Consensus" embraced by the West. The latter was initially coined by John 
Williamson in J 989 to prescribe a set of ten neo-liberal policies for underdeveloped countries 
in Latin America based on their interaction with Washington-based international financial 
institutions.46 Many commentators envisage the "Beijing Consensus" as a competitor to and 
even a replacement for the "Washington Consensus." Ramo ' s proposition has received 
international attention from high-profile foreign media reports. 
In contrast, the low-key "China model" is a topic that Chinese political elites have engaged 
with over decades. It emerged from speculation about the robustness of the Soviet command 
economic model in the 1980s, and again in deliberation on the "socialism with Chinese 
characteristics" model in the l 990s.47 Most recently there has been debate about what the 
"China model" is and what its implications are for China and the world in the 21 " century.48 
It can be seen that the "China model" was a theme that first occupied Chinese researchers on 
the issues of the development of China' s economy and domestic institutions. Subsequently, 
the emergence of the "Beijing Consensus" debate in the West has intrigued many Chinese IR 
analysts, who are enthusiastic about how the "China model " can enhance China' s soft power 
and international clout. 
Generally, Chinese debate on this subject covers four key questions: (1) the relationship 
between the "Beijing Consensus" and the "Washington Consensus"; (2) whether the "Beijing 
Consensus" is the same as the "China model"; (3) whether the "China model" has universal 
44 Joshua Cooper Ramo, Beijing Consensus (London, U.K.: Foreign Policy Centre, 2004). The author 
is a senior advisor to the investment form Goldman Sachs and adjunct professor of Tsinghua 
University in Beijing. The Chinese translation of Beijing Consensus can found in Huang Ping and Cui 
Zhiyuan eds., cfi&-"J±Iff./:;: if!JJ!f1[f!Ji:i,F!:JE}ldf;Jfrji;i,F! (China and Globalisation: Washington 
Consensus or Beijing Consensus) (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian, 2005). 
45 Ramo, Beijing Consensus, 11-24. 
46 See John Williamson, "Did the Washington Consensus fail?" Outline of Remarks at CSIS, 
Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, November 6, 2002, accessed at: 
http://www.iie.com/publicotions/papers!paper.cfin? ResearchID ~488. 
47 See Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol.3: 2, 139, 178, 237, 261 , 292. 
48 See Yu Keping et al ed., er [l,ltclt:rl'.!J "~tffi~U'!" MJ,ll!, "~:ilH.vl:tt:-U'!" (China Model and the 
"Beijing Consensus": Beyond the "Washington Consensus") (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian, 2006). 
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value; and (4) the re lationship between th e ' 'China model" and China ' s soft power. 49 Many 
study these questions using a comparative method, comparing Chinese experience with those 
developing states which implemen ted poli cies along the lines of the neo-liberal policies 
prescribed by the " Washingto n Consensus." These studi es actuall y lead to one centra l 
di chotomy: uni versa li sm vs . tbe uniqueness of Chi na's develo pment model. 
Some Chinese scholars explore the universali ty of experiences and va lues underly ing China ' s 
development. 50 The "China model" characteri zed by " protecting national interests," 
" pragmati sm," "hannony without uni fom1i ty" (he er bu tong) and "anti-shock therapy" is in 
striking contrast with the " Washington Consensus," featuring liberalizati on and 
privatization.51 Based on China's economic achievements in the reform era, these scholars 
argue that the "China model " has global appea l particu larly in the developing world . 
In contrast, some other analysts emphas ize the "Chineseness"52 of the country's deve lopment 
experience, and mainta in that the "China model" is based on the PRC 's own d istinctive 
qualities and conditions. Some of them also point out that th ere are a lot of problems wi thin 
China's development, such as poll uti on, corruption and income di sparity, making talk about 
the uni ve rsal va lue of China's model look premature. 53 N evertheless, both sides consider that 
with China's continui ng economic growth, the "China model" or Chinese experie nce of 
national development can be a source of soft power for China. 54 
49 Tang Huiyun. "J;lsi i*Jejt;j(:3'/,cp Jlsl ~ ~:;l1li)fj;;JJ11, :{}::i.']'{,!i" (Review of the studies on China's soft 
power in China), /lfl![,jij(;ffiffe'/IJE,lj/:!fl (Journal of University of International Relations), no.3 (2008), 
21. 
50 Zhou Jianjun and He Hengyuan. ·' 9-' 00 'I# ll'/ ((,J ttf: 1/- ;li'L)(: ' J,I, ii" JJl\ 491 ;!t if(' i lJ '~t Ji\' ;Jt i,'~ "' 
(International signi fi cance of Ch ina ' s trans iti on: from "Was hington Consensus" to "Beiji ng 
Consensus"), ff/_}'j!ffilf--.EJilJ:ifiif;'Jjj (Forum of World Economic and Politics), no.l (2005), 72-75; 
Cai Tua, "1*'.* 'i18~''P001'Yl'it''' (Exp loring "China model' '), afttifJ'f.-'-ii±1l!I.X (Contempora,y 
World and Socialism), no.5 (2005), 12-14. 
51 Chen Dawei , ··.:p,t,ttf:;c.z.£1'r--hA.i/"J1li:19l;!ti,'-(i1:UtJi\;/tif(" (The path of ha lf a century - from 
Washington Consensus to Beijing Consensus), f!l!it'/!iii1 (Theoretical Investigation) , no.5 (2007), 74-
75. 
52 The concept of ·'Chineseness" can be referred to Wang Gungwu, The Chi11ese11ess of China: 
Selected Essa_vs (Hong Kong; New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
53 Yuan Shan. ·'*f ·~tg,;ltiR'liJfJ'.i:(i'Ju l' lciJ~' ' (Some issues on the study of"Beijing Consensus"). 
3ftfl!J'1-'--Jtlf!!I5: (Co nte111pora1y World and Socialism), no.5 (2004), 17-2 1; Zheng Yongnian and 
Zhang Chi. ·'OOll-f-AA:it'PD1$;;/J:!,l:IJ..&x1'P00$,:;/J:!;!:fl(] J,!i!~" (Soft power in international politics 
and the observation of China's soft power), tJ!!f!ffiJP.EJiJJ:ifi(World Economics and Politics), no.7 
(2007). 12. 
" Yuan Shan. "Some issues on the study of ' Be ijing Consensus '". 18; Zhang Jianjin, '·' ~thf;l-h;(' 1i'P 
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Chinese officials are naturally very cautious about the term "Beijing Consensus," and are 
certainly not promoting it. Firstly, Beijing does not want to be seen as a challenger to 
Washington 's global leadership. 55 The "Beijing Consensus" versus "Washington Consensus" 
debate has gone beyond the issue of economic development to the other topics including 
political system, culture and foreign policy, which is discussed later. The CCP is particularly 
sensitive to avoid any links between the "China model " and the promotion of China's one-
party system as well as support for authoritarian governments. Such links are likely to be 
associated with the "China threat" to the liberal and democratic values of the West, which 
could impede China's peaceful rise project. 56 Secondly, the Chinese leadership insists that 
each country should adopt a path of development suitable to their specific conditions. 
Throughout the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping repeatedly told the leaders of developing countries 
that, "conditions vary from one country to another," therefore, "you must always remember 
one point: suit your own conditions ... The world's problems cannot all be solved in the same 
way. China has its own way," and your country "must also find its own way."57 In China ' s 
approach to foreign affairs, Deng established a policy style which holds that China must 
"keep a low profile" and "never take the lead."58 Deng's doctrine requires China not to export 
its ideology. It restrains China from dealing with international relations based on ideologies 
and from seeking to be a hegemon. To date, this low-key approach still constrains Beijing 
from taking the lead in international affairs in general and from exporting its model in 
particular.59 
[;i,1 $):'!);j:, (J(J j;\',fr" (The "Beijing consensus" and the enhancement of China 's soft power), afttiff'f' 
$/1#.33'5< (Contemporary World and Socialism) , no.5 (2004), 11-12; Yu Keping and Zhuang Junju, 
"11\i.,1;/13--'=i;tt,',l!,~--Jc"f':ll)5'(~i.,';'--'=i't'lllitJlHltrt;(J(Jxji,1i" (Hot topic and calm thinking - the 
dialogue on Beijing consensus and China model for development], a ft tit J;! $ t± it± X 
(Contemporary World and Socialism) , no.5 (2004), 9; Pang Zhongying, "fA':it)5'(~i;r~cp l'liJJil;U[ii]" 
(Observing China 's influence from "Beijing Consensus"), ,Pfl[Jf{Jt] (China Bid) , no.42 (2005), 46. 
55 Interview with Dr Ren Xiao, Deputy Dean of Institute of International Studies of Fudan University, 
Canberra, December 4, 2009. 
56 Interview with Dr Yu Keping, Deputy Director of .the Bureau of Transl ation of the CCP Central 
Committee, Canberra, May 18, 20 12. 
57 Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol.3: 178, 261. Such a recommendation can be 
found his talks to the leaders from Zimbabwe, Poland, Yugoslavia, Mozambique and the USSR, see 
Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol.3: 136-40, 178, 236-43 , 260-1 , 291-2. 
58 Deng' s "Sixteen-Character Principles" for China 's foreign affairs: observe cool-headedly, stand 
firmly, cope with difficulties calmly, and keep a low profile. Later he added "never take the lead" and 
"accomplish something." See Quansheng Zhao, Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy: The Micro-
Macro Linkage Approach (Hong Kong; New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 53-54. 
59 See the discussions in "!°fil fjj;f{t /l,l 2012, #J&,fi'l:)'t'fl'IIJ,j--'J;f1*Bttll.'if.ii'iX:J13~" (International 
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Whether China ' s economic performance serves as a "model" fo r other developing countries 
to emu late is still a subject of debate. Nevertheless, the intense debate on " Beijing Consensus" 
arou nd the world actually shows that China 's soft power is increasing. The "Beijing 
Consensus' ' or "China model"' has become an issue transcending economics and bringing in 
politics, foreign policy, and culture. The accretion of economic power and social capital have 
certainly boosted China' s confidence, pride and capacity to project its political and cultural 
influence abroad. 
To recap, this section identifies a four-phase development of the Chinese discourse of soft 
power in recent years. There have been various concerns mixed together and soft power has 
been assigned to different roles to achieve different purposes. It demonstrates that the 
Chinese understanding of soft power - including the content and the purpose - is not fi xed. 
The interaction of the global and domestic context and the swelling number of Chinese 
participants in soft power discussions all together account for thi s evolving understanding. As 
China becomes increasingly open and materially wealthy, it recei ves more and more attention 
from the outside. The concerns of other societies al so have a correspondingly stronger impact 
on Chinese domestic thinking. Moreover, the Chinese leadership plays an important role in 
shaping the ongoing Chinese di scourse, such as the di scussions about culture and peaceful 
ri se. 
3.3 Constitution and mobilization of China's soft power in 
contemporary Chinese discourse 
The first section of this chapter has di scussed the emergence of a Chinese discourse of soft 
power in the last two decades. It explores how thi s concept serves Chinese interests in 
defending the country ' s cultural identity and in realizing China' s peaceful ri se, and how the 
concept of soft power resonates with Chinese concepts of CNP and a "China model. " From 
th is analysi s, thi s section identifies the key componen ts of Chi na ' s soft power fro m Chinese 
discourse. They are (I) Chinese culture, (2) China as a model for development, and (3) 
China' s fore ign pol icy and diplomacy. Soft power, in the view of many Chinese analysts, 
does not come naturally from the growth of hard material power. Rather, it has to be 
intentionally cultivated and built up by mobili zing Chinese sources of soft power. 60 Therefore, 
situation of 20 12: rethinking "keep a low profi le" - issue one at Annual Conference of Global Times 
held on December 17, 2011 ), accessed at: hllp:llwor/d.huanqiu.comlzhua111i/2011-12/2265056.html. 
60 Yan Xuetong. "'PJc!iHX~::/JHtii~A" (Chi na's soft power needs to be enhanced), June 2006, 
60 
this section also sketches Chinese thinking about the cultivation and mobilization of these 
key sources of China' s soft power in international politics. 
It is widely argued that China in the new century faces two new challenges. One is to counter 
the "China threat" theory and persuade the international community, especially China' s 
neighbours, to accept China' s rise as a desirable event. The other is to project China ' s 
national identity as a responsible great power by assuming more international obligations and 
engaging in international affairs through cooperation with other great powers . To meet both 
challenges most Chinese IR scholars agree that it is inevitable that China must strengthen its 
soft power.61 While the definition of soft power - the ability to get what a country wants 
through attraction rather than coercion - has not been substantially questioned by most 
Chinese analysts, there are different meanings given to it with regard to what constitutes soft 
power and how to generate attraction. 
3.3.1 Chinese culture and a "going out" strategy 
Today, Chinese culture is a salient topic within the overall debate on China' s soft power. The 
argument that "culture is the core of China' s soft power" dominates the Chinese discourse of 
soft power, evidenced by the term "cultural soft power" (wenhua ruan_shili) appeared in Hu 
Jintao's report to the 17th Party Congress on October 15, 2007 .62 The major explanations for 
this argument are sununarized as follows . 
Firstly, the argument that "culture is the core of China' s soft power" is tied to the function of 
culture. Zhang Guozuo, Director of the Chinese Soft Power Research Centre shows that 
internally, cultural soft power has the capacity to enhance national cohesion and innovation; 
and externally, it has the function of " infiltration, persuasion and attractiveness." 63 As such, 
culture is the "soul" of soft power. The cultural factor of soft power can affect the " rise and 
accessed from: http://www.ccwe.org.cn/ccweold/journal/2/l .pdf ; Yan Xuetong and Xu Jin, "1'~10(:,:i; 
jJ ~G -'l&'."· (A comparison of soft power between China and the United States), JJf!ff: fy(f,ji;,(;}f{ 
(Contemporary International Relations) , no.I (2008), 24-29. 
61 Cao Dong, "ili:"f'* [J;l p;i !lf:~ T 10(:!);;jJ:iiJ!'J'Un t'i0£ " (An overview of soft power study in and out 
of China), tJ!-filN"f: (Leadership Science) , no.35 (2009), 48. 
62 
"Hu Jintao ' s report to the 17'h Party Congress on October 15, 2007," RMRB (October 25 , 2007), 3. 
In 2009, a Research Centre on China' s Cultural Soft Power was established in Changsha, Hunan 
Province, which obtained support from differ_ent levels of the Chinese government and research 
instih1tes. See Zhang Guozuo "The Chinese cultural soft power research of 2009," in Zhang Guozuo 
ed., Annual Report on China 's Cultural Soft Power Research (20 I 0) , 2-7. 
63 Zhang Guozuo, "The Chinese cultural soft power reseijrch of2009," 23. 
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fall of a nation" and can contribute to the " recognition and respect" from other countries. 64 
Secondly, many Chinese schol ars bel ieve that China's " fi ve thousand years of civil isation'· 
demonstrate the vita lity of Chinese culture and prove that China has abundant cultural 
resources. For instance, Yu Xintian, a Chinese IR and culture specialist, suggests that 
Chinese tradi tional culture has always played a significant role in defining the "Chinese 
nation" (zhonghua minzu) and has contributed to the growth of China' s national power and its 
regional influence in East Asia. The socio-economic success of East Asian "Tigers" in the 
latter part of the 201" century and China's current achievement all provide evidence of 
Chinese cultural merits . Furthermore, China 's splendid civil isation has left many cu ltural 
asset s, ranging from ancient Chinese philosophy, language and art to food and medicine.65 
Concepts and values in Confucianism, such as "humane authority" (wang dao) , "winning 
respect through virtue" (yi de Ju ren) and "harmony without uniformity" (he er bu tong), 
influenced imperial China's governance and China ' s relations with other countries and 
societies, and continue to play a role in building China's international influence.66 
Thirdly, in addition to arguments which hold up the merits of Chinese cu lture, some scholars 
argue that Chinese culture may provide an alternative to the confrontational approach which 
features in modem civilisation, a product of modem Western history and culture. For instance, 
the philosopher Zhao Tingyang at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) suggests 
in hi s monograph "Tianxia System" that the problem in international politics today is not 
·'fail ed states" but a "fa iled world. " He explai ns that Western politica l theories use 
"nation/state" as basic unit of analysis. This approach leads to the division of the world 
according to radical distinctions between friends and enemies, between inside and outside, 
which is easi ly converted into absolute "Otherness" and thus causes confrontations and 
6-1 Ibid .. 25. 
65 Interview with Yu Xintian, senior research fellow at Shanghai Institutes of International Studies, 
Shanghai, March I 0, 20 I 0. 
66 Fo r instance see Luo Jianbo, ·· 'IJ,;:v:;jJ.!ejcjo OO :W3t·· (Soft power and China ' s dipl omacy), i/iiiiUE 
(/llew Thinking), no.5 (2008), 45: Zhu Hanmin, "111 ff! ti f l/ Jt f-t ' W. ~ ~ 'M( ~ JJ ' JAJ im ·· (The 
connotation of '·soft power·· in the concept of "cu lture" in Ancient Chi na), Qu Yongfang and Wei Leyi , 
··fr!)$: L:,q, 00:.icf-t!f;!;:v:;jJ ·· (Confucianism and China 's cultural soft power), Liu Liping, "ff!i!jf:ffiflllt/i 
~.!ej '-1-100 Jtf-t~x;t JJ J!-j)l'·· (Confuc iani sm ethnics tradition and the construction of China' s cultural 
soft power), in Zhang Guozuo ed .. Annual Report on China ·s C11/t11ra/ Soi Power Research (2010), 
193-99. 336-42. 343-50: Yan Xuetong. ·'How assertive shou ld a great power be?,'. n,e New York 
Times. March 31. 20 11 : Yan Xuetong, ··How China can defeat America;' n,e New York Times, 
November 20, 2011. In these two articles, Yan emphasizes the importance of ancient Chinese 
philosophy such as --human authority"' (wa11g) to a great power. 
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conflicts. In contrast, traditional Chinese philosophy observes the world throngh the 
dimension of "Tianxia-state-famil y," which is believed to provide a broader framework for 
social and political interaction. Because all is under the heaven, there is "no outsider. " In 
Tianxia system, it stresses "ethics" (dao de) and human relations, and the distinctions such as 
friends and enemies are more relative than absolute. In this sense, Zhao suggests that Chinese 
traditional culture is more appealing in that it is a culture of transfonning enemies into friends 
rather than making the radical distinction - the Self and the Other.67 The study of ancient 
Chinese political thought to find alternative approaches in addressing and solving today 's 
international issues has become popular in Chinese IR circles .68 
Despite China' s glorious cultural history, Chinese analysts of soft power are aware of the 
hard reality of the competition in the "cultural industry" including mass med ia and the 
international trade in mass cultural products. Some argue that Chinese traditional cultural 
legacies actually reflect rather the soft power of "Chinese civilisation" (Zhonghua wenming) 
than the soft power of the "PRC."69 To enhance the latter, China needs to develop "dynamic" 
soft power through conducting international public relations, particularly in expanding the 
influence of the Chinese media and dealing with the Western media. 70 Some point out that 
China has lagged far behind its Western counterparts in competing for business in cultural 
products, such as movies, television programs, books, popular music and fashion .71 At a time 
of expansion in American popular culture, many are afraid that the Chinese voice will be 
drowned in a sea of international media, resulting in the waning of Chinese culture and 
ultimately the weakening of Chinese cultural identity. They argue that China needs to make 
strenuous efforts to change the "unbalanced situation" in cultural promotion and strive for 
"discursive power" (huayu quan) ." 
67 Zhao Tingyang, Arf,je~ , t!t!J'l-l#Ll ~i"f "F -@ii; (Tianxia System: A Philosophy for the World 
Institution) (Nanjing: Jiangsu Jiaoyu, 2005). 
68 The prominent examples are Qin Yaqing, " [°fil f,ij; :!fc * :f'!1 ii; 9" ~ $: i/R 'E RX il<J rlJ ('fg i P :Ji'., i.!\ " 
(Possibility and necessity of building a Chinese School in IR), tffJ'lf&i.!flgJJf{;f; (World Economics 
and Politics) , no.3 (2006), 7-13; Yan Xuetong, Ancient Chinese Thought. Modern Chinese Power 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). 
69 Interview with Dr Wu Guanjun, Institute for Advanced Study in Social Science ofFudan University 
(now Professor of Politics at East China Normal University), Shanghai, March 11 , 2010. 
70 Wu Xu, "'t' l!Jti,~JJ::f('ft 11z~;,js:" (China 's soft power cannot just rely on traditional cultural 
legacies), Global Tim es (June 27, 2007), 10. 
71 Ni Xun, "1':[i,JiJ& !;)}~Jjl-(J/Ui') 5g\yf,t ![)(~JJil<J ,gnli/: .si,'' (CPPCC National Committee members 
discuss how to enhance cultural soft power), Guangming Ribao (January 3, 2008). 
72 Zhang Guozuo, "The Chinese cultural soft power research of2009," 37-38. 
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From the analysis above, the conclusion that --culture is the core of China·s soft power" is 
largely drawn from the comparison between Chinese and Western culture. Many suggest that 
"the competition over cultural power is the core of soft power competition'· and believe that 
the Chinese government must have a cultural strategy. 73 ln September 2006, a cultural "going 
out" strategy was explicitly written in "The National Planning Guidelines for Cultural 
Development in the Eleventh Five-Year Period." It proposes measures to utilize various 
festival occasions and mass media to promote Chinese culture, to cu ltivate international sales 
networks for Chinese cultural products, and to provide support to major overseas-oriented 
cultural enterprises . 74 At the 6th Plenary Session of the 17th CCP Central Committee in 
October 201 1, this cultural "going out·· strategy was further stressed in the decision regarding 
culture development and reform of the cultural system, including the expansion of Confucius 
Institutes abroad.75 
However. some scholars have pointed out problems in the ··going out" strategy of Chinese 
cul ture. Some argue that the ·'appreciation of Chinese culture and interesf in learning Chinese 
language would not automatically increase .. support for or understanding of China·s policy. 
It is impossible to ascertain to what degree we can achieve our political objectives by 
projecting our cu]hiral soft power. .. 76 According to this argument, China needs to pay 
attention to other aspects of soft power. Other scholars point out that the attraction of Chinese 
culture is confined to Asia; it has not constructed a value system with global appeal. 77 Yu 
Xintian concludes. "[t]he construction of China·s core val ue system serves not only to prop 
-, For instance. Li Haijuan. ·· tl(:l):;.hjl'.$-1'\':llt Fi¥J>Citli!:li}·· (Cultural strategy within the context of 
soft power competition). 4'i~JFJ(ff,},-IfZ:f!!!if'!ilfJl (Studies Oll Mao Z.edollg and Deng Xiaoping 
11,eories) . no.12 (2004). 50. 
-, ··~*·+-.ii·HtJIJl>Cit~l!UU.tH:!Hll ( :'£:iO ·· (The National Planning Guidelines for Cultural 
Development in the Eleventh Five-Year Period (full text)). Xillh11a News Agency, September 13, 2006. 
; --Decision of the CPC Central Conuninee on major issues pertaining to deepening reform of the 
cultural system and promoting the great development and flou.rishing of socialist culture. passed at the 
Sixth Plenarv Session of the Seventeenth CPC Central Comminee on October 18. 2011.·· rranslated by 
English Section of the Central Document T ranslarion Department of the Central Compilation and 
Translation Bureau. accessed from: www.cctb.net/bvwwxfv/20111 !/W0201 l I l215195278266l5.pdf. 
·• Gao Yifei. ·· i:p~i¥J~~:htEl9:ifflfr-lt!i1..l!l '' (Chinas Soft Power in European Perspective). i&lf-lY 
if /Refom, Reference). no. 32 (2010). 38-40: also see Zhang Zhizhou. ·· )(-f.t:9r3<'.'.!::i't'OOJtit·iE tll 
-t ' fr-JR/;~, ja]~!::,x;t~·· (Cultural diplomacy and Chinese culture "go out"). §fft!f.Ji!.!itlff'±X 
Co111emporary World and Socialism) . no.3 (2012). 12-16. 
- Zhao Kejin and Peng Pingping. ·· q,OO:x=it'tX*)Ji!Dllaii¥Jffiiff:&Jt~lic~U·· (The difficulties in 
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up the Chinese dream, but also to make the outside world understand and embrace the 
Chinese dream." Only when it has "world-wide appeal ," can "the cultural China" become 
more "eye-catching." 78 Some analysts also show their concerns about the state-centric 
approach of promoting Chinese culture. They think associations between this cultural strategy 
and China ' s broader political agenda may weaken the credibility of Chinese culture.79 
Despite these reservations about China' s cultural strategy, many Chinese scholars and policy 
analysts already believe that culture constitutes a "core" source of China' s soft power. The 
role that culture plays in enhancing national cohesion and international appeal has been 
confirmed and emphasized by the Chinese leaders. The Chinese government has already 
decided to promote a "cultural China," which will be discussed in Chapter Five. 
3.3.2 China as a model for development 
Another source of China ' s soft power discussed widely by the Chinese intelligentsia is the 
"China model." As noted in the previous section, Chinese political elites have worked on this 
topic since the 1980s. But Joshua Cooper Ramo ' s publication Beijing Consensus prompted a 
new wave in the debate on "China as a model for development." 
The prestige of China as a model for development has been premised on China' s persistent 
economic growth since the implementation of the policies of "reform and opening up" at the 
end of 1978. It is considered that China' s economic success presents the developing world 
with a new recipe for achieving social prosperity. 80 While there is still debate concerning 
what the "China model " is, some features of this model have been summarized by a number 
of scholars. For example, noted economist Lin Yifu (Justin Lin) considers that the essence of 
China ' s achievement lies in flexibility and pragmatism. 81 Suisheng Zhao describes the "China 
model" as "authoritarian capitalism," a pattern of incremental reform towards a controlled 
78 Yu Xintian, " rj, OO ~t,C,,jfrrn 1**~-\)1-El'J 00 f;iF t.!MB'" (International dimension of building China 's 
core value system), !Jf/!f,ji/b]J'fh'f;ii; (Forum of International Studies) (winter 2008), 24. 
79 Zhang Zhizhou, "Cultural diplomacy and Chinese culture 'go out' ," 15; Fang Changping, "9"~19( 
:,);;fl bttQ'.&;!,;x,J 9" 00 El'JJa 7r" (A comparison between China' s soft power and that of US and its 
implications for China), tlfJ'!-i£;i;f_!gJ]jf!:rf! (World Economics and Politics), no.7 (2007), 27. 
80 For instance, see Yu Keping et al ed. ,'P!Jf/!J{:it:_lg ":ft}irftiR": jjf//ft ":!pJJJii/!ffi;,-/fc iR" (China 
Model and the "Beijing Consensus ": Beyond the "Washington Consensus') (Beij ing: Shehui Kexue 
Wenxian, 2006); S. Philip Hsu, "In search of China 's development model : beyond the Beijing 
Consensus," in S. Philip Hsu, Yu-Shan Wu and Suisheng Zhao, eds., In Search of China 's 
Development Mode/ (London; New York: Routledge, 2011), 13-15. 
81 Andrew Batson, "Lin urges flexibility in fighting poverty," Wail Street Journal , February 29, 2008. 
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decentrali zation and gradual liberalization of a market economy. 82 Likewise, Taiwanese 
scholar S. Philip Hsu refers to China· s deve lopment model as the '·Janus-faced stare-led 
growth." He argues that "the state has played a much more critical role vis-a-vis the market in 
steering China' s economic take-off. ' . However, he suggests that the state's ultimate role " is to 
be comprehended as to nurture and accelerate marketizat ion , liberalization and privatization, 
rather than to replace them." 83 These scholars argue that China' s deve lopment path goes 
against the Western prescriptions for the developing world - wholesale privatization and 
rapid liberalization. 
Therefore, in many scholars ' view, the stare plays a big role in China's economic 
development in contrast with the idea of laissez-faire under the Western liberal democratic 
system. The "China model" differs from that of the West, and China ' s economic 
development cannot be fully explained by Western economic theories. 84 As was claimed by 
fonner Chinese President Jiang Zemin in hi s speech at the University of Cambridge in 1999: 
The Chinese nation bas persi stentl y pursued an independent national 
spirit and road to development. We, the Chinese people, regard 
independence as the foundation on which to bui ld the country. 
Independence and self-reliance should not rule out learning from other 
countries and drawing upon the fruits of world civilization since the two 
are complementary to each other. However, it must be pointed out that 
the absorption and learning process is by no means one of simple 
imitation and China cannot copy the development model of Western 
capitalist countries, nor can it mechanicall y follow other countries' 
models of building sociali sm. 85 
The discuss ion of the "China model" serves two ends. First, it provides an effecti ve 
counterpoint to the ··China co llapse rheory."'86 and thus it has enhanced the CCP· s leadership 
" Suisheng Zhao. ··The China model and the authoritarian state:· East Asia Fonim (August 31 , 2011), 
accessed from: http ://www.eastasiaforum.org/20 I 1/08/31/the-china-model-and-the-authoritarian-state/ 
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role in China's national development. In the "China collapse theory," the PRC's imminent 
collapse was predicted, not unlike that of the Soviet Union in 1991, because of the envisaged 
policy mismanagement under the illiberal authoritarian political system. However, the PRC 
has not only survived but also maintained rapid economic growth in the post-Cold War era, 
even when many other societies both in the West and Asia have suffered from financial crises. 
The publication of Beijing Consensus further bestows greater international recognition on 
"reform with Chinese characteristics", not only as an economic development model but as an 
alternative model of political system and social structure. In this sense, the "China model" to 
some extent provides the CCP with leadership credentials in China ' s modernization process, 
mainly on the basis of economic development and national strength improvement rather than 
refonn of the political system. 
Second, Chinese scholars suggest that the "China model ," seen as an alternative to the 
Western neo-liberal model for economic development, enhances China' s global appeal. For 
instance, Xiao Gongqin and Wu Jiaxiang, noted proponents of neo-authoritarianism in China, 
consider that China' s current development model demonstrates the attractiveness of its 
modernization process because it succeeds in leading the country to economic prosperity and 
political stability in the long term.87 Due to China's socio-economic successes, some analysts 
posit that the "China model" can serve as a model for developing countries to emulate. As 
Men Honghua, Professor of International Strategies in the Central Party School of the CCP 
put it bluntly: 
Because of the failure of the 'Washington Consensus ' in Latin 
American and other developing countries, these states have increasingly 
turned to the Chinese model of economic growth and political stability. 
African leaders have been interested in how China has achieved rapid 
growth while maintaining political stability, and have frequently visited 
·China to seek the experience. 88 
(Summer 1995), 35-53. A review of "China collapse" theory by Chinese scholar can be referred to 
"Groundless of China collapse theory" in Liu Dengge, 'f'{it/ffJJJl4/' (Yes or No Questions of China) 
(Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui, 2003), ch.2. 
87 See Mark P. Petracca and Mong Xiong, "The concept of Chinese neo-authoritarianism: an 
exploration and democratic critique," Asian Survey 30: 11 (1990), 1099-1117. 
88 Men Honghua, " cj-J lIJ $')(~jJ\,'l'{i1;:l~ 'J:i Cf) " (Assessment of China 's soft power, pa,12), 1%//f,i,%!{! 
Jft (International Observation) , no.3 (2007), 38. 
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Therefore, some partic ipants in the di scussion of the "Chi na model" propose that the 
attractiveness of the China model to other deve loping countJ·ies as an alternative model of 
development makes thi s model a source of soft power for China. 89 
Despite the merits Chinese scholars have fou nd in the "China model ,'. some are sceptica l. 
They maintain that China's modernization is not yet complete, and consequentl y it is too 
early to conclude that there is a unique Chinese model of socio-economic development.90 As 
Zheng Yongnian and Zhang Chi point out, "due to deficiencies in its own refonn process, 
China cannot offer a cohesive model on which to base their own efforts, and as a result, it is 
far too soon to talk about a ' consensus' derived from the Chinese experience." 91 The so-
call ed "new left" thinkers in China are keen to point out those "defi ciencies" of the current 
patterns of economic development in China such as the income gap, workers ' rights, 
environmental pollution, education and social welfare.92 They call for fu rther political refonn 
in China to improve the "China model. " Zheng Yongnian also suggests that Chinese scholars 
shou ld not use the term "Beijing Consensus," because it sounds · too proacti ve and 
expansionist.93 
In spite of the im perfec ti ons in China ' s political and economi c refo rms, in the Chinese 
di scussion of the "China model ," there is a clear message that China 's development model 
constitutes another sou rce of China 's soft power. The significance of this model is not onl y 
for China' s dom esti c economic growth, but a lso for other societies whi ch may take Chi na as 
a model for national development. 
89 In addition to the Ch inese writings 1 the view that the ,:Chi na model" constitutes a source of China's 
soft power was obtained from my interviews from the end of 2009 to 20 12. 
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3.3.3 China's foreign policy and diplomacy 
The above two elements - Chinese culture and China as a model for development - are the 
qualities and capacities of China which other societies may want to learn from or to emulate. 
A third important source of China's soft power relates to China' s cultivation of its soft power 
through articulating foreign policy and conducting diplomacy. In this sense, China's foreign 
policy and diplomacy are both sources and vehicles of China's soft power in so far as they 
represent and project particular ideas and values which encapsulate what China stands for, 
and which enhance China's role as a responsible great power in the post-Cold War world. 
In the context of the rise of China, many Chinese scholars and policy analysts suggest that the 
Chinese government needs to clearly articulate its peaceful and constructive foreign policy. 
They also advise that it is necessary for the government to carry out an omnidirectional 
diplomacy dealing with international issues with other major powers to assuage the worries 
about China' s rise and establish a favourable image of China as a responsible international 
actor. 94 They suggest that China should not only be seen as a good international citizen 
through abiding by the nonns of the existing international system, but also be an active 
international actor by providing public goods.95 
One important change in Chinese thinking about China's diplomacy relates to the 
advancement of the "new security concept" (NSC, xin anquan guan ), which to some extent 
has catalysed the Chinese government's journey to initiate and engage with international 
institutions to deal with regional or international issues_% The NSC is based on the premise 
that a "Cold War mentality" needed to be replaced by less confrontational approaches to 
94 See the various writings under the title of "9" I],¥Qftl/w~z.Jlli" (The road of China's peaceful rise) 
in the website of 'f'tf!IM (www.china.com.cn), which involves distinguished Chinese scholars from IR, 
politics, history, strategy and security studies, accessed at: 
http:i/www'.china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/hp/530363.htm; Li Baojun and Xu Xi yuan, "/tlil\fci 'f II it! 
:f!l:ff::kl!J:'!J-(j}ErJ~t'0" (Chinas self-identity construction as a responsible power in the post-Cold War 
era), !Jf'ffe.lj!flf]i (Teaching and Research), no. I (2006), 49-56. 
95 Interviews with Dr Su Changhe, Professor of International Relations at Shanghai International 
Studies University (now Professor of International Relations, Fudan University), Shanghai , March 12, 
2010; Dr Chen Yugang, Associate Professor of International Relations, Fudan University, Shanghai, 
March 15, 2010; Dong Manyuan, Deputy Director of China Institute of International Studies, Beijing, 
April 8, 2010; Dr Liu Feitao, research fellow, China Institute of International Studies, Beijing, April 8, 
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diplomats, Canberra, May 28, 2010. 
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security politics. These approaches include "mutual trust, mutual benefit, equal dialogue and 
consu ltation, and cooperation" designed to generate a "fair and reasonable new international 
order."97 The rudiments of the NSC appeared in April 1997 when China signed a series of 
security agreements with Russia and five other Centra l Asian countries.98 These agreements 
dealt with border issues among these countries and subsequen tly provided the fo undation of 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The underlying rationales for China adopting 
thi s doctrine reflect its significant understanding of the sweeping structural changes dri vi ng 
international rel ations after the Cold War. In this context, scho lars advocate that China must 
cooperate and engage with other internationa l actors to maintain a peaceful environment to 
help China conti nue its "peaceful development."99 The proposal ofNSC also reflects Chinese 
intention of undern1ining Ame1ican-led alliance systems in the East Asia, because this 
represented Chinese leaders ' efforts to induce American alli es in this region to accept 
Chinese recipe for building regional security by the cooperation from regional powers. '00 
Following the recognition of the changing nature of security in the post-Cold War era , 
Chinese analysts and policy makers increasingly accept that there are "collective interests" in 
dea ling with global issues including terrori sm, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction , 
epidemics and climate change. 101 Chinese liberal lR scholars have increasingly pointed out 
the importance of building a positive global image of China by shouldering proper 
international responsibilities. Such efforts will help shape a more stable regional and global 
environment for Chi na ' s development and enhance China's political and diplomatic 
influence. 102 In this sense, Men Honghua proposes that "China should provide more global 
97 The Informa1ion Office of China's State Co uncil , cp!J!l/ffJIJ!/f!/J (National Defence of the PRC), 
Beijing: The Information Office of China 's State Council , Jul y 1998, accessed from: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2002-11 /l 5/content 630690.htm 
98 Among the most prominent of these agreements are "The Agreement on Confidence Building 
Measures in Mi litary Field along the Border Areas" and "The Agreement on Mutual Reduction of 
Milita,y Forces along the Border Areas." 
99 See Li Xuebao, "ffi/r'l,::i;~Jl!.!=jcplilil1;fD"f.:!i1:J&z.lljf' (New securi ty concept and China' s peaceful 
development pat h), :/1'f1:.E5:!iJf!ft: (Socialism Studies), no.I (2005), 11 6-11 8; Wu Zhaoxue and Ma 
Yanchen. "'P l'i,l!/jjj,'"£~Jl!.!=j ;j-tJ~;fU'iii\'tl:IJ'/-" (China ' s new security concept and the construction of a 
harmonious world), llfff!f£iJ!--~jff{ifii(;'Ji.; (Forwn of World Economics & Politics) , no.6 (2006), 84-
89. 
100 William Tow and Richard Rigby, "China 's pragmatic security po licy: the middle-power factor," 
The China Jou ma I, no.65 (January 2011 ), 165. 
101 This view is summari zed from my interviews conducted in Shanghai , Beij ing and Canberra from 
late 2009 to early 2012. Such a view can also be seen from the speeches by the Chinese leaders cited 
earlier. 
102 See David Scan, "China and the 1responsibilities 1 of a 'responsible power' - the uncertainties of 
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and regional public goods to build its responsible, constructive and reliable image." 103 More 
concretely, China has to make diplomacy towards its neighbourhood a pressing target, further 
strengthening cooperation with regional organizations, such as the ASEAN+ 3 arrangement, 
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the SC0.1°4 Luo Jianbo, an expert on Sino-African 
relations at the Central Party School, calls for enhanced coordination with the US and other 
global powers on issues such as the humanitarian crisis in Darfur and the development of oil 
and other natural resources . 10' Guo Shuyong, Professor at Shanghai Jiaotong University, 
suggests that China' s involvement in UN peacekeeping operations is one way China can 
demonstrate that it is an " internationally socialized country." 106 These liberal Chinese IR 
experts attach great importance to foreign policy and diplomacy in enhancing China' s soft 
power and China' s responsible great power identity. 
In short, China' s foreign policy and diplomacy are both sources and vehicles of China ' s soft 
power in so far as they project particular ideas and values that enclose what China stands for 
and that shape China ' s responsible great power identity in contemporary world affairs . There 
are two dimensions to this . On the one hand, the way in which China conducts foreign policy 
and diplomacy can be influential in making it attractive to others as engaged, cooperative, 
and prepared to play a responsible role in handling international issues. On the other hand, 
diplomacy is in and of itself a vehicle through which other elements of China' s soft power 
can be projected, such as Chinese government' s standpoint of international issues, Chinese 
culture and the Chinese approach to economic growth and development. Central to the debate 
around the relationship between China' s foreign policy and diplomacy and its soft power is a 
concern by policy analysts as well as policy makers to enhance China' s soft power in this 
regard. 
appropriate power rise language," Asia-Pacific Review 17:1 (2010), 72-96; David Shambaugh and Ren 
Xiao, "China: the conflicted rising power," in Henry R. Nau and Deepa M. Ollapal ly ed. , Worldviews 
of Aspiring-Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy Debates in China, India, Iran, Japan and Russia (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 36-72. 
103 Men Honghua and Hu Jun, "Ji'Ji-Jili't'3':1Jll.\l":f;f/-:Pf, a<:J5'f X:liJGOO/l,\!:,j-j ( - ) "(Diplomatic and 
strategic thoughts of the new leadership, part 1), Shanghai Studies on CCP History and Construction, 
no.4 (2005), 26-29. 
104 Men Honghua, "rji 001=:l:#;/Ji!TiMIH!s' Cf ) " (Assessment of China ' s soft power, part 2), fi!J!f.jiJ!f! 
#, (International Observation), no.3 (2007), 41. 
105 Luo Jianbo, "'t' ~:,~-~Fifli:YfX:tcl\!l!J't' il{j ~ %%::®'.!!'/mt" (National image building in the vi sion of 
China' s diplomacy toward Africa), JJf!lf: fi!/!f.jij4$ (Contempora,y International Relations), no.7 
(2007), 53. 
106 Guo Shuyong, " ll'Ji'II/ !.if:E.x'..£) 't' ~~; :,t ; JJfX:" (New internationalism and China' s soft power 
diplomacy), fi!//f.jiJ!f!Jfr (International Observation) , no.2 (2007), 50-51. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
To conclude, a strong interest in the concept of soft power has surged in Chinese di scourse in 
recent years. Soft power is now increasingly considered to be an indispensable factor in 
China's grand strategy of peaceful ri se, the concepnialization of CNP, and strengthening 
China' s responsible great power identity. 
This chapter has first explored how the soft power discourse has evolved in recent years in 
China. Initially, the Chinese intel lectuals ' response to Nye 's notion of soft power was quite 
negative. They took it as American "cultural imperialist policy" that would erode Chinese 
culniral identity, and hence they strongly recommended that China should develop its soft 
power particularly by mobilizing Chinese cultura l assets to protect its cu ltural identity. 
However, a more open and positive view has subsequently emerged in Chinese di scussion of 
soft power. On the one hand, a domestic dimension has been incorporated into the concept. 
Soft power is seen to be one important factor of the CNP and needs to serve the interests of 
China's domestic politics. Sources of China ' s soft power such as Chinese culture can be 
mobili zed to help enhance national cohesion, and the "China model " can be used to justify 
the rule of the CCP. On the other hand, soft power is considered as an international strategy 
for China' s rise and for bui lding China' s responsible great power identity. Many Chinese 
intellectuals strongly believe that it is necessary to use soft power to assuage external 
concerns about China's ri se, establish a favourab le international image across the world, and 
shape an international environment conducive to China 's long-tenn growth. The changing 
perceptions of soft power in China reflect the reality that China has been and is still 
undergoing a social , political and economic transfonnation . 
This chapter has then identified the most commonly discussed sources of China 's soft power, 
which are: Chinese culture, China as a model for development and Chinese foreign policy 
and diplomacy. These three sources of soft power are considered as the most important 
components of China ' s soft power. They can enhance China's global attracti veness either in 
the sense of providing a successful model for other societies to admire or emulate, or in 
assuaging the fears of particular societies about China' s intentions in world affairs. 
However, as the previous chapter has pointed out, sources of soft power do not equal soft 
power per se; these sources need to be intentionally cultivated, interpreted, mobilized and 
projected to let them speak to the particular audiences. As the definition of thi s study suggests, 
soft power is treated in thi s thesis as purposeful efforts the government makes to attract 
targeted audiences through the mobilization of non-material sources of power. Drawing upon 
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this analysis of the concept of soft power and Chinese discourse of soft power, I put forward 
an operational framework for empirical studies of China ' s soft power. Utilizing what I 
describe as the key "sources" of China' s soft power, I will investigate to what extent we can 
see the patterns of mobilizing and projecting these key "sources" of China ' s soft power 
occurring in the past and present. Put more specifically, I will examine the purposeful efforts 
to mobilize and promote China' s culture, developmental model , and foreign policy and 
diplomacy as ways to attract or reassure other societies in the past and present of the PRC. It 
thus allows me to compare and contrast these processes of mobilization and projection of 
China ' s soft power in the past and present. It also allows me to compare who the Chinese 
government was seeking to attract, for what purposes and through what tools. The following 
two chapters will go through these questions, exploring how these key "sources" of China' s 
soft power were interpreted, mobilised and promoted in the PRC' s international engagement 
at two historical moments. Through this comparison of the constitution and mobilization of 
the key sources of China ' s soft power, I seek to identify what factors have shaped the 
constitution and mobilization of China' s soft power in the PRC. 
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4 Maoist Soft Power Reaching Out to the World: 1959-1965 
lt is generally regarded that the PRC's revolutionary period was associated with belligerence 
and assertiveness which relied upon hard coercive power. 1 However, one leading China 
scholar once told students of Chinese foreign policy that weapons and material strength alone 
cannot explain the significance of the PRC in a global power equation in its early days. 2 
Drawing on the relative abundance of primary and secondary sources on the foreign policy of 
Maoist China, this chapter argues that the prominence of the PRC in its early history derived 
in great part from its projection of soft power, the non-material dimensions of power. The 
CCP's imagination of China as "a great power" born of its path of revolution shaped the 
trajectory of what this study calls "Maoist soft power." 
Mao 's China during 1959-1965 provides an illuminating case pertaining to the historicity of 
China's soft power, a time Beijing was prepared to carry out its "revolutionary" policies and 
actively seek international prestige due to the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations. 3 The 
Sino-Soviet collision in some respects provided the Beijing regime with a space within which 
to build its status as a model and a true leader in the community of-{post)colonized non-
Western world. However, due to the inauguration of the so-called "Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution" in 1966, Mao's China turned inwards and generally retreated from international 
affairs. 
1 For instance, see Henry Kissinger, On China, New York: Penguin Press, 2011, ch.6 and ch.7; Robert 
S. Ross, "China's three rises, regional power transitions, and East Asia security: 1949 to the Twenty-
First Century," in William C. Kirby ed., The People's Republic of China at 60: An International 
Assessment, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011 , 92-95; Andrew Bingham 
Kennedy, .The International Ambitions of Mao and Neh111: National Efficacy Beliefs and the Making of 
Foreign Policy, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
2 Jonathan D. Pollack, "China and the global strategic balance," in Harry Harding ed. , Chinas Foreign 
Relations in the 1980s (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 173. 
3 In terms of the exact time of the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, I take the view that by 1959 
China and the Soviet Union were on an irreversible collision course, which is discussed in the first 
section of this chapter. For those who argue that China and the Soviet Union broke up in 1959, see for 
example, William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, M.A.: M.I.T. Press, 1964); Donald S. 
Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961 (New York: Atheneum, 1969); Vladislav Zubok and 
Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin :S Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, M.A.: 
Harvard University Press, 1996); Chen Jian, Mao :S China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill and London: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Lorenz M. Luthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the 
Communist World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). However, some other scholars argue 
that the process of breakdown became "irredeemable" around the very early years of the 1960s, see 
Odd Arne Westad ed., Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963 
(Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998); Wang Dong, "The quarrelling brothers: new 
Chinese archives and a reappraisal of the Sino-Soviet split, 1959-1962," Cold War International 
History Project Bulletin Working Paper #49 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Centre 
for Scholars, 2005). 
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The projection of Maoist soft power sought to reinforce China 's identity as a revolutionary 
Third World power - a leader in the world revolutionary movement and a truly leading 
fighter against the US imperia li sm and a competitor of the USSR in the Conununist and 
developing world. The projection of Maoist soft power to some extent ampl ified Chi na's 
weak hard power and made China conspicuous in front of global audience. 
This chapter also demonstrates that Maoist soft power projection interwove the aims of 
attracting international as we ll as domestic audiences, thus seeking to legitimate the 
revolution at home and build a leadership role in the developing world . On the one hand, the 
mi ss ion of ful fi lling China 's "proletarian internationalism" served as a constant source of 
domestic mobilization for the purpose of legitimizing revolution at home and maintaining its 
momentum. On the other hand , through the promotion of the "revolutionary" character of the 
"new" China, the Chinese sought to build China as an exemplary model of nation building for 
the post-colonial states to emulate. The promotion of Maoist soft power, therefore, served as a 
means to transform China' s state and society, as well as its international outlook. 
This chapter is organized into four sections. The first section di scusses the international and 
domestic context of Maoist China, to unfold Maoist understanding of the PRC's status, power 
and aims in world politics. The second section elaborates the key sources that constitute 
Maoist soft power. Following the research framework , it explores how Chinese cu lture, 
Chinese model for nation building and Chinese foreign policy were understood and 
interpreted by the Chinese leaders. The third section analyses the key too ls employed by the 
Chinese government, namely, cu ltura l diplomacy and fo reign aid , to attract the Third World 
countTies. The last section provides a conclusion of Maoist soft power and the legacy it has 
left fo r post-Mao China. 
4 .1 China's foreign policy transition: from "leaning to one side" to 
"double-anti" 
The PRC was born on October 1, 1949, at a crucial juncture of the Cold War, when the two 
contending camps were emerging, the capitalist led by the US and the communist by the 
Soviet Un ion (USSR). Nevertheless, in many key aspects, Maoist China was not 
overshadowed by the two camps, but played a pivotal role in configuring and reinforcing the 
Cold War in Asia, and intensifying the hostility between the two political ideologies 
(communism versus capitalism) globally. To a large extent, thi s was because Communist 
Chinese leaders and Chainnan Mao in particular, had their own vision of China and the 
internati onal system. They not onl y intended to restore China's great power status but wanted 
to make politica l change in the entire world according to their experi ence and ideas. As a 
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result, as soon as the PRC was founded, the CCP leadership was detennined to break with the 
legacies of the "old" China, to "make a fresh start" in China's foreign affairs.' 
This policy of "making a fresh start" represented an anti-US policy adopted by the CCP, and 
demonstrated that the Chinese Communist leaders were detennined to break away from 
Chiang Kai-shek's diplomatic practice in the Republican period, which greatly relied upon 
America's support. PRC enmity towards the US stemmed from not only divergences in 
political ideology but also historical frustration and America's China policy. 5 Washington had 
supported the Kuomintang (KMT) government against the CCP in China's Civil War (1945-
1949) and it continued to do so after the KMT retreated to Taiwan. What is more, 
Washington 's decision to intervene in the Korean War in 1950 and dispatch the Seventh Fleet 
to the Taiwan Strait on June 27 , 1950 was perceived by the Chinese leaders as interfering in 
China' s internal affairs (the enterprise of unifying China), and endangering China 's 
sovereignty and border security. 6 The Chinese government consequently decided to 
participate in the Korean War in October 1950 and launch the "Great War of Resisting 
America and Assisting Korea" (l 950-53).7 In return, the US enhanced its support of Taiwan 
militarily and economically, and backed it as the only legitimate representative of China in 
4 Zhou Enlai , ":ftir'l BCJ:>'~3(7J'Wfn1:f* (1952 "!c 4 Jl 30 B) " (Our diplomatic policies and tasks) 
in /lJ/!!f/.:J/(y'f:Jl:Xiff; (Selected Diplomatic Papers of Zhou Enlai) (Beij ing: Zhongyang Wenxian, 1990), 
48. 
5 During the Cold War, there was a big debate in the US questioning "who lost China?" From the 
available Chinese sources and research into Cold War history, many scholars however provide 
evidence that, even before the founding of the PRC, it was unlikely that the CCP would approach the 
US. For example, according to Shi Zhe - the Chinese leaders' Russian-language interpreter - recalled 
that when Liu Shaoqi (then a member of the Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee, later Vice -
Chairman in 1949 and Chainnan from 1959 to 1968) visited Moscow to talk to Stalin in May 1949, 
Liu made clear that China would stand with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to fight 
against irn'perial ism. See Shi Zhe, (Effi!i: f'Li\ }!Jjjz--jifi'l§'fii!/Z,;'!/.· (At the Side of Historical Giants: 
Shi Zhe's Memoirs) (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian, 1991), 402; Mao Zedong, "On the people 's 
democratic 'dictatorship (June 30, 1949) ," in which he argued that from China 's previous seven 
decades ' experience, there had been no "third road," that is, where China could sit on the fence 
between the USSR and the US; China must lean to the socialist side, in Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works 
of Mao Tse-tung (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1965), vo\.4:415-17; Mao, "Cast away illusions , 
prepare for struggle (August 14, 1949)", in which he contended that '"Prepare for struggle ' , is 
addressed -to those who still cherish certain illusions about the relations between China and the 
imperialist countries, especially between China and the United States," thus he suggested that the "new 
China" would take an anti-US policy, in Selected Works of Mao, vol.4:429-30. In addition, Chen Jian, a 
historian of Cold War history, argues that "America 's ' lost chance ' in China is a myth ." See Chen Jian, 
Mao s China and the Cold War, 38-48. 
6 Propaganda Sector of the Chinese People 's Movement to Resist America and Assist Korea 
Association compi led, f/,;j::ffJJJt])tjjj!Jlgifl; (The Great Movement to Resist America and Assist 
Korea) (Beijing: Renmin, 1954), 4. 
7 Mao, "*i'iJK$:IB?t'.1JiJJfii$i'\c/&ioJJliR ( ~71:Ji O 'f-t ,El = B ) " (On dispatching the People's 
Volunteer Anny to the Korean War, October 2, 1950), in Mao Zedong, -'fd/A,ff:J2xiff; (Selected 
Works of Mao Zedong on Foreign Policy) (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian, 1994), 139-41. 
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the United Nations (UN) with veto power in the Security Counci l. " US imperiali sm" was 
therefore perceived by the CCP as the only force that stood in the way of uni ft cation of China 
and interfered in China's domestic affairs, mak ing the US the most dangerous enem y of 
China.8 
Chinese perception of the "Ameri can threat ," however, enabled the Maoists to hold high the 
banner of "anti- US imperiali sm" and to mobili ze the great masses to embrace Chairman 
Mao 's doctrine of "continuous revo lution" internally and externall y. For Mao and hi s 
followers, the seizure of power in China in 1949 was not the conclusion of the mission of 
Chinese revo lution; "Rather, Mao was very much concerned about how to maintain and 
enhance the revolution 's momentum after its nationwide victory."9 The ultimate goal of the 
Chinese revolution was to transform the "old China" that was weak in material power and 
decaying in terms of prowess into a "new China" fu ll of strength and international influence. 
Equally important, it was their mission to destroy the "old world" which the imperialists and 
reactionaries belonged to, and redefine the values and rules of the existing international 
system, which of course was seen to be dominated by the US. In thi s sense, Maoist China 
em pl oyed the di scourse of "anti -US imperiali sm" to represent China as one of the most 
"revo lutionary" and "progressive" forces in the international area, and a leader in the world 
revo lutionary movement. Given the Chinese perception of the "American threat," security 
imperatives and convergence in political ideology led the PRC to lean to the sociali st camp 
led by the USSR. '° Chinese leaders decided to all y wi th the USSR and other sociali st 
countries to confront the Western bloc led by the US. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, 
Alliance and Mutual Assistance was consequently signed in Moscow on February 14, 1950. It 
was designed to ensure that China could receive mili tary, economic and technological 
assistance from the USSR, to support China 's participat ion in the Korean War, and boost 
national economic development based on the Soviet experience in the early I 950s. 11 It was 
8 Mao, "Casting away illu sions, preparing for strugg le" and "Fri endship or aggression," in Selected 
Works of Mao, vol. 4: 425-32, 441-450. 
9 Chen Jian, Mao s China and the Cold War, 47. 
'° See Mao. ·'On the people 's democratic dictatorship," Selected Works of Mao , vol. 4: 415-17. 
11 Wu Xiuqu an, "l'~l\!l.fo.±//f,ffl- /:kih l• HJ:rf1c" (The first visit to the Soviet Union with Chairman 
Mao), in Chinese Communi st Party History Studies ed., #fjJj,fJ,A.-jJj5':'!/ffl!J;::Jx· (Memoirs of living 
through Significant Historical Events) (Beijing: Dangjian Duwu, 2000), vol.4: 182-3 ; Shen Zhihua, 
-~~~~~mM~a~$~m•M~¥*fl~- *~~~~~~~~-MM<~)" 
(Essential infonnation on Soviet economic aid to China in the early days of the PRC - materials from 
Chinese and Russian archives (part one)), f./P}!,"jpjlilf'fz: (Russian Studies), no.1 (2001), 53-66 , and "ll'fr 
rp ~J4lflfJJJ(l]j)f.ll*)(t$t}iJH£ll!JA~~,,js:t,!,'1)1,-* Fl r[1 ~;fll#x~fl~;f'.'l~t-JH ( Tl " (Essential 
information on Soviet economic aid to China in the early days of the PRC - materials from Chinese 
and Russian archives (part two)), f.lP!JYJPjlilfffi (Russian Studies), no.2 (2001), 49-58 ; Qi Dexue, " 't' 
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widely argued that China's policy of leaning to the USSR helped the Chinese government 
deter the US tlu·eat from the east coast and consolidate China's new-born regime. 12 To a large 
extent, this Treaty laid a foundation for China to become a major player in world affairs, 
virtually extended and enhanced the antagonism of the bipolar system in Asia , and endowed 
the Cold War with global meaning. 
However, the close relationship between the two socialist giants did not last long; the tension 
between the two communist parties was exposed to tbe public in the late 1950s after Nikita 
Khrushchev came to power in the USSR. Although there was evidence that the CCP was 
di ssatisfied with the way tbat the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSV) treated it in 
the Stalin period,'3 it was under Khrushchev's leadership that the friction between the two 
Parties was uncovered. First and foremost , the ideological differences produced and 
intensified tension between the two communist parties. As Donald Zagoria has suggested , the 
crux of the Sino-Soviet conflict was "a direct result of the ideological commitment [of leaders 
on both sides] to worldwide revolution and of diJferences on how to promote it. " 14 
4.1.1 The emergence of the differences in political ideology between the 
CCP and the CPSU 
The differences in political ideology between the two Parties emerged after KJ1ru shchev 
consolidated hi s leadership in the Soviet Union in the mid-l 950s, and concerned de-
Stalinization, the judgment of the world situation and the mission of the communist parties. 
,Ji, [ci] Jl{l:f:E:fJtJi:ttl'l/Jl/&'J'; cpa-J1t'F!l" (The role of Sino-Soviet alliance in the war of resisting America 's 
aggression and assisting Korea), U!.J'!-!Ji.1:' (Wo rld Histo,y) , no.4 (2010), 4-12. 
12 Meanwhile, some researchers and sources point out that the Soviet support was limited and 
conditional , and China made compromises with the USSR in achieving the Treaty. For example, the 
Treaty specified that the USSR could maintain its special rights in Northeast China, which laid down 
distrust between the two Communist Parties. See Mao, " /fil9J'.lt1c~1$ :*:if:Jt~B%k-iti ( - :hJi.J \.:$ 
-t.R =-t = B ) " (Talk to Soviet Ambassador in China Pavel Yudin) in Selected Works of Mao 
Zedong Oil Foreign Policy, 323; Xie Yixian ed ., 1:/-J&af t':Yfx.1:' (1 949-2009) (Diplomatic Histo,y of 
Contempormy China (1949-2009)) (Beijing: Zhongguo Qingnian, 2009), 30; Shen Zhihua, "x*A'J~ 
Jf- , '11 }f.Ji'il ll!Bl 1L a-Jil.lltfiJjjf_'E 0 944-1950 )" (A reluctant choice: complicated process of the 
estab lishment of Sino-Soviet alli ance, 1944-1950), i!ift:.1:'lilf'f[ (Modern Chinese Histo,y Studies) , 
no.6 (2010), 51-52. 
13 For example, see Mao, "Talk to Soviet Ambassador Pave l Yudin," 326; Yang Kuisong, 11:fPA feJ:t 
;/f!&JJi&.1:'lilfJ! (A Study on the Histo,y of P.R. China 's Establishment) (Nanchang: Jiangxi Renmin, 
2009), vol.2: 91-3; Harold C. Hinton, 'S ino-Soviet Relations : background and overview,' in Douglas T. 
Stuai1 and William T. Tow, eds., China, the Soviet Unio n, and the West: Strategic and Political 
Dimensions in the 1980s (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1982), 9; Ross Terrill, Mao: A Biography 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1980), 202; Benjamin Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1951), is a good source to see Mao's sceptici sm about 
Stalin before the founding oftbe PRC. 
14 Zagoria, Th e Sino-Soviet conflict, 5. 
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The divergence was ignited by Khrushchev's "secret speech' ' at the 20"' Congress of the 
CPSU in Feb ru ary 1956, in whi ch he negated his predecessor Stali n . He attacked Sta li n 's 
personality cult and cri tic ised many of Stalin's domest ic and fo reign po li cies , and thereafter 
started the de-Stalini zati on campaign. Khrushchev 's action toward Sta lin shocked and upset 
the CCP leaders because they had not been consulted in advance; 15 the CCP had exalted 
Stalin and foll owed Sta lin 's ex perience in building soc ial ism at the very early stages of th e 
PRC. 16 What also upset the Chinese M aoists was that Khrushchev was less enthusias ti c about 
world revolution, and instead posited the necess ity and possibili ty of " peaceful coex istence" 
between the different regimes, especiall y between the USSR and the US.17 How could the 
Chinese revolutionari es make peace with the "evil" US imperia li sm, especia ll y after fi ghting 
the bruta l battles of the Korean War which had just fini shed three years before? In Chinese 
Maoists ' view, the negation of Sta lin and the advocacy of "peaceful coex istence" could 
eventua lly undermine th e CCP 's authority as we ll as Mao's cult of personality at home and 
repudiate the great cause of "continuous revol ution" all over the worl d. 
Chainnan M ao believed that de-Sta lini zation was "a grave error," and a poss ible threat to hi s 
own au thority.18 In response to the de-Stalini zation campaign, he displayed hi s contempt by 
remarki ng that " [i]n the Soviet Union, those who once extolled Stali n to the skies have now 
in one swoop consigned him to purgatory." He was alert to the fact th at " in Ch ina some 
people are fo llowing thei r example." To clarify the confusion, he reached a verd ict that in the 
"opini on of the [Chinese] Centra l Committee," "Stalin 's mistakes amounted to on ly 30 per 
cent of the whole and his achievements to 70 per cent, and that a ll things considered Stalin 
was nonetheless a great Marx ist." 19 Mao 's co mment not only demonstrated hi s disagreement 
with Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign, but it displayed that Mao had placed hi mself in 
15 Wu Lengxi, -f-:qc-j;(;'lift: 1956- 1966 't' Jj:}(:/~fn!fZJK (Ten-Year War of Words: A Memoir of Sino-
Soviet Relations, 1956-1966) (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian, 1999), 4-5. 
16 For the remarks that China had followed Soviet ex perience to build its socialism in its early days, 
see Mao, .. Strive to bu i Id a great socia lis t country (September t 5, 1954 )" and "On the ten major 
re lationships (April 25. 1956)." Selected Works of Mao , vol.5 : 148-9, 284-306. The Chinese had called 
Stalin .. a great teacher" and ·'a great Marxist-Len inist," see Mao Zedong, "=E;.±/:l';~t"'1,,'j',tt,1,J1Tr;l;: tf:il1i 
lit'' (Chairman Mao Zedong sent a telegraph of co ndolences on the death of Stal in), RMRB 
(07/03/1953), I: Editorial , "olsr7i:i"'!fi'i;/,,Hti\ltA9/J5 .11:.t&~·, (On the historical experience of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat), RMRB (05/04/1956), I. 
17 The suggestion of ·'peaceful coexistence'· made by Khrushchev included reaching agreements with 
major world powers in terms of ceasing the anns-race, a ban on nuclear weapon tests_, disarmament and 
detente between East and West. See Chinas Central Compilation and Translation Burea u ed., ;J;:Jf}fft 
l"'Jtf/J°....:: /-l}:ff:lt;xf?Jt/f?l_tlf!J (..1:.) (The Compilation Documents for the CPSU's 20'' National 
Congress) (Beijing: Renmin, 1956), vol. I : 27-34. 
18 Vladislav M . Zubok, A Failed Empire: the Soviet Union in the Cold War Fam Stalin to Gorbachev 
(Chapel Hill: Uni versity of No rth Carolina Press, 2007), 136. 
19 Mao, "On the ten major relationships," vol.5: 304. 
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a higher position than Khrushchev, because to some extent the role of Soviet leader(s) needed 
the approval from their Chinese counterpart - the CCP. 
Khrushchev's open criticism of Stalin and advocacy of "peaceful coexistence" with the West 
thus led Chinese leaders to re-evaluate the Sino-Soviet relationship. Mao was especially 
concerned about the importation of "weak points" from the CPSU and the Soviet influence on 
or even control of Chinese politics. In his speech, "On the Ten Major Relationships ," he 
reminded his Communist colleagues that, 
It must be recognized that there are always two aspects, the strong 
points and the weak points [of Soviet socialism]. Our policy is to 
learn from the strong points of all nations and all countries ... but ... we 
mustn 't copy everything indiscriminately and transplant mechanically. 
Naturally, we mustn't pick up their shortcomings and weak points. We 
should adopt the same attitude in learning from the experience of the 
Soviet Union and other socialist countries.20 
Furthennore, for the first time, in this same speech, Mao warned about the danger of 
overdependence on the USSR and publicly called for China to take -a more independent 
stance in the cause of revolution and "anti-U.S imperialism." Mao emphasized: "The Soviet 
Union differs from our country in that, firstly, tsarist Russia was an imperi alist power and, 
secondly, it had the October Revolution. As a result, many people in the Soviet Union are 
conceited and very arrogant." He expressed his alarm that "there are people who, having been 
slaves too long, feel inferior in eve1ything and don't stand up straight in the presence of 
foreigners." Mao thereafter requested the Chinese people to overcome this sentiment of 
inferiority, "we need to bestir ourselves, enhance our national confidence and encourage the 
spirit typified by ' scorn US in1perialism,' which was fostered during the movement to resist 
US aggression and aid Korea."2 1 Not only did Mao call for an independent China, strong and 
reliant on no one, but also he made it clear that China should take up the banner of "anti-US 
imperialism" and continue the road of revolution. 
The Sino0 Soviet ideological difference also appeared in ideas about how to develop socialism 
and achieve communism at the national level. As mentioned earlier, after the founding of the 
PRC, Chinese leaders followed the Soviet experience of building socialism by making its 
20 Ibid. , 303. 
21 Ibid., 305-6. 
81 
First Five-Year Plan ( 1953-1957)." In 1956, it appeared to the Chinese government that 
China would fulfil its First Five-Year Plan ahead of schedule.23 The significant achievements 
in national deve lopment enhanced the CCP's confidence that China was able to pursue 
communism without following the Soviet steps. Chaim1an Mao therefore called on hi s people 
to take more initiative in consolidating socialism and achieving communism in China. In 
1958, China launched Mao 's bold project - the Great Leap Forward (GLF) - to speed up 
industrialization and communization al l over the country. 
However, the CCP's initiative was not welcomed by the USSR. The Soviet model and 
leadership in the communist world was chall enged by the GLF campaign and the scheme to 
move ahead with the " People 's Communes."24 Ch ina 's policies were criticised by the leaders 
of the CPSU. ln his report to the 21 51 Congress of the CPSU in January 1959, Khrushchev 
insinuated that China 's soc ial ist construction was "skipping over a stage" and was 
"egalitarian communism."25 He even told hi s US counterpart that the People 's Communes 
were " in essence reactionary," which was an absol ute insu lt to the CCP.26 · 
On all accounts, the di vergence in political ideologies between the CCP and CPSU began to 
surge from 1956 and concerned the following three issues. The first issue related to how to 
assess the role of Stalin. Should he be negated completely or was he despite everything a 
great leader? Second, how should the communist world deal with the West - "peacefu l 
coexistence" or "continuous revolution?" The third and probably the most signifi cant 
question was who could provide leadership in the communist world in the post-Stalin era. 
Holding even higher the rhetorical banner of "anti-imperiali sm" and "continuous revolution", 
and launching the GLF to transfonn an underdeveloped country into conununism in practice, 
China certainly projected an image as an independent sovereign nation capable of providing 
leadership in the sociali st camp as wel l as the underdeveloped world. 
22 Generally China had fo ll owed the Soviet model in its First Five-Year Plan (FFYP), wh ich gave 
priority to the development of large-scale heavy industry at the expense of agriculture and lighter 
industry. Because of the extensive investment in heavy industry, China relied on Soviet aid and 
experien ce. On th e di scussion of China 's FF'YP, see for example, Mau rice Meisner, A4ao S China and 
After: a histo1y of the People's Republic, 3'' edition (NY: Free Press, 1999), I 07-120; Cong Jin, 1.949-
1.989 -If(//;cp/J!/tliJl/j.£/ll(/'}$ Ff (The frars of China's Tortuous Development, 1949-1 989) (Henan: 
Henao Renmin, 1990), 1-9. 
23 Editori al, "'fJiJisJ1'1, ::.*:H~±..x'.. 'Jt'1li¥.JllHM"*" (The mil estone of the great soc iali st enterprise in 
our country), RMRB (1 5/0911956), 1. 
24 Wang Gungwu, China and the World since J 949: the impact of independence, Modernity and 
Revolution (London [etc.]: Macmillan, 1977), 53. 
25 The Editorial Departments of RMRB and Hongqi, ·'The origin and deve lopment of the differences 
between the leadership of the CPSU and ou rse lves (September 6, 1963)," in 77,e Polemic on tl,e 
General line oftl,e lntemational Co111111u11ist Move111ent (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1965), 77. 
26 Ibi d. 
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4.1.2 Sino-Soviet disputes in international issues in the late 1950s 
The already public Sino-Soviet rift was aggravated by the following bilateral or international 
issues . To begin with, in 1958, indignation was aroused by the two proposed projects for the 
joint construction of a long-wave radio station in Northeast China27 and the establishment of 
a joint submarine flotilla28 by the USSR and China. Moscow requested that the two projects 
should be jointly constructed and managed and owned by the two sides. Mao responded to his 
Soviet comrades that China would need Moscow's help and advice but nevertheless the 
ownership of the two projects should belong to China unconditionally. In the talks with 
Soviet leaders about these two proposals, including both Ambassador Yudin and Khruschev 
in July 1958 in succession, Mao lost his temper. He charged that Soviet leaders intended to 
control China by implementing these two projects, which infringed upon China 's sovereignty 
and territorial integrity.29 By associating them with the historical relationships between the 
CCP and the CPSU, he accused the Soviet leaders of distrusting their Chinese comrades and 
claimed that the Soviets had long adopted an attitude of "big-power chauvinism" toward 
China, which hurt the "dignity" of the Chinese people.3° Finally, the proposed establishment 
of a joint submarine flotilla was abandoned. Although an agreement on the construction of a 
27 According to Chinese sources, on April 18, 1958, the Minister of Defence, Peng Dehuai, received a 
telegraph from the Soviet Defence Minister Rodion Malinovskii, in which the latter proposed to 
cooperate with China in the establishment of a long-wave station in China. Malinovskii explained that 
the Soviet Union did not possess a Jong-wave radio station in the Far East but the station was needed 
for long-distance communication to facilitate the activities of Soviet submarines in the Pacific. The 
Soviets thought that China had a suitable place to build such a station and might like to cover the major 
cost of establishing it, and it would be managed and used by both sides. See Xi e Yixian ed. , Diplomatic 
History ofContempora,y China , 157; Cong Jin, The Years of China s Tortuous Development, 348-350. 
28 On July 2i , 1958, Ambassador Yudin called on Chairman Mao to report the Soviet position on four 
issues of the current world situation on behalf of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. The 
third issue was regarding China 's earlier request that the Soviet Union provide technological assistance 
for enhancing China's navy to defend China's coastal area. Yudin proposed that China and the Soviet 
Union establish a joint submarine flotilla. He explained that unlike the geography of China, with its 
long coastal 'lines and good natural harbours, the Soviet Union did not possess such good geographical 
conditions. Mao was offended by this proposal and asked, "so according to your [Soviet] opinion we 
have to create a 'cooperative ' [in this issue]? [Do you mean that] we should jointly create the fleet, 
otherwise you will not offer any assi stance [for China 's naval build-up]? That is to say that you force 
us to create a 'cooperative '?" See Wu Lengxi, Ten-Year War of Words, ]59. 
29 The CCP believed that "if the ownership (of companies, actions and projects) could not be under 
Chinese control, it would damage China 's sovereignty." See Luo Hanping, Jtjf,.}!!Jf!f(f;cpffl (China 
on the Eve of Cultural Revolution) (Beijing: Renmin, 2007), 113. Actually, Mao was quite upset when 
Moscow requested conducting cooperatives between the PRC and the USSR from 1950 to 1951 , 
especially for the four joint-stock companies in Xinjiang and Northeast China managing airline, 
petroleum, nonferrous and rare metal, and shipbuilding. See Mao, "Talk to Soviet Ambassador to 
China Pavel Yudin," 328-339; Yang Kuisong, c{'jif}f:-$~/{!i/4(/f;/;!J/,@,l,.,0@ (Mao's Gratitude and 
Resentments towards Mosco w) (Nanchang: Jiangxi Renmin, 1999), 425. To a large degree, Chinese 
leaders' super-sensitiveness toward sovereignty issues was due to the Chinese "victim mentality" 
formed in China 's modem history. 
30 Wu Lengxi , Ten-Year War of Words , 156-167. 
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long-wave station and dispatch of Soviet experts to China was signed on August 3, 1958 after 
Mao and Khrushchev 's intensive meetings in Beijing, the di strust between the leaders of the 
two countries was increasing. 31 The psychological rift was further intensified by Mao 's 
initiation of the Taiwan Strait Crisis which happened just three weeks after Khrushchev 's vis it 
to Beijing. During Khrushchev's visit to Beijing from July 31 to August 3, 1958, Chi nese 
leaders did not inform him of the plan to shell the Jirunen (Quemoy) islands, which are just a 
few kilometres away from China's coastal province Fujian but controlled by the KMT in 
Taiwan.32 Mao carefully scheduled the bombardment to "shock the international community. " 
According to Wu Lengxi , then director of the Xinhua News Agency, the shelling of Jinmen 
was purposefully to "support the Arabs' anti-imperiali st struggle as well as to crack down on 
the Nationalist army 's frequent and reckless harassment along the Fujian coast across from 
Jinmen and Mazu [Matsu]." Jn mid-July 1958, American troops invaded Lebanon and British 
troops invaded Jordan to suppress the Iraqi people's rebellion. Mao sought to protest aga inst 
US-British actions in the Middle East in thi s way: 
(T]he bombardment of Jinmen, frankly speaking, was our turn to create 
international tension on purpose. We intended to teach the Americans a 
lesson. America had bullied us for many years, so now that we had a 
chance, why not give it a hard time? ... Americans started a fire in the 
Middle East, and we started another in the Far East. We would see what 
they wou ld do with it. In our propaganda, however, we still need to 
conde1m1 the Americans for causing tension in the Taiwan Straits. 33 
Therefore, according to Mao 's explanation, China's purposefu l military action was used to 
demonstrate China's suppo1t for the worldwide anti-imperi ali st struggles. By triggering a 
crisis in the Taiwan Straits, it would di stract the imperialist forces in the Middle East , and 
hence "The Arab world would be delighted, and African and Asian people would take our 
31 Khrushchev expressed how upset he was at a meeting with Mao during hi s visit: "Comrad e Mao 
Zedong, the NATO countries have no problem in mutual cooperation and supply, and we two cannot 
even reach an agreement on such a matter.' ' Liu Guoxin, 'f1$A/f;flfll[fl//jj;l:'f.(:eflf, (A Macro 
/-lis /o,y of/he Peoples Republic q/China) (Nanning: Guangxi Renmin, 1994), vol.2: 41. However, for 
Mao himself, it was not an issue of cooperation but a step by Moscow to control China, a threat to 
Chi nas sovereignty and integrity. See Mao. "Talk to Soviet Ambassador to China Pavel Yudin," 328-
330. Some details of the conversation between Mao and Khrushchev, see Henry Kissinger, 011 China 
(London and New York: Penguin Press, 2011), 168-17 l. 
3
' Wu Lengxi, Ten-Year War of Words, 173 . 
33 \Vu Lengxi, ·'lnside story of the decision making during th e she lling of Jinmen ,·· in "Mao Zedong ·s 
handling of the Taiwan Straits Cri sis of 1958 : Chinese recollections and documents," translated and 
annotated by Li Xiaobing et al , Cold War I111ernatio11al His101 y Project Bulleti11 , nos.6-7 (Winter 1995-
6), 208. 
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side."34 In this regard, the PRC actually mobilized its coercive power against the US to 
promote China's prestige in the anti -imperialism struggles in the Third World. 
However, it needs to be admitted that the primary goal of shelling Jinmen was not simply to 
suppo1t the Arabs ' anti-imperialist struggle; China intended to call international attention to 
the fact that the issue of Taiwan was China's own business which should only be solved by 
the Chinese people and not by any other international forces. China wanted to display its 
capability and its detennination to manage its domestic and international affairs 
independently. In this regard, it may be safe to conclude that Chairnrnn Mao used thi s crisis to 
test whether their Soviet comrades truly supported the PRC to resolve the Taiwan issue. 
Khrushchev 's advocacy of peaceful coexistence, as discussed earlier, from Mao 's point of 
view, was not only problematic in tenns of communist ideology, but also made Moscow an 
unreliable ally in countering "US imperialism." Therefore, if the Taiwan Crisis went to the 
brink of war, it wou ld become an opportunity to see how the Kremlin would choose between 
its new policy of peaceful coexistence and its alliance with Beijing.35 
The sudden and intensive artillery bombardment of the islands on August 23, 1958 thus not 
only shocked Washington, but also caught Moscow off guard. Moscow in the following 
weeks kept close contact with Beijing to inquire about China's intention in shelling Jinmen. 
Beijing told its ally that the shelling was designed to attract international attention to the 
Taiwan issue and distract the US from the Middle East; it was not a step leading to the 
liberation of Taiwan, nor intended to provoke a direct confrontation with the US. 36 Only after 
Moscow got to the bottom of Beijing's plan did it issue a statement on September 8 to 
demonstrate its support of China's action. 37 In Washington's eyes, the CCP's military 
operation was undertaken with Moscow's ful l support from planning to implementation, since 
the Soviet top leader had visited Beijing three weeks before the crisis. 38 Nevertheless, the 
Soviet leaders perceived that China 's unilateral action in the Taiwan Crisis of 1958 sign ified 
"an implicit chall enge to the unity of the communist bloc under Kremlin leadership - and was 
therefore anathema to Soviet leaders on both political and ideological groups."39 Therefore, 
34 Ibid . 
35 For this hypothesis, see Kissinger, On China , 173 -1 74. 
36 Wu Lengxi, Ten-Year War of Words, 179. 
37 
"~\'i<litHcR!Hi'\1/ilJ~" (The United States [needs to] stop as soon as possible), RMRB (09/09/1958), 
I. 
38 Some scholars even think that it was Mao 's plot "to induce Khrushchev to go to Beijing to play hi s 
assigned role in that design." See Kissinger, On China , 174. 
39 Vladislav M. Zubok, " Khrushchev 's nuclear promise," in "Mao Zedong's handling of the Taiwan 
Straits Crisis of 1958: Chinese recollections and documents," translated and annotated by Li Xiaobing 
et al, Cold War International Histo,y Project 8111/etin, 225. 
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although the Sino-Soviet rel ationship appeared close in public, in reality a scar was left on the 
minds of the leaders of the two communist parti es; "the Sino-Soviet rift was deepening and 
would erupt in earnest only a year later, in the autumn of 1959."40 
It was around thi s time that the Sino-Indian border conflict broke out, and the Soviet 
government issued a TASS statement which did not fa vour China. In March 1959, the Dalai 
Lama fled from Tibet, and New De lhi accepted the Dalai Lama's exiled government . This 
resulted in subsequent Sino-Jndian di sputes about the Tibet issue as well as the historical 
problem of the Sino-Indian border. A Sino-lndian border skinni sh broke out in late August. 41 
The clash was apparentl y instigated by the lndians.42 Despite this fact and despite China 's 
explanation concerning the situation on the Sino-Indian border to the Soviet diplomat in 
Beijing and an appeal for Soviet understanding, Khrushchev di sregarded Beijing. He believed 
that it was Beijing's scheme to sabotage hi s forthcoming visit to the US. A TASS statement 
was released on September 9, which expressed " regret" at the conflict between China and 
India. What made Chinese leaders more angry was that it complained that the conflict 
"jeopardized the relaxation of international tensions," and "complicated the situation prior to 
the meeting between Khrushchev and Eisenhower." 43 Jt thus publicised the rift between 
China and the USSR. To Chinese leaders, thi s statement not only failed to demonstrate that 
the Kremlin stood on Beijing's side, but indicated that Moscow virtuall y supported Indi a 's 
position.44 Furthennore, they interpreted Khrushchev's issuance of the statement on the eve 
of hi s visit to the US as a "gift" presented to Eisenhower "so as to curry favo ur with the US 
imperi ali sts and create the so-called ' spirit of Camp Dav id ' ." 45 The CCP suspected that 
Soviet leaders had actua lly started to implement a policy of detente and intended to settl e 
internati onal affairs by collaboration with the US govenunent. 46 The Sino-Indian border 
confli ct thus conso lidated the CCP's beli ef that the CPSU lacked revolutionary spirit and was 
an untrustworthy ally of China. 
40 Vladi slav M. Zubok, "Khrushchev 's nuclear promi se," 225 : also see Xie Yi xian ed., Diplomatic 
Histo,y ofC011temporo1y China, 157; Chen Jian , Mao s China and the Cold War , 79. 
41 Wu Lengxi , Ten-Year War of Words, 208- 10. 
42 Wang Dong, "The quarre lling bro thers," 20: also see Wu Le ngx i, Ten-Year War of Words, 209-10; 
Odd Arne Westad ed ., Brothers in An11s, 23. 
43 Wu Lengxi, Ten-Year War of Words, 214. 
" Mao, ·'Speech at the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central Comminee, 24 September 1962," in Stuart 
Schram ed. , Chairman Mao Talks to People, Talks and Letters: 1956-1971 (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1974), 190. 
45 The Editorial Departments of RMRB and Hongqi, "The origin and development of the differences 
between the leadership of the CPSU and ourselves (September 6, 1963)," in The Polemic 011 the 
General Line of1he International Co mmunist Mo vement , 77. 
46 Wu Lengxi, Ten-Year War ofWords , 21 7. 
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In the meantime, a number of other events happened which worsened the already stressed 
Sino-Soviet relationship. First, in June 1959, Moscow notified Beijing that it bad to suspend 
its plan to provide a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture 
due to the Soviet-American negoti ations at Geneva on the banning of nuclear weapon tests. 
The Soviets thus broke the agreement on new technology for national de fence signed with 
China on October 15, 1957.47 Moscow's abrupt action greatly upset the Chinese leaders and 
Chairman Mao in particular, who had longed to have nuclear arms to enhance China's great 
power status and force the US to treat China equall y at the negotiating table.48 Second, on 
July 16, 1959, Moscow decided to recall all Soviet experts from China and drastically 
reduced economic and military aid to China, just when China was experiencing serious 
economic plight. Moscow's deci sion certainly made China's economic recovery harder. 49 
These events further impelled the CCP to adopt a policy of self-reliance, rel ying on nobody 
but Chinese people themselves to develop its economy and nuclear weapons. To achieve that, 
the CCP returned to nationaJism to enhance Chinese morale and obtain the masses' support 
for the CCP's pol icies. This actually formed a pattern in China 's management of domestic 
politics and international relations, particularly in it s radical years: the CCP repeatedly 
utilized the struggles against "US imperialism" and "Soviet revisionism" to mobilize the 
great masses ' support of CCP policies and project its leadership role in the world 
revolutionary movement. 50 
All in all , by 1959, most evidence demonstrated that China's relationship wi th the Soviet 
Union had arrived at a "point of no return."51 The ri ft was partly derived from disputes about 
practical issues concerning China's national interests and sovereignty, such as the project to 
establish the join t submarine fl otilla. However, differences in political ideology held by the 
leaders of the two Parties were more fundamentally the cause. The Soviet leaders preached 
"peaceful coexistence," "peaceful competition" and "peaceful trans ition" and advocated 
seeking "a world without weapons, without armed fo rces and without wars."52 In contrast, 
the CCP held that although people should strive for peace, they should not be afraid of war, 
47 The Editorial Departments of RMRB and Hongqi, "The origin and development of the differences 
between the leadership of the CPSU and ourselves (September 6, 1963)," 77. 
48 Yang Kuisong, A Study on the History of P R. Chinas Establishment, vol.2: 194, 201. 
49 Xie Yix_ian, ed. , Diplomatic History of Contemp orary China , 161-162. 
50 See The Editorial Departments of RMRB and Hongqi, Th e Polemic on the General Line of the 
lntenwtional Communist Movement. 
51 Griffith, Th e Sino-Soviet Rift, 18. 
52 N. S. Khrushchev, "Replies to questions by Roberto J. Nob le, Director of the Argentine paper 
C/arin, December 30, 1959," quoted in 11,e Polemic on the General Line of the International 
Communist Movement, 76. 
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especia ll y nuclear wa r. 53 The ideological differences between the two Parties in the late 
1950s, as a result, planted seeds for and intensified the later open polemic debates and 
di vorce in the earl y 1960s. 
Thus, in the early l960s, Mao's China arrived at a foreig11 policy ca lled "double-anti .'' Whil st 
"US imperiali sm" continued to serve as China's primary "vicious" enemy through the 1950s 
to the 1960s, the deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relationship in the late 1950s made Chinese 
leaders consider the Soviet Union as an unreliable ally and probably a potential enemy. The 
CCP in the 1960s thus ca rried two banners in its international engagement: "anti-US 
imperialism" and "anti-Soviet revisionism and big power chauvinism." 54 The rhetoric and 
practices of "double-anti" were central to mobi lize the great masses to support Maoi st 
"continuous revo lution" and project China's central rol e in the communist world as well as 
the world revolution. 
4.2 Key elements of Maoist soft power 
In the context of the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations and the Maoist perception that the 
Soviet spirit of revo lution had "degenerated", the CCP considered that on behalf of authe nti c 
Communists, it was their miss ion to suppot1 the "oppressed" peoples all over the world . The 
Sino-Soviet split thus to a large degree provided China with a space within which to build 
itself as a model and a leader in the conununist world and world revolutionary movement. To 
play such a role, Maoist China could not only rely on its hard coercive power, but had to 
mobi li ze its so ft power to persuade and attract the audience all over the world . 
The CCP believed that the PRC's significance and presti ge was deeply rooted in the cause of 
world revolution, so those who sought revolut ion and national independence provided the 
target audience, as it were, of Maoist soft power. They believed that China could project its 
attractiveness in the following th ree aspects. In the first place, the " new China" was regarded 
as a model fo r the underdeveloped world in tenns of winning national liberati on and 
achieving national deve lopment. On the one hand , Communist China had already provided a 
53 Luo Hanping, China on the Eve of Cultural Revolutio , 111 . For Mao 's argum ent on war and nuclear 
weapons , see Mao. "Imperiali sts and all the reacti onaries are paper tigers - excepts from a speech at 
the Moscow Meeting of Representatives of th e Communi st and Worker 's Parit ies, November I 8, 1957,'' 
in Renmin Press ed ., Imperialists and All the Reactionaries Are Paper Tigers (Beijing: Renmin, 1958), 
23-24: Mao, ·'Ta lk to Marshal Montgomery on three principles and nuclear weapons (September 1961 )" 
in Selected Works of Mao Zedong 0 11 Foreign Policy, 475-7. 
54 For instance see " Annual report o f Chin a's cultural delegation in Laos, January 26 , 1962," Chinese 
Diplomatic Archives (CDA) (Beij ing: The Mini stry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC), archival no.106-
00672 -0 I: '·Suggestions and work summ ary for the cultural exchanges between Ch ina and Guinea, I 0 
January to 16 May 1963,'' CDA , no.108-0090 1-01 ; "Report of the vis it of Ghanaian writer Williams to 
China, July 7 to August 25. 1963." CDA, no. I 08-00921 -01 . 
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successful model in throwing off colonial shackles and founding a new nation. This alone 
made it attractive. On the other hand , it also provided a national development model to attract 
the emerging states, because unlike the West as well as the USSR, none of them (including 
China) had a sophisticated industrial structure. In the second place, the political culture it 
projected was post-colonial , liberationist, modernising but non-Western, which claimed to 
represent the interests of the proletariat. It might well appeal to other post-colonial societies. 
Thirdly, Chinese foreign policy provided both vehicles and channels through which Chinese 
ideas and leadership were spread. 
4.2.1 China as an exemplary model of nation building 
Despite its youth and fragility, at the very beginning of the PRC, Chinese Communists made 
it clear that owing to "proletarian internationalism," it was their duty to provide support for 
the peoples in the underdeveloped world. The CCP promoted its experience in waging a war 
of national liberation and in national development for others to emulate. China as an 
exemplary model of nation building, in this sense, can be divided into two categories: one 
was for national liberation in colonial and semi-colonial countries; the other was for socialist 
construction for those who had secured national independence. 
4.2.1.1 China as a model (I): national liberation movement 
As soon as the PRC was established , its leaders stressed that China's path to national 
liberation could serve as a model for the other colonial and semi-colonial countries. 55 
However, China's role in th.is regard was shadowed by China's bigger brother, the Soviet 
Union. Nevertheless, due to the Sino-Soviet rift and Chinese perception of the "degeneration" 
of the revolutionary spirit of the CPSU, in the late 1950s the CCP vigorously promoted its 
experience of national liberation for those who were undergoing the process of securing 
national liberation to emulate . At the Eighth National Congress of the CCP in 1956, Chairman 
Mao declared: "We must actively support the movement for national independence and 
For the argument that China could serve as a model for national liberation movements in colonial 
and semi-colonial countries, one of the best known statements was Liu Shaoqi 's address to the Trade 
Union Conference of Asian and Australasian Countries. See Xinhua News Agency, "XIJ:'.J>';!tri"EiJJii1Hi!J;! 
;1HI,g,~i:51._ti¥:J7f~ili]" (Liu Sbaoqi 's inauguration speech at the Trade Union Conference of Asian 
and Australasian Countries), RMRB (22/1 1/1 949), I ; also see Editorial, "'1i'\~B1.Aflc&x1fi't;'\i/.1Ei1& 
_/j!,:-;f,;-'~,f~qc, ll,J_lj!,:-;f,;-Jij1Jlfnt/f .~? "("Armed people against the armed counter-revolution" - is it a 
unique feamre of Chinese revolution?), RMRB (16/06/1950), l ; Lu Dingyi, "'t' l'lsl1j!,:$1¥:Jii!J'l-:@':5/. 
( 7i§c,1',;qc, ll,l~i"'Ji:ili!:':t(J(J.==+ }lil~jjijfjc) " (The world significance of the Chinese revolution -
in commemoration of tbe 30"' anniversary of the CCP), RMRB (2310611 95 l ), 1. 
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liberation in various Asian, African and Latin American countri es."56 Meanwhile, the CCP 
repeatedly elaborated the CcP·s experience of revo lution and the concept of "continuous 
revolution" to demonstrate Chinese support for the struggles of the peoples of Asia, Africa 
and Latin America to achieve or safeguard their national independence.57 
ln Maoist theory, there were two types of national liberation movement, and both belonged to 
revo lution.58 The first one was " led by bourgeois nat ionalists and a imed at the estab li slunent 
of true independence from foreign control or imperiali sm and the abolition of so-called feudal 
patterns of landholding." The 1911 Xinhai revolution led by Sun Yat-sen as well as the 
Algerian revolution ( 1954-1 962) were good examples of thi s kind of revolution. The second 
one was led by communists, composed of "a two-stage revol ution" (fi rst to win national 
independence and then to build up a socia li st system) which led eventually to communism. 59 
Obviously the Chinese revolution belonged to the second category, and Mao called it a "new 
democratic" revo lution, because the communist party took the leadership in contrast with the 
first bourgeois-led revolution. When talkin g to international audiences, however, the Chinese 
leaders did not highlight the di stinction between the two kinds of revolution. Rather, they 
intentionally mi xed them under one single title, " the national liberation movement" (minzu 
jiefang yundong).60 The CCP stressed that the two types of revolution shared common foes 
and goals. Their common enemies were foreign imperial ism , domestic feudalism and 
bureaucrat-capita li sm, and the aim for all the underdeveloped countries undertaking 
revo lution was to obtain nati onal independence and "grasp our own destiny in our own 
hands."61 
56 Mao, " 't' l;J,!Ai"":WJ~/\.17':i:f'islft:'&:k-fr:Jf:miiil" (Speech at the Eighth National Congress of the 
CCP), in Mao Zedong, Ji!!J!//;)J/f:§fefiJ,x!iff (Mao Zedong 's Manuscripts since the Founding of the 
PRC) (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian 1992), vo l. 6: 203. 
57 Mao, "Some experiences in our Party's hi story, September 25 , 1956," Selected Works of Mao , vol.5: 
324-29. This talk was delivered to representatives of some Latin-American Communist Parties. 
58 For the two types of revol uti on, see Mao 's "On new democracy, January 1940," Selected Works of 
Mao Tse- tung, vol.2: 347. 
59 Mao ·s ·'On new democracy''; also see Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: 
Peking's Support for Wars of National liberation (Berkeley, Univ. of California Press, 1970), 51-52. 
'
0 Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy, 52. 
61 Mao, "The present situation and our tasks, December 25 , 1947," Selected Wo rks of Mao, vol.4: 168. 
In this article, Mao defined bureaucrat-capital ism: "monopoly capital , co mbined with state power, has 
become state-monopoly capitalism. This monopoly capital ism, closely tied up with fo reign 
imperiali sm, the domestic landlord class ... op presses not on ly the workers and peasants but also the 
urban petty bourgeoisie, and it injures the middle bourgeois ie .... This cap it al is popularl y known in 
China as bureaucrat-capital. This capitalist class, known as the bureaucrat-capitalist class, is the big 
bourgeoisie of China.1• 
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The next issue was how to achieve national liberation in relevant countries and how China's 
experience was applicable to them. The success of the Chinese revolution was largely 
credited to Chairman Mao's "successful and creative application" of universal Marxism-
Leninism to suit the concrete conditions of China. Therefore, the CCP highlighted Mao's 
revolutionary theory in general and his "three magic weapons" (san da fabao) fonned in the 
Chinese revolution in particular. These three principal weapons were "party building," where 
the party served as the "vanguard of the proletariat;" "armed struggle" with a revolutionary 
army controlled by the party; and "conectly handling the issue of the united front. "62 The 
essence of the Chinese model for revolution, in the last analysis, was attributed to the 
leadership of the CCP and the Party-led anned struggle. As Peter Van Ness argues, "the idea 
that the local communist party should gain control of the nationalist movement and use it as a 
vehicle to attain state power, after which it can transform the national revolution into a 
socialist one .. is at the heart of Mao Zedong's whole theory of new democracy."63 In 1965, 
Marshal Lin Biao's famous article "Long Live the Victory of People's War", refening to all 
those elements, promoted Mao 's strategy with regard to national liberation movements and 
the strategy of people 's war as a universal guideline for revolution in the underdeveloped 
world. 64 Lin sought to promote "people 's war" to enhance Mao 's leadership in the entire 
revolutionary world. 
However, one should bear in mind that revolution using "three magic weapons" was an ideal 
type which Maoist China endorsed in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Under the policy of 
"anti-imperialism" and "anti-revisionism," it also promoted revolutions that were not led by 
the communists, such as the examples of Algeria and Indonesia, whose revolutions were led 
by bourgeois nationalists. 65 This was obviously for the sake of building "the broadest 
possible" international united front to mobilize all the "oppressed peoples" of the world to 
oppose their c01mnon and principal enemy, US imperialism. 
62 J\1ao first expounded these three elements in his article "]ntroducing 171e Communist , October 4, 
1939," Selected Works of Mao , vol.2: 285-96, and later in "On the people's democratic dictatorship, 
June 30, 1949," Selected Works of Mao , vol.4 : 422; also see A. M. Halpern, "The foreign policy uses of 
the Chinese revolutionary model," Ihe China Quarterly, no.7 (Jul.-Sep. 1961), 1-16, in which these 
three elements were named as a "tripod. " 
63 Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy , 72. 
64 Lin Biao, "Ai:'c/i1i.%Jl't;JcU.7J;/,~-;;:~rj,l'_i,IJd.\';JJ\:Elli1i.$-JltfU=+flili¥" (Long live the victory 
of people 's war), RMRB (03/09/1965), I. 
65 Ibid. 
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4.2.1.2 China as a mode l (IT) : national development 
Whilst China highlighted its experience of national liberation to attract the peoples who were 
seeking national independence, it also set an example of socialist construction for those who 
were undertaking national development. 
The Maoists ' intention to stand as an example of sociali st construction dated back to the mid-
1950s, when the Chinese leaders reviewed China 's First Five-Year Plan. This Plan was 
shaped by the Soviet developmental model , which gave priority to heavy industry by 
transferring some of the profits from agriculture and li gh ter industry, and it was achieved with 
the aid of loans and technical assistance from the USSR.66 However, Chainnan Mao soon 
decided to depart from the Soviet model of development and explore a "China model" for 
advancing Chinese soc ialism. As China entered into 1958, Mao defined another "revolution" 
in hi s article "Sixty Points on Work Methods," which prefaced the launch of the GLF.67 He 
wrote: 
Our revolutions come one after another. Starting from the seizure of 
power in the whole country in 1949, there followed in quick succession 
the anti-feudal land refonn, agricultural co-operativization, and the 
soc iali st reconstruction of private industries, commerce and hand icrafts. 
The three great soc ialist refonns - i.e. the sociali st revolution in the 
ownership of means of production - were basically completed in 1956 
and there came the socialist revolution on the ideological and political 
front last year. This revolution may draw to the end of one stage by I 
Jul y this year. now we must start a technological revo luti on so that 
we ma y overtake Britain in fifteen or more years. Chinese economy is 
backward and China is materi all y weak.. We must make a spurt 
[forward in producti on] ... After fifteen yea rs, when our foodstuffs and 
iron and steel become plentiful, we shall take a much greater initiati ve. 
Our revolutions are like battles . After a victory, we must at once put 
66 Yang Kuisong, A Study 011 the Histo,y of PR. Chi11a's Establishme11t , vol.2: 191 ; also see Shen 
Zhihua. "Essent ial information of Soviet economic aid to China in the early days of the PRC.'" 
67 It was in May 1958 that the GLF campaign was forma lly launched, when the General L ine for 
Socialist Construction was put forward by Mao at the 2'd Pl enum of the Eight h Central Comm ittee. 
See Ed itorial, ".'f,j'J!!'J,,\\!, !'37i ;!, '" (Long Live Mao Zedong's Thought), RMRB (01 /07/19660), 1. 
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forward a new task. In this way, cadres and the masses wi ll forever be 
filled with revolutionary fervo ur, instead of conceit.68 
There were a few considerations for launching the GLF in China. First, the speed of its 
nati onal development in the first few years made the CCP very optimistic about China 's 
future. The PRC spent three years to restore order in China's economy, and another three 
years to realize the socialist transfonnation of the national economy, which meant that 
sociali st public ownership of the means of production had been built. 69 It took China six 
years to achieve the process wh ich had taken the Soviets 19 years. 70 This process represented 
a "miracle" created by a CCP-led China and convinced the CCP that it should not passively 
follow a Soviet path , but that China could take the lead and make more miracles by itself. 71 
Second, despite the achievements China had made in the First Five-Year Plan, Mao was 
preoccupied with " revolution anxiety", which had a significant impact on the launch of the 
GLF. For Mao, what was most important for the CCP was to maintain the momentum of 
revolution and push the revolution forward constantly. Khrushchev 's concept of "peaceful 
coexistence" presented a striking contrast to bis "continuous revolution" theory. As di scussed 
earli er, in Mao 's eyes, the Soviet advocacy of "peacefu l coexistenc_e," "peacefu l competi ti on" 
and "peaceful transition" would inevitably lead the communists to deviate from the ideal of 
revolution and to be afraid of imperi alism and war." Mao perceived that the detente policy 
actuall y negated the imperative of anned struggle and proletarian dictatorship. It thus not 
on ly produced a negative influence on the CCP's leadership in China but also threatened the 
cause of international communism and world revolution. In order to prevent China from 
falling into Soviet ways and to maintain the momentum of revolution in China, Mao came up 
wi th the GLF to elevate the revolution into a higher stage." 
Third, in the context of the anxieties of the revolution and the Sino-Soviet rift, Mao 's China 
sought to set itself as an alternati ve to the Soviet model in terms of national development: to 
realize communism in a developing country. It had been argued from Marx to Stalin that 
industriali zation was a prerequi site for reali zing communism. That is to say, communism 
68 Mao, "I j')c1fi't7'"+~ C 1/i~) C ·71.,]J.)\ijc- .Fl) " (S ixty poi nts on working methods (draft) 
- January 1958), in Mao Zedong s Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC, vol.7 : 51. 
69 Ed itorial , "ftOO'f1l::*:H-s:-:l=. .:x) f.ill'.tfl 11!.fi1lil\'" (The milestone of the great sociali st enterpri se in 
our country), RMRB (15/09/1956), 1. 
70 Yang Kuisong, A Study on the Histo,y of P. R. China's Establishment, vol.2: 192. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Chen Ji an, Mao s China and the Cold War, 72. 
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could only be achieved from a highl y industriali sed economic base. However, the reality 
faced by the Chinese was an agricultural underdeveloped China, with a large population in 
rural areas, in contrast with the situation in the Soviet Union. Due lo this rea lity, Chinese 
leaders understood that there were limi ts to their ability to follow the Soviet model of 
national development. 74 They therefore wondered if there was any other approach to 
communism more su ited to countries with low levels of industry. Eventually, Mao succeeded 
in launching the GLF, with organizational changes and massive mobili zation of resources and 
people. He believed that these measures "could provide the dramatic breakthroughs 
necessary for rapid growth, which, in tum, would free China from the apron strings of 
Moscow and also from other 'objective' constraints."75 The GLF and the People's Communes 
were extensively promoted to developing countries as well as to foreign guests who visited 
China. Being China 's initiative, this project demonstrated China's political will to achieve 
communism on its own and its intention to set an example for national development in the 
underdeveloped world. 
Last and probably the most significantly, the GLF actually represented widespread 
nationali stic sentiment in favour of restori ng China 's great power status in Mao 's generation. 
This needs to be understood in the context of the Chinese "victim mentality," formed and 
reinforced up to contemporary times. The Chinese "victim mentality" is unique, according to 
Chen Jian, "because it formed such a sharp contrast with the long-lived Central Kingdom 
concept." "The Chinese felt that their nation 's modern experience was more humiliating and 
less tolerable than that of any other victimized non-Western country in the world, and they 
firmly believed that China 's victim status would not end until its weaknesses had been turned 
into strength ."76 
Perhaps due to the uniqueness of thi s Chinese "victim menta li ty", Chinese leaders were 
agoni zed by China 's awkward international status and its weakness in material power. They 
fe lt that the PRC was unequall y treated by the world powers, particularl y the US. Chainnan 
Mao nursed his grievance, noticing that American delegates sought to derail the talks about 
the Taiwan issue in Sino-US ambassadorial talks in Geneva in September 1955 ." He felt 
74 Chinese leaders had discussed the drawbacks of So viet style development as well as the Chinese 
way of socialist development, see June Grasso, Jay Corrin, and Michael Kort , Modernization and 
Revolution in China: from the Opium Wars to World Power, 3'• edition (Am1onk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 
lnc., 2004), 174-5; Cong Jin, The }"ears of Chinas Tortuons Development, 1-6; Asbjorn Levbrrek, "The 
Chinese mode l of development;' Journal of Peace Research 13:3 (1976), 207-226. 
;s June Grasso et al. Moder11izatio11 and Revolution in China , 176. 
76 Chen Jian, Mao s China and the Cold War, 12. 
77 Xie Yixian ed., Diplomatic Histo,y ofContempora,y China, 89-90. In his meeting with Khrushchev 
in October 1959. Mao also ai red hi s grievance at Ameri ca ns' arrogance towards China in the Geneva 
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insulted by the inequality China had encountered in international relations. 78 To change this, 
it was imperative to overtake other world powers, particularly the US, as he told Chinese 
entrepreneurs one month later: "Our goal is to catch up with and surpass America .... Once we 
catch up with America and surpass it, we can take a break. Now we appear poor, (and thus] 
we were bullied ... We must strike back." 79 Mao further revealed his unhappiness about 
China's international status in hi s talk to Sukarno, the president of Indonesia, when he visited 
China to celebrate the PRC 's National Day in 1956. Mao remarked that "China was a big 
country, but China was not powerful " so that " China was looked down upon" and bullied by 
the US and could not enter into the UN. The PRC was denied fonnal recognition by many 
countries because of Washington 's support for the Republic of China (ROC/Taiwan). To so lve 
this issue, there were only two approaches available for the Chinese: "one is to make the PRC 
more powerful , the other is to take back Taiwan as soon as possible."80 
For Mao and many other Chinese leaders, " to make tbe PRC more powerful" was 
fundamental , because only then would it have international leverage against the US on the 
Taiwan issue and be able to regain its "rightful role" in contemporary international relations. 
Therefore, China had to enhance its material power, but not at a steady pace. Wanting to 
realize China's "big power dream" in a short time, Maoists expected sudden great leaps in 
China's soc iali st construction. 
These are the major considerations that catalysed Maoists to launch the GLF campaign in 
1958. Under Mao 's instigation, the GLF in agriculture started first. From 1957 to 1958, it was 
widely reported that the food production had increased astonishingly. 81 This spurred Mao on 
to the aim of creating miracles in industry. In January 1958, Mao defined the mission: "we 
talks. See "Discussion between N.S. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong," CWIHP, accessed from 
http ://1 egac y. wi I soncenter.org/va2/i ndex .cfm ?topic id= I 409&fuseacti on= HO ME. docu ment&iden ti Ji er 
=5034C225-96B6- l 7 5C-904C329 I 59CA3 F25&sort=Col lection&item=Sino-Soviet Relations. 
78 Yang Kuisong, "M 1955 if:jj'j)-{,~*wtiirr~- 0/4:" (From the year of 1955 Mao had been 
nursing a grievance), m7T/f'!J.$ (So uthern Weekly) (03/04/2008), Bl 1. 
79 Mao, "tE'ti ;;js:l:5<. I lll!'ll'. 'i±~.±5<.c'ltm: (ol/ll!lllim~ _I· J)(Jifri.E <- fL.liliif:-t J=I = + fL 8 l " 
(Speech at the meeting of socialist transformation of capitalist industry and conunerce, October 29, 
1955), Mao Zedong, .:§/l/1'<Y:ffi (A Collection of Mao Zedong's works) (Beijing: Renmi n, 1999), 
vol.6: 500. 
80 Mao,··~ HYi~c+'i;EJt1:J!¥-1)-t'fil ((,J -iri'l:J/);t'I(iiJ~ ( - fL]i ;\i:p:)L J=l ~ +B )" (The issue of 
restoring PRC's legitimate position in the UN, September 30, 1956), Selected Works of Mao Zedong 0 11 
Foreign Policy, 264-5 , 269, 271. 
81 Mao referred to the increase of China 's agricuitural production in his speech at the 151h Supreme 
State Conference on September 5, 1958, see Mao Zedong 's Manuscripts since the Founding of the 
PRC, vol.7: 380,397. 
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shall catch up with Britain in fifteen years."82 Eight months later, however, Mao bypassed 
Britain and now claimed that China aimed at catching up with and even surpassing America 
in five to seven years. 83 No matter how unrealistic the goals of the GLF sounded, no one 
could challenge Mao's projects in particular and his authority in general , owing to the unique 
Chinese "victim mentali ty" and popular pass ion for restoring China 's great power status. 
The key elements of China's model for soc iali st construction at the time were as fo llows. The 
first element was to speed up " the transition to communism," which was refl ected by the 
General Line fo r Socialist Construction . Mao characterised the General Line as "going all out, 
aiming high and achieving greater, faster, better and more economical results in building 
sociali sm," which became the guideline fo r the GLF. 84 However, a speed-up of socialist 
construction was needed to maintain the balance between industry and agricu lture. lndustry 
and agri culture were to be developed in tandem by making use of both modem technology 
and traditional methods.85 Thi s was from the Maoist view that moderni zation in the Soviet 
way, with emphasis on heavy industry, could lead to a fast-growing gap b·etween industri al 
cities and the agricultural countryside in backward countries.86 While Mao was unwilling to 
slow down the speed of industri alization , hi s solution was to carry out industriali zation on a 
large scale by bringing industry to the countryside. Industry in thi s sense would not be 
concentrated exc lusively in urban centres but scattered throughout China 's large rural area . 
Thirdly, for organizing industri alization in the countryside, self-reli ant People's Commune 
units were established, in which the peasants lived and worked together like a trul y 
revolutionary corps: "The communes were designed to be the nation 's basic soc ial unit, 
organi zations of agricultural and industrial production as well as incubators of revo lutionary 
Commun ist behav iour." 87 This method represented a Chinese alternative to the Western 
approach to moderni zation, which was rejected by Mao: 
" Ed itorial , "'Jfe);<lfi&:/~" (Ride on the wi nd and break through the waves), RMRB (OJ /01/1958), I ; 
Mao, "Speech at the 14th Supreme State Conference, January 28 , 1958," in Schram , Chairman Ma o 
Talks to the People, 93 ; Mao, "S ixty art icles on work methods," Mao Zedong s Manuscripts since the 
Founding of the PRC, vol.7: 51. 
83 See Mao, ··x,t~tr/£/oJ~iJl....[~~j(f!jc((.J,sYe, C-1L1i)\.if}l,R.:::.EI)" (Comments on the 
documents of industry presented in Beidahe Conference, September 2, 1958), Mao Zedong s 
Ma nuscripts since the Founding of the PRC, vo l. 7: 368. 
84 
··Long Live Mao Zedong ·s Thought;' RMRB. 
85 Mao, "On the ten major relationships." ' 
86 Wang Gw1gwu , China and the World since 1949, 90. 
87 June Grasso et al , Moden,;zario n and Revolution h1 China , 183 . 
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The process of modernization in the West had moved the social order in 
the direction of increased urbani zation, reliance on bureaucracies, large-
scale production, social stratification, specialization of labor and 
domination of elites . The communes were intended to break up this 
lock-step process by bringing industry to the countrys ide, thereby 
avoiding the assorted social and political ills that accompanied 
urbanization.88 
The Maoists aimed to reject centralized planning under the control of government bureaucrats. 
Instead, they mobilized the great masses to be self-reliant and take the initiative to build 
small-scale manufacturing faci lities in their own villages and neighbourhoods. That was 
where the "the most creative initiative" - "backyard steel furnaces" came from. With its aim 
of building a Communist utopia in China, the GLF was probably the most radical program 
unleashed in the PRC since it was founded . It marked the start of China's most radical years 
and produced far-reaching influences on its domestic and foreign policies in the following 
two decades. Nevertheless, Chairman Mao was adept at mass mobilization to support hi s 
"continuous revolution" projects in China. His party members al so promoted the GLF in 
foreign states to build China 's image as a model for socialist construction. The General Line 
of Socialist Construction, the GLF and the People' s Commune were call ed "the three red 
fl ags" and were vigorously promoted by the CCP in diplomacy, which is discussed later.89 
4.2.2 A "new" Chinese culture: proletarian culture 
The second strand of Maoist soft power evolved from Chinese culture. The culture promoted 
by Maoist China was neither traditional nor Western, but was a post-colonial "proletarian 
culture." It was claimed to represent the interests of the proletariat. This "new" culture 
promoted Chi na 's "revolutionary" political identity as well as nationali sm - the glory of one's 
own nation . 
A clear definition of culture however could not be found in Mao 's writing; rather, culture for 
Mao could mean everything. It is concluded that Mao refen-ed to culture as "not only ... how 
people were educated, what they read, how they created their art and music - although these 
were important - but al so ... how people inten-elated, how people thought, and even how 
people amused themselves.'·9° For Mao, there was no pure culture for culture's sake . Culture 
88 [bid. 
89 
"The sum of the cultura l work aimed at foreign countries in the las t ten years and guidelines and 
tasks for the future , Beijing, 01 /07/1960," CDA , no. I 02-00015-03. 
90 June Grasso et al, Moderniza tfon and Revolution in China , 208. 
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was interrelated with a ll the other aspects of society, including politi cs, revolution, literature 
and art, education, and soc ial nonns and va lues. 
However, among all these aspects , politics played the most significant role in shaping culture. 
This point of view was refl ected in Mao 's speech at the Forum on Literature and A11 in 
Yan ' an in 1942: 
In the world today all culture, all literature and art belong to definite 
classes and are geared to defini te political lines. There is in fact no such 
thing as art for art 's sake, art that stands above o r ait that is detached 
from or independent of politic.91 
Culture, in this sense, was subordinate to politics and should be guided by politi cs according 
to Mao. The nature of politics however was detennined by the prevailing class of the society 
according to Marxism. It thus meant that class al so mattered in the shaping of culture. Mao 
made thi s point by following Marxists ' argument that cu ltural consciousness reflects the 
poli tical and economic values of the prevailing class. 92 Therefore, when a society was in its 
feuda l or capitalist stage, culture or culture related actions were identifi ed with th e values of 
the privileged upper-class. Working classes were seldom entitled to obtain or produce 
knowledge. In contrast, when a society "progressed" into a proletarian stage, a "new" culture 
- a "proletari an" one - ought to be estab lished and serve the needs of the majority of 
population, that is, the workin g classes , which consisted of the workers, peasants and sold iers 
in the first place.93 
The establi shment of a "proletari an cul ture" in Mao 's theory was "an indispensab le part of 
the entire revo lutionary cause", because culture in its turn exe11·ed a great influence on politi cs 
and revo lutio n. He warned hi s co lleagues that if they failed to recognize thi s, they "could not 
carry on the revo lutionary movement and win victory. " 94 The importance of culture, more 
specifically revo lutionary culture, had been exp lained in an earli er essay : "Revolutionary 
culture is a powerful revolutionary weapon fo r the broad masses of the people. It prepares the 
ground ideologically before the revolution comes ai1d is an important, indeed essential, 
fighting front in the general revolut ionary front during the revo luti on." 95 This weapon would 
91 Mao, "Talks at the Yenan Forum of Literature and An (May 1942)," Selected Works of Mao, vol.3: 
86. 
92 Mao, ·'On new democracy.'· 340. 
93 Mao, "Talks at the Yen an forum of literature and an (May 1942),' ' 84. 
94 Ib id. 
95 Mao, "On new democracy ... 382. 
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"unite and educate" people, so that they would "fight the enemy wi th one heart and one mind ." 
In thi s sense , culture served as a tool in the work of the united front. By educating the great 
masses and uniting them under the discourse of revolution and communism guided by the 
CCP, it not only helped defeat the enemy of the great masses in China , such as imperiali sm 
and bureaucrat-capitalism - i.e. the KMT, but would push the revolution into a higher stage. 
In other words, revolutionary culture actually consolidated the leadership of the CCP in China. 
Whilst the relationship between politics, class and culture was clear, what represented a "new" 
' 
culture according to Mao? On the one hand, this national culture should belong to "the broad 
masses" and serve the maj ori ty of the nation's population. It should encourage "the liberation 
and development of the individuality of hundreds of millions of people . "96 On the other hand, 
this individual liberation and development should be ·'scientific" according to Marxist 
materialism. To build thi s "new" culture, Mao asked people to oppose "all feudal and 
superstitious ideas" and those theori es with capitalist and imperialist features which 
manifested the interests of previously dominant classes. For example, in China, feudal and 
superstitious ideas included "the worship of Confucius, the study of the Confucian canon, the 
old ethical code and the old ideas."97 In the world, the capitalist and imperialist culture was 
large ly manifested by colonialism and racism. Mao called to the-.great masses, " Imperialist 
culture and [feudal and] semi-feudal culture are devoted brothers and have fonned a 
reactionary culture alliance against ... new culture ... and must be swept away .... There is no 
construction without destruction ... The two are locked in a life-and-death struggle."98 Mao 's 
requirement of the "destruction" of the "old" cultures was later reflected by hi s advocacy for 
movements to ra ise the social status of youth , the poor and women who had been usually 
oppressed under the "old" societies, to break tbe hi erarchical order under the guidance of 
class theories, and to build a utopian community constituted by the People's Communes.99 In 
conclusion, his ideal of building a "new" culture was to establish a utopia in which a 
universal equal relationship would be established among all mankind regardless of age, class, 
gender or race. 
In addition to the emphasis on the decisive role of politics and ideology played in building 
China 's "new" culture, Mao also stressed the "ethnic" or "national" (minzu de) aspect of the 
culture. He stated, "New-democratic culture is national. . .. It belongs to our own nation and 
96 Mao, "On coalition government." Selected Works of Mao, vol.3: 233 . 
97 Mao, "On new democracy," 369. 
98 Ibid. 
99 See "Transforming man, nature, and society," in Stuart R. Schram, The Political Thought of Mao 
Tse-tung, revi sed and enlarged edition (New York: Praeger, 1969), 331-7 1. 
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bears our own national characteristics. " 100 Mao thus criti cized the idea of "wholesa le 
westernization," as we ll as the mechani cal absorption of Marxism, because they fa il ed to 
combine with specific Chinese national characteri sti cs and meet the actual needs of Chinese 
people. "In app ly ing Marxism to China," Mao stressed that the Chinese Communists should 
fo llow this principle, "the universal truth of Marxism must be combined w ith spec ifi c 
national characteristics and acquire a definite national form if it is to be usefu\. " 101 
Therefore, the estab lishment of a "new" Chinese cu lture und oubtedly should be based on the 
principle of the absorption of Marxism with Chinese national characteri stics. This represented 
one of the CCP's earl y effo11s to sinicize Marxi sm. First, due to the particularity of the 
Chinese revo lution, there would be a two-stage revo luti on, and th e estab li shment of "new" 
Chinese nati onal culture should be gnided by this two-stage revolntion. China had long been 
a feudal society and entered into a semi-colonia l stage owing to the invasion of the 
im periali st powers in its recent hi story. Chinese society thus had become " predominantly 
colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal." 102 The factors of feudalism ; capitali sm and 
imperiali sm represented the reactionary forces. Due to the various enemies and different tasks 
of Chinese revolution, there would be a two-stage revolution in China. In the first stage of the 
revo lution, a "new democratic" one led by the CCP aimed at obtaining national independence, 
the theme of the "new" culture " is the ant i-imperialis t and anti-feudal culture of the broad 
masses." However, when China entered into the second stage of the revolution - a "sociali st" 
one for the overthrow of capita li sm, the "new" national culture would have a social ist content 
and reflect socialist politics and economy. 103 
Second, thi s two-stage revol uti on informed the content of the "new" culture. In the first stage, 
Chinese people needed to oppose "a ll feudal and superstitious ideas." Also, it required 
bu ilding a culture to unite the great masses including the bourgeoisie for the purpose of 
opposing imperialism. For example, in the Anti-Japanese War (193 1-1945), it was "the 
culture of the anti-Japanese united front. " 104 After obtaining national independence, however, 
it was the proletariat's task to ann the other c lasses with sociali st ideology. 
The third and probably the most subtle iss ue was how to deal with China·s thousands of years 
of civilization dating from feudal times. Once again , Mao categorized culture according to the 
ioo Mao . ·'On new democracy,·• 380 . 
IOI Ibid .. 380-81. 
1
°' Ibid., 34 1. 
103 Ibid. , 3 79 . 
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standard of class. " It's imperative to separate the fine o ld culture of the people, which had a 
more or less democratic and revolutionary character, from all the decadence of the old feudal 
ruling class." 105 As a result , he was more supportive of promoting Chinese culture that was 
created by the great masses and reflected the revolutionary spirit of Chinese people, which 
included folk art, the revolutions carried out by Chinese peasants and so on. This kind of 
culture was wide ly dispersed both at home and abroad in post-1949 China, which is further 
discussed in the section of China 's revolutionary diplomacy. 
In conclusion, Mao saw the forms of culn1re in a relative way. It was the "progressive" tasks 
of the revolution that designated the nature of culture, and culture mainly served as a means 
for the united front. In the first stage of the Chinese revolution, the national bourgeoisie and 
petty bourgeoisie were members of the alliance against imperialism and feudalism, and the 
CCP's cu ltural workers should unite them for that purpose. But when it came to the second 
stage of the revolution, the entire bourgeoisie became the target for ideological rectification 
and even struggle. 106 Despite the difference of the struggle targets in China's two-stage 
revolution , one key aspect was certain, that is, to maintain the leadership of the CCP and 
communist ideology - Mao Zedong Thought in particular - in steering peoples' minds. The 
ideas of class and revolution were embedded into Chinese cultural policies. By cultural 
means, the CCP not only could consolidate its leadership in China but also could mobilize the 
great masses to support its policies. 
4.2.3 China's revolutionary foreign policy 
The third important strand of Maoist soft power in the 1960s was rooted in China's 
revolutionary foreign policy, which provided a platfonn by means of which Chinese 
revolutionary concepts and the leadership of the CCP in the world revolution was projected. 
The revolutionary feature of Chinese foreign policy in the 1960s was mainly reflected by its 
"double-anti " policy and the adoption of the tactics of the united front in international 
10
' Ibid., 381. However, it is unclear from Mao as how to distinguish the revo lutionary part that had 
been created by the people from the feudal and reactionary part in China 's "old" culture. Actually Mao 
maintained himself as the final judge in this area, which was reflected in the brutal project of the 
"Culture Revolution." 
106 The bourgeoisie included intellectuals, industrialists and business people, leading religious figures, 
the members of democratic parties and democratic personages. See Mao, "Main points of the 
resolution adopted at the enlarged meeting of the political bureau of the Central Committee of the 
Conununist Party of Ch ina, February 18, 1951," Selected Works of Mao, vol.4: 48. The standpoint that 
the bourgeoisie were the target of socialist revolution was implicitly expressed in Mao's writings 
before 1949, but was explicitly demonstrated in his statements and the movements instigated by him 
after 1949, which reached a peak in the Cultural Revolution. See Mao, "The struggle against the ' three 
evi ls ' and the ' five evils' , (November 1951 -March 1952)," Selected Works of Mao , vol.4: 66-69; Mao, 
"The contradiction between the working class and the bourgeoisie is the principal contradiction in 
China (June 6, 1952)," Selected Works of Mao, vol.4: 77. 
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engagement. Whil st the fom1er sought to promote the idea that China was an independent 
force which represented the large non-aligned third world in between the two superpowers, 
the latter served to persuade revolutionary fo rces all over the world to support China 's 
policies and its role in the world revolution. 
4.2.3.1 T he policy of "double-anti " 
As di scussed in the first section , the CCP began to be doubtfu l about Moscow's practices and 
theories from the time of the 20 'h National Congress of CPSU in February 1956; China 
however still clung to the two-camp theory. This theory held that the world was di vided into 
two hostile and irreconcilable camps - the socialist camp and the capitalist/imperialist camp. 
Th is view of the world led to the PRC's adoption of the poli cy of leaning to the sociali st bloc 
as its first foreign policy. The idea of the two camps was reaffi rmed in Mao 's speeches in 
Moscow in November 1957. 10' Nevertheless, the CCP's unce11ainty about the two-camp 
theory increased after 1959. The di sagreements between the CCP and CPSU, and 
Khrushchev 's approach to the US, hugely impacted upon the solidarity between the two 
sociali st giants. They helped the Chinese leaders conclude that the two camps might not 
really as irreconcilable as had originall y been thought. China 's foreign policy of " leaning-to-
one-side" hence mrned out to be problematic . Chinese leaders needed to make a new foreign 
policy to clarify the confusion due to the ongoing frictions between the CCP and the CPSU , 
to justify the PRC 's international engagement, and to mobilize their people to support China's 
international policies and actions. This led to the transition to the policy of "doubl e-ant i." 
In the spring of 1960, the Chinese leadership started to send out signals indicating a shift in 
China's forei gn policy. Under Mao 's guidance, the Secretariat of the Central Committee of 
the CCP draft ed three articles titl ed "Long Live Leninism." They were publi shed in Renmin 
Ribao (Peop le's Daily) on the occasion of the commemora tion of the 90th anni versary of 
Lenin' s birthday and later publi shed as a booklet in Chinese, Eng li sh, Russ ian, German, 
Japanese and French. 108 These three articles publ icly criticised Soviet propositions of 
"peaceful coexistence," "peaceful competition" and "peaceful transition." They argued that 
Leni n's ideas of "proletarian revo lution and the dictatorship of the proletari at" in tbe fi ght 
against im perialism were still " irrefut able truths" in today's world . Imperi a li sm was still the 
ma in source of war and ' ·the most vicious enemy of the peopl e of the entire world ." As such , 
it was imperati ve for the communist countries to unite to oppose imperiali sm and help the 
io- Mao, "{:fXJ!lif4,J:tf':it;;jcll [)\.:it; f-l:*'fii)(J-.1¥.Jijti! (-;!Lli {:;i:jo-j--}3) ., (Speeches at 1957 
International Meeting of Co mmuni st and Work ers' Parti es in Moscow, November 1957), Mao Zedong:S 
Manuscripts siuce the Founding of the PRC, vol.6: 625, 630-44. 
'
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anned struggles of people all over the world. 109 When Mao later met foreign leaders such as 
Kim II Sung and Marshal Montgomery in 1960, he remarked that there would be no 
"peaceful coexistence," but only "coexistence under the state of cold war," because there was 
guerrilla warfare in many oppressed countries and it was impossible for them to maintain 
peace with Western imperialism, the US in particular. 110 
It is worth noting that in Chairman Mao's talks to these two leaders, he did not fully negate 
the possibility of "coexistence" (although in the context of cold war) . Mao 's response to 
"coexistence" was tactical, because he was expecting good results from the GLF. 111 However, 
when the GLF produced severe consequences all over the country from 1960 to 1962, Mao 
temporarily had to keep restraint on domestic and foreign policies. It once again revealed how 
domestic policies were closely connected to foreign policies. 
In effect, in these transitional years, Chairman Mao's authority was to some extent 
undennined by the GLF and he had to gamer support and develop a unified understanding of 
his policies within the Party. 112 In the aspect of foreign policy, Mao' s "continuous revolution" 
was challenged by the advocacy that China should adopt a foreign policy according to its 
own capacity and carry out it in a pragmatic way. Wang Ji ax iang, the Minister of 
International Department, Central Committee of Communist Party of China (IDCPC), 
pointed out that China should not over issue "cheques" for the aid of foreign revolutions 
109 The Editorial Department of Hongqi , " 3'0 T ± 51.. lf :!i ! " (Long live Leninism!), RMRB 
(20/04/1960), I. Together with the other two articles "Forward along the path of the great Lenin!" and 
"United under Lenin 's revolutionary banner! ," these three articles were compiled and translated into 
English as a book long live Leninism, Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1960. 
110 Mao, "r] f< {}} l:!; o¥U 5G yrl1 ~ risl !is Jal 1,',c C - 7L t; 0 '¥ Ji Jj = -J- -t El ) " (Talk to Marshal 
Montgomery on international situation, May 27, 1960), Selected Works of Mao Zedong on Foreign 
Policy, 421-35 ; ""Eii$ 1f-~[i',']~13J,x;S'J~-if.ic:iit 1960 $ 5 )=] 21 B " (RecordofMaoZedong'sand 
other comrades ' talk with Kim II Sung, May 21 , 1960), quoted in Jin Jichong ed. , -'B i'tJJ<l!t 
(Biography of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976), Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian, 2003, accessed from 
http:i/cpc.people.com.cn/GB/69112/70190/70 \ 92/70271/476549 l .html 
111 Wu Lengxi , Ten-Year War of Words , 338-9; Yang Kui song, A Study on the Histo,y of PR. China s 
Establishme111, vol.2: 220-1. 
112 Actually many Chinese leaders had reservations about the GLF. But most of them either kept sil ent 
or maintained that the achievements during the last few years were major. However, the Defence 
Minister Marshal Peng Dehuai and the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Wentian provided sharp 
opinions on the GLF at the Lushan Conference in July 1959. Their opinion, especially Peng 's, actually 
challenged Mao 's infallibility and pointed to his personality cult. Peng 's and Zhang's views of the GLF 
were supported by the Secretary of the Hunan Provincial Committee of the CCP, Zhou Xiaozhou, and 
the PLA Chief of Staff, Marshal Huang Kecheng. Chairman Mao felt that hi s authority was challenged, 
and the momentum of continuous revolution and the cause of communism were threatened. He 
thereafter launched attacks on them as the "Peng-Huang-Zhang-Zhou Anti-Party Group" in August 
1959, and their "crimes" were further elaborated in the Cultural Revolution. On the details of the 
Lushan Conference, see Cong Jin, 11,e Years oj China's Tortuous Development, 187-221. For the 
EngLish version of Mao 's speech at the Lushan Conference, see Mao, "Speech at the Lushan 
Conference, 23 July 1959," in Schram ed., Chairman Mao Talks to People, 131-46. 
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beyond its economic capacity. Chinese fore ign policy should be practical and realistic, should 
be based on China 's reality and should se rve China 's national development. He maintained 
that defending world peace was the primary task for the people of the world , and even 
suggested that it was inappropriate to complete ly negate the idea of "peaceful coexistence." 
He contended that it was better to use "negoti ations and other peaceful means" to solve 
di sputes between countries. 113 According to his observation , Wang embraced the proposition 
of "peaceful coexistence" in the World Peace Conference held in Moscow in Jul y 1962. 
Wang 's argument undoubtedly challenged Mao 's basic conclusion that war was a form of 
class confrontation, and inevitable as long as classes existed. Mao believed that the most 
effective means to prevent war was revolution, and thus had great expectations of the rising 
national liberation movements in the Third World . He insisted that it was the PRC's 
obligation to support those movements due to the spirit of "proletarian internationali sm." 
Mao was provoked by Wang's argument. He offered harsh cri ti cism, charging Wang with 
" revisionism" and claiming that hi s view was compatible with those · of imperiali sts, 
reactionaries and revisionists. Mao warned his colleagues that Wang's argument represent ed 
"a compromise with Klu·ushchev and a ' revi sioni st road ' within our Party, and must be 
opposed. " 114ln this way, China 's foreign policy was further rad icali zed. At the Tenth Plenum 
of the Eighth Central Committee of the CCP in September 1962, Chainnan Mao affi nned the 
significance of "class struggle .'" He maintained that due to the existence of classes, there 
were tluee tasks facing Chinese people, which were "anti-imperialism, anti-revisionism and 
anti -reactionaries." 11 5 As Mao instructed , Premier Zhou Enlai made a speech in thi s Plenum, 
where he said "the contradiction between us and US imperia li sm is the major contradiction," 
" the struggle against revisioni sm has entered into a stage of face -to-face fi ghting," and ·'we 
must a lso attack reactionary nationali sm [Nehru's lndia]." He declared that "the truth of 
Marxism-Leninism and the centre of world revolution have now transferred from Moscow lo 
Beijing [ emphas is added]. We now should take up thi s role and act bravely for this just 
113 Wang Jiaxiang. "1H~J/r'iiEIL'.l!i*ll'Tlrr 1)1.l;/c;t E!L'.((,Ji&~ < -:tLli::h.if-+fcl+Bl ., (Decide 
policies based on the reality of one 's own cou ntry, October 10, 1959); "*'fX:J\fl,Ll ffWi.\W4$, ti'; 
li~1!il.:fz:,fU)\R;.¥fil;iE7;/J l"lilfil--'.*~::F::,';': , :[a:); j/jjqj ( - ;/L;\".-.{f.=:JJ=-j--- 1::J) " (The iss ue 
of the suppon of anti-imperial ist struggles, national independ ence and people's revolution - be 
practical and rea listic and accord ing to one·s capacity, March 3 1, 1962); "IH/lii/i.xi:JiHt\:l!JJl,y, Ju]/12i (j(J:7j· 
'ff;; C - :tL;\_: ,ic:; .. JL..:. l·:tL n) ·· (A brief view on some international issues, June 29, 1962), in 
Wang Jiaxiang . .Ef#j.fjjf;f/;(Selected Works of Wang Jiaxiang) (Beijing: Renmin, 1989), 441-3 , 444-5, 
446-60. 
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11
; Mao, ·'Speech at the Tenth Pl enum of the Eighth Central Comm inee. 24 September 1962," in 
Schram ed .. Chairman Mao Talks to People, 188-90. 
104 
cause."
116 Indeed, it was after this Plenum that Beijing adopted a more radical foreign poli cy. 
The CCP intensified disputes with the CPSU and other communist parties which took the 
CPSU's views. From the end of 1962 to 1965, Renmin Ribao and Hongqi, the Party 's major 
mouthpieces, published various articles criticizing Soviet " revisioni st" ideo logy and '"big 
power chauvinism" practices and charging the CPSU with being a "betrayer" of the great 
cause of world revolution.117 China thus openly divorced with the Soviet Union and officially 
started its "double-anti " policy. 
When China carried out its "double-anti " policy, it nonetheless promoted the Five Princi ples 
of Peaceful Coexistence. China maintained that it had been oppressed by the superpowers and 
needed to defend itself against these reactionary forces, but at the same time however was a 
peaceful force standing finn with other like-minded states and people to safeguard world 
peace. This led to China's policy of forming an international united front. 
4.2.3.2 The support of world revolution: the inte1mediate zone a nd the united front 
China's "double-anti" policy and its increasing support of world revolution represented two 
sides of a coin and there was interplay between the two. The "double-anti" policy in some 
respects provided China with a space within which to build its starns as a model and a leader 
in the community of post-colonial societies. This foreign policy also highlighted the 
distinctiveness of the soft power of Maoist China. It attempted to build a community free 
from the control of the two superpowers, to be an alternative to the capitalist system and to 
provide a model that was different from the Soviet one in that China had successfull y thrown 
off colonial shackles and founded a new nation with a very low level of industrialization. 
Maoist China sought to present itself as undertaking a just cause for mankind as a leader of 
the world revo lutionary movement. It targeted the audience in the vast area caught between 
the US and the USSR, which represented an "intermediate zone" in Chairman Mao 's 
conceptuali zation, 
When China gradually took the "double-anti" as it s fo reign policy, one problem posed to the 
CCP was "how to reconcile its hostility towards a state that was neither counterrevolutionary 
11 6 
"f.ll.~-*tEAfill+if1:i:~J: B',1tR1;t;· <-:fL1'=¥1L~= +1' B)" (Zhou Enlai 's report at the 
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117 See Wu Lengxi, Ten-Year War of Words, 531-933. The open polemics between the two parties 
however started from 1963. The CCP published nine arti cles to respond to CPSU's criticism and 
elaborate Chinese arguments. The nine articles were compil ed into a book call ed ;Rr/:fl/J,jij:/J:cI.J< 
iE iJJ ,& J!ff tit//') if: lift (77,e Polemic on General line of the !11ternatio11al Communist Movement) 
(Beijing: Renmin, 1965) and Engli sh edition was publ ished by the Foreign Language Press in the same 
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nor particularl y imperialistic, by accepted Marxist standards, with its ideology. '· 11 8 The 
CCP's one major approach was to redefine the structure of world politics. Ch inese leaders 
charted a new picture fo r the ' ·oppressed peoples" as well as "peace-loving countri es ." Mao's 
notion of the " intermediate zone" and hi s strategy of forming " the most extens ive united front" 
represented this attempt. 119 
In the early 1960s, Mao divided the " intermediate zone" into two parts. The first part 
consisted of the independent countries and those striving for independence in Asia , Africa and 
Latin America, which was called "the first intermediate zone. " The second part consisted of 
the areas of Europe and Oceania , and the other capitalist countries such as Canada and Japan , 
and was defined as "the second intermediate zone." Mao claimed that when the two 
superpowers were collaborating together to reign over the world, the "contrad ictions" within 
the two blocs headed by the two superpowers began to evolve. Mao argued that while the 
relationships between the Soviet Union and its fellow socia list countries were becoming 
unpleasant, countries belonging to the second intennediate zone were di ssati sfied with 
America's control. These fellow countri es in the two camps were seeking to free themse.lves 
from the control of the two superpowers. Mao then took the example of De Gaulle 's France, 
praising its detennination to develop an independent foreign policy free from Washington 's 
control. In thi s regard , Mao believed that those capitalist countries had something in common 
with the peoples of underdeveloped countries, that is , their opposition to control from 
America. 120 
The main intention of Mao 's conceptua li zation of an " intermed iate zone" was to propose a 
"broad united front" to oppose hegemony, in other words, to oppose the superpowers' 
manipulation of the destiny of the rest. By fonnin g an international united front, Maoists 
sought to persuade the peop le who belonged to the " intermediate zone" to engage in the fi ght 
aga inst hegemonisrn. As Liu N ingyi, the Chainnan of the All-China Federation of Trade 
Unions, declared at the Third Afro-As ian Peo ple's Solidarity Organization (AA PSO) 
conference held in Moshi , Tanzania, in February 1963, 
118 J .D. Armstrong, Revolutiona,y Diplomacy, Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine 
(Berkeley: Uni versity Of California Press, 1977), 85. 
119 The two ideas actua lly had been developed by Mao in China's Anti-Japanese War and Civil War 
with the KMT. The CCP implemented these ideas and strategies to unite the people who had been 
sitting on the fence, to strengthen its power, whic h helped the CCP in its fight to win the wars. In post-
1949 China. the CCP continuously promoted these ideas to win international friends and sympathizers 
fo r the Chinese revolution. 
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All countries, whether big or small, are equal and independent. The 
problems of the world must be solved jointly by all countries of the 
world. The attempt to decide major problems of the world and to 
manipulate the destiny of mankind by one or two countries runs counter 
to the trend of our times and is against the interests of the peop le ... The 
countries of Asia and Africa as well as all peoples are finnly opposed to 
the big powers bullying and oppressing and giving orders to the smaller 
countries. 121 
Several points in this statement are worthy of note. First, this statement demonstrated Chinese 
dissatisfaction with the existing international system, a hierarchical world order dominated by 
two superpowers. Second, as Peter Van Ness has pointed out, it was perhaps the first time that 
a Maoist proposa l for an international united front had gone beyond the socialist countries as 
well as the "oppressed peoples" to extend to "all peoples" opposed to the big powers, which 
might include some Western countries. 122 What is more, it was also perhaps the first time that 
China implied that the Soviet Union was another target of the international united front , 
though it was secondary to the " principal enemy" - US imperiali sm . The declaration by Liu 
Ningyi revea led that the Sino-Soviet relationship had been broken and that China had carried 
out its "doubl e-anti" policy to attract the vast potential audience in the "intermediate zone." 
The concepts of "intermediate zone" and " international united front" therefore defined the 
priority of the foreign audience that China sought to win in its international engagement. The 
first target cons isted of the communist countries and parties which di sagreed with the Soviet 
leadership. This priority of China's united front work was decided by the nature of the 
Chinese regime. Having claimed that it was the authentic successor of Marxism and the cause 
of revolution, the CCP sought to strengthen it s force against the revisionist CPSU and 
consolidate its leadership in the communist world. 
The second but equally important target was the revolutionaries spreading in Asia, Africa and 
Latin America. On the one hand , the struggles undertaken by these revolutionaries not only 
gave "great support to the sociali st countries," but also constituted "an extremely important 
force safeguard ing the socialist countries from imperiali st invasion ." 123 On the other hand, 
the revolutionaries in the underdeveloped world though relatively isolated were profoundly 
121 
"Liu Ningyi 's speech at the Third Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization," RMRB 
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di ssatisfied with the status quo and were seeking a way to change it. To them, Chi na 's 
experience was quite relevant. China projected itself as a model , either in tenns of obtaining 
national liberation or in the aspect of national development. China claimed that there were 
two main "s imilarities' ' between itself and those underdeve loped countries. First, they were 
all "non-white" and with "coloniali st'' or "semi-colonia li st" hi story. Second, recently emerged 
from "co lon ial ism" and only just having started its modernization, China was more 
persuasive to win their affinity than the Soviets, who were "white," more advanced in 
industrialization and whose revolution was so long ago. 124 
The last gro up of people that China sought to "unite," despite their limited numbers 
compared with the first two groups, were those from the West who opposed American 
domination or were "sympathetically di sposed towards China, either because of its new 
revo lutionary dynamism or out of respect for its great cultural past." 125 That is to say, they 
were either di sappointed at the existing international system, or dissatisfied with their own 
govenunent s or societies and trying to find an alternative ideology in revolu.tionary China, or 
interested in Chinese cu lture per se, such as sino logists. China targeted these bodies to win 
favourable public opinion internationally. 
In addition to the identification of the audience, the CCP infonned the mission of the 
international united front. Secondary to opposing US imperi ali sm, the CCP added another 
task for the international united front, namely, to counter revisionism. 126 It thus sought to 
represent an alternative in the bipolar system and to be a j ust force in the internationa l 
community. The CCP criticised Soviet leaders for in effect collaborating with US imperiali sm 
and ignoring the rights of small nations. They claimed that Moscow's present stand "goes 
against the united front agai nst US imperia li sm and its lackeys in defence of world peace." 127 
This was why the CPSU bad reduced its support for revolution in the Third World. By I 964, 
in continuing denunciations from the CCP, the CPSU was not onl y a "revision ist," but also a 
124 In this regard, there was some sort of competition between the PRC and the USSR to win fri ends, 
prestige and in fluence in the Thi rd World . See for example. Robert A. Sca lapino. "Sino-Soviet 
Competition in Africa;· Foreign Affairs 42:4 (Ju ly 1964), 640-654. 
'" Herbert Passin, China's Cultural Diplomacy (New York: Praeger, 1963), 12; some may call them 
'·left ists or activists'' ev ident in the student movements in the West in the I 960s. 
126 However. by 1968, the USSR was given a new designation - "social imperi alist" due to its invasion 
of Czechoslovak ia in August and was ranked with the US as another leading oppressor country, see 
'·Diaboli cal Socia l-Imperiali st face of the Sov iet Revisioni st renegade clique; · Peking Review, no.43 
(October 25, I 968), 8- I 0. Before that, the US was regarded as the principal enemy of the oppressed 
peoples. 
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player of "great power chauvinism" and a "splitter." 128 In contrast, China projected itself as a 
serious contender against imperialism, colonialism and the exploitative capitalist order. The 
PRC constantly depicted the developing nations, including itself, as the main force of global 
change, "propelling the wheel of world hi story" because of their just cause. 
The CCP's promotion of the intennediate zone and the international united front therefore 
reflected its dissatisfaction with the bipolar world system, and its intention of uniting all 
possible forces around the world to overthrow the system dominated by the rwo superpowers. 
In this sense, it resonated with China's foreign policy of "double-anti. " In the meantime, both 
"double-anti" policy and united front strategy aimed at building an image of China as a major 
player on the international stage, an alternative to the two superpowers and a genuine leader 
of the international revolutionary movement. 
To sum up, this section identifies three key elements of Maoist soft power. They are the China 
model for national liberation and development, a "proletarian" culture, and China's "double-
anti" foreign policy and united front strategy. These non-material aspects of Maoist China's 
strength were perceived to be central to China's "revolutionary" identity. Maoist China not 
only projected these non-material elements rhetorically, but also promoted them through 
international engagement to win friends and prestige, to attack opponents, and to gain 
legitimacy and recognition as a key player in the international community. The next section 
investigates how these elements were mobilized and promoted through China 's diplomacy. 
4.3 Maoist soft power tools: 1959-1965 
As demonstrated above, from the late 1950s the PRC sought to promote itself as a leader of 
the world revolution, a key player in world politics and an alternative model to the rwo 
superpowers in the fields of culture, national development and foreign policy. This then leads 
to the question of how the newly-born China could achieve its ambitious goals. Based on 
sources of Chinese foreign policy during Mao 's time, including the recently declassified 
Chinese documents on foreign affairs ( 1959-1965), it can be argued that rwo main 
instruments were adopted in China's diplomatic practice: one was cultural diplomacy and the 
other was foreign aid. According to J.M. Mitchell 's definition, cultural diplomacy is "the 
involvement of culture in international agreements; an application of culture to the direct 
support of a country 's political and economic diplomacy." 129 The following analysis 
128 
·'Peaceful coexistence - two diametrically opposed policies: sixth comment (December 12, 1964)"; 
"The leaders of the CPSU are the greatest splitters of our times: seventh comment," Th e Polemic 011 
General line of the International Communist Movement, 296, 303-58. 
i29 J.M. Mitchell , International Cultural Relations (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 81. 
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demonstrates that a sustained cultural diplomacy was used by Mao 's govenunent to promote 
its revolutionary cause and build a new image of China. Given China 's limited economic 
resources, cul tura l diplomacy was probably the most fruitful tool in its diplomacy. In addition , 
China employed foreign aid as another maj or tool to deliberately export Maoist ideas of 
revo lution and national development. China's fo reign ass istance played an important role in 
the battle of ideas with the two superpowers regarding revolution and political ideology. 
4.3.1 China's cultural diplomacy 
The significance of cultural interaction in strengthening the solidarity of the underdeveloped 
world was rai sed by Chinese leaders very early in the PRC's hi story. At the Bandung 
Conference in 1955, Premier Zhou Enlai made the fol lowing statement: 
Asian-African countri es need to cooperate in economy and culture, so as 
to overcome our backwardness in these areas owing to the exploitation 
and oppression by coloniali sm ... Our cultural exchanges shou ld respect 
and lea rn from each nation 's culture and not dismi ss the advantage of 
any nation's culture. 130 
ln thi s statement, Premier Zhou not only highlighted the importance of cultural cooperation in 
the underdeveloped world for the purposes of solidari ty and anti -co loniali sm, he also 
encouraged cultural diversity in the non-Western world . Chinese leaders thus favoured li fting 
levels of nationalism in post-colonial societies: they should cherish and develop their own 
ethnic culture and get rid of cultura l influences from the fonner coloniali st powers. 
Premier Zhou·s advocacy of cultural cooperation soon developed into a strategy fo r China·s 
internati onal engagement, which was call ed "culture leads (wenhua xianxing)." 131 According 
to this strategy China should make friends and build its influence by means of cultural 
interactions. The exp lanation for thi s strategy was fi rst that culture could facilitate people's 
understand ings of a foreign country. Second, there were various fo rms of culture that could 
be used in cu ltural interactions, and cultural work therefore could be ca rri ed out in a flexible, 
sub tle, and less sensitive and expensive way, compared to economic and political means. 
Additionall y, cultural exchanges might produce a spill-over effect: once there were cultural 
interactions between China and targeted societies, the impact would extend to th e other fields 
130 Zhou Enlai , '·{fl[ ~~-i;;i..x 1':1<!>1l:ei..xJ:A~1,t1, (-:!Llili"icl/!I Fl 1- :!L H) " (S peech at the 
Bandung Co nference, April 19, 1955), Selected Diplomatic Papers ofZl,011 Enlai , 118. 
131 Han Nianlong ed .. Diplomacy ofC011te111pora1y China (Hong Kong: New Horizon Press, 1990), 
168. 
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and international issues. 132 Therefore, the Chinese government made great efforts to 
encourage cultural interactions between itself and targeted countries, particularl y those in 
Asia, Africa and Latin America. An ideali zed process of cultural interactions is illustrated by 
Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1: Process of Cultural Interactions 
Chen Yi, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, elaborated the ideal process of China's cultural 
interactions with foreign countries, "Cultural interactions should be in the vanguard of 
diplomacy. Leading the way with culture, China can make friends everywhere, enhance 
[mutual] understanding, and all else will follow, [and] it will contribute to the establishment 
of diplomatic relations [between China and other countries]." 133 It needs to be pointed out 
that cultural interactions mi ght not have been directly carried out by the Chinese government, 
but were nevertheless supervised by Beijing due to its complete control of the cultural agenda 
132 Interview with Yu Xintian, senior research fellow at Shanghai Institutes of International Studies, 
Shanghai, March 10, 2010. 
133 Wu Di , ""614". 3i<5fDil'Ji9" [£[)(,J:',r:ieit3l:: ii!L" (Mao Zedong and China 's cultural exchanges wi th 
foreign countri es), 'Pf'! Xft:X:iifl (Cultural Exchanges between China and Foreign Countries) , 110.6 
(1993), 5. 
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and its meticulousness about diplomacy and organi zation. 134 These cultural interactions were 
not only for culture 's sake, but were close ly connected to politics. They raised the unjustness 
of coloni ali sm, imperiali sm and the existent bipolar system, meanwhile providing an 
alternative - the Chinese path of revolution and development. As a larger audience was 
exposed to Chinese revoluti onary and poli t ical ideas, it would help build empathy fo r Chi na's 
path and create the psychological prerequisites fo r the change in the aud ience 's life and 
soc iety. Once the seeds of discontent with the status quo and the hope of change were planted, 
they would be enforced by the contrast between the perceived unjustness of local reality and a 
prescribed and promising alternative model. By constant repetition of the themes, public 
opinion could therefore be moulded toward what Maoist China wanted. The targeted poor 
might endorse revolution and the state might establish diplomatic relations with the PRC. If 
the fonner, China would support the revol utionaries by rhetoric and by sending anns or other 
material assistance, or by training the revolutionaries in Maoist ideology; if the latter, China 
would sign a cultura l agreement with the targeted states and then implement schedul ed 
cultural, economic and poli tica l acti viti es each year. Friendship and solidarity would 
thereafter be strengthened by continuous interacti ons in vari ous fie lds. Admittedly this was an 
ideali zed process of Chinese cultural interactions with forei gn countries, dating fro m very 
earl y in the PRC's hi story. The e ffect iveness of cultural interactions or diplomacy could be 
affected by various factors, including the nature of the targeted state (such as whether it 
endorsed revolution or preferred some other alternative to the ex isting sys tem), the 
competit ion between the proj ectors, and the projector 's domesti c and international poli c ies 
and so forth. 
Aware of the importance of cul tural interactio ns to China 's diplomacy, the Chinese 
government employed various fo nns of cultural interacti on in its engagement with foreign 
societies, including movies and radio broadcasts, touri ng perfonnances, exhibitions, 
exchange of intellectuals and students, di stribution of printed materi al and so on . 
134 Although so me cultural exchanges were carried out by so-called non-governmental organizations, 
such as the Co mmittee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Co untries or the Chi nese People's 
Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, they were not independent, because the top leaders 
of these organizations were appointed by the central government and the funding was from the 
government. What is more, as the first generation of Chinese leadersh ip believed that there were no 
little things in the foreign affairs, the central government tended to dea l with almost everything related 
to foreign countries. When reviewi ng the CDA from 1959 to 1965, I found a lot of evidence in thi s 
regard. 
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4.3. l .I Chinese movies and radio broadcasts 
Chinese movies and radio broadcasts received a high priority among Beijing's various form s 
of cultural interaction and probably reached the widest audience in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America. They were used to target the poorly educated great masses of people in the 
underdeveloped world. Through audio-visual means, China promoted its ideas of revolution 
and national development as well as showing Chinese concern and moral support for the 
struggles of the "oppressed" societies. A diplomatic report from the Chinese embassy in Mali 
summarized that "to the great masses, movies and pictures are the most effective promotion 
tools. Movies are particularly efficacious, [because] they are the most eye-catching and 
expose lots of issues in a few hours.. [From the response from the local people,] watching 
one Chinese movie is better than making several speeches." 135 Another report from Somalia 
said, "there are not many literate people .. Since our work is addressed to the great masses in 
Somalia , the priority of our promotion scheme should be given to audio-visual methods, with 
books, newspapers and magazines as complements."ll6 Therefore, Chinese movies played a 
significant role in China 's interactions with foreign societies. China screened its movies in 
many third world societies and signed contracts to hold "Chinese Movie Week" every year in 
countries such as Iraq, Laos, Bunna, Cambodia, Pakistan, l:ndonesia, Japan, Yemen, 
Tanganyika and Zanzibar (Tanzania in 1964), Tunisia , the United Arab Republic (UAR), 
Guinea, Mali , Algeria and Somalia in addition to the socialist countries. 13 7 Many Chinese 
movies not only were well-received by the masses of the underdeveloped world but also won 
awards in international film festivals held by Third World countries, which is discussed below. 
Beijing was very careful about the selection of movies targeted to a foreign audience. In 
general, they advanced the CCP's experience and ach ievements in and after the revolution. 
On the one band, a great variety of Chinese movies reflected the hardship and class struggle 
in the "old" Chinese society before 1949 in contrast to the happiness enjoyed by the Chinese 
in the "new" China. Meanwhile, they promoted the significance of armed struggle, guerrilla 
warfare, and the CCP's correct leadership in the revolution, the prowess of the PLA and the 
necessity of uniting "oppressed" peasants and workers. Well-received Chinese movies 
included "The White-Haired Girl" (Bai Mao Nii 1950), "The Letter with Feathers" (Jimao 
Xin 1954), "Guerrillas Sweep the Plain" (Pingyuan Youjidui 1955), "Guerrillas on the 
Rail way" (Tiedao Youjidui 1956), "The Daughter of the Party" (Dang de Nu 'er 1958) 
135 
"Cultural work summary in 1961 , Chinese embassy in Mali, 26/02/ 1962," CDA, no. 108-00797-0l. 
136 
"Cultural work summary in 1963, Chinese embassy in Somali a, 19/0J/ 1964-09/02/1964," CDA , 
no. I 08-01018-06. 
137 From the survey of the CDA (1959-1965) wi th the key word "culture" (X1l wenhua). 
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"Seahawk" (Hai Ying 1959), "Liberate Shanghai" (Zhan Shanghai 1959), "Youth in the War" 
(Zhanhuo Zhong de Qingchun 1959), "Red Detachment of Women" (Hongse Niangzi Jun 
1961 ), " Revo lutionary Family" (Geming Jiating 196 1 ), " Litt le Soldier Zhang Ga" (Xiaobing 
Zhang Ga 196 1 ), "After Arm istice" (Tingzhan Yihou 1962), "Start A Prai rie Fire" (Liaoyuan 
1962), '·Angry Tide' · (Nuchao 1963) et cetera. 138 It is worth noting severa l of them were 
dubbed into other languages. For instance, "The Whi te-Haired Girl," "The Daughter of the 
Pa,ty" and "Red Detaclm1ent of Women" were dubbed into the west African language 
Bambara to attract audiences in Mali and neighbouring countries. 139 Through these movies, 
Beij ing provided a good example of a successfu l national liberation movement and instigated 
the "oppressed" to carry out the ir revolutions. 
The White-Haired Girl (film 1950). The film described the oppression suffered by millions of Chinese 
peasants and women in Chinese society before 1949 by describing the fate of the leading female 
character Xi 'er. It expressed the theme that "the old society (before 1949) turned a person into a ghost 
and the new society (after 1949) turns the ghost back into a person". In 1951 , it won the Specia l 
Honorary P1i ze at the Sixth Karlovy Cary International Film Festival (Czechoslovakia). More than six 
million people watched the film in the first round of release in China. In the 1950s, it was screened in 
more than 30 countries and regions. It was so popular that it was turned into an opera in 1958 and a 
ballet in 1965. Source: chinaculture.org, January 19, 2004, accessed from 
http ://www.china.o rg.cn/ engl i sh/feat ures/fi I m/8 513 6. htm 
On the other hand , there were Chinese movies wh ich propagated the image of the "new·· 
China, such as the enhanced social statu s of women, the poor and minorities, the new life and 
achievements in Communist China, and Chinese ethnic culture. For instance, "Five Golden 
Flowers· ' (Wu Duo Jinhua 1959) portrayed the happy life of Chinese minorities and their 
efforts to build socialism in the PRC. This movie won the Silver Award for Best Director and 
Best Actress in the 2'" Afro-Asian Movie Festival in Cairo in 1960. Another example was the 
documentary "The Celebration of the IO'" Anniversary of the PRC'' (Huanqing Shinian 1959), 
which filmed a military parade and mass pageant in Tianamnen Square and di splayed the 
PRC's achievements in all field s in the previous decade. This documentary received a high 
138 Ibid. 
139 
.. Premier Zhou Enlai met a cultural delegation from Mali government, Beijing, 04/05/1963;' CDA , 
no . I 08 -00367-03. 
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priority in the promotion of film overseas. It certainly provided an example for the 
underdeveloped world of what sort of future they could achieve. After watching this 
documentary, a large number of foreign audiences were amazed by Chinese achievements in 
such a short time. They expressed their admiration of China, which gave them confidence for 
their own country's future. 140 Additionally, Chinese ethnic culture was demonstrated by 
cartoons such as "Tadpoles Looking for Their Mum" (Xiaokedou Zhao Mama 1960), which 
di splayed the beauty of Chinese ink wash painting. "Golden Trumpet Shell" (Jinse de Hailuo 
1963), another example of Chinese traditional ethnic arts, employed paper cut and puppet 
play and was granted the Lumumba Award in the 3'd Afro-Asian Movie Festival in Djakarta 
in 1964. 
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Film still: "Five Golden Flowers" (W11 Duo Ji11/111a-l959) 
Documentary "The Celebration of the I 0th Anniversary of the PRC" (H11anqing Shinia11 1959) 
Fi lm stills: "Tadpoles Looking for Their Mum" (Xiaokedo11 Zhao Mama 1960) in the left used ink 
wash painting; "Go lden Trumpet Shell" (Ji11Se de Hailuo 1963) on the right employed paper cut and 
puppet play. 
"
0 
"Report of the 2"d Afro-Asian Movie Festival, Chi nese embassy in UAR, 04/03/1960-12/03/ 1960," 
CDA, no.107-001 80-03 ; "Cultural relations between China and [raq in 1959, Chinese embassy in Iraq, 
28/05/ 1958," CDA , no.107-00410-01. 
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In addition, China produced documentaries to demonstrate Chinese concern and moral 
support for the struggles in Asia , Africa and Latin America. In 1960, for example, China went 
to Cuba to film "Cuba in Combat" (Zhandou zhong de Guba), which described Cuba 's 
revolution and ahnosphere of anti-US imperialism. It attracted large audiences in Cuba, 
China and A frica. 141 A year later, China produced "A Comer in Africa" (Feizhou zhi Jiao) to 
show China's understanding of Northeast Africa. It won the "Africa Prize" in the 4'" Africa 
International Film Festi val {AIFF) in Somalia. ln 1963 , another Chinese documentary on 
Africa, "Unyielding Algeria" (Buqu de A 'erjiliya) again won the "Africa Prize" in the 5'" 
AIFF. China also used documentaries to reflect the friendship between China and certain 
developing countries, such as "The King of Laos Visits China" ( 1956) and " Welcome 
Burmese Friends" ( 1960), which were screened in both countries with local languages. It is 
worth pointi ng out that the latter presented the friendly ahnosphere when Bunnese Prime 
Minister U Nu visited China in October 1960, during which he signed the Sino-Bunnese 
Boundary Treaty with the Chinese government. This documentary was inten_tionall y screened 
in "Chinese Movie Week" in Yangon one month later to consolidate the friendship between 
the two countries. 142 Additionally, Chinese documentaries were used to demonstrate the 
Chinese political stance on certain international issues. One of the best examples was the 
documentary " Resolving the Sino-Indian Border Dispute Peacefully" (Weile Heping Jiejue 
Zhong-Yin Bianjie Wenti 1963). It clarified China's policy and its resolution to peacefully 
resolve this di spute. It showed that the attack aud provocation had come from the Indian anny 
and government, and that China was forced to fight back. This documentary was presented to 
foreign audiences to seek international support and sympathy. 143 
141 
•· «,'r,, .·:j.BiJ ,:':;!:',)) !:cjjl::Jt5LQ_t119<'· ("Cuba in Combat" on screen on New Year's Day), RMJU3 
(27/12/1960), 4: "Report fro m Mali , 16/02/ 1962,'. CDA, no.108 -00797-0L 
140 
··Burma Prime Mini ster U Nu's China vis it, Beij ing, 22/09/1960,'' CDA, no.204-007 15-0 1; 
'·C hinese delegation 's Burma visit. Beijing, OJ /I J/1 960-3 1/12/1 960," CDA , no.03-00165-03. 
143 
•· ( jJT;fD-'j' ff1¥f.ic'1-'ollillJ/-1uJ!IU ~J\'~P¥fJ:119<" ("Reso lving the Sino-Indian Border Dispute 
Peacefully .. onscreen soon). RMJU3 (17/03/1963), 2; '·jz;:jJ,ifH.r!ft,FfjBiJ-- 0 ~7:tllf/M'-tlFPEP 
itl!l/-i0l@D) ~r,;-- (Dalvi was inco nceiva bl e - after watching "Reso lving the Si no-lndian Border 
Dispute Peacefully"). RMRB (16/04/1 963). 6: "The reception of the delegates of Kenya Africa 
National Union visiting China, Beij ing, 27/02/1964-18/07/1964,'' CDA, no.108-01001-02 . 
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Chinese documentaries (from left to right): "Cuba in Combat" (Zhandou zhong de Guba 1960), "A 
Comer in Africa" (Feizhou zhiJiaol 961) and "Unyielding Algeria" (Buqu de A'erjiliya 1963) 
In effect, when screening movies in Third World countries China faced competition from 
Western countries all the time, and it was the same with the Soviet Union after their public 
split in the early 1960s. This competitive environment is revealed by reports from Chinese 
embassies in Third World countries. One report from Guinea, for instance, described how 
American and British embassies in Guinea had protested against the movie contract signed 
between the Chinese and Guinean governments, and said that West Germany had asked to 
hold a movie week in Guinea. 144 Another report from Mali in 1963 depicted the situation 
after screening the documentary "Celebrating National Day" (1962). FolJowing "The 
Celebration of the Io'" Anniversary of the PRC" ( 1959), this ·-documentary once again 
highlighted the "China model" for the underdeveloped world to build their countries. What 
made a big difference was that the film showed only Sta lin's portrait with no portrait of 
Khrushchev. The report wrote, " When the images of Chairman Mao and Soviet leader Stalin 
appeared on the screen, applause broke out in the hall. . Soviet and Czechoslovak diplomats 
left despondently." 145 Chinese competi tion with the Soviets in the Third World became more 
intense after 1962. For example, Beijing asked a Cambodian cinema not to import Soviet 
movies after 1963. 146 These episodes revealed the competition in cultural promotion between 
China and the world powers at the time. 
The achievement of China's movie exports was remarkable. In 1959, China exported 883 
films , a high point in the export of film in the Maoist era. In 1964, more than 70 countries and 
regions screened Chinese movies. By the end of 1965 , China had built up connections with 
144 
"Implementat ion of the cultural plan between China and Guinea in 1961 , Chinese embassy in 
Gui nea, 23/0l/1961-24/ 12/1961 ," CDA, no.108-00723-01. 
145 
"Cultural exchange between China and Mali, Mali , 19/02/1963-11/12/1963 ," CDA , no.108-00892-
06. 
146 
"Report from the culture division of the Ch inese embassy in Cambodia, Ol /01/1964-10/04/1964," 
CDA, no.106-01204-01. 
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more than 680 film companies in about 90 countries and regions and attended nearl y 50 
international film festivals and exhibitions with 76 films awarded pri zes. 147 
Chinese radio broadcasts constituted another important tool of Beijing's overseas propaganda 
due to the large audience it could reach. It was reported that the weekly hours of radio 
programs beamed abroad increased substantially during the first two decades of CCP power 
on the mainland. In 1965, China broadcast 1,027 hours per week to countries outside its 
borders, a tenfold increase compared to I 00 hours per week in 1953. 148 It is argued that 
China's radio broadcasts gave pr iority to the Far East: "Over half the broadcasting time 
during 1965 - 582 hours per week - was devoted to programs for li steners in the Far East, 
which were heard in five Chinese dialects and th irteen other languages." In contrast, Beijing 
broadcast 70 hours per week to South Asia and the N ear East as well as to Africa in six 
languages to each area, and 39 hours to Latin America in Spanish and Portuguese. 149 
Although it is hard to assess the effecti veness of the radio program promotion, a change was 
noted by one article in Foreign Affairs in 1966 of a previously apathetic Panamanian school 
teacher who had been listening to radio programs with revolutionary content, and 
subsequently became discontented and demanded answers to why things were not better. 150 
Reviewing Chinese movies and radio programs promoted by the Chinese government at the 
time, they were mostly less personal and c01mnercial , but more political and diplomatic. By 
promoting these audio-visual programs, the Chinese exported China 's revo lution , policies and 
political ideas. They targeted the great masses with little education in the Third World, 
building an image of China as an alternative model to the two superpowers and a leader in the 
world revolution. 
4.3.1.2 Touring p erfo1mances 
A second visual means employed by China in overseas cu ltural interactions was touring 
perfonnances. They served as a special envoy to promote Chinese ethnic and revo lutionary 
culture overseas. Chinese acrobatics and ethnic songs and dances were widely popular in the 
underdeveloped world. Chinese acrobats, for example, played a special role in the 
relationship between China and Afro-Asian countries. Reviewing the CDA for the years 
147 Zhou Tiedong, "ifr rfi 11 rl:i.Jii;xt?'r">cvii" (New China 's films in int eractions with fo reign co untries), 
Ff!. ;;J,2;,f< (Fi/111Ar1) , no. I (2002), 115. 
148 Research and Reference Service, US Information Agency, Communist China s Propaganda 
Acti,-ities: 1965, May 1966, 6, quoted from Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy, 116. 
149 Ibid. 
"
0 George C. Lodge ... Revo lution in Latin America," Foreign Affairs 44:2 (Jan., 1966), 197. 
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1959-1965 , Chinese acrobatics troupes visited 16 Afro-Asian countries and perfonned more 
than 200 times. 151 For example, Chinese acrobatic troupes made an increasing presence in 
Africa in the 1960s, particularly in Northern and Eastern Africa. In January 1960, the China 
National Acrobatic Troupe visited 27 African cities in Sudan, Ethiopia, Guinea and Morocco, 
and performed 98 times in front of 160,000 people. In 1964, the Shenyang Acrobatic Troupe 
visited 20 African cities and perfonned 86 times. Even in the beginning of the Cultural 
Revolution , Chinese acrobat s went abroad. The Taiyuan Acrobatic Troupe visited Somalia 
and perfonned 13 times in 1966. 152 
In contrast to the well-received acrobats in Africa, Chinese ethnic songs and dances were 
more popular in China 's neighbourhood and demonstrated the influence of Chinese 
traditional culture in this region. Various ensembles of Chinese ethnic songs and dances went 
to Southeast Asian countries, such as Burma, Cambodia , Laos, Thailand and Vietnam, and 
were used to en tertain foreign leaders and guests when they visited China. In addition , 
Chinese revolutionary movies, such as "White-Haired Girl" and "Red Detachment of Women" 
were adapted into Beijing opera and refonned ballet staged both at home and abroad to 
arouse the great masses ' sentiment of struggle. The difference between styles of cultural 
promotion in the targeted countries was illustrated by Zhang Zhixiang, the Party Secretary of 
the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries: 
Cultural work directed toward foreign countries needs to serve politics, 
[ when we carry out cultural work, we need to] gain a mastery of the 
features of cultural activities , spot the differences in timing, location, 
object and specialty, and enhance the arti stic quality of struggle and the 
influence [on local people]. It is an instrument not only for struggle, but 
for solidarity .... ' White-Haired Girl ' could be exported to Cuba, but in 
Cambodia we need to promote songs and dances. 153 
151 These 16 Afro-Asian countries were Burma, Laos, Iraq, Yemen, Burundi, Ethiopia, Central Africa, 
Guinea, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Tunisia, UAR and Uganda. 
152 The above figures are obtained from Teng Yun, ~ 1~'P:Yr::ic1t3Cim.9:'.l 4 (Historical Material 
from China's Cultural Exchange with Foreign Countries in the Contemporary Period) (Beijing: 
Wenhua Yishu Chubanshe, 1990), 428-458. 
153 
"The sum of the cu ltural work aimed foreign countries in the last ten years and guidelines and tasks 
for the future, Beijing, 01/07/1960," CDA , no.102-00015-03. 
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The most popular Ch inese acrobatic performances overseas in the 1960s 
Illustration 1.6: Acrobat Xia Juhua 's performance in Cuba in 1963 (source: Xinhua News Agency, 
accessed from http: //www.chinese.cn/quyi/article/2009-09/27/content 29279.htm) 
(Left) Actresses of the Central Ensemble of Ethnic Songs and Dances who visited Burma in 1960, 
source: http: //www.zymzgwt.com.cn/upimg/2009724 l 857 I 3.jpg; (right) "Red Detachment of Women" 
ballet poster(I964). 
4.3.1.3 Exhibition and printed material 
Third, exhibitions and printed material were used to promote Maoist ideology, and Chinese 
policies and achievements. Exhibitions held in underdeveloped countries demonstrated 
China·s achievements in socialism and modernization by di splaying pictures, agricu ltural 
apparatus and machines. The Chinese governmenfs key policies - the " three red flags'· i.e. 
the General Line for Socialist Construction , the GLF and the People 's Commune - were 
vigorously promoted in overseas exhibiti ons in the early l 960s. 154 With vivid pictures and 
objects, China sought to impress on the spectators its achievements encompassing industry, 
15
-' For example ... The sum of the cultural ,vork aimed at foreign countries in the last ten years and 
gu id elines and tasks for the future. Beijing, 0 1/07/1960." CDA, no.102-00015-03 ; "The mutual visits 
of Chinese and Iraqi cultural delegations and the implementation of the Sino-Iraq cultural plan, Beijing, 
06/04/ 1960-13/08/J 960 ,'' CDA , no .107-00410-03 ; "The 1961 cultural work summary and the plan for 
1962. Chinese embassy in Mali, 16/02/ 1962,'' CDA, no.108-00797-01. 
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agricu lture, culture, education, public health , and sports. The images of soldiers, women and 
minorities were highlighted as well, projecting a modem China within which all were equal 
and could contribute to revolution and national development. 155 
The "three red flags" (san mian hongqi): General Line for Socialist Construction, the GLF, and the 
People's Communes 
Chinese printed material was widely circulated in various languages around the world. 
Chairman Mao's works received the highest priority among all the Chinese publications in 
overseas circulation. The English version of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, firs t 
published by Lawrence & Wishart (affiliated to the British Communist Party) in 1956 in 
12,000 copies, targeted leftists in Europe and intellectuals in English-speaking countries. In 
June 1962, the Japanese Communist Party published 7,000 copies of the fourth volume of 
Selected Wlorks of Mao Tse-tung in Japanese, and was sold out within one month. 156 
Nevertheless, compared to the developed world, Chairman Mao's works were a lot more 
vigorously promoted in the Third World to distribute the Chinese revolutionary experience. 
Some of them were free and some were exported at no,ninal cost. Iraq, for instance, which 
had intended to get rid of the control of the West for a long time, issued 90,000 copies of 
translations of Mao 's works in 1958, but this reached 330,000 one year later. 157 This increase 
related to China's domestic policy - the launch of the GLF. Since the beginning of the GLF, 
Chinese officials had repeatedly emphasized Mao's views that "the East wind prevails over 
the West wind" and "Imperiali sm and all reactionaries are paper tigers." Mao 's works were 
gi ven priority to consolidate the development of the international revolution movement. In 
the early 1960s, " ~th the public divorce between China and the USSR, Mao 's works were 
extensively issued in Africa and became a "best seller" in many African countries. According 
to the statistics from the China International Publishing Group, from l 962 to 1966, China 
l;; See for instance "The overview of the cultural work in Somalia in 1963 and the plan for 1964, 
Chinese embassy in Somalia, 19/0J/1964-09/02/1 964," CDA , no.108-0101 8-06. 
1
;
6 He Mingxing, "IT-Sl'?_~Ai ;iii:5'1-mr'"' (The legacy of the red classics overseas), 1-'li/xl ff! (For the 
Public Good), no.2 (2009), 89. 
157 Ibid. 
12 1 
issued 1,380,000 books and booklets in Ghana, 970 ,000 in Ethi opia, 850,000 in Nigeria, 
640,000 in Algeri a, and 530.000 in Tanzania, most of which were M ao's works. 158 
Second , Chinese magazines were widely avai lable throughout the Third World. China 
Pic/orial was probab ly the most widely circulated magazine, a monthly picture magazine in 
19 different languages. 159 ln Latin America, for instance, each issue had a circulation of 
3,000 copies in Argentina, 2,500 in Bra zil , and 1,100 in Uruguay. The case of Cuba was the 
most outstanding. It issued 2,000 copies in 1959 but reached 100,000 in 196 1. 160 Together 
with China Reconstructs and Women of China, another two widely circul ated Chinese 
magazines, they proj ected an image of a modem China un der the communist regime. Peking 
Review, announcing itse lf as a "weekly magazine of Chinese news and views," was almost 
universally availab le in various languages around the world . 
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Chinese printed material circulated widely overseas (from left to right : (fi rst row) Selected Wo rks of 
Mao Tse-lung, Peking Reivew, China Reconstructs, Women of China , and People's Piclorial (no. 19, 
1959: Celebrating Nati onal Day; (second row) 1960 annual cover image: First Summ it of Mount 
Everest; 1961: Condolence on Mei Lanfang 's (noted Peking Opera singer) Death; 1963: Scientist Zhu 
Kezhen; 1964: Fi lm Ashima (Sani ethnic minority); 1965: reformed Peki ng Opera The Legend of the 
Red Lantern) 
158 Ibid. 
159 Chinese, Mongolian. Tibetan, Uighur, Chuang, Korean, Russian, English, Japanese, Vietnamese, 
Indonesian. Arabic. Hindi, German, French, Spanish, Sweden, Swahil i, and Italian, quoted from Van 
Ness. Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy, 115; also see, He Mingx ing. "The legacy of the red 
classics overseas, .. 90. 
160 He Mingx ing. ·'The legacy of the red class ics overseas," 90 . 
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4.3.1.4 The exchange of intellectuals 
Fourth, the exchange of intellectuals was a two-way approach. It was used to attract educated 
people to learn Chinese political ideology and to send Chinese intell ectuals to learn from the 
targeted societies and spread Chinese ideas. Different from the above forms of China's 
cultural interactions, intellectual exchange usually happened after a diplomatic relationship 
was established between China and the other countries. As more independent countries 
appeared in Africa, Asia, and Latin America in the 1950s and 1960s that fanned diplomatic 
relationships with China, China promoted the exchange of intellectuals and educational 
cooperation with these countries, particularly from the late 1950s. Chinese statistics on 
education once again demonstrate that China shifted its target of attraction or persuasion after 
the late 1950s, from the socialist bloc to the post-colonial countries. The numbers of Chinese 
students studying abroad and foreign students studying in China from 1959 to 1965 are 
evidence of the shift in China's targeted countries. The Chinese government dramatically 
reduced its students in the USSR after 1961 , but the number of students sent to post-colonial 
countries such as the DPRK, Vietnam and Cuba increased markedly in 1964 (see Table 4.1). 
In tenns of foreign students studying in China at the time (see Table 4.2) , the majority were 
from post-colonial countries, for example, Vietnam, DPRK and- Somalia. 161 The case of 
Vietnamese students was extraordinary. Vietnamese students in China increased to 3200 in 
1965, which constituted 96.6% of all foreign students in China. This sudden increase directl y 
related to the US escalation of the Vietnam War in August 1964 and China's assurance to Ho 
Chi Minh's Vietnam that it would supply unconditional support to the Vietnamese people. 162 
China 's support of the Vietnamese revolution certainly attracted more Vietnamese to travel to 
China to learn about the Chinese revolution experience at a critical moment of their nation 's 
destiny. 
161 Albania and Mongolia were the exceptions, members of the socialist bloc who stiLI supported the 
PRC after the Sino-Soviet split. 
162 Xie Yixian ed., Diplomatic Histo1y of Contemporary China , 183-186. 
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~ 1959 1960 196 1 1962 1963 1964 1965 total ry 
USSR 460 317 74 55 20 3 54 983 
Albania 2 7 4 2 2 40 10 67 
Romania 4 13 3 I 3 33 15 72 
Poland 4 5 6 I I 20 14 51 
Czechoslovakia 6 II 9 6 4 13 49 
Bulgaria 16 6 8 2 3 35 
Hungry II 7 3 l 5 27 
Gern1an Democratic Republic 7 24 I 5 3 12 15 67 
Britain I I 
Switzerland 2 5 I 2 6 16 
Denmark 5 5 2 12 
Sweden 5 5 
Nonvay 3 2 5 
DPRK I 3 8 6 38 14 70 
Mongolia 6 I 2 I 10 
Vietnam 2 3 2 4 48 34 93 
Cuba 18 15 120 5 158 
lraq 14 5 6 10 35 
Other Countries 25 33 7 I 326 25 6 648 
Total 2404 
Tabl e 4.1: The number of Chinese students s tudying abroad 1959-1965 (Department of Planning, 
Mi nistry o f Education, PRC ed ., rp/Jilif!ilff!iftfft, !1iifiif/41949-J983(Achievement of Education in 
China: Statistics 1949-1983), Beij ing: Reomin Jiaoyu, 198 5, 126-130.) 
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~ 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 total ry 
USSR 21 21 20 13 75 
Albania 5 4 102 47 22 180 
DPRK 41 4 16 I 27 21 110 
Mongolia II 28 25 9 4 77 
Vietnam 106 253 263 133 59 11 5 3200 41 29 
Laos 2 I 2 5 
Indonesia 20 I I I 5 19 47 
Sri Lanka 4 I 2 2 I 10 
Pakistan 7 7 
Nepal I 14 6 6 I I 13 17 68 
Sudan 5 5 
Congo (Brazzavil le) 3 2 5 
Somali 41 3 7 5 1 
Tanzania 6 6 
Japan 2 6 24 32 
France I 21 8 30 
Italy 5 I 6 
Canada I I 
Other Countries 42 84 24 16 3 1 35 26 258 
Total 5102 
Table 4.2: The number of foreign students in China 1959-1965 (Department of Planning, Ministry of 
Education, PRC ed ., 'PfJI/fifl!ilt#, f!tif§f# 1919- 1983 (Achievement of Education in China: 
Statistics 1949-1983), Beijing: Renmin Jiaoyu, 1985, 136 -143 .) 
While there is limited infonnation about the details of student exchanges between China and 
Africa provided by the source from the Chinese Ministry of Education, Educational 
Cooperation and Exchanges bet.veen China and African Countries offers complementary 
data: According to the latter, in 1960, for example, the Committee for Cultural Relations with 
Foreign Countries of the PRC provided the Somali National Alliance with scholarships for 60 
Somali students studying in China, and likewise the Union des Populations du Cameroun 
(UPK, Cameroon) received scholarships for I 00 Cameroonian students. Whist there were 
only 24 African students studying in China in the 1950s, the number of African students 
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increased to 164 in China in 1966. Similarly, the figure of Chinese teachers who went to 
Africa increased from 3 in the 1950s to 14 in the I 960s. 163 The development of the exchange 
of intellectua ls in the 1960s, to a large part, was attributab le to Premier Zhou 's three visits to 
Africa from 1963 to 1965, which aimed to strengthen the relationship between China and the 
newly independent African countries .164 
4.3.1.5 International cultural events 
Fifth, attending or hosting international cultural events was another approach to promote 
Chinese political views in the international arena. Those cultural events did not confine 
themselves to culture, but extended to the issues of politics, and the solidarity and 
development of underdeveloped societies. Chinese leaders often associated cultural events 
with the national liberation movements of underdeveloped nations. For instance, before the 
Chinese delegation went to the Asian-African Women 's Conference in 1958, the Chinese 
female political figure Song Qingling (Madame Sun Yat-sen) emphasized the significant role 
of women in the work to achieve Asian-African nations ' independence and world peace, in 
her telegraph to the Conference. 165 Another good example was the Games of the New 
Emerging Forces (GANEFO) hosted by Jakarta in 1963, which exemplified how sport was 
utili zed by governments to achieve political aims. Beijing full y supported Indonesian 
advocacy of the GANEFO as a counter to the Olympic Games because the International 
Olympic Committee (JOC) incorporated Taiwan and Israel as its members. 166 Beijing 
therefore was extremel y active in working for the success of the GANEFO and provided 
immense financial support for the participants. 167 Additiona ll y, in the 1960s, Beijing held 
international cultural events to protest aga inst US imperiali sm in Vietnam and expose Soviet 
" rev isionism" regarding revolution and "splittism" in Third World solidarity, for example, the 
163 Sino-African Educational Cooperation and Exchanges Editorial Team compiled, i-/>/Jll.!ff-ftlf!/Jllii< 
1&1Titfj:.!j:):fjfl (Educational Cooperation and Exchanges between China and Afi'ican Countries) 
(Beijing: Beij ing University, 2005), 13, 23. 
164 He Wenping, "1' ~1cil'xi'f3ci.m 1Jil-1t~:i£" (A survey of Sino-African educational exchange and 
cooperation), ilfijffcffojf/ (East Asia and Afi'ica), no.3 (2007), 14. 
165 
":-i<f.:K~"Hll<i>OO!Ci1!1'rt!.1l\''1Ulc!Clfr4h5C' (Song Qingling and All China Women 's Federation se nt 
a telegraph to Asian-African Women Conference), RMRB (14/02/1958), 5. 
166 For example. see "The conversation record of President Liu Shaoqi and th e Ca mbodian spo 11s 
delegation. Beij ing, 12/09/1963 ," CDA, archi val no. I 06-0 11 24-0 I : ·'The conversation record of 
Comrade Zhang Lianhua and the delegation of Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, Beijing, 
09/07/ 1964, .. CDA, no.108-01092-05. 
167 For instance, see "The overview of the cultural work in Somalia in 1963 and the pl an for 1964. 
Chinese embassy in Somali , 19/0 l/1 964-09/02/1964,' ' CDA , no.108-01018-06 . 
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1964 Beijing Scientific Symposium 168 and the 1966 Beijing Asian-African Writers ' 
Emergency Meeting. 169 Beijing's involvement in these international cultural events certainly 
was not just to understand and cooperate with other nations in the field of culture, but more 
importantly, it made use of these cultural events to express China' s international pol iti cal 
views and compete with both superpowers for prestige and influence in world politics. 
To sum up, given the limited economic resources in these early days of the PRC, sustained 
cultural diplomacy was probably the most fruitful instrument in its international engagement. 
The Chinese government employed various forms of cultural interactions, such as granting 
scholarships to foreign students studying in China and welcoming foreigners to visit China. It 
extended the means of propaganda to the two-way approach and noticed the differences in the 
audiences. The audio-visual methods of cultural promotion such as movies, radio broadcasts, 
touring perfornrnnces and exhibitions were employed to attract the large number of illiterate 
people in the underdeveloped world. On the other hand, China exported printed material , 
exchanged intellectuals with the targeted societies and welcomed foreign visits to persuade 
educated people of the benefits of China's alternative political system. By means of cultural 
diplomacy, Beijing projected an alternative model for a large audience in Asia, Africa and 
Latin America. 
4.3.2 Foreign Aid 
Foreign aid was another major tool of Maoist soft power. 170 Maoist China's foreign aid 
demonstrated that the PRC intended to build an alternative leadership role in competition 
with Western aid which was usually motivated by economic payoff and wi th conditions 
attached. Foreign aid in Mao 's China was used to export Chinese ideas of revolution, national 
development and the way of carrying out international affairs to attract "like-minded" nations. 
China's foreign aid in its early days was not for the purpose of securing economic benefits, 
such as market access and natural resources. Mao 's government insisted that foreign aid must 
not bring economic profit to the donor, but shou ld strengthen the independence and 
development of the recipients . Therefore, foreign aid was an important tool of Maoist soft 
168 Xiong Weimin, "tEtif s)!:fnii;l(fc;Z.(sJ, 1964 '¥8(:J~i; * N'fiii-f: ~ liUlL*'5\:1::l:.th * ill:" 
(Between science and politics: the 1964 Beijing Scientific Symposium, interview record of Mr. Xue 
Pangao), 14'¥f.Y:f.f:Jfi-/>; (Science and Culture Review) , no.2 (2008), 58-70. 
169 
"Report of the Asian-African Writers ' Emergency Meeting," RMRB (1010711966), 5. 
"
0 Whether foreign aid can be counted as a tool of soft power is a debatable question. Joseph Nye 
originally excluded foreign aid and assistance from his framework of soft power, regarding that they 
belonged to coercive power either buying favour or punishing by withdrawal. However, recentl y he 
acknowledges that soft-power tools include economic ass istance, see Joseph Nye, "The war on soft 
power," Foreign Policy, April 12, 2011. In this chapter, foreign aid in Maoist China is considered as a 
tool of soft power because it involves moral support and suasion. 
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power. Beijing used fo reign aid to demonstrate the CCP 's ·'pro letarian internationalism" and 
build itself as a moral authority regardless of its substantial economic weakness . 
The form of the PRC's foreign aid was developed and diversified with social vic issitud es , 
which varied from financial grants, interest-free Joans, infrastructure build-up and medical aid , 
to military assistance including military training, consultancy and equipment. However, the 
bas ic model of the PRC's foreign aid was consistent. From the very beginning, the Chinese 
government stressed that its foreign aid would comply wi th the principles of " non-political 
cond itionality" and "non-interference in interna l affairs"; its purpose was to consolidate 
national independence and self-reliance in the recipient countries. This policy symbolised 
China's independent stance and was underpinned by the foundation of Chinese foreign policy, 
that is, " the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence." 171 
4.3 .2.1 Asia 
Despite its considerable economic difficulties at home, Beijing was a major supporter of 
conununist movements and neutral states in the Third World, particularly those in Asia and 
Africa in the years following the Bandung Conference. Due to geopoli ti cal factors and 
Chinese traditional influence, Southeast Asia was the first region to recei ve Chinese foreign 
aid. 172 Beijing sough t to build relations with those nations on poor terms with Moscow, and 
mea nwhile aimed to project a leadership role in its neighbourhood by providing foreign aid to 
nationalist countries such as Afghanistan , Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, the DPRK, Indonesia, 
Laos, Mongolia , Nepal, Pakistan, Syria , Vietnam and Yemen. 173 For example, in February 
1959, China granted 10,000 tonn es of wheat to help Yemen out of a drought. In 1964, China 
granted 10 million pounds in interest-free loan to the Yemen government and agreed both to 
repair the road built by China and to undertake the cons truction of a hospital and a college of 
n The Fi ve Principles of Peacefu l Coexistence are: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other ·s internal affairs, equali ty and mutual 
benefit. and peaceful coexistence. 
,-, It is not ha rd to understand that Southeast Asia received a priori ty in China 's foreign relations due 
to the geopolitics and its traditional influence in the region based on the tribute system. For Beijing's 
support of communi st movements in Southeast Asia, see Quansheng Zhao, !11te1preti11g Chinese 
Foreign Policy. 55. China increased its focus on Africa from the mid-l950s as more African nati ons 
emerged from \Vestem co lonisation and Ch ina saw an opportunity for its presence in this ·'new" 
cont inent. For China·s increas ing engagement with African countries in the Maoist period see Philip 
Snow. The Star Rafi: Chinas Encounter with Afi-ica (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988); Tareq 
Y. Ismael , ··The Peoples Republic of China an d Africa," ' The Journal of Modern African Srudies 9:4 
(197 l ). 507-529: Roben A. Scala pi no. "Sino-Soviet Compet ition in Afri ca,'" Foreign Affairs 42:4 (July 
1964). 640-654. Latin America, however, probably received the lowest priority in Chinese foreign 
policy, see Ernst Halperin . ""Peking and the Latin American Co mmun ists;· 77,e China Q11a11erly, no.29 
(Jan. - Mar. 1967), l I l-154. 
n A survey of CDA from l 959 to l 965 with the key word "aid"" (111ll/.J yuanz/111). 
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technology. 174 In the early 1960s, China also offered help in building infrastructure such as 
roads and bridges in Bunna, Laos, Nepal and Vietnam. After the development of its own 
industry in the 1950s, China went overseas to help post-colonial nations to build their own 
preliminary industries. At the end of 1963, Cambodia built a textile mill , a plywood factory 
and a paper factory with help from China. Eventually these three factories produced half of 
the gross industrial output value of Cambodia. 175 In contrast, China provided considerable 
assistance, mainly military aid, to Vietnam, and actively supported Vietnamese communist 
guerrillas. According to a Chinese source, from 1962 to 1966, China provided Vietnam with 
270,000 guns, 200 million bullets, 540 artilleries, 900,000 shells, 700 tonnes of detonators 
and numerous pieces of military equipment and material assistancei 76 
The PRC's motivation in providing foreign aid to the Asian countries was mixed with 
considerations of realpolitik and ideology exportation, and was partly deri ved from security 
concerns. On the one hand , China needed to solve border issues with countries including 
Burma, Nepal , Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Mongolia, with all of which it signed border 
agreements from 1960 to 1963. 177 On the other hand, China wanted to develop buffer zones 
on its peripheries to defend itself against attack from the other powers. Historically, China felt 
that it shared a common lot with neighbouring countries such as Korea and Vietnam against 
invasion from Japan from the late 19th century to the 1940s as well as from the US afterwards, 
making an ana logy that "if the lips are gone, the teeth will be cold." That was why China 
participated in and provided significant assistance to the Korean War and the Vietnam War in 
the early 1950s and 1960s respectively. 
While it is true that China 's foreign aid to its neighbouring countries involved security and 
strategic considerations, China simultaneously promoted its ideational power in its foreign 
aid, that is, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Chinese leaders especially stressed 
the principles of sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit 
which were strongly upheld by the post-colonial countries. Compared with the Western 
powers, including the Soviet Union, which had never suffered from colonization, China 
probably knew a lot more of what the newly-independent nations desired because they shared 
a simi lar colonial history. China also understood the struggle of the non-aligned states in the 
174 
"The conversation record of the Sino-Yemen relations on economy, military and culture, Beijing, 
04/06/1964-05/06/1964," CDA, no.204-01524-02. 
175 The above figures are from Zhang Yuhui , cp[f/Xifj'f!Jlfl/J!ilf'ft (Research on China's Foreign Aid), 
PhD Thesi s (Pa1ty School of the Central Comminee of the CCP, 2006), 79-80. 
176 Wang Taiping ed. , ,P$.).._ff;ft,ftlff!J'f5tst 1957-1969 (Diplomatic Histo,y of the People's 
Republic of China 1957-1969) (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi, 1998), 35. 
177 Xie Yixian ed., Diplomatic Histo1y ofContempora,y China, 119-125. 
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bipolar system due to its agonized relationship with the USSR. Foreign aid was important to 
the Jess developed countries, but these nations also cherished independence, equality, respect 
and non-interference in their internal affairs when treated by the other powers. Aware of the 
needs of post-colonial nations, China highlighted the Five Principles and sought to build a 
new and more principled approach to international relations. Later, China fonnulated a 
specific policy of foreign aid when it engaged wi th African countries. 
In addition to the concerns with the traditional balance of power and periphery security, 
China provided considerable foreign aid to socialist counties such as Mongolia, Albania, 
Hungary (and Cuba) garnering support to counter Soviet influence and play a leadership role 
in the communist camp. 178 According to the Vice Primer Li X iannian 's report to the Standing 
Committee of the 200 People's National Congress, China provided 1.154 billion RMB foreign 
aid to sociali st countries in 1961 and 1962, taking up 84% of its foreign aid in these two 
years. 179 At the same time, for the purpose of the exportation of Maoist ideology and support 
of revolutions in the region, China provided extensive assistance fo{ the communist 
movements in Bunna, Cambodia, Japan, lndonesia, Korea, Laos, the Philippines , Thailand 
and Vietnam. 18° Chinese leaders believed that providing fore ign aid to these forces was 
"China's internationalist obligation." The benefit of forei gn aid however was mutual: "whi le 
we (China) supported them (post-colonial countries) by means of finance , material and 
technology, once they develop their economy and anti-imperia li st strength, it actually will 
help us." 181 
4.3.2.2 Africa 
The promoti on of " internationali sm" was further exemplified when Beijing expanded its 
foreign aid to Africa in the latter part of the 1950s. Although China 's presence in Africa was 
quite late, it acti vely courted Africans' affec tions with both ass istance and engagement. In the 
firs t place, China provided extensive military and material assistance to revolutionary 
movements in countries and regions such as Algeria , Angola, Congo (Leopoldvill e), 
i-s Zhang Yuhui, Research on China~ Foreign Aid, 77-79. 
179 Li Xiannian ... J::'f 1961 '¥;ffl 1962 '¥ l'isl~ tit'i'Un!R 'Ff (-:h/,='¥-ttJ P1J D)" (Report of the 
national budget in 1961 and 1962, 04/07/1 963), in Research Centre of the Central Committee of the 
CCP, J1! fJ!/ l;1 )It gj-ffJ! _j(tfil if/; f/f; (Selected !111po11ant Documents since the Founding of the PRC) 
(Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian, 1997), vol.1 6: 531. 
180 Van Ness. Revo/111io11 and Chinese Foreign Policy; Armstrong, Revolutiona,y Dip lomacy; A .M. 
Halpern ed., Policies toward China, Viewsfro,n Six Continents (New York, publi shed fo r the Council 
on Foreign Relat ions by McGraw-Hill , 1965). Ch. 9-12 and 17; Quansheng Zhao, lnte,preting Chinese 
Foreign Policy, 55; Justu s M. van der Kroef, "Philippine Communism and the Chinese," 77,e China 
Quarterly. no. 30 (Apr. - Jun .. 1967), 115-148. 
181 Li Xiannian. "Repon of the nat ional budget in 1961 and 1962, 04/07/ 1963." 
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Mozambique and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). 182 It also set up military training fields both in 
China and in Africa to train African revolutionaries in the arts of guerrilla warfare based on 
Mao's military theory. 183 
In the second place, China provided economic and technological assistance for the 
development of the newly-born African nations. Its foreign aid started from the support of the 
Egyptian government's fight over the Suez Canal, during which China provided 20 million 
Swiss Francs as a financial grant. ln 1960, China helped Guinea build a match and cigarette 
manufacturing plant, which was China 's first development project in Africa. From late 1961 
to early 1962, China sent seven agricultural specialists to Mali to assist with their 
experiments in sugarcane and tea. In 1963, China dispatched its first medical team to Algeria, 
initiating a new form of foreign aid in China's international engagement. 184 Nevertheless, it 
was the Chinese leaders ' three visits to Africa in 1963 and 1964 that rea lly anracted Africa 's 
attention to China. From 13 December 1963 to 5 February 1964, Premier Zhou and Vice-
Premier Chen Yi toured ten African countries: the United Arab Republic (Egypt) , Algeria, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Mali , Guinea, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. 185 Zhou drew African 
people ' s attention to the hi storical connection between China and Africa 186 and their common 
experience of oppression at the hands of the colonial Europeans, -and thereby proceeded to 
formulate the five principles governing China's relations with Third World countries and the 
eight principles of China's aid to foreign countries (see Box l ). Zhou thus sent out two key 
messages to African peoples. One was that since China had succeeded in its revolution, 
"Africa is ripe for revolution ;" the other was that China would provide tangible support to 
African people, "but only if it was asked to. " 187 This revealed the substance of China 's 
approach to Africa: China would respect African nations and would not impose its own will 
182 Zhang Yuhui, Research on China's Foreign Aid, 81, 91; Snow, The Star Rafi, 77; Van Ness, 
Revolutio11 a11d Chinese Foreign Policy , 93. 
183 Van Ness, Revolutio11 a11d Chinese Foreign Policy, I 14; Snow, The Star Rafi, 76-78. 
184 The above figures are from Zhang Yuhui, Research on China 's Foreign Aid, 80-8 1, 91-92. 
185 
"Premier Zhou Enlai's three tours of Asian and African countries", 17/11 /2000, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the PRC: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/tl800l.htm# . For detail s of the 
tours to Africa see Chen Dunde, /,'f}/!JU/C7Sit'/t#I/: !Jt!l./ft£ 1964 (Zhou Enlai's Visits to Africa: 
Explori11g i11 1964) (Beijing: Jiefangjun Wenyi), 2007. 
186 The historical connection between China and Africa referred to Zheng He's voyage to the East 
African coast in the early 15 th century during the Ming Dynasty ( 1368-1644). 
187 Snow, Th e Star Rafi, 76. 
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on less developed countries. It therefore promoted an image of Chi na as a new and different 
force on the world stage and an alternative to Soviet and Western powers. 188 
To sum up, from the late 1950s to the ea rl y 1960s, there were signi ficant changes in world 
poli tics , particu larly the emergence of the Sino-Soviet split, w hich had a huge impact on 
China's fore ign pol icy in general and foreign aid in particular. China thus expanded its 
foreign aid from its peripheries to the Midd le East, Af1ica and Latin America 189 to enhance its 
pol itical leverage in world poli tics. Until the end of 1965, China 's foreign aid extended to 32 
countri es: 13 of them were in Asia, 16 in Africa, 2 in East Europe an d I in Latin Am erica. 190 
Chin a demonstrably increased its focns on Africa and Asia. Due to this expansion, the amount 
of China's foreign aid saw steady growth, from 0.35 bi ll ion RMB in 1959 to 1.845 billion 
RMB in 1965. The average growth reached 22.5% in these seven years . Accordingly, the 
pe rcentage of fo reign aid in C hina's financi a l expend iture increased from 0.664% to 3.747% 
in 1965 . Whi le its revenue was in flux at the time, China 's fo rei gn aid grew fast and thi s trend 
continued in the fo llowing years of the 1960s (see Figure 4.2 and Appendix I). 
188 Admitted ly, China's fo reign aid to Africa was used to undermine Ta iwan in Africa and to obtain 
suppo11 from Africa n countries in China's bid to rep lace the ROC/Taiwan in the UN. Nonetheless, the 
Taiv,1an issue at the time was secondary to China's competition with the two superpowers. I f China 
could build its leadership in world politics and display its capacity to counter the superpowers, 
Taiwan 's influence wou ld decline. For Taiwan 's fo reign aid see Lin Dechang, ;!/j//glfj'Jjlft:/JJ:f!iljf(fllz 
f:l::.f3Nilf!fi' (A Comparison of Foreign Aid Policies between the PRC and Taiwan) (Taipei: Chengwen, 
1999). 
189 Due to the scope of this chapter, Chi na's foreign aid to Latin Ameri ca is not discussed. Compared 
to Asia and Africa, its foreign aid to Latin America was minor, mainly confined to Cuba. The figures 
for China's fore ign aid to Cuba can be referred to Zhang Yu hui , Research on China's Foreign Aid, 79. 
'
90 These 32 countries were Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon (Sri Lanka after 1972), DPRK., 
Indonesia, Laos, Mongolia, Nepal , Pakistan, Syria, Vietnam, Yemen in Asia, Angola, Algeria, Central 
Africa, Congo (Brazzaville), UAR/Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mali , Mozambique, Somalia, Sudan, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe in Africa, Albania and Hungary in Eastern Europe, and 
Cuba in Latin America. Most of the aid was sent to the state governments but in a few cases to the 
nat ional liberation movements mentioned earlier. The li st of the recipients of China's fore ign aid was 
obtained from the survey from the CDA from 1959 to 1965 with the key word "aid '. (J%'WJ), and 
referred to Zhang Yuhui , Research on China 's Foreign Aid, 84-85 , JOO; Snow, n,e Star Rafi, 76-79; 
Yan Ness, Revo/111ion and Chinese Foreign Policy, I 12-11 4; Wolfgang Bartke, China's Economic Aid 
(London: C. Hurst, I 975). 
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China's Foreign Aid (in billion RMB) 
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Figure 4.2: Gro"1h of the PRC's foreign aid (1958-1969), Uni t: B illi on RMB. The percentage of 
foreign aid {FA) in PR C's financial expenditure (FE) is calcu lated based on Appendix I in this chapter. 
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Box I: The five princ ip les guiding China's relat ions with the Third World countri es and the eight 
princ iples for China's aid to fore ign countries (extracted from "Premier Zhou Enl ai's three tours of 
As ian and Africa n countries", 17/11 /2000, Mini stry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 
hnp://www.fmprc.eov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t 1800 I .htm#.) 
The five principles guiding Chinas re/a/ions wilh !he Third World countries were: a. China supporls 
1he Arab and African peoples in !heir slruggle to oppose imperialism and old and new co/011ialism 
and lo win and safeguard nalional independence. b. fl suppons the pursuance of a policy of peace, 
neutrality and non-alignment by the Goven11nents of Arab and African countries . c. It supports the 
desire of the Arab and African peoples to achieve unity anti solidarity in the manner of their own 
, choice. d. fl supports !he Arab and African co11n1ries in !heir ejforls lo selt/e !heir dispules 1hrough 
peaceful consuilalions. e. fl holds thal 1he sovereignty of !he Arab and African countries should be 
respected by all other countries and that encroachment and interference from any quarter should be 
opposed. 
The eight principles for Chinas aid lo foreign counlries were: a. The Chinese Governmenl always 
bases ilself on !he principle of equality and mutual benefit in providing aid 10 olher counlries. !1 
never regards such aid as a kind of unilateral alms but as something mutual. b. in providing aid ro 
other countries, the Chinese Government strictly resp ects the sovereignty of-the recipient countries, 
and never attaches any contlitions or asks for any privileges. c. China provides economic aid in the 
fonn of interest-free or low-interest loans and extends the time limit for repayment when necessmy so 
as lo lighlen !he burden of 1he recipien/ counlries as far as possible. d. In providing aid lo other 
countries, the pwpose of the Chinese Government is not to make the recipient countries dependenr on 
China b11110 help them embark step by step 011 the road ofself-relia11ce and i11depe11de111 economic 
developm ent. e. The Chinese Government tries its best to help the recipient countries build projects 
which require less investment while yielding quicker results, so that the recipient governments may 
increase their income and accumulate capital. f The Chinese Gover11me111 provides the best-qua/;ty 
eq uipment and material of its own manufacture at i11ternational market prices. If the equipment and 
material provided by the Chinese Governme1ll are not up to the agreed specifications and quality, the 
Chinese Governmem undertakes to replace them. g. In providing any technical assistance, the 
Chinese Government will see to it that the personnel of the recipient count,y fully master such 
technique. h. 171e ex~perts dispatched by China to help in construction in the recipient countries will 
It ave the same standard of living as !he expe11s of 1he recipienl counl!y. (Emphasis added) 
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4.4 Conclusion 
When Mao 's China faced increasing antagonism from the US and the USSR beginning in the 
late 1950s, according to the avai lable sources including the declassified CDA from 1959 to 
1965, soft power played a significant role in China's international engagement. At a time 
when China was materially weak, the Chinese government made purposeful efforts to 
mobilize its key sources of non-material power. These sources were utilized to attract and 
persuade the peoples in post-colonial societies and Chinese citizens that the PRC represented 
a just force in world politics and an alternative to the Western powers including the USSR. 
The key sources of non-material power promoted by Maoist China were China itself as an 
exemplary model of nation building, its "proletarian culture" and revolutionary foreign policy. 
The major tools of Maoist soft power were China 's cultural diplomacy and foreign aid. 
When promoting its soft power through cultural interaction, China noted the differences of 
each target audience. Taking into account the poorly educated peoples from the 
underdeveloped world, Chinese visual arts which manifested China's revolutionary identity 
and age-old civilisation were vigorously promoted. Visual arts were easily accepted and well 
received by thi s group of people. In contrast, regarding "educated" leftists and "progressive 
forces" such as nationalists, China provided scholarships for students in the Third World to 
study in China and distributed its publications which elaborated Chinese revolutionary 
thoughts . Additionally, China made use of international conferences and organizations, and 
the meetings of foreign leaders and "progressive forces" to advance China's political 
standpoint and vision. China sought to persuade these "elites" to build favourable public 
op inions internationally. These differential methods not only promoted China 's political 
culture but also delivered China 's political ideas. 
When offering foreign aid, beginning in the late 1950s, China expanded out of its immediate 
neighbourhood to the far-away African countries with favourable tenns, and more 
sign ificantly it set new standards such as the respect of sovereignty and non-political 
conditionality as stated in the Eight Principles of China 's Foreign Aid. Maoist China 's foreign 
aid was characterized by heavy ideological and political considerations. It did not take into 
account economic profit but was largely defined by the needs and requests of the recipient 
countries. It was practised to demonstrate China 's "obligation of proletarian internationalism", 
to compete with the two superpowers, and thus to project a leadership role in this field. 
Maoist soft power was unique. Its ideological intent was a conspicuous feature. However, it 
should be noted that the uniqueness of Maoist soft power was not only detennined by the 
Chinese, but was also the result of the interictions between the PRC and the other major 
international forces. The increasing antagonism between the PRC and the two superpowers 
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propelled the Chinese government to enhance its internationa l engagement with the less 
deve loped world by projecting Maoism and a "proletarian" political culture, and carrying out 
a "revolutionary" diplomacy that differed from that of other maj or world powers. China's 
alienation of the two blocs and the emerging non-aligned forces in the bipolar system 
provided Mao's government with the opportunity and space to build itself as a leading third 
force in world politics. 191 
The PRC gained a political di vidend from Maoist soft power projection. It helped the PRC 
generate its influence and presti ge in different international affairs, such as the movements of 
national liberation in the developing world and the world student movement in the West.192 
This prestige transfonned into a political asset which was extremely important for the PRC to 
win support from the Third World countries and sympathy from the leftists in the West. It 
shaped Beijing's leadership role in the Third World and the international communist 
movement. In the meantime, however, the fear of communist infiltration, which had given 
China a formidable reputation of being "the political villain" in the US-influenced parts of the 
world ever since the Dulles era , was further enhanced. 
Therefore, this chapter argues that to a large degree, Maoist soft power contributed to the 
PR C's second wave of diplomatic recognition since 1949. There were 19 countries wh ich set 
up diplomatic relations with the PRC from 1959 to 1965. Except France, all the others are 
post-coloniali st countries and 16 of them are African nations (see Appendix 2). Reviewing all 
the diplomatic relations that China estab li shed by the year 1965, it is evident that from 1959 
to 1965 the PRC extended its efforts to win international support from the socia li st bloc to 
more post-colonial states. This implies that Maoist soft power projection played a significant 
rol e in the extension of the PRC 's fore ign relations. 
Due to Maoist soft power projection and the support obtained from the post-colonial states, it 
is further argued that the PRC thereafter could replace the ROC as the only legitimate power 
to represent China in the UN in 197 1. 193 At the 261h Session of the UN General Assembl y in 
191 See Chih-yu Shih , Chinas Jusr World: rhe Moraliry of Chinese Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colo: 
Lynn Rienner Publishers, 1993), ch.3. 
192 For excell ent and detailed di scussions of the correlation between China and the nat ional liberation 
movements, see Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy, 77 ·197; Armstrong, Revolutiona,y 
Diplomacy, 114-236. For the discuss ion of th e correlation between China 's revo lution and the world 
student movement in the deve loped soc ieties, see W. Richard and Amy A. Wi lson. "The red guards and 
the world student movement:· The China Qua11erly, no.42 (Apr.-Jun. 1970), 88- 104. 
193 Adminedly there were several factors that co ntributed to the PRC's entry into the UN as the onl y 
legitimate government of Chi na in 1971. Some scholars may argue that it was the US engagement with 
the PRC in the very late 1960s that led the PRC to obtain its seat in the UN. Wh il e the importance of 
Sino-US rapprochement is undeniable, the third world nations support was crucial. Without China 's 
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1971 , 23 countries lodged a joint proposal to restore the lawful rights of the PRC as the only 
representative of China in the UN. 194 Most of them were the targets of China's cultural 
interaction and foreign aid. This proposal finall y was approved by 76 members of the UN, 
with 35 vetos and 17 abstentions. Among these 76 countries, 51 were developing countries 
and most of them engaged with China by means of culture or foreign aid. ' 95 It thus 
demonstrates that the PRC's acquisition of legitimacy in the UN derived from China's Maoist 
soft power offensive. Chainnan Mao expressed hi s sincere appreciation to the Third World, 
" In any case, we should not forget the immense support from the Third World for this issue 
[that the PRC was able to restore its rights in the UN].'"96 
The influence of China's soft power projection in the early 1960s can be attributed to the 
following two factors: first, Chinese leaders made a proper judgment that the Third World 
would be an emerging and third force of world politics in the bipolar system of the Cold War. 
Accordingly they projected C hina 's identity firmly in line with this group as an alternative to 
the two superpowers, and thereby they could garner support from the Third World to oppose 
the two superpowers simultaneously. Second, looking at the 1960s, Chinese words were in 
general consistent with their deeds. The Chinese opposed hegemony not on ly in words but in 
their actions. They believed in revolution, and insti gated and supported revolutionaries who 
wanted to carry out struggles to change world politics. Chinese consistency in words and 
actions was very important to their winning internationa l support and building up an image as 
a revolutionary force and a leader in the world revolutionary movement. 
influence in the Third World, the West and the US in particular might not have realized what a 
significant role the PRC had played in world politics from the 1950s to the 1960s, and the US might 
not have had the intention to engage with China. 
194 The UN, "2758 (XXVI) Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the 
United Nations (October 25 , 1971 )" accessed from UN website : 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/26/ares26 .htm 
195 The 23 countries which provided the proposal were Alban ia, Algeria, Burma, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), 
Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Jraq, Mali, Mauritania, Nepal, Pakistan, Yemen (Democratic), 
Congo (Democratic), Romania, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Yemen (Arab), 
Yugoslavia and Zambia. See RMRB (28/10/1971), 6. The 51 developing countries which voted in 
favour of the proposal were Afghanistan, Algeria, Bhutan, Botswana, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, 
Ceylon, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, India, Jran, 
Iraq, Israel, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Libya, Malaysia, Mali , Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, 
Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Yemen (Democratic), Congo (Democratic), Peru, Rwanda, Senegal , Sierra 
Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Tanzania, 
Yemen (Arab) and Zambia. See RMRB (27/10/ 1971), I . 
196 Wang Xingfang, 'f'tf/-/;JJfJc f;tfl (China and the United Nations) (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi, 1995), 47. 
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However, it needs to be pointed out that the projection of Maoist soft power imposed a heavy 
cost on the Chinese state and society. 197 Firstly, due to the policies of '"double-anti " and se lf-
reliance, the PRC alienated itself from the areas dominated by the two superpowers as well as 
the major international institutions and organizations that had come into operation after World 
War II. It left China very limited room to get foreign aid and develop its economy by 
international cooperation. Further, the PRC's material assistance to the movements of 
communist and national liberation in addition to their foreign aid to post-colonial states went 
too much beyond its economic capacity. It thus aggravated the already serious economic 
situation for the PRC. China 's policies were much more radicalized in the second half of the 
1960s and led to the "Cultural Revolution" (1966-1976) . The radical domestic and foreign 
policies almost devastated China 's domestic economy and destroyed its foreign relations in 
the second half of the 1960s. 198 While some other East Asian societies were taking off 
economically, the PRC was on the edge of collapse in the early 1970s. 
Secondly, by the end of the 1960s, China had arrived at an impasse in its national security. It 
not only had to continue to deal with the encirclement from the US in the Pacific, but had to 
handle the increasing danger from its northern border which finally led to a clash with the 
Soviets in 1969. Thus, at the end of the 1960s, Chinese leaders had to make a major shift in 
foreign policy. Security imperatives led Chairman Mao to approach the US, which 
contradicted his earli er claim that "the US imperialists are the most ferocious and most 
arrogant aggressors in the hi story of mankind." Maoist China 's rapprochement wi th the US 
shocked and confused Mao 's revolutionary fellows and lefti sts around the world. It shattered 
China·s revolutionary image and moral authority. 199 
w ln the so-call ed ··three years of natural di saster (1959- 1961 ),'' it is estimated that China 's economic 
loss was about 120 billion RMB and ab normal deaths reached 40 million in mainland China. Despite 
the disaster. the PRC still increased its foreign aid, whi ch can be seen from the chart of China 's 
Fore ign Aid. For Chinas economic diffi culti es in 1959-1961 see Cong Jin, The Years of China's 
Tor111011s De,·elopment. 268-273. Scholars have pointed out that actually the huge cost was not from 
··natural disaster;· but was a man-made tragedy due to the campaign of the GLF. For the most 
comprehensive and recent research on the impact of the GLF see Yang Jisheng, Tombstone: The Great 
Chinese Famine, 1958-/962 (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2012). 
198 A few countries broke diplomatic relatio ns with China in the late 1960s, e.g. Dahomey (Benin), 
Central Africa. Ghana. Indonesia. Kenya and Tunisia. Some of these were because of China's 
rad ical ization in its foreig:n relations and some were due to military co ups d"Ctat in foreign countries, 
such as Indonesia. See Xie Yixian ed., Diplomatic History 0JC0111e111pora1y China , 204-6. 
199 See Peter Yan Ness. '·Co llapse of moral authority and the end of the civilizer state : co mparing two 
cases - Mao·s China and George W. Bush's United States; · The East As ia Institute (EAJ) Fellow 
Program Working Paper No. 37. October 2012. 
138 
The further impact was that China to some extent lost its identity in the 1970s and 1980s, as 
Maurice Meisner has called it, "neither capitalist nor sociali st." 200 In Mao's China, the 
traditional order and philosophies, such as Confucianism, were to a large degree destroyed by 
a few campaigns. This created huge impacts on society as well as on the legitimacy of the 
CCP after the Maoist era. Chinese people in general have lost interest in revolution and 
Maoist ideology. The ideology of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought has collapsed in 
Chinese society and cannot provide support for the CCP's rule . In its place, patriotic 
education and nationalism have begun to surge in post-Mao China. In short, these aspects are 
the deficits of Maoist soft power, wh ich led Mao's successors, sooner or later, to discard 
much of what was most distinctively Maoist. As the Party 's mouthpiece, the Beijing Review, 
declared in 1984, the CCP "does not recognise any so-called leadership or guiding 'centre ' or 
any ready-made ' model ' in the international Communist movement." And it further claimed 
that "neither at present nor in the future wi ll our Pa11y act as a ' centre ' or create a ' model ' ."20 1 
200 
"Maoist China was not capitalist because it bad abolished an essential condition of capitalism -
p1ivate ownership of the means of production. It was not genuinely socialist because the masses of 
producers, workers and peasants alike, were denied the means to control the products and conditions of 
their labour - and also denied the means to control· the state, which increasingl y stood above them as 
both the economic and political manager of society." Meisner, Mao :S China and After, 424. 
'°' "Foreign contacts of the communist party," Beijing Review, no.42 (1984), 19. 
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Append ix I: PRC's Foreign Aid ( 1958-1969) 202 (in Billion RMB) 
Year Foreign Aid (FA) Financial Expenditure FA/FE(%) Revenue 
(FE) 
1958 0.276 40.94 0.664 38.76 
1959 0.35 55.286 0.633 4 8.7 12 
1960 0 .363 65.4 14 0.555 57.229 
196 1 0.519 36.702 1.414 35.606 
1962 0.854 30.525 2.798 31.355 
1963 0.91 33 .963 2 .679 34.225 
1964 1.25 39.902 3. 133 39.954 
1965 1. 845 46.633 3.956 47. 332 
1966 2.029 54.156 3.747 55 .87 1 
1967 1.972 44.185 4.463 41.936 
1968 2.056 35.984 5.7 14 36. 125 
1969 2. 196 52.586 4. 176 52.676 
202 The Gen era l Office of the Mini stry of Finance (compil ed), "J;g! l\( fijj:!'j:;jf )'f' (Nati onal budget and 
final accounting of revenue and expenditure), tf':f#A /!f!ft:,1{!/lflf!fj]J{.1::/4 (Historical Material of 
PRC Finance) (Beij ing: Zhongguo Caizheng Jingji , 1983), vol.2 , 419-420. The forei gn aid figures 
from 1958 to 1964 are spread in the annual repon s of China's national budget and fin al accounting of 
revenue and expenditure made by the Vice Premier Li Xiannian in the same book, but were only 
available in 1965. The other foreign aid figures of 1965-1969 are cited from Zhang Yuhui , Research on 
China s Foreign Aid. 165. The percentage of FA/FE is calcu lated by the author. Pl ease note that except 
for the foreign aid figures of 1965-1969 the other figures of the abo ve tabl e are slightly different from 
the ones in Zhang·s thesis. The figures of FE an d reven ue ci ted by Zhang are consistent with the data 
in Chi na Data Online produced by China Data Centre at Uni versity of Michigan, see 
http: //ch inadataonline.org/. but China Data Online does not have the fi gures of China's foreign aid . In 
add ition, Wo lfgang Banke's research covers in detail China 's aid to less developed co untries from 
1956 to 1973. However, his study does not include China 's fore ign aid to sociali st countries or China 's 
mi li tary aid, see Wolfgang Banke, China s Economic Aid, 7, 9-11. 
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Appendix 2: Countries Establishing Diplomatic Relations with China, 1949-1965 203 
The date of establishing 
Number Name of the country diplomatic relations with China 
(dd/mm/yy) 
l. USSR 02/10/1949 
2. Bulgaria 04/10/ 1949 
3. Romania 05/10/1949 
4. DPRK 06/ 10/1949 
5. Czechoslovakia 06/10/1949 
6. Hungary 06/10/1949 
7. Poland 07/ 10/ 1949 
8. The Gennan Democratic Republic 27/ 10/ 1949 
9. Albania 23/ 11 / 1949 
10. Vietnam 18/01 / 1950 
11. India 01 /04/ 1950 
12. Indonesia 13/04/ 1950 
13. Sweden 09/05/ 1950 
14. Denmark 11/05/ 1950 
15. Bunna 8/06/1950 
16. Liechtenstein 14/09/1950 
17. Switzerland 14/09/ 1950 
18. Finland 28/ 10/ 1950 
203 See the websi te of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peop le's Republic of China, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/zi I iao/2193/ 
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19. Pakistan 21 /05/1 95 1 
20. Norway 0511011954 
2 1. Yugos lavia 02/01/ 1955 
22. Afghanistan 20/01/ 1955 
23. Nepal 0 1/08/1 955 
24. Egypt 30/05/ 1956 
25. Syria 01/08/1956 
26. Yemen 24/09/1956 
27. Ceylon (Sri Lanka since 1972) 07/02/ 1957 
28. Cambodia 19/07/ 195 8 
29. Iraq 25/08/ 195 8 
30. Morocco 0 1/ 11 /1 95 8 
3 1. Algeria 20/ 12/ 195 8 
32. Sudan 04/02/1959 
33 . Guinea 0411011959 
34. Ghana 05/07/1960 
35. Cuba 28/09/1960 
36. Mali 25/10/1960 
37. Somali 14/ 12/1960 
38. Congo (Leopoldville, Democratic) 20/02/1961 
39. Laos 25/04/1961 
40. Uganda 18/10/1962 
41. Kenya 14/12/1963 
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42. Burundi 21 / 12/1963 
43. Tunisia I 0/01/1964 
44. France 27/01/1964 
45. Congo (Brazzavi lle, Republic) 22/02/ 1964 
46. Tanzania 26/04/ 1964 
47. Central Africa 29/09/1964 
48. Zambia 29/10/1964 
49. Benin 12/ 11 / 1964 
50. Mauritania 19/07/1 965 
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5 China's Soft Power Mobilization in the 2008 Beijing Olympic 
Games 
Whilst the previous chapter has illustrated China's projection of Maoist soft power in PRC's 
revolutionary period, what can be said about China 's soft power campaign in its refonn era? 
China 's hosting of the 29th Olympiad provides an excellent case study for examining the 
constitution and mobilization of the three key sources of soft power as they apply in the 
contemporary debate. It provides this study with a prism to compare and contrast two 
versions of Chinese soft power: the Olympiad 's reformist version , and the Maoist version in 
the previous chapter' s empirical study. 
As many experts on sports and politics have noted, the Olympics have never been an 
exclusively sporting event. They have been intertwined with various issues such as culture, 
ideology, economics, politics and international relations. 1 Moreover, the socio-political 
meaning of the Games changes depending on the host country's stage of socio-economic 
development and its different political and strategic objectives. 2 The hosting of the 2008 
Summer Olympiad in China, in front of the largest audience it had ·ever had access to, gave 
China a powerful platfonn to actively use its soft power to demonstrate how it seeks to 
represent itself in the global community. After three-decade material build-up through 
economic refonns, China seized the moment to project itself as a strong and vigorous nation 
but simultaneously a "good global citizen" on the world stage. Soft power, for today 's China, 
complementing and amplifying its increasingly growing hard power, is utili zed to both attract 
and soothe global audience. It involves not only promoting its culture to win admiration, and 
offering a worthy development model for other societies to respect or emulate, but also 
assuaging the fears of particular societies about the intentions of a newly strong China in 
international politics. ln this sense, China's soft power takes on a strong "dualistic" character. 
The hosting of the 2008 Olympic Games represented a milestone in China 's cu ltivaiion, 
reinterpretation , and mobili zation of its key soft power resources - Chinese culture, its 
development model , and its modem foreign policy and diplomacy in contrast with those in 
revolutionary China. The Garnes provided a great site to project a "cultural China" by re-
1 For instance, Richard Espy, Th e Politics of the Olympic Games (Berkeley: University Of California 
Press, 1979); Christopher R. Hill , Olympic Politics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992); 
Susan Brownell , Training the Body for China: Sports in the Moral Order of the People 's Republic 
(Chicago: Uni versity of Chicago Press, 1995); Xu Guoqi , O(ympic Dreams: China and Sports, 1895-
2008 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008). 
2 Maurice Roche, Mega-Events and Modernity: Olympics and Expos in the Growth of Global Culture 
(London: Routledge, 2000). 
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embracing its traditional culture but in a way that blends in modern and multidimensional 
aspects including what has been learned from the Western world. It was an opportunity to 
present a '·modem China" born of on-going refonn and economic development, achieved by 
open ing its economy but with the state retaining firm control. It also provided a platfonn for 
China to recast itself as a reju venated but responsible global power within the existing liberal 
order, prepared to cooperate and engage with other world powers to handle globa l issues. 
Therefore, China' s "charm offensive" by mobili zing and projecting these key sources of 
China's soft power at its Olympic moment in particular was not only targeted at the "Global 
South," but mobili zed to atta in recognition from the "Global North ." It aimed at maki ng 
China appealing whi le allaying the fears of the "China threat" and shaping China 's image as a 
responsib le global power. 3 Of equal importance, from the process of bidding to the 
celebration of the Games, the ro le of the Chinese leadership - the CCP - was more or less 
enhanced and consolidated both domestically and internationally. The mission of fulfilling 
China 's "great power dream" and the pride in the glory of the Chinese nation served as a 
potent source of domestic mobili zation to support the current regime. 
The discuss ion that proceeds consists of three sections. The first section discusses the broad 
international and domestic background before China engaged to host this mega event and 
explains why the Olympics mattered in China. The second section analyses the key sources of 
Ch ina's soft power that were mobili zed and promoted at the time of hosting the 2008 
Olympic Games. These included (I) the rehabi litation of traditiona l Chinese culture but in a 
way that blends in modern aspects of the Chinese culture; (2) China's economic vitality and 
its model of achieving modernization ; and (3) the employment of an omnidirectional 
diplomacy to demonstrate its "good global citi zenship." The third secti on highlights the key 
sources and targeted aud ience of China's soft power at the moment of the hosting of the 
Beijing Games. This empirical study of a reformist version of soft power at the time of 
staging an Olympiad leads to an anal ys is comparing and contrasting China 's soft power 
mobilization and projection in the past and present of the PRC in the next chapter. 
5.1 The context of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games 
Before it moves to the di scuss ion of China 's soft power projection throu gh staging the 
Beijing Games, thi s secti on portrays its broad domestic and international context and explains 
3 In this regard, Yongjin Zhang argues that it is not China's so ft power that co-opts others; rather, 
China's international behaviour has been transfonned by the dominant in ternati onal norms and ru les. 
See Yongjin Zhang, ·'The discourse of China 's soft power and its discont ents." in Mingjiang Li ed., 
Soft Power, 55. Whil st I agree wi th Yongjing Zhang's observation, I also consider that China 's so ft 
power projection neverthe less aim s to change others ' behav iour or attitudes toward China for Ch ina's 
conti nuing development purpose. 
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why the Chinese were so keen to host an Olympiad. ln doing so, firstly, it helps to elucidate 
China's changing role as a rising power in the post-Cold War international system. Secondly, 
China's shifting role in the evolving international system affects Chinese perception of power. 
Thirdly, it helps to understand why China put in such an enonnous amount of efforts to 
promote itself by hosting an Olympiad. 
5.1.1 The rise of China on the world stage 
The 2008 Olympic Games arrived in China in the context of China 's rise resulting from the 
persistent implementation of economic-driven reform from the end of 1978. Many 
commentators remarked that the 2008 Beijing Games represented a "coming out" party for 
China to showcase its newly gained material strength.4 The success was not only about 
China, but also should be understood as the consequence of mutual engagement and 
recognition between China and the evolving international system since the l 970s. 
During most of the Maoist era, the PRC experienced non-engagement and non-recognition 
from the post-war international system and from many states. However, this situation reached 
a turning point in the 1970s, when China began its participation and integration in the 
prevailing international system. This turning point started with the fRC 's replacement of the 
Republic of China (ROC) in the UN in 1971. The PRC's entry into the UN not only 
legitimated the Beijing regime in the international community, but " re-established the 
universality of that global international organization."5 
The mutual engagement and recognition between China and many other international forces 
that started in the early 1970s brought significant changes to the country. First, China began 
to participate in and interact with various post-war international political and economic 
regimes. Second, many more states established diplomatic relations with China, which 
enabled more bilateral interactions. Third, China "went through a period of apprenticeship to 
master. the rules of the game of parliamentary politics at the General Assembly and other 
institutions. "6 
Fourth and most importantly, the mutual engagement and recognition in the 1970s laid the 
foundation for China to re-orient itself within the existing international system and provided 
incentives for Mao 's successors to open up China to the outside world. China began to see 
itself as a part of the existing international system.7 As such, it fundamentally challenged the 
4 For example, Lee M. Sands, "The 2008 Olympics' impact on China," China Business Review, July-
August 2008, accessed at: https://www.chi nabusinessreview.com/public/0807/sands.htm1. 
5 Yongjin Zhang, China in International Society sinCe 1949, 61. 
6 Ibid., 73. 
However Beijing in the 1970s still pronounced its opposition to the prevai ling international system 
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Maoist vision of China and the world where China represented the antithesis of the prevailing 
international system and sought revolutionary changes to it by means of war and revolution. 
ln the post-Mao period, the themes of war and revolution were gradually repl aced by the 
asp iration for peace and development. 8 The changing perception of China and the world 
prope lled China 's fu11her integrati on and accommodation into international politica l and 
economic systems through the arduous implementation of the program of modernization and 
the policies of " reform and opening up" in the post-Mao era. 
Furthermore, the end of the Cold War and the fall of the USSR created a new international 
geopolitical context. For China , it produced a welcome relief due to the disintegration of the 
Soviet adversary - the colossus on its northern borders. However, in the meantime, it brought 
challenges to the ruling party - the CCP - involving controversy over the legi timacy of 
Conununi st rule as well as how to run a "modem sociali st state." 9 Reacting to these 
challenges, paramount leader Deng Xiaoping emerged from his retirement and took a 
"Southern tour" through the economic hubs of southern China in early 1992 to send a clear 
message to both Chinese citizens and international China observers that China wou ld 
continue its economic liberali zation but with the CCP in control. 10 However, despite still 
being a one-party political system, the PRC is no long commanded by paramount leaders. It 
has become more factional and bureaucratic. 11 1n add ition , the fall of the USSR prompted a 
debate within the Chinese intelligentsia over what makes a great power. Chinese analysts 
generally took the Soviet model of developing its power as a negative example. They 
suggested that the Soviets paid excessive attention to the expansion of hard military power 
and that the unbalanced development between military and economic, between hard power 
and soft power, contributed to the Soviet loss in the Cold War and its dimin ished global 
presence." Consequently, these ana lysts strnngl y recommended that in the post-Cold War era 
and hegemonism, in pa11icular, the Soviet aggressive international policies. The PRC still sought 
changes of the international system, but such challenges by China in the 1970s were mostly made from 
the perspective of an " ins id er:· See Qin Yaq ing. [t/(!;f.f;lr}ff.!grf,[Nj"f :,Z (Jmemational System and 
Chino s Diplomacy) (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi, 2009), 86. 
8 See Liang Shoude, X/f /), .If I'/! if:: $ }!j f e ,P ft/ fir! (!.,j :X: ,ff "f: (Deng Xiaoping n,eo,y and 
Contempora,y China s International Relations) (Harbin and Beijing: Heilongj iang Jiaoyu & Beijing 
Daxue, 2003), 53-68. 
9 Kissinger, On China , 456-458. 
" Deng Xiaoping, "ITift~ , U:!JII, :J;!;i#J, J:i#J~ J-t!!(f~iik~~ !:.\. , (Ta lking points [from Deng's 
visits to] Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai , January 18-February 21, 1992), Selected Works of 
Deng Xiaoping, vol.3: 370-383. 
11 For recent discussion of China·s po litica l and soc ial changes, see Willy Lam, Changing of the 
Guard: Beijing Grooms Sixth-Generation Cadres for 2020s (Washington, DC: Jamestown Fou ndation, 
2010); Zhao Litao and Lim Tin Seng eds., Chinos New Social Policy: Initiatives for A Hamtonious 
Society (Singapore; Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific, 2010); David Shambaugh ed ., Charting Chinas 
Fwure: Domestic and Intemationol Challenges (London; New York: Routl edge, 2011). 
12 Zhu Tingchang, "1:tt tcz. 3):1' III f(,]tf--ft IIl:t., iil' (i'i" (The assessment of Ch ina's CNP at the turn of 
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China must strengthen its comprehensive national power (CNP) by a coordinated 
development between hard power and soft power to achieve long-lasting great power status. 13 
Therefore, the changing international environment has affected not only Chinese elites ' 
perception of China 's role in the international system, but also the way of conducting their 
refonn and developing the country. The basic goal of reform under the CCP's leadership is 
simple and clear, which is to ensure continuing sustained economic growth and enrichment 
for the Chinese population, but to avoid dramatic regime change. 14 Guided by this 
economically-driven reform, China's economy has moved from a self-reliant and rigid 
centrally planned economy in the Maoist period to a more liberal and market-oriented system. 
China has experienced phenomenal economic growth in the past decades. For the thirty years 
from 1979 to 2008, China's economy grew at an annual rate of about IO per cent. 15 China's 
gross national income (GNJ) per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP) increased 
from $250 in 1980 to $6230 in 2008. China also made great strides in poverty reduction . By 
the World Bank 's estimate, by 2008, 662 million Chinese people had ri sen above the poverty 
line. 16 
In addition to material growth, the Chinese leadership has paid enonnous attention to shaping 
and reinterpreting Chinese culture by the rehabilitation of traditional culture, so as to enhance 
national cohesion at a time when the ideology of communism and Maoism were losing public 
appeal. 17 They launched various national patriotic campaigns by advancing "Chinese 
socialist culture" and Chinese cu ltural heritage such as Confucianism to enhance Chinese 
people's belief in the regime and pride in their country. 18 Chinese culture has become more 
dynamic by incorporating its own traditional culture as well as modern aspects learned from 
other societies. 
Accompanying it s massive domestic transformation was China 's more positive and 
cooperative role in world affairs. The Chinese government demonstrated its wi llingness to 
the century), -tf!:J'i!f£iJr_!gJJJ!ifiif;'J:i; (Forum of World Economic and Politics) , no.3 (1999), I ; Sheng 
Jiru, "China must not neglect strengthening its 'soft power '," 12. 
13 Xi Runchan, "Strategic thinking on strengthening CNP," 12. 
14 Wang Fei-ling, "Preservation , prosperity and power: what motivates China's foreign policy?" 
Journal of Contemporary China 14:45 (2005), 669-694; Scott, "China and the ' responsibilities' of a 
'responsible power ' ." 
15 See "data" of the World Bank website, http ://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG 
16 See "data" of the World Bank website, 
http: //data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP:PCAP.PP.CD/co untries ; and 
http ://si teresources.worldbank.org/INTPOVCALNET/Resources/Global Pove11V Update 2012 02-
29-12. pdf, 3. 
17 Yingjie Guo, Cultural Nationalism in ContempoPa,y China: the Search for National Identity under 
Refom, (London; New York: Routledge, 2004). 
18 fbid ., ch.2. 
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play a constructive and respons ible role by cooperating with other powers to tackle 
international issues. China has become deeply integrated into the international polit·ica l 
economy and acti vely parti cipated in multil ateral poli tica l, economic and strategic 
international organizations, particularly since the mid-l 990s. According to Marc Lanteigne, 
China's behaviour in thi s regard represents "a notable departure from traditional fo re ign 
policy preferences for bilateral linkage (especially in matters related to security) and from a 
longstanding aversion to committing the cou nt ry to forma l strategic regimes." 19 This 
dimension of the change of China 's diplomacy is elaborated in the second section. 
China's emerging material strength and increasing global presence since the commencement 
of its refonn and opening in the late 1970s thus drove the Chinese movement from the fringes 
to the centre of the world stage at the beginning of the 21 ' 1 century. The rest of the world 
generally we lcomed C hina 's " reform and opening up" policies, but no one (even the Chinese) 
anticipated that China could accumulate its material power so quickly. It therefore rai sed a 
hi gh-profile debate about whether China 's ri se would pose a threat to the West and the 
prevailing liberal order. Responding to international concerns about China's ri se, Ch inese 
political eli tes brought out the concept of " peaceful ri se/development" and made it a national 
policy to rea ssure other states of its benign intentions and to project a positi ve image to 
faci litate its continuing development and integration into the international system. ' 0 The 291" 
Olympiad arrived in China within this context. Hosting the Games provided China w ith a 
central stage to di sp lay what China is and what ro le it seeks to play in the global conununity. 
It al so represented an opportuni ty for the CCP to lift its leadership role both at home and 
abroad. 
The historical change in China 's national development path and its sense of itself and the 
world co incided with Ch ina 's re lat ions with the Olympic Movement, which is explained next. 
5.1.2 Sport as the continuation of politics and the Olympic Movement in 
China 
This subsection provides a di scussion of the relationship between sport, particularly the 
Olympics, and politics, so as to grasp wh y the Olympic Games are of such importance to the 
Chinese peop le and the state, broadcasting a renewed image of China across history. 
Nowadays, probab ly nobody would deny that many large-scale international cu ltural events 
are just a continuation of politics, and it cannot be truer than with the Olympic Garnes. The 
19 Marc Lanteigne, Ch ina and /11 ter11ational !11stitutio11s: Alternate Pa1hs to Global Power (New York: 
Routledge, 2005), 101. 
20 Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, 'f'{!!/((:;;f/l 1'lftldiiii'iff (China s Peac~(u/ 
Deve/op 111e111) (Beij ing: Jnfonnat ion Office of the State Council of the PRC, December 2005). 
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main reason is that the Games and the lntemational Olympic Committee (IOC) have been 
structured and developed within the modem international state system: the athlete is a 
representative of a state; the national Olympic committees are organized by state boundaries; 
the lOC is composed of Olympic committees that are organized by sta te boundaries; and IOC 
members themselves are regarded as "sport ambassadors" representing their states. 21 Albeit 
an international organization, the Games' primary actor is the state. As such, there has been 
an inherent tension between internationalism, by which the founder Baron Pierre de 
Coubertin meant the appreciation of the differences between the participating countries, and 
the tendency to homogenize world cultures through the worldwide expansion of the Olympic 
Movement.22 
Due to the structure of the Olympic Games and their great public exposure, it is impossible to 
keep politics out of the picture; rather, they " increasingly serve as an arena for debate about 
modern nationhood and international relations."23 ln thi s sense, sport in general and the 
Olympics in particular are used as a political means to achieve political ends. For one thing, 
the Games have always provided a superior platfonn for the nation state to obtain recognition 
and legitimacy. For this reason, " [t]o be a nation recognized by others ... a people must march 
in the Olympic Games Opening Ceremonies." 24 The state needs this spotlight to gain 
universal recognition of its membership . Secondly, the Games are frequently used as a tool of 
diplomacy to demonstrate national predisposition and positions toward international affairs. 
Richard Espy, an expert on Olympic politics, observes that, " [b]y sending delegations of 
athletes abroad, states can establish a first basis for diplomatic relations or can more 
effectively maintain such relations." By contrast, "the cancellation of a proposed sports visit 
to another nation can be used by a state as a means of voicing displeasure with that specific 
government or with its policies."25 Third ly, the Games have significance for promoting 
"official" versions of political and public culture, hi story, society, development and nation-
branding, as shown in the riva lry in the Cold War between the US and the USSR both in 
sports competitions and for hosting rights. Large-scale global events thus have been used as a 
stage for the projection of socio-political successes as well as the distinctiveness of each 
nation, and sometimes "for the symboli c contestation of modernity .. between different 
models of development." 26 These representational usages can all be found in China's 
21 Espy, 77,e Politics of the Olympic Games , 9. 
22 Brownell, Training the Body for China, 32. 
23 Ibid. , 313. 
24 Quoted from Xin Xu, "Modernizing China in the Olympic spotlight : China 's national identity 
and the 2008 Beijing Olympiad," The Editorial Board of the Sociological Review 2006, 95. 
25 Espy, 77,e Politics of the Olympic Games, 3. 
26 Wolfram Manzenreiter, "The Beijing Games in the Western imagination of China: the weak power 
151 
approach to the Olympic Movement since the early 20th century. 
China claimed that its aspiration to host an Olympiad was the culmination of a I 00-year-old 
dream (bai nian meng x iang). ln the Chinese media, many referred to the year 1908 as the 
starting journey of the Chinese Olympic dream, because they believed it was the year that the 
fa mous "three questi ons about the Olympics" had been rai sed in China. These questions were: 
( I ) when would China be ab le to send a wi nning athlete to the Olympics? (2) When would 
China be able to send a winning team to the Olympics? And (3) when would China be ab le to 
invite the entire world to come to Beijing for an Olympiad? 27 Whilst some scholars 
questioned whether these exact expressions were fonnulated 1908, a general consensus was 
that it was at the begirrning of the 20tl' century that the European Olympics caught Chinese 
attention .28 Chinese eli tes would obsess over variations of these questions for the remainder 
of the 20tl' century. No one associated with these questions in the early 20th century could 
have dreamed that China wou ld ha ve to wait a whole century before it cou ld host an 
Olympiad. "One World, One Dream," the motto fo r the 2008 Beiji ng Olympics, exactly 
expressed the Chinese desperate yearning for an Olympiad held in their own country. 
The modem Olympic movement introduced to Chi na in the early 20th century was significant 
for the Chinese people and nation. It represented a provocative chall enge meant to stimulate 
the modem and nationa li st sentiments of the Chinese people and the internationa l role of 
China. The Chinese yearning for the Olympics di rectly reflected their anxiety about their 
decl ining national fortune and international image since the mid -1 9th century, a time when 
China was weak, invaded by maj or world powers and forced to make " unequal treaties" with 
them. However, it was after the Sino-Japanese War in 1894- 1895 , in which China was 
defeated by its smaller neighbour Japan , once a tributary state of the Chinese empire, that the 
situation became particularly alanning. In previous wars, the Chinese eli tes had attributed 
their fail ure to the Europeans ' advanced technology and weapons, whereas the Sino-Japanese 
War evoked a deep fee ling that there must be something fun damenta ll y "wrong" in the 
Chinese people 's phys ique and psyche. Yan Fu, a well -known scholar and an Engli sh-Ch inese 
translator, co ined the ph rase ·'sick man" (b ingfu ) in 1895 to ex press hi s anxiety about China's 
of so ft powe r,'· Journal of Sport and Social Issues 34:1 (20 10), 32. 
' ' For example, "~:if_:c l•f' (The three questions of the Olympics), the eighth ep isode in the Ch inese 
documentary $':}tEf.'f'· -l!lfl/iij (JO(!' A1111iversa1y of the Xinhai Revolwion - A Flash), 20 I I ; "El"ff' 
!l',liE:!:l' 1*Hiii'd-k1Jill'· ( JOO-year-old Ol ympic dream, the road to being a great sporting power) (July 
3 1. 2008), Rewnin Ribao Online: http: //theory.people.corn.cn/GB/40557/123400/ 123579/7593154.htrnl 
" Cui Lequan, '·~UIITfttE '11 Rs!A!J.t:i:~'· (Development of the Olympic Movement in Ch ina), ffti!< 
f*"lff!!f!f!fiI:lf:!fj (Journal of Wuhan Institute of Physical Education) , no.4 (2007), 2; Zhang Bo, i!iff'f' 
l/c//J!J!J!iE-icfZ (The Olympic Me1110,y in Modern China} (Tianjin : Tianjin Guji. 2008), ch.2 "~]E_: 
iaJ , $'.'!l;iEJ,Hhlii!C (The three questions of Olympics: fact or fabricated). 
152 
weakness. To make China strong again, Yan argued, the Chinese had to improve their 
physical strength, intelligence, and morality. The improvement of Chinese people 's phys ical 
strength was of the first necessity.29 One year later, the Shanghai journal Shiwu Bao , under 
the editorship of a leading refonni st scholar Liang Qichao, publi shed a translation of an 
English journal article which called China "the sick man of the East" (dongfang bingfu). This 
English article regarded that "China has long been insensitive and deeply sick. However, only 
after the Sino-Japanese War did other countries recognize the real situation of China [its 
deep-rooted sickness]." 30 Perhaps this was the first time that such a name-calling had 
occurred. What is more, Shiwu Bao soon published another translated article "The World 's 
Four Sick Men" (Tianxia Si Bingren), which ranked China with Turkey, Persia and Morocco. 
The artic le characterised the symptoms of China 's sickness as "the government has no 
strategy and the people lack prowess," despite China 's large territory and population and its 
rich endowment of resources. It conc luded that "had there not been intervention by other 
powers, China could have been conquered by Japan in the Sino-Japanese War."31 Later, the 
label "sick man of East Asia" became associated with the Chinese, and it continued to haunt 
and humiliate the Chinese for the following half-century. While the Chinese elites wanted to 
use this phrase to prompt the Chinese people to fight for their nation, the foreign press picked 
it up to show their changing attitude toward China - from respect for a country once seen as 
civilised, prosperous and admirable, to contempt for a China that seemed ever more barbaric 
and backward. 
To purge the shame and rebuild the image of China and its people, leading scholars and 
politicians since then have repeatedly picked up the phrase "sick man of East Asia" to urge 
the populace to strengthen their physical training and make great efforts to save their nation. 
Firstly, Olympic-style physical culture was imported and promoted in China as the kind of 
endeavour required of a modem and healthy populace. China as a nation had valued letters 
and belittled anns for too long and it was high time that the Chinese liberated and 
strengihened their bodies by importing modem physical culture from the West. 32 Wang 
Zhengting, a Republican diplomat wrote in 1930: " If people want to pursue freedom and 
equality in today's world where the weak serve as meat on the chopping block, they first must 
29 Yan Fu, "/~J!i," (The origins of national strength), in Wang Shied., ?i!JI! (Collections of Yan Fu) 
(Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1986), 5, 13, 14, 18, 26. 
30 
"'P l;fil'.!k"ti'i" (The real situation of China), flf;Jf!/i (Shiwu Bao), no.JO (November 1, 1896), 15-16, 
accessed from database "National Index to Chinese Newspapers and Periodicals": 
http ://www. en b ksy.co m/S hanghai Li brary/pages/j sp/fm/i ndex/i ndex. j sp 
31 
":rs:Tli.Y /~A " (The world's four sick men), Shiwu Bao, no.14 (December 15, 1896), 12-13. 
32 For instance, Liang Qichao, !Ji ff! iJt (71,eories of New Citizenship) (Shenyang: Liaoning 
Publishing House, 1994), 150-56; Zhang Zhidong, Jl;c'f:Jil (Exhonation to Leaming) (Beij ing: 
Zhonghua Shuju, 1991). 
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train strong and fit bod ies."33 The most effective way of training the body, according to many 
Chinese elite in tell ectuals in the Republi can era, was through militari zed sports.34 Secondly, 
the purpose of the populace 's physical traini ng was tied to the ultimate goa l of the Chinese: to 
save their nation and strengthen the race Uiu guo qiang zhong).35 For instance, Chiang Kai-
shek made an inscription for Shishi Yuebao's special issue on Republican China's Fifth 
National Games held in October 1933 : "National power relies on a warli ke spirit .. [we] 
should use sports to save the nation. We Chinese can thereby achieve our heroic national 
ambi ti on."36 The underpinning logic for this kind of argument was that if the citizens were 
sick, the nation naturally became vulnerable; conversely a strong people could lead to a great 
nation.37 The improvement of Chinese physical quality and China 's national survival and 
revival were closely cormected. The Chinese elite thus embraced Olympic-style sports 
competition as an instrument to prompt the populace to exercise and boost morale for the 
fight for their nation . The embrace of modem international sports in China represented a 
systematic effort to li nk " individual strength, di scip line, and health" with the military, 
industrial and "diplomatic 'strength ' of the national body."38 What is more, man y Chinese 
believed that tlu·ough the vehicle of international sports competitions, the Chinese people 
could convey what they stood for and could achieve, and consequent ly overcome hi storical 
humiliation and regain international recognition. 
Chinese historical perceptions of modem phys ical culture greatly affected China 's poli cy and 
practice of international sports. International sports games and the Olympics in particular 
were frequently and purposefully used by Chinese politicians as a tool of politics and 
diplomacy. For instance, China's first anendance at the Olympic Games, in the 1932 Los 
Angeles Games, was actuall y more dri ven by political ca lculations than by enthusiasm about 
the Games per se . At first, China 's Nationalist government did not intend to participate due to 
the severe domestic situation caused by the Japanese invasion in 193 1. However, when the 
Nationali st authorities recei ved infonnation that Manchukuo, the puppet state created in 1932 
33 Quoted in Song Ruhai , f;/!;fiti'f:@, tf!.·J'i!)EiJ;f}!.,j;!ft (I Can Compete: Records of the Olympic 
Games) (Shanghai: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1930), preface I. 
34 Xu Guoqi, Olympic Dreams, 20-24. 
35 For example, Sun Yat-sen o nce argued "today we advocate phys ical exercise because it is crucial for 
us to strengthen our race and protect our nation ... lf we wa nt to make our country strong, we must first 
make sure our peop le have strong bodies.'· Quoted in Gu Shiquan, ,P/Jflf;jfff.!f:: (Histo1y of Sport in 
China) (Beijing: Beijing Tiyu Daxue, 2003), 204. 
36 11/]i /j f/i (Current Events Momhly) 9:4 ( 1933), accessed from "Nati onal Index to Chinese 
Newspapers and Periodicals ." 
r Liang Qichao, Th eories of New Citizenship, 160; also see Mao Zedong, '·f,j( t'l" L liJ!-ft: (On physical 
culture)."' Jli,tffp (New Youth), 1 April 1917. 
38 Andrew D. Morri s, Marrow of the Nation: A Histo,y of Sport and Physical Culture in Republican 
Chino (Berkeley: Uni versity of California Press, 2004), 3. 
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by Japan in Chi na's Northeast, might take part in the Games, they were full of indignation at 
this Japanese attempt to gain legitimacy for their invasion of China's territory. As a resu lt, 
they decided to attend the Games to represent the only legitimate body of China - even with a 
delegation of on ly one single athlete. 39 
After the Communist takeover, the CCP were fu lly aware that national sports policy could 
influence the PRC's national image building and international prestige. Sport has been 
implicitly or explicitly defined as a supplementary vehicle of the PRC's diplomatic struggle 
for its international legitimacy and prestige. International sports competition has to some 
extent been deliberately employed by Chinese Communist leaders to fulfil subtle diplomatic 
tasks.4° For instance, Beijing withdrew from the Olympic movement from 1958 until "the 
two Chinas" issue was resolved in 1979.4 1 The PRC's withdrawal was a symbolic act to 
protest against Western support for the ROC as the only legitimate body of China in the IOC. 
To strengthen its protest, China played a leading role along with Indonesia in rallying the 
other underdeveloped countries to create a Games of the New Emerging Forces to oppose the 
IOC, though it was held only once in Jakarta in November 1963. Another classic example 
was the famous "ping-pong diplomacy." On April 6, 1971 , the Chinese leaders deliberately 
sent out an invitation to an American ping-pong team to visit China, when the latter was 
taking part in the 31th World Table Tennis Championships in Japan. By this invi tation, the 
CCP gave an important message that they would like to resume their contact with the US 
government. This episode helped break the ice and gave rise to the comment that "the small 
ball" (ping pong) eventually moved the "big ball" (the globe). 42 Additional ly, China's 
boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics was utilized to protest "Soviet chauvinism" in the 
Communist bloc and its invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. In contrast, its participation in the 
1984 Los Angeles Olympics was a demonstration of its aligmnent with the US. 
A review of China's historical views of and relationship with modem sports helps us 
understand the role of sports in Chinese international relations and moreover why China 
should see it as a historical responsib ility to host an Olympiad. The sign ificance of modem 
sports, and the Olympic Games particularly, was recognized and embraced by the Chinese 
elite at a critical juncture in the expansion of Western civilisation and the saving and re-
39 
"1932 ¥, :,(IJ-bc!\'f7,11"JJ'fl.7JiEJ:~? " (The year 1932, why Liu Changchun attended Olympics 
alone?), February 20, 2006, Jing Bao, accessed at: http://www.thefirst.cn/900tian/90006 2 27 8.htm 
40 Xin Xu , "Modernizing China in the Olympic spotli ght," 93. 
41 Xu Guoqi , Olympic Dreams, 2008, 75-116; Hill , Olympic Politics , 40-53 ; Zhang Qing, $~~i3~-
- ffs /n't' ~11!:~~ill;filjl/JI)( $ ~ (Witness of the Olympic Bids: Personal Experience of China 's 
Return to the Olympics and Two Olympic Bids) (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2008), 1-2, 13-
30. 
42 Xie Yixian ed., Diplomatic Histo1J' a/Contemporary China , 222. 
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building of the Chinese nation. Sport has been endowed with a nationalist sentiment to 
become a vehicle to transform the '·sick man of East Asia" into a legitimate, equal , and strong 
modem nation that is worthy of respect by the entire world . Modern international sports thus 
have been infused with nationalism in the Chinese context - as another means of fighting for 
the nation, and have been perceived by the Chinese political elite as a continuation of politics 
and an effective tool of diplomacy. Overall , the whole process of China's entry, withdrawal 
and re-entry into the Olympic system represents Chinese aspiration for the international 
recognition of its status and legitimacy in the international community. 
5.1.3 Two bids for the Olympic Games 
Even though the Chinese had long noticed the significance between politics and sports, it was 
not unti l after the PRC had acquired its recognition from international society and its 
membership of the IOC in 1979 that the Chinese authorities started to work on the possibility 
of hosting an Olympiad .43 This was also the time that the PRC re-designed its path of 
national development by implementing the policies of "reform and opening-up" and started 
its "new long march" toward the goa l of being a modern, ri ch and strong nation within the 
existing international system. Reformist Chinese leaders decided to socialize with the rest of 
the world by various channels, such as trade, cultural exchange, sports, touri sm, and 
pragmatic diplomacy. Participating and successfully hosting international sports events 
greatl y suited the state's interest to engage with the international community. Projecting 
China's "greatness" through hosting an Olympiad was regarded as an effective mechani sm 
for fulfill ing the "great power dream (qiangguo meng)" and an essentia l component of 
China's re-emergence on the world stage.44 Nevertheless, an aspirant Olympics host city has 
to overcome many hurdles. For Beijing, it took two bid attempts to obtain the ri ght to host: 
the first attempt in 1993 failed ; and the second bid in 200 I succeeded. 
5. I .3. I The 1993 bid for the 2000 Summer Games 
The success of the 1990 Beijing Asian Games, its first experience of hosting an international 
Games, made the dream of hosting the 2000 Summer Olympic Games seem within reach.45 
On March I, 199 1, the State Council of the PRC approved the joint application from the 
Chinese Olympic Committee (COC) and the Beijing muni cipal government for Beijing's bid 
for the 2000 Olympiad. On December 4, 1992, Beijing delivered its application package to 
IOC headquarters in Lausanne, Switzerl and . 46 Beij ing thus started it s Olympi c Games 
43 Zhang Qing, f¥i 111ess of the O~ymp ic Bids, 3 I . 
.,_. Inte rviews with two Chinese official s at M ini stry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, April 16, 20 10. 
45 Zhang Qing, Witn ess ofrhe Olympic Bid, 52-53. 
46 Ibid. , 53. 
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bidding journey. 
In the proposal , the Beijing 2000 Olympic Games Bid Committee highlighted the Chinese 
Olympic dream, China's determination to further socialize itself to be in tune with the rest of 
the world through the Olympics, and Beijing's cultural assets as a candidate host city.47 The 
slogans of the Beijing 2000 bid - "a more open China awaits the 2000 Olympic Games" and 
"a chance for Beijing, a miracle returns to the world" 48 - demonstrated China's re-
imagination of itself and its detennination to engage with the rest of the world. 
However, Beijing did not get the chance. In 1993 Beijing was defeated by Sydney, which 
received 45 votes, 2 more votes than Beijing.49 There were two leading explanations for this 
outcome. For one thing, concerns over China's human rights issues remained strong during 
the deliberation, because of the fresh memory of Beijing's crackdown on the 1989 Tiananmen 
protest. Beijing's bid consequently was strongly attacked and opposed, particularly by the 
US.50 Another common explanation in China attributed this loss to the biased view of China 
from the West. The Chinese were aware of the decisive Anglo-European force in the IOC. It 
was said that almost half of the IOC seats were held by the European countries, and two-
thirds of the committee's executive board were European.51 Many Chinese believed that thi s 
factor led to Beijing's loss to Sydney.52 Beijing's Joss led the Chin-~se to link their loss with 
the notion of"clash of civilisations." Some Chinese analysts argued that it had been a cultural 
or ideological bias that resulted in the failure of Beijing's 1993 bid. 53 However, both 
arguments have their limitations. From the first time Beijing made it s bid in 1993 to its 
second attempt in 2001, there was neither substan tial development of China 's human rights 
held by the international public opinions 54 nor significant changes in Anglo-European 
47 Beijing 2000, the Year of the Games - a S11m111a1y, Beijing: Beijing 2000 Olympic Games Bid 
Conunittee, 1993. 
48 Zhang Qing, fflitness of the Oly111pic Bid, 56. 
49 For details of all rounds of voting in 1993, see Xu Guoqi, Olympic Dreams, 237. 
50 Brownell, Training the Body for China, 323; Xu Guoqi , Olympic Dreams, 235-237. 
51 Robert Knight Barney et al, Selling the Five Rings: the International Oly111pic Committee and the 
Rise of Olympic Commercialis111 (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2002), 286, quoted 
from Xu Guoqi , Olympic Dreams, 238. 
52 Interview with Dr Li Ning, Deputy Director of Department of Physical Education of Beijing 
University, Apri l 12, 2010. 
53 For the linking of Beijing 's loss with the idea of "clash o f civi lisations", see for example, Li Xiguan 
et al , if!fi!f-tc/0 /JflffJ'f'f!ff (Behind Demonizing China) (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1996); 
Wang Bo et al, "~'f , '!ldfJif:fiJ T !J:li£" (At last, we have arrived at the Olympics), -J/J:J'j!j,77if! 
(World Affairs) , no.IS (2008), 20-37. For the concept of "clash of civi li sations" see Samuel P. 
Huntington, "The clash of civilisations?" Foreign Affairs 72:3 (Summer 1993), 22-49. 
54 See the Reports of China from Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/home For example, 
Dangerous Minds: Political Psychiat,y in China Today and its Origins in the Mao Era, 13 August 
2002, 2785 , avai lable at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/doci d/3 deb868a1 .html ; also see, Minky 
Worden ed., China 's Great Leap. the Beijing Games and Olympian Human Rights Challenges (New 
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influence at the IOC. 55 Foll owing the above arguments, Beijing should have lost it s second 
attempt as well. But Beijing did succeed in 200 1. A much simpler explanation fo r China 's 
loss was later revea led by Australia 's O lympic Committee, that it had bribed two IOC 
officials to secure the crucial two vote margin over Beijing. 56 
A lthough the Chinese authoriti es were di sappointed at the IOC's decision, some offic ials 
admitted that the international political environment was not good for China in the early 
1990s and China 's comprehensive power was not strong. Accordingly, they stressed that 
China had to work hard to develop its economy and improve its global image. In thi s regard , 
China needed to be more open and to continuous ly sociali ze with the rest of the world .57 
Although China's first bid fai led , it represented an important attempt in this broad process in 
wh ich China sought to reposition itself as an engaged and hannonious power. This moti ve 
gu ided the Chinese authorities for their second bid. 
5.1.3.2 The 200 1 bid for the 2008 Summer Games 
Fully aware of the s ignificance of the Olympics for national development and branding as 
well as for international recogn ition and prestige, the Chinese leaders determined to win the 
right to host an Olympiad . At the end of the 1990s, Beijing decided to make another bid for 
the hosting ri ghts. On April 7, 1999, Beijing once agai n submitted its app li cation to IOC 
headquarters.58 Thi s official decis ion was backed by overwhelming popular support and the 
Chinese peopl e's great enthusiasm for hosting the first ever Olympi c Games in China. In 
2001 , the IOC undertook a Gallup poll , which showed a 95% approval rating for a bid to host 
the 29'" Olympiad among Beijing residents .59 Beijing appeared more confident and ready this 
time. 
First, Chinese leaders made a strong argu ment that a truly international Olympic Movement 
York: Seven Stories Press, 2008). 
55 The member list of the JOC is availab le at: http://www.olympic.org/content/the-ioc/the-ioc-
institutionl /ioc-members-li st/. However, thi s list only shows the current IOC members. As such, we 
cannot see the earlier members as well as those who might have left the organization during the time. 
Neve11heless, it allows an approximate calculation. There are 14 Europeans (including those from the 
USA, Canada, and Australia, and I from Russia) vis-a-vis 6 from other countries by the year of 1992, 
before the 1993 bid. Although there is a big increase in non-European members since 1994, from 6 to 
22 by 2001, European members still take up more than half of this li st, which is 33 Europeans 
(includ ing 2 Russians) versus 28 non-Europeans by 2001. 
56 See Kevan Gosper and Glenda Korporaal , O(ympic Life: Melbourne 1956 to Sydney 2000 (St. 
Leonards, New South Wales: Allen & Unwin, 2000), 328-348; Xu Guoqi , Olympic Dreams, 239-240. 
57 Interview with an official of General Administration of Sport of China, Beijing, December 9, 201 1. 
58 
'"1¥ !r<c;/;: 'f\:ic'" (Memorabilia for the Olympics bid), RMRB (July 13, 2001 ), 9. 
59 
· ' ~~ );'( ~ rJ1 :I' ffi till ,It ,/fj ~ :lit p M {.I\;\'!!" (Vehement applause in the the Beij ing Organising 
Committee for the Olympic Games (BOCOG) press), RMRB (July 13 , 2001 ), 8. 
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would have to encompass the non-Western world. In his letter to the JOC in 2000, China 's 
President Ji ang Zemin wrote: 
It will be of extremely great significance to promoting and carrying out 
the Olympic spirit in China and across the world and to faci litating the 
cultural exchanges and convergence between East and West if the 
Games of the XXIX Olympiad are held in China, a rapidly developing 
country with a long-standing civilization and 22 per cent of the world's 
population .@ 
Second, Beijing's 200 I bid promoted what China could do for the world through the Games, 
unlike the more passive "wait ing for a chance" sentiment in its first bid slogan. It 
demonstrated China's confidence and its strong sense of the internationalism of the Olympic 
Movement. Beijing highlighted that, "history has presented a unique opportunity for the IOC 
to create an unparalleled legacy for Olympianism through its 2008 deci sion. China is ready to 
welcome the world." What is more, "the Olympic Games in Beijing will be a bridge of 
harmony between cultures and embody the Olympic movement's unique integration of sport 
and culture."61 Accordingly, the emblem Beijing chose for its _2008 bid was a styli zed 
traditional Chinese handicraft pattern known as "China knot," incorporating the typ ical 
colours of the five Olympic rings. The design looks like a dynamic human figure in a stance 
that portrays someone doing " Taiji" , a traditional Chinese exercise. The choice not only 
highlighted China's traditional sporting culture but symbolized the unity and cooperation 
among peoples from all over the world.62 
BEIJING 2008 
candidate City 
QSe9 
Figure 4.1: The emblem for the bid for the 2008 Summer Olympic Games: China knot 
60 Jiang Zemin, "Letter of support by Jiang Zemin," Candidature Files, vol.I, available at: 
http ://images. bei j in g2008 .cn/u p I oad/1 i b/bi dreport/j i ang. pd f 
61 Quoted from Xu Guoqi, O(ympic Dreams, 2008, 244. 
62 The illustration is based on the explanation from the designer, Chen Shaohua, " ~t);c( $ ~f;j;0~JIQ 
f,i[ l±l:tf•fli " (how did the emblem for Beijing Olympics bid emerge), :!pil'!f:fft(Huashang Bao), 
November 8, 2000, available at: http ://sports.sina.corn.cn/o/0893092.shtml 
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In addi ti on, Beijing promised to provide the world with a "Xin Beijing, Xin Aoyun (New 
Beijing, Great Olympics) ," which was its bidding slogan. It is worth pointing out the 
difference between the Chinese version and English one. The Chinese slogan literally means 
"New Beijing, New Olympics." So why the difference when put into English? One Chinese 
official explained to a foreign journalist that if China proclaimed a "new Olympics" in 
English, " it would seem as if China wanted to change the Games," and "the IOC wouldn ' t 
like that. They ' d think here's this Communist country that's trying to take over the 
Olympics."63 The subtlety of the language indicated one lesson China had learned on how to 
communicate with the internat ional audience, "the importance of considering what others 
might think of China and making adjustments to be sure that nothing is offensive."64 
On all accounts , in its second bid, the Chinese authority was trying very hard to send a 
message to IOC members and the international public that China was a normal nation, a 
peaceful force , willing to socia lize with the rest, not an iso lated and ideologically detennined 
country any more. The Chinese efforts eventually paid off. The IOC members chose Beijing 
in 200 I . In the conclusion of the IOC's report on Beijing's bid, it writes: 
This is a Government-driven bid with considerable assistance of the 
NOC (National Olympic Committee) . The combination of a good sports 
concept with complete Government support results in a high quality bid. 
The Commission noted the process and pace of change taking place in 
China and Beijing, and the possible challenges caused by population 
and economic growth in the period leading up to 2008, but was 
confident that these challenges cou ld be met. There is an environmental 
challenge, but the strong Government actions and investment in thi s 
area should resolve this and improve the city. It is the Commission's 
belief that a Beijing Games would leave a unique legacy to China and to 
sport, and the Commission is confident that Beijing could organise 
excel lent Games.65 (emphasis added) 
From the IOC report, it is ex plicit that there were two factors that contributed to Beijing's 
success. On the one hand, due to the wholehearted support from the central government of the 
PRC, man y IOC members believed that Beijing had the financial , mobili za tion and 
operational capacity to host the Games. On the other hand , there were political considerations 
63 Peter Hessler, Oracle Bones: A Journ ey between Chinas Past a11d Present (New York: 
HarperCol\ins, 2006), 26 1. 
64 Xu Guoqi , Olympic Dreams, 243. 
65 IOC Archives, Minutes of the 112'" IOC Session, Moscow, Jul y 13-16, 2001, 240, quoted in Xu 
Guoqi , Olympic Dreams, 246. 
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- a Beijing Games would have an unprecedented influence on China and the Olympic 
movement. As di scussed earlier, China 's human rights record in the li ght of the Tiananmen 
crisi s was one factor that led to China's loss of its 1993 bid. This mindset was balanced by the 
desire of many others in the IOC and international community to fully socialize China 
through the Olympics. They an ticipated that if the 2008 Olympiad cou ld be held in Beijing, it 
would help to accelerate openness in China and enhance China's integrati on into the global 
community. 66 It is generally argued that the 1964 Tokyo Summer Olympics and the 1988 
Seoul Summer Olympics represented the " turning points" for the integration of Japan and 
South Korea into the international community. An analogy perhaps had been made between 
China and its two close East Asian neighbours. It thus had generated the expectation that the 
2008 Beijing Games would be a " turning point" for China, especially for China's politi cal 
regime and it s international behaviour.67 
As for China, the success of thi s bid was backed by considerable Chinese effort made in the 
previous eight years. Firstly, in spite of the isolation after the Tiananmen tragedy, the CCP 
leaders emphasized that China would stick to the trajectory of economic refonn and opermess 
to the world. They also highlight ed the importance of global capitali st institutions to China 's 
development, such as the nonns of the market economy, free trade -and open capital fl ows.68 
China's economy grew rapidly in the 1990s with the average annua l growth rate reaching 
10.6%. 69 Undoubtedly, China 's economic power enabled Beijing to provide suffi cient 
financial support for the Games. Secondly, its stance of openness to the world and 
engagement of the international community since the late 1970s demonstrated its sense of 
membership of the international community. China 's openness and integration into the 
existing international system was generally welcomed by the external world. Its sophisticated 
diplomacy in the 1990s was recognized by other world powers and regional actors. The Sino-
US relationship was mainta ined under the framework of engagement in the 1990s. China 's 
"good neighbourl y foreign poli cy" was well received in the region. 70 In the late 1990s, China 
66 See Jere Longman, "Beijing wins bid for 2008 Olympic Games," New York 71mes, July 14, 2001. 
67 Susan Brownell, "The Beijing Olymp ics as a turning point? China 's first Olympics in East As ian 
perspective," Asia-Pacific Journal (Japan Focus Online), vol.23-4-09 (June 8, 2009), accessed from: 
http://www.japanfocus.org/-susan-brownell/3 166; Victor D. Cha, "Beijing 's Olympic-sized catch-22," 
Th e Washington Quarterly 31 :3 (Summer 2008), 105-123; Victor D. Cha, "Politics and the Olympic 
transaction: measuring China 's accompli shments," The International Journal of the Hist01y and Sport 
27: 14-1 5 (Sep.-Oct.2010), 2359-2379. 
68 On October 18, 1992, in the 14th CCP National Congress, the CCP 's constitution was forma lly 
modified to adopt an amendment on adopting a market economy and building up the socialist market 
economy system. See http ://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64 162/64168/64567/65446/6415682.htm1 
69 Worl d Bank, China at a Glance, March 29, 2012, accessed from 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/chn aag.pdf · 
70 Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, "China's new diplomacy," Foreign Affairs 82:6 
(November/December 2003), 25-26; Xie Yixian ed. , Diplomatic Histo,y of Contemporary China, 383-
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also settled its territoria l di sputes with Vietnam, Laos, Russia , Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan in order to build a fa vourable regional environment for its economic 
development. 71 All in all , Chinese leaders tried very hard to break out of their post-
Tiananmen iso lation and rebuild China 's image as an integral member of the globa l 
community. At the beginning of the new millennium, China made itself more accommodated 
by the world than it was in the early 1990s. 
Beijing's successful bid for the 2008 Olympics brought an outpouring of nationali sm. An 
estimated 400,000 people converged on Tiananmen Square. Their boasts, "Beijing won! " 
"China succeeded '" and "Long live the motherland! " were echoed not only in the Square, but 
all over the country72 and among overseas Chinese communities. 73 China 's leading officia l 
newspaper exclaimed that thi s was "a victory for Beijing, a victory fo r China, and al so a 
victory of the Olympic spirit," and it was "a s leepless night for the 1.3 billion Chinese 
people."74 This victory was not just about the success of the bid per se; it meant that Chinese 
people had eventually realized their century-long "Olympic dream" and frnall y erased their 
hi storical label as the "sick man of East Asia." It represented a great step in the grand 
revitalization of the Chinese nation. 75 Equally important, this success also meant a lot for 
the ruling party of China, the CCP. The official Chinese media were quick to talk up the 
larger symboli sm of the decision made by the IOC. For example, one party publication stated : 
"The 2008 Beijing Olympics will be the world' s affim1ation of contemporary China 's 
economic and social progress."76 Similar comments in the Chinese media hinted that this 
great feat was only accompl ished under the rule of the CCP and thus this very achievement 
constituted a ringing endorsement of the CCP regime. 
5.2 Constitution and mobilization of China's soft power in the 2008 
Beijing Games 
Hosting an Olympiad had been the Chinese people's dream for a hundred years, and China 
had been longing for the moment to demonstrate its arrival on the world stage as a modem, 
395 , 419-448. 
71 For detail s, look at Xie Yi xian ed. , Dip/0111atic Histo,y o/Contempora,y China, 445-448. 
'' "~1"1l~Wi);:'*Jtt,"UJ1)} 2008 $!J:! iE4;,,J,)/;J)J'' (All fields in Beijing celebrated Beijing's victory 
in bidding for the 2008 Olympic Games), RMRB (July 14, 2001), I. 
73 See the section of "internationa l responses" under the titl e of"2008 Beiji ng wo n!" from the websi te 
of Ren111in: http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5934/5937/index.ht ml 
" "~i£'tJ: fffrA!J lJ:l :f!i1/i'" (New milestone in Olympic hi story), Xinhua News Agency, Jul y I 3, 200 1. 
-, Interviews of Chinese undergraduate/postgraduate students of history and international relati ons, 
carried out in Nanjing University, Shanghai Fudan Uni versity, Beijing Uni versity, Apr. 2009, Mar.-Apr. 
2010, Dec.201 l , China. 
76 Editorial. ".lf.!iE.J':'.!<., i/J,~ f JK T !" (The sacred Olympic torch has come at las t1) , JZJ!JZ.!x." 
(Friends of Party Me111bers}, no.15 (200 I), 1. 
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civilised and respected member of the world community. Immediately after obtaining the 
right to hold the 29th Olympiad, Chinese authorities faced the question of how China wou ld 
achieve this goa l of staging a successful and magnificent Olympic Games. As discussed 
earlier, the Olympic Games are not only about sports, but are also a significant international 
cultural and diplomatic event. The hosting of the Garnes naturally became an important site to 
study the constitution and mobili sation of China 's key sources of soft power located at the 
peak of the debate on China 's soft power. 
This section therefore explores the key elements of soft power utilized and promoted 
throughout the Games. It finds that China's soft power was tied to the following aspects: (I) 
the rehabilitation of traditional Chinese culture but in a way that blended it with modem 
aspects of Chinese culture ; (2) China's economic vitality and how it had achieved 
moderni zation; and (3) the employment of various diplomatic means to demonstrate its "good 
global citizenship. " 
5.2.1 Cultural China 
Chinese scholars have long argued that culture should play a vital role in lifting China's 
international image and neutralizing perceptions of China as a th:_eat when Chinese global 
influence grows.77 ln the context of the coming of the Olympic Garnes to China, "the world 's 
largest single event for the production of national culture for international consumption ," 78 
cultural strategy became more prominent. Accordingly, Chinese authorities placed the idea of 
"cultural China" into "the centre of the dialogue with the international audience in Olympic 
discourse. " 79 Posters, emblem, slogans, mascots, and opening and closing ceremonies, 
blended with Chinese traditional culture and modem culture, were designed to present a 
benevo lent China full of good spirits, such as hannony, diversity, pacifism, good governance , 
inclusiveness and openness. The promotion of a "cultural China" is examined through the 
theme of "Humanistic Olympics" (Renwen Aoyun)80 major symbols of the Beijing Games 
and the "Brilli ant Civilization (can/an wenming)" presented in the opening ceremony. A 
"cultural China" was used not only to amaze the international audience, but also to rai se 
Chinese cultural nationalism - Chinese people's pride in their nation. 
77 Interview with Yu Xintian of Shanghai institute for !J1temational Studies, March 10, 2010, Shanghai, 
China. 
78 Brownell , Training the Body for China , 314. 
79 Jv1anzenreiter, "The Beijing Games in the Western imagination of China," 33. 
80 There are two other translations of .AX~iE (Re11wen Aoy1111): ·'People's and Cultural Olympics" 
and "People 's Olympics." 
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5.2. 1. J " Humani stic Olympics" (Renwen Aoyun) 
" Humanistic Olympics," the first theme of the Beijing Garn es, demonstrated Chi na's 
intention to leave its great human and cu ltural legacy to the world . Litera ll y, Ren means 
people, and Wen means cu lture. Therefore, there were two aspects of this concept: one stood 
for the " peop le 's" O lympics and the other highlighted the "mul ticultural " Olympics. Together 
with "Green O lympics" (Li.ise Aoyun) and "High-tech Olympics" (Keji Aoyun), they were the 
three themes of the Beijing Games. According to Jin Yuanpu, executive director of the 
Humanistic Olympics Studies Centre al People 's Uni versity of China, the "Humani stic 
Olympics" concept represented a creative idea of un ique value, which was at the heart of the 
spirit of the Beijing Olympics. The theme referred to the Games as an opportunity to ( ! ) 
promote a "cu ltural China," and advocate cu ltura l exchange and understand ing among 
nations; (2) advance the CCP party-state 's idea of governance; and (3) gamer public support 
and sociali ze the Chinese people to be a "c ivi li sed nation" in a globali zed world .81 
Firstly, Chinese Olympic organisers argued that th e theme "Humani stic Olympics" had 
caught the essence of the principle of the Olympic Movement, namely, the promotion of 
internationalism through sports and cultura l exchange.82 The Beijing Games organizers noted 
that "the O lympic Games in Beijing will be a bridge of harmony between cultures and 
embody Olympiani sm 's uniq ue integrat ion of sport and culture." 83 A sports ana lyst 
com mented that the 2008 Games' "meeting of East and West - China and the world - wi ll 
li kely be the defining encounter of the 2 1" Century."84 The meeting of China and the world 
a lso echoed in the offic ial Olympic s logan "One World , One Dream." Li u Qi , Chairman of 
the Beijing Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (BOCOG) and the CCP Secretary 
of Beijing, on June 26 , 2005, the day Beij ing announced its slogan for the 2008 Games, 
claimed that it "voices 1.3 bi llion Chi nese people 's aspiration to cont ribute to the 
establi shment of a peaceful and bright world. It conveys the nob le ideals of people in 
Beijing as well as in China to share their civilization and create a bright future hand in hand 
with people from the rest of the world .' '85 The Chinese sei zed the opportun ity not on ly to 
secure international recognition , but also to reinterpret the fundamenta l Olympic principles 
81 Jin Yuanpu , ",l'Oiis\':,iLA.JtJl:iE(J(JtR,;%'' (Harmony as the sou l o f Renwen Aoyun) , tTJJDtl,f,f (Red 
Flag Manuscript), no.15 (2008), 12-14. 
" Peng Yongjie el al , .A.Xft!iil (Peoples and Cultural Oly mpics) (Beiji ng: Dongfang, 2003), 7. 
83 BOCOG, New Beijing, Great Olympics: Hi ghlights of Beijing 's Ol ympic Candidacy, offi c ial 
publication of the bi d committee, 2000. 
84 Brook Larmer, "The Center of the World ," Foreign Policy, no.150 (Sep/Oct 2005), 68. 
85 
"[;,J-1-Jll:W, [PJ - 1-~'W--~t,"t:!J:!iE:l::llfilD l"}:!,t;(p'· (The release of the slogan o f the Beijing 
Olympic Games: One World, One Dream), Xinhua News Agency. June 27, 2005; also see "'One World. 
One Drea m· slogan fo r Olympics," China Dai(y, June 26, 2005. 
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and to promote the hannonization of world civilizations. 86 In this sense, it obviously echoed 
the Chinese political notion of "harmonious world. " This term form ed the setting for Hu 
Jintao 's hi gh-profile speech, "Building a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common 
Prosperity," deli vered at the conventi on of the 60111 anniversary of the United Nations on 
September 15, 2005 . He declared that China 's development was to "jointly construct a 
harmonious wo rld ," and emphasized that China was a force contributing to internati ona l 
peace and development. 87 Overall , the Chinese authorities promoted the concept of 
"Humani stic Olympics" to tell the world that China had not only rapid economic 
development, but also a rich cultural heritage that could contribute to enduring hannony in 
the world. It thus projected an image of a "cultural China" and demonstrated its full grasp of 
the spirit of internationalism embedded in the Olympic Movement. 
Secondly, advancing the cause of the people and their culture refl ected the Party 's concern 
and understanding of its legitimacy, closely tied to the people. Th.is had historical roots, 
resonating with an age-old Confucian dictum of good governance, "he who wins the throng 
wins the throne. "88 After the gradual decline of Marxism and Maoism as the dominan t 
ideologies in society since the late 1970s, the CCP had to explore other ideologies to 
consolidate its rule. In recent years, the party burrowed into the Chinese cultural legacy to 
find statecraft. In 2003 , just after Hu Jintao came to power, he advanced his ideology for 
China 's modernization project - "a scientific outlook on development" (kexue fazhan guan ). 
This ideology highlights that "people-oriented development" is the central tenet of the CCP,89 
taking "development as its essence; putting people first as its core; comprehensive, balanced 
and sustainable development as its basic requirement; and overall consideration as its 
fundament al ap proach."90 It aims at tackling imbalance in developmen t between different 
regions , urban and rural areas, economy and society, and domestic development and opening-
up to the outside world, thereby building "a harm onious sociali st society." Achieving a 
"harmonious society," represent s "a long-coveted dream of humankind," a belief drawn from 
the ancient Chinese concept of "great hannony under heaven" (tianxia datong) and "harmony 
86 V. Girgi nov, "Creative tensions: 'Jo in in London' meets 'Dancing Beijing' - the cultural power of 
the Oiymp ics," !11 ternatio11al Journal of the Histo,y of Sport 25:7 (2008), 893. 
87 Shi Yinhong, '"Hannonious world ' is pragmatic foreign policy," China Daily, July 5, 2007; Yu 
Keping, "We must work to create a harmonious world," China Daily, October 5, 2007. 
88 
":/1Jcf1:'.,C.•:'/l'-~7'T" (de 111i11 xi11 zhe de tian xia), can also be translated into "whoever wins the 
hearts of the people rules the world ," developed from Mencius's writing; for the ori ginal te>."t see, Zhu 
Xi , f!!J-f;,':l/fti}J/YI (A11 !11te1pretatio11 of the Four Great Books) (Beij ing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1986), 280. 
89 Central Committee 's Documents Research Office, (( +7',;;l;:I;);J/{~.JffXiMiftffO (_t) (Selected 
Important Documellls since the I 6'h Pa11y Congress) (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian, 2005), vol. I : 396. 
90 
"Hu Jintao proposes Scientific Outlook on Development for tackling China's immediate woes, 
challenges," Xinhua News Agency, October 15, 2007. 
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berween man and nature'· (Tian ren he yi).9 1 In 2007, both concepts - the "scientific outlook 
on deve lopment" and "building a harmonious soc iety" - were given an official endorsement 
at the 17'" Party Congress. A new amendment to the CCP constitution was adopted which 
commi tted the CCP to the building of "a harmonious soc iety characterized by sustained peace 
and common prosperity."92 The Chinese government has encouraged the populace to study 
the Chinese classics, or Guo Xue.93 Chinese elites found that the classics had a wide appeal 
in civil society because they help to reconstruct a moral social order based on classical 
cultural trad itions, which in turn can overcome materiali stic tendencies caused by China 's 
economy-focused modernization process. In short, advancing the interests of the people and 
traditional philosophical concepts in Chinese poli tical ideology and policies reflected the 
ruling party's concern for its legitimacy. At the same time, thi s move was used to reframe and 
red efine China 's ident ity into a modern, c ivili sed and renewed nation , which was in line with 
traditional and universa l values of greater appeal.94 
Thirdly, "Humanistic Olympics" indicated that the Beijing O lympics aimed at securing public 
support and training Chinese citi zens fit for a globalized world by wide public participation . 
On the one hand, BOCOG mobilized the public through various public relations campaigns, 
both domestically and internationally. For instance, regardin g Western accusations of the 
Ch inese government 's manipulation of the social media,95 BOCOG made a temporary rule 
that guaranteed more freedom to foreign journalists who could repott and do interviews in 
Ch ina without hind rance, and particular se rvices were set up to facilitate forei gn journalists ' 
work in China .96 Moreover, BOCOG claimed that it had recruited 1.7 million volunteers for 
the 2008 Games, the largest number of volunteers in Olympic hi story. 97 It also inspired 
public participation both at home and abroad in designing the emblem, mascots, ceremonies 
and so forth. On the other hand , the autho riti es were very aware that the nation 's image was 
closely associated with the behaviour of the populace, so they widely publicized programs 
91 Yu K eping, "We must work to create a harmonious world ." 
92 Ye Duchu, "N$:/Jt/&.:fflt±f:;fllil1f,!l!: l·{:;};:~~!i\i'?i" (Scientific development and harmoni ous 
society are the strongest voices in the 17•h National Congress), /!J{t/! (Outlook Weeki;) , no.20 (May 14, 
2007), 32. 
93 For example. "~1:~J!l!A-tllffiiJ: [lsll'l';(J(J#-Jjlj{[tjlJ~~" (Chinese class ics enter into schoo ls to 
improve the quality of the people), Guoxue Education Online, avai lable at: 
http://www.guoxuewang.org/gxzx/gxgy8295.html 
94 Xi n Xu. ·'Modernizing China in the Olympi c spotlight," 97. 
95 For the di scussion of this issue, see for instance, Cha, " Beijing's Olympic-sized catch-22," 2008. 
96 BOCOG, '·:/L,jf!f!i!ifJ!,&J{!ilJ;.J!Jj/i'ij}'ff*lielfJiU!i/JG#J/firf,j" (Service Guide/or Overseas 
Media Coverage of the Beijing Olv111pics and 1he Preparoto,y Period), January I, 2007, available at: 
http://www.beijing2008.cn/upload/Service Guide cn.pdf. 
97 
'" 170 TJ~i£,-,B/.ll;;!t~:,y,lt~{(z ;\~1llJ~ i£ ~:®'· ( 1.7 million vo lunteers are ready, the largest 
number of volunteers in Olympic history), iJj}j[J/i (Beijing News) (August 2, 2008), avai lable at: 
http ://news.2\cn.com/domestic/vaowen/2008/08/02/50 I 7197 .shtml 
166 
dealing with Chinese people 's bad habits, Beijing city beautification and learning English. 98 
5.2.1.2 Symbols of the 2008 Olympics 
As discussed earlier, the selecti on of the "China knot" emblem for the 200 1 bid had already 
reflected the Chinese authorities' intention to promote Chinese culture. After China obtained 
the right to host the Games, Beijing's careful se lection of emblem and mascots for the 
Olympics further reflected Beijing's cultural promotion strategy: a good combination of a 
traditional culture and a modern China deeply committed to internationalization. 
The Emblem: China Seal - Dancing Beiiinq 
The official emblem for the Games, unveiled in the summer of 2003, entitled "Chinese Seal -
Dancing Beijing," clearly indicates the capital of China with an anci ent culture embracing the 
modem world . lt shows graceful traditional Chinese calligraphy of the Chinese character for 
"capital" (Ji'( Jing) on the top, with the words "Beijing 2008" written wi th a Chinese brush in 
the middle and the five Olympic rings at the bottom. The heart of the emblem is obviously at 
the top, which resembles a traditional red seal enclosing a figure with arms outstretched as if 
in the act of dancing or greeting. The open arms convey a message of invitation - an 
invitation to the world to share in Beijing's rich cu ltural heritage alld dynamic present. The 
who le emblem carries the information that today's China not only has a Jong and glorious 
history, but is also full of modern dynamism, and ready for the world to come and explore. 99 
It is said that it is the first time that a Chinese character has been introduced into an Olympic 
emblem, which means a lot to the Olympic Movement and China.' 00 JOC president Jacques 
Rogge observed, "Your new emblem immediately conveys the awesome beauty and power of 
China which are embodied in yo ur heritage and your people ... In thi s emblem, I saw the 
promise of a new Beijing and a great Olympics."' 0 ' 
98 See "Il: ~:JEJ,x.;:/J j[ll/] !j')ii!!jr,!:" (Let the 2008 Olympics becomes a new starting point of 
civilization), RMRB, August 20, 2007; a website of "illi!i:!:iEi:!fj[RJIV{JlfrJx~ " (Welcome the 2008 
Olympics, Promote Civility and Create a Favourable Social Atmosphere) was especially set up for the 
Olympics, see http :i/2008.people.com.cn/GB/22192/99979/index.html. Xi n Xu, "Modernizing China 
in the Olympic spotlight," 98; Hessler, Oracle Bones, 26 I; Susan Brownell studied how the Games 
influenced Chinese primary and secondary education, see her "Beijing's Olympic education 
programme: re-thinking Suzhi Education, re-imagining an international China," The China Quarterly, 
I 97 (March 2009), 44-63. 
99 
"Beijing Unveils the Emblem of the 2008 Beijing Olympics," RMRB, August 3, 2003, accessed 
from: http: //engli sh.peopledaily.com.cn/200308/03/eng20030803 I 21616.shtml 
100 i1Jl ij;"cp11s]Cp-t'lJ,i,/JfEJ:jt 1,\" (Careful read of China Seal - Dancing Beijing), RMRB Online, August 
I 5, 2003, accessed from: http ://2008.people.com.cn/GB/22 I 80/22195/2019232.html 
'
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Figure 4.2: The Emblem of the 2008 Beijing Games: Chi na Seal - Dancing Beijing 
Mascots: Fuwa 
Beijing's announcement of its choice of mascots for the 2008 Games is another example of 
projecting a "Cultural China" . The mascots consist of fi ve styli zed doll s representing a fish , a 
panda, the "spirit of the Olympic flam e," a Tibetan ante lope, and a swallow, which are 
respectively ca lled " Beibei," ".Jingjing," "Huanhuan," "Yingying" and "N ini ." When these 
names are put together, it makes "Bei Jing Huan Ying Nin ," whi ch means " Welcome to 
Beijing." 102 The two-syllable name is a traditional way of expressing affection for children in 
China. The name and the image carry a message of friendship, peace and goodwi ll from 
China to people and pat1icularly children all over the world . The design of the fi ve doll s was 
clearly influenced by Chinese traditional culture: they represent the five basic elements of 
nature, namel y, water, wood, fire, earth , and metal. Meanwhile, their numbers and colours 
match those of the Olympic rings, which represen t an aspi ration to "seek to unite the world in 
peace and fri endship through the Olympic spi rit." '03 According to Liu Qi , these mascots 
" reflect the cul tural diversity of China as a multi-ethnic country" and " represent the 
enthusiasm and aspirations of our people." 104 
"
2 
'·The Official Mascots of the Beijing 2008 Olympi c Games;· beiji11g2008.c11 (The Official Website 
of the Beiji ng 2008 Ol ympic Games), accessed from: 
http ://en .beijing2008.cn/spi ri t/bei j in g2008/graphic/n2 14068254.slnml 
'
03 Ibi d. 
'"' .. Beij ing chooses 5 do ll s fo r Olympic mascot:· China Daily, November 14, 2005 . 
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Figure 4.3: Mascots for the 2008 Beiji ng Games: Fuwa 
In addition, it is interesting to point out the story of the mascots ' collective name. Originally, 
the organizers gave them an Engli sh name "Friendlies" in order to highlight the spirit of 
friendship and to enhance their popularity overseas. However, some Chinese scholars soon 
suggested that "Friendlies" was not a proper English name, and might be mistakenly 
pronounced as "friendless ," or even worse, "friend lies. " 105 Responding to that, the 
organizing committee finally replaced it with "Fuwa ," a Chinese name with the meaning of 
"blessing doll s." This episode demonstrates that language has its own culture load and 
sometimes a corresponding word may not be found in another language. What is more, the 
name change reflects that the Chinese language and indeed Chinese traditional culture has its 
own channs. 
5.2.1.3 The " Brilliant Civilization" (canlan wenming) 
A "cultural China" was also promoted through the Games ' spectacular opening ceremony, 
particularly the first part, called "Brill iant Civilization." China paid a lot of attention to th is 
opening ceremony, being proud of its tradition and eager to present a fasc inating image of 
China at this cultural feast. As one Chinese sport scholar pointed out, " Ln fact, there were two 
things that Chinese people were most concerned about at the 2008 Olympics - one was the 
opening ceremony and the other was the performances by Chinese athletes who won medals. 
Tue opening ceremony was an important opportunity to spread the Olympic spirit and display 
Chinese culture and history." 106 China thus sought to create a party that would amaze the 
world with the richness of Chinese civilization at the opening ceremony on August 8, 2008. 107 
105 Wang Yinquan, "'tliltl '9i:itz.~.!;;y:1.t:fld1tvil~~9iillmi1':m'llll'i" (The contested translation of 
Fuwa and the strategy for Chinese-English translation of cu lture-loaded phrases), cptff!J#w (Chin ese 
1i'anslation) , no.3 (2006), 74. 
106 Interview with Dr Li Ning, Deputy Director of Department of Physical Education of Beij ing 
University, Apri l 12, 20 I 0. 
107 
"'*~l'lLl , ~~ Jit!J!!ili~:rf~'i'\~~j)j[ttlJ'l-" (Zhang Ji gang: the opening ceremony of the Beij ing 
Olympics wil l amaze the whole world), August 7, 2008 , accessed from: 
http://2008.people.corn.cn/GB/22192/1 21135/121138/7624851 .html. Zhang Ji gang was the deputy 
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Entit led "The Beautiful Olympics'· (Meili de Aolinpike) , the ceremony consisted of two parts 
- the ·'Brilli ant Civili zation" and the "Glorious Era" (huihuang shidai). The fonner reflected 
the beauty of Chinese cul ture, and the latter hi ghlighted China's achievements and its 
promising future since the refonns began in the late 1970s. In this section , the strand of 
Chinese cul ture is discussed and the latter is illustrated in the next section. 
The strategy of promoting a "cultural China" to an international audience was very clear 
through the opening ceremony. As the film-maker Zhang Yimou, the chief director of the 
ceremony, implicitly indicated afterwards, the ceremony's target audi ence was reso lved in 
favour of the international audience over the dom estic. 108 What might attract the global 
aud ience 's attention? From the experience of the 1990 Beijing Asian Garnes, it was argued 
that "'ethni c cu ltural' (minzu wenhua) symbols were more attracti ve to the outside world in 
genera l and also constituted a shared cultural repertoi re with East Asians and overseas 
Chi nese." 109 However, the 2008 Beijing Garnes was very different in scale from the 1990 
Asian Games as well as in the global audience it had access to. BOCOG required that the 
ceremonies should be creati ve and competitive in impressing the world and should present 
China as both an ancient civili sation and a modernizing nation.11 0 Zhang Heping, a Party 
cadre in charge of the ceremonies, said that the open ing ceremony had to "use an 
international language to tell China 's story. " 111 Underpinning thi s thinking was a growing 
des ire to turn the momentum of the ceremony into an oppo11unity for "cul tural rejuvenation -
a Chinese renaissance - and for Chi na 's deeper integrat ion into the internationa l 
cornmunity.1) 11 2 
"Bri ll iant Civi li zati on" not onl y emphasised China 's cultura l heritage but also promoted 
China's historical interacti on with the rest of the world and made reference to a united world 
of connections between people. Firstly, it projected a dynamic age-old civilization, a peace-
loving and friend ly China deepl y rooted in its pacific culture. The perfonnance demonstrated 
China 's "four great inventio ns" (si da faming), namel y, gunpowder, paper, printing and the 
compass which were manifested through fireworks , Chinese scro ll painting, movab le-type 
director of the opening ceremony of the Beij ing Olympics. 
'
0
' !l(Z:ih\j))jJJ1s~H.i£:lf~:cl:;:;J:FnM'.*(Zhang Yimou tell s the stories behind the opening ceremony), 
di // )l!j ,1;· (The Southern Weekend), August 14, 2008, accessed from : 
http: //www.infzm.com/content/ 15978 
109 Brovmell. "The Beijing Ol ympi cs as a turning point?." 
110 BOCOG, "BOCOG in Search of Proposals for Grand Ceremonies,", March 1, 2005. accessed from: 
http://www.china.ore.cn/engl ish/ol ympic/121 732.htm 
111 
·''}[<,¥11 '!' , flltl:!:!1/-i'cH'ri#Y., ~;\{,(;;jl:" (Zhang Heping: using international language to te ll China 's 
story), _clf)!§jif/JJT!J (Sa11/ia11 Life Weekly), no.492 (18 August 2008), 70. 
'" Xin Xu, --Modernizing China in the Olympic spotlight," 97. 
170 
printing and Chinese characters, and China's ancient maritime silk route. It also incorporated 
Chinese high culture such as Beijing Opera and Kunqu , and folk culture including puppet 
plays. According to Zhang Yimou, the perfonnance of movable-type printing was distinctive 
and magnificent, representing the great contribution that the Chinese people had made to 
world civilisation. 113 The act contained variations of Chinese characters by using the 
example of the character of "Tl]" (he - harmony). It showed the evolving nature of Chinese 
culture in China's history, and more importantly, it sent out a clear message that China had 
always been a nation which sought hannony. 
Second, in addition to the illustration of China's dynamic cultural heritage, it also showed 
China's historical contact and cultural exchange with the rest of the world, as perfonned in 
the act on the theme of China 's ancient "silk road. " The Chinese "silk road" went in two 
directions: one on land and the other by sea. 114 The "silk road" has become a cultural symbol, 
which represents China's historical efforts to spread Chinese civilisation and build cultural 
and economic relations with the peoples in Asia, Europe and Africa. The story of Zheng He, a 
renowned Ming Dynasty admiral , who sailed south and west on diplomatic and trade 
missions with the outside world in the early 15"' century, is a well-known episode of China's 
maritime history. The ceremony staged Zheng He 's story to hint that, despite their command 
of superior technological devices such as the compass and gargantuan seafaring vessels, 
Chinese people did not seek to conquer other nations. Rather, their intent was merely to 
disseminate Chinese civilisation, friendship and promoting cultural exchange. This story has 
been repeatedly cited by the Chinese leaders to highlight that China is a nation that has long 
loved peace and cherished friendship and respectful interaction. 115 
From these cultural symbols from the 2008 Beijing Games , its emblem, mascots and opening 
ceremony, we can see that the Chinese authorities were very careful in choosing their cultural 
113 
"¥1s!5'll:4'00-1M!.!tl:IJ'l--:ff~~.e.-l\"ilii\'lfz-il/:'1,i;/J"" (Romantic China and dream world - an 
interview with Zhang Yimou, director of the opening ceremony), August 9, 2008, Xinhua News Agency, 
accessed from: http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2008-08/09/content 1068148.btm 
114 The exact routes on land and sea have been long under debate. Generally, the land route is 
understood from northwest China to Arabic countries, India, Central Asia and even Europe; the sea 
route was referred to from southern China to Southeast Asia, India and Eastern Africa. For the research 
on the "silk road" see for example, Gun Junxian, "' i'i'.#l!Z.l!l\ 'JB'fit:lW 15 't1 OOJ~X:" (The plan of the 
revival of "silk road" and China 's foreign policy), .ffeff;iffiP:i:2 (Northeast Asia Forum), no.5 (2010), 
65 -73; Gong Yingyan, "'/lit.-ti'i'.#llz.l!l\1',ttJJ'!-3CllJJitt;f'l''l'lsif.if.'Jt#i.t:i'E~:i£" (A summary of the 
international symposium of "The maritime silk road and the process of world civilisations"), 'Pffl.'1: 
iilf'Jiif/Jii§ (Trends of Recent Researches on the Histo,y a/China), no.2 (2012), 78-82. 
115 For example, "/.Jl'ililtlf"'1:i3a/&"1'!l;fP:i:/ill".fP ''l'~MN8*i**" (The significance of Hu Jintao 's 
presenting Lian Zhan a "Zheng He Seven-Gem Ship"), Xinhua News Agency, April 30, 2005, accessed 
from: http ://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-04/30/content 2898235.htm ; "1'11 ;fP AA~ 9'P U~" 
(Voyage of Zheng He), China Central Television , June 14, 2005, accessed from: 
http: //www.cctv.com/history/specia1/Cl4156/20050614/l 01719.shtrnl 
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elements. They tried very hard to lin k China 's still-evo lving national identity wi th their 
tradi tional values, which clearly refl ected a return to and a renewed appreciation for Chinese 
traditional culture. 
However, as analysed in the previous chapter, in Maoist times, China promoted a proletari an 
cu lture which denounced Chinese traditional culture such as Confucianism. The question then 
is how to understand China 's rediscovery and re-embracing of its traditional cu lture - an 
about-face so prominently on di splay at such a high-profile globa l event? While it is a 
question far too complicated to engage with in this chapter, the implications may not be hard 
to scope. First and foremost, the Chinese must have found that presenting a "cultural China" 
would appeal to the international audience and might help alleviate international worries 
about China 's increasing economic and military power. China has Jong been criticised as an 
authoritarian state lacking individual freedom and democracy - an "Other" in the 
international system. Its ri si ng materi al power makes China 's presence even more alanning. 
However, as shown in the cu ltural symbols it chose, China sought to tell the world a story of 
Ch ina greater than its newfound might. A "cultural China" demonstrated that it had a rich 
reservoir of cu ltural/soft power capital, embodied in its cu ltural heritage and society which 
emphasized the importance of hannony, people, diversity, meritocracy and good governa nce. 
All these clearly aimed at proj ecting a benign image of a China which cherishes its traditional 
mora l va lues, with no totalitarian desire to conquer the world. 116 In addition, the promotion 
of China's brilli ant civilisati on provided Chinese citi zens and overseas Chinese with a sense 
of the country's greatness, to strengthen their cultural identity and enhance Chinese pride and 
nationa l cohes ion. China's approach to projecting its development path fu1iher elaborates 
these two points. 
5.2.2 Modern China 
In addition to presenting Chi na's dyn amic cul ture there was the promotion of a "modern 
Ch ina" with economic vita li ty and its own ideas and vision of development and 
modernization. In thi s sense, China has built itself as a model fo r development - an opening 
economy but wi th the state retaining firm con trol. This section illustrates a "modern China" 
by look ing at the concepts of ·' Hi gh-tech Olympics" (Keji Aoyun) and "Green O lympics" 
(Luse Aoyun), and the staging of "Glorious Era" in the second part of the opening ceremony. 
They all were ut il ized to promote China as a powerhouse of development, and to tell the 
world what China is capable of. A '·modern China" not only lifted China's image as a 
renewed society but also enhanced the CCP's leadership ro le in guiding China's develo pment. 
116 Daniel A. Bell. ·'Thi s is no Chinese triumph of tota litariani sm," Guardian , August 7, 2008. 
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5.2.2.1 " High-tech Olympics" 
Promising a "High-tech Olympics," Beij ing desired to utilize the Games as a window to 
showcase China's economic achievement and strength of innovation. After undertaking the 
central pol icies of "reform and opening up" for three decades, China's economic achievement 
has transformed China's landscape as well as people's spirit. For the previous three decades , 
China had generall y been regarded as a manufacturing factory for the world. Chinese 
authorities thought that hosting the 2008 Olympics would provide an optimum opportunity to 
demonstrate its innovative capacity. 117 With the concept of "High-tech Olympics," Beijing 
was meant to project a new image of China full of economic vitali ty. 
First, "high-tech" and innovation were embodied in the most recent city hal lmark architecture. 
Modem and styli sh facilities for the Games were designed and buil t to impress the 
international audience. For instance, the National Stad ium, or "Bird's Nest," a brand new 
stadium that secured its name from its physical appearance, was the venue for the opening 
and closing ceremonies. The structure was made out of special steel through manufacturing 
innovation made in China. It was said that the designers aspired to make it "the most visible 
icon in contemporary China." 11 8 Another iconic facility was the National Aquatics Centre, or 
" Water Cube," strong and energy efficient. It was said that the material used in the exterior 
helped save half of the energy used for lighting during the day. 119 Other strikingly 
breathtaking cosmopolitan buildings, such as the National Grand Theatre, a place for fine 
cultural perfonnances, and the new Central China Television (CCTV) headquarters , were 
equally regarded as legacies of the Beijing Olympic construction boom. Al l of them occupied 
a prominent ro le in the campaign to display a glamorous urban face to international visitors, 
although they did not have direct association with the Games. 120 
117 BOCOG, "~ t )i(~:iEfiz;/]m_J<!J(- ), ,~,1'fsc /i'i; Dl?r f£JfJ'." (The programming o f the Beijing Olympics 
(part one): overall strategic thinking), July 2007, accessed from: 
http ://www.china.com.cn/chi nese/zhuanti/1 77019. htm 
11 8 Carolyn Marvin, '"All under heaven ' - megaspace in Beijing," in Monroe E. Price and Daniel 
Dayan eds., Owning the Olympics: Narra tives of the New China (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 2008), 242. 
11 9 
"Green Olympics : a pl edge to honour for Beij ing," Xinhua News Agency, October 4, 2006, 
accessed from: http://www.china.org.cn/english/sports/182954.htm . 
12
° For the chal lenges of design and construction of those icons, see Marvin, 1 · ' AJ I under heaven· -
megaspace in Beij ing," 236-243. 
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Figure 4.4: Beijing city hallmarks (from left to right) Bird Nest, Water Cube, National Grand Theatre, 
CCTV headquarters 
Second, Chinese efforts to promote its high-tech and innovative strength were demonstrated 
by projecting its home-grown brand names throughout the Games. When asked about 
products labelled "Made in Chi na," the most common responses up to now have been cheap 
pricing and low quality. 121 The concept of " High-tech Olympics" was directed at changing 
the image of Chinese brands. For instance, before the Games, a number of Chinese 
companies were selected as sponsors for the Games, including well-known companies such 
as Lenovo and China Mobile. 122 The dazzling opening ceremonies' deployment of the 
world 's largest LED screen, which was produced by a local company, also demonstrated 
China's high-tech capability. 123 Another effort to achieve a more positive technology-driven 
image was the construction of high-speed railways (Gaotie) across the country. This program 
was highly promoted in the run-up to the Games. It was claimed that high-speed railways 
wou ld be a Chinese brand being based on China's own design and domestic engineering 
techno logy and equ ipment. 124 
In add ition , the Beijing municipal government made a huge investment in transportation 
improvements, such as building and extending Beijing's subway system, completing the 
city's light rail system and constructing an enonnous new internationa l airport terminal. In 
the meantime, it made steady efforts to transform Beijing into a "digital'· city with 
widespread use of digital and broadband telecommunications, wireless transmission and 
networking technologies. 125 
The high-tech initiatives in the run-up to the Beijing Games were used to promote Chinas 
121 Pere Berkowitz er al, "Brand China: usi ng the 2008 Olympic Games to enhance China's image." 
Place Branding and Public Diplomacy 3:2 (2007), 173. 
122 For a detailed case study of choosing the two companies as the Beijing Olympics' sponsors, see 
Lee Humphreys and Christopher J. Finlay, "New technologies, new narrative," in Monroe E. Price and 
Dan iel Dayan eds., Owning the Olympics, 284-306. 
123 This LED screen was made by Leyard Company, with its website at http://en.leyard.com/ 
104 
'"i};j\j($,:Jf,f.'t )jOJ"/.'li~i!U?r7f J.:J!l! iUf0:;/,J;lt~M" (Wen Jiabao anended the ceremony for the 
start of the construction of the Beijing-Shanghai high-speed rai lway), Xi11hua News Agency, April I 8, 
2008. 
105 Sands. ·'The 2008 Olympics' impact on Ch ina. " 
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home brands and strengths in technology and innovation, and through that, to help secure 
international recognition of China 's development and economic vitality. 
5.2.2.2 " Green Olympics" 
The second approach to promoting a "modern China" was demonstrated by the management 
of China's environment issues. Due to the priori ty given to economic growth in the previous 
three decades, China 's environmental issues were looming large. China 's poor environmental 
perfonnance became a target both for domestic and international criticism. For instance, as 
early as China 's first bid for hosting the Olympics in 1993, the environment had been one of 
the concerns of the IOC.126 China's environmental degradation made the Chinese people 
ponder the future enviromnental consequences of the government's "attain economic 
development first, and then work on enviromnental governance" strategy. 127 Enviromnental 
pressure impelled Chinese authorities to engage wi th global concerns and standards. They 
also realized that in effect by taking proper measures they could recas t China as a responsible 
and respectable participant in international environmental norms. 128 
The "Green Olympics" deli vered a promise not to dismiss critici sm of Chjna's pollution 
problems. Ln China 's 2001 bid, the bidding comminee emphasized that enviromnental 
improvement would be a priority through the implementation of the "Green Olympics" 
initiatives. Various enviromnent-related projects were initiated to "ensur~ cleaner water and 
bluer skies for the 2008 Olympic Games." All the projects were required to reach 
international standards of safety management and enviromnental protecti on, as well as to 
meet the requirements of many green technology and management policies. 129 The Chinese 
govermnent made and emphasized pledges to use cleaner energy sources and adopt green 
technology for transportation, recycling, and Games-related building projects, with the hope 
of reducing dependency on more polluting sources of energy such as coal , and building a 
circular economy. 130 Power plants in the capital area were converted to cleaner fue ls, 
polluting factories were closed or curtailed, and private traffic was di scouraged throughout 
the Games.13 1 In addition, Beijing Olympic authori ties launched campaigns to plant mjllions 
126 
"rfi ~r,tJ)J''(The success of bidding fo r the 2008 Olympic Games}, China Online, accessed from: 
http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/MATERlAUl 78576.htm 
127 For the discussion of Chinese concerns of the environmenta l issue, see Kathy Morton, "China and 
the global environment: learn ing from the past, anticipat ing the future, " Lowy Institute Paper 29, 2009, 
32. 
128 
"China, UN sign agreement on envir~nmental protection for 2008 Olympics," Xinhua News 
Agency, November 19, 2005. 
129 Yang Cheng. "Green Olympics underway," China Business Weekly, July I 0, 2006. 
130 Li Fangchao, "Beijing unveils plans fo r 'green' Games," China Daily, May 29, 2006. 
131 Mitchell Landsberg, "Clearing the air for Olympics," Los Angeles Times , August 11 , 2007. 
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of trees and build its largest city park - Beijing Olympic Forest Park. 132 By effectively facing 
envirorunental challenges, the Chinese government showed its wi ll ingness and capacity to 
respond to international expectations and improve the life quality of its citizens. It sought to 
seize the opportunity to build an environment-friend ly China. 
5 .2.2.3 The " G lorious Era" 
The "Glorious Era," the second part of the performance at the openi ng ceremony, sought to 
advance Chinese visions of modernization. Comprising three acts, "Starli ght, Nature and 
Dream," this part of the performance projected Chinese modern achievements and their 
understanding of development - hannon ious coexistence . 
Harmon ious coexistence could be regarded as the theme of the "Glorious Era" performance. 
Firstly, the Chinese traditiona l exercise Taiji was used in the perfonnance to convey Chinese 
understanding of the hannonious relationship between humans and nature in the context of 
the modem world. 133 Secondly, the meaning of "One World , One Dre.am" was further 
elaborated by the segment with a blue orb representing our earth, with 58 perfonners running 
and dancing around the orb, a positive message about human w1ity and breadth of vision and 
to lerance (see Figure 4.5) . 134 Even the spacewalk was utili zed in the perfonnance to 
represent human exp lorati on of space, a "shared homeland" (gongyou jiayuan) of 
humanity. 135 The spacewalk also projected China' s achievements in spatial exp lorati on and 
symbolized that China had crossed the threshold into this new frontier. Thirdly, Chi na's 
detennination to safeguard world peace was illustrated by the image of a dove, projected on 
the rim of the stadium. Last but not least, the 2008 Olympic theme song, " Yo u and Me" ( Wo 
he Ni) expressed the hope of hannonious coexistence between the West and East, sung by the 
Chinese singer Liu Huan and the British singer Sarah Brightman, who were del iberately 
picked by the organizers.136 
132 
'·JOC supports Beijing·s c lean-air measu res: Jacques Rogge,' · Xinhua News Agency, August 24, 
2007: ·'Ol ympic Forest Park in Beijing," Xi11/111a News Agency, Jul y I 0, 2008. 
133 
'· Romanti c China and dream world - an interview with Zhang Yimou, director of the opening 
ceremony. 
134 Geremie R. Barme, "Chinas flat earth : hi story and 8 August 2008 ," The China Quarterly 197, 83. 
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Figure 4.5: The blue orb in the opening ceremony of the Beijing Games, enhancing the theme of the 
Games - "One World, One Dream" 
China's projection of a high-tech and environment-friendly China throughout the Beijing 
Olympics on the one hand reflected its desire to meet the expectations of the international 
community. On the other hand the Chinese authorities attempted to promote a "modern 
China" with phenomenal economic success and full of ideas and vitality of development. 
Overall , through the projection of a "cultural China" and a "modern China," the Chinese 
people seized the moment to convey a message: China is a modem-, civili sed , dynamic and 
renewed nation, which has "come out" as a global power. This demonstrates the paradox of 
the Olympic Games - whilst the Olympics pay a tribute to internationalism, they reinforce 
nationalism at the same time. For Chinese people, the Beijing Olympics represented an 
important sh ift in their collective identity as they started to see their nation as an equal partner 
among other nations instead of "a sick man of East Asia" bullied by hosti le powers. 137 They 
have been longing for China's international status to bring acceptance and respect from the 
rest of the world. This nationalist sentiment may produce huge effects on this country and 
generate profound implications for China's international relations. Whil st Chi na sought this 
historical moment to promote a positive image of the country, how did it engage with foreign 
states and publics? The remainder of this section tackles this question with a focus on China 's 
Olympic diplomacy. 
5.2.J China's "new" diplomacy138 
China's diplomacy serves as both a source and a vehicle of soft power to project particular 
ideas and values which encapsulate what China stands for, and which shape or guide China 's 
137 Brownell , "The Beijing Olympics as a Turning Point?," 9. 
138 For the discussions of "China 's new diplomacy" see Pau line Kerr, Stuart Harris and Qin Yaqing 
eds., China 's "New" Diplomacy: Tactical or Fundamental Change? (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); 
Zhiqun Zhu, China's New Diplomacy: Rationale, Strategies, and Significance (England ; VT: Ashgate 
Pub. Ltd., 2010). 
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role in world affairs. As discussed earlier, the Olympic Games in and of themselves are a 
fonn of diplomatic outreach and engagement. The Beijing Games provided China wi th a 
great platfonn for intensive interaction with the rest of the world. The hosting of the Games 
served as a venue of public diplomacy for China to fulfil two main roles: (I) announcing its 
arrival on the world stage as a global power but as a constructive and active participant in the 
existing international system through moral suasion rather than as a revisioni st seeking to 
overthrow the system; and (2) rebutting unfavourable foreign reports and opinions of China 
through repeated emphasis of "peacefu l deve lopment." 139 ln short, China sought lo project a 
benign and responsible image which represented a new pattern of ri sing through peaceful 
means and an alternative to the aggressive powers in recent history that rose through strong-
arn1ed accumulation, such as Gennany and Japan in World War II. ln order to present this 
positive image, China invested heavily in its public diplomacy before and during the Games. 
This part of the second section analyses the hotspot issues in the run-up to the Games. It also 
exp lores China 's earlier diplomat ic efforts to sell itse lf lo the rest of the world. These efforts 
included media diplomacy, multilateral diplomacy, institutional setup, and cultural diplomacy. 
5.2.3 . l Media diplomacy 
Media diplomacy 140 constituted a major effort to project China's image in its run-up to the 
Games. It included both Chinese media 's "going abroad" and foreign media's "com ing in." In 
the age of global infonnation, media plays an increasingly important role in shaping a 
country 's image and constitutes an efficient way to promote a country 's soft power. As Nye 
clearly pointed out, internati onal media, such as CNN, BBC and Al Jazeera, "had the field 
largely to themselves as they frame the issues." 141 The Chinese government understood that 
the Games certainly represented a global media event through which the state and a number 
of international and domestic institutions could attach needed attention and make a 
connection with the global audience. However, the actors which en tered into the virtual 
platfonn could be both competitive and/or complementary in nature. 142 China "must take the 
commanding height ' ' in thi s media platform to convey its ideas and po licies and regulate the 
flow of infonnation. 143 
139 See for example, Yiwei Wang, ·' Public dip lomacy and the rise of Chinese soft power', The Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol.616 (March 2008), 263; Pang Zhongying, 
'·Soft power strategy for post-Olympics Ch ina," CS!S Freeman Report (September 2008), 258. 
1
"° For the concept of"media diplomacy," see Patr icia A. Karl , "Media diplomacy," Proceedings of the 
Academy of Political Science 34:4 (1982), 143-152. 
141 Nye, Soft Power, 54. 
142 Monroe E. Price. "On seizing the Olympic platform,'' in Monroe E. Price and Daniel Dayan eds .. 
Owning the Olympics, 87-91. 
143 Yu-nu Lu. ·'The representation of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games: the rise of China 's soft 
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The Chinese government entered the field of the media in the mid-l 990s to increase Chinese 
international media presence. China 's state-owned media, such as Xinhua News Agency, 
China Daily, CCTV overseas television channels and China Radio International, received 
enormous support from the central government to enhance their influence on overseas 
audiences. For instance, in 2006, CCTV-4, an international channel launched in 1992 and 
targeted toward overseas Chinese, launched different time shifted feeds to make sure that 
overseas Chinese could watch the same programs that mainland Chinese watch on a similar 
daylight schedule. 144 This was further complemented by CCTV-9, a news channel launched 
in 2000 to attract an English-speaking audience all over the world. Following this step, in 
2004 , the CCTV expanded its channels into CCTV-E and CCTV-F to cater for Spanish-
speaking and Francophone audiences. In 2009, Russian-speaking and Arabic-speaking 
channels appeared in the CCTV conglomerate as well. 
In the information era, the internet provides another significant channel to reach out to the 
global audience. In the run-up to the Games, the Chinese broadcasting authority urged 
Chinese media to establish web-based radio and television networks for the purpose of 
transmitting important events of the Beijing Games to the international public in general and 
the overseas Chinese community in particular through the internet.!~5 A major endeavour in 
this regard was to create the China Network Television (CNTV), "a global focused , multi-
language, and multi-terminal public service platform that integrates network TV, internet TV, 
mobile phone TV, and mobile media" to reach internet users throughout the world . 146 
China's media engagement during the Beijing Olympics comprised efforts not only to reach 
out, but also to invite the foreign media to come in. As mentioned earlier, before the Games, 
the Chinese government adopted a set of new regulations to relax restrictions on the foreign 
press, which allowed foreign reporters and journalists to travel around the country for 
interviews without prior government approval. It was estimated that more than 20,000 foreign 
press and an additional 10,000 freelance j ournalists showed up in Beijing during that 
period. 147 It was an unprecedented move by the CCP, but it brought both risks and 
opportunities for its engagement with the global audience. 
power," in Baogang Guo and Chung-chian Teng eds. , China S Quiet Rise: Peace through Integration 
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For instance, the unrest in Tibet in March 2008 evoked massive international reports of 
China 's human rights iss ues and denu nciations of the PR C's rul e of Tibet from Tibetan ex il es 
and their supporters. 148 In the dominant global media , not onl y did they associate the unrest 
with the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, but they also made an analogy between the Beijing 
Games and the 1936 Olympiad in which the Nazis had earlier used the Berlin Olympics site 
for mass executions. 149 Nevertheless, pai1ly due to the new foreign press regulation 
mentioned above and partly to rectify the " biased" reports from the international med ia, 
James Miles, a correspondent for The Economist, was allowed to stay in Lhasa during the riot. 
ln hi s comment, he po inted out that it was " remarkable" that the authorities did not ask hi m to 
leave, "given that the authori ties are normally extremely sensiti ve abo ut the presence of 
foreign journalists when thi s kind of incident occurs ." 150 More importantly, wh ile James 
Miles noted that there were tensions between Han Chinese and Tibetans, he reckoned that 
"the authoriti es are trying their best to g ive the outside world an impress ion of norma lity. 
Un like their response to a big outbreak of anti-Chinese unres t in 1989, thi s time they ha ve not 
dec lared martial law, nor even announced any cu rfew or measures to expel foreigners. " 151 
Such comments from a foreign reporter provided a somewhat balanced view of th e Lhasa ri ot 
in particular and China in genera l in the context of the dominant negati ve coverage of China. 
The opportunity for presenting a more positi ve image came with the Sichuan earthquake in 
May 2008. Compared to similar events in the past, Chinese authorities gave wider access to 
the area, allowing more forei gn journalists to visi t the affected site and make news coverage. 
They also accepted help from foreign rescue and medial teams. These measures attracted 
globa l attention to the severity of the Siclrnan earthquake, which produced wide sympathy for 
the people affected. Moreover, foreign media covered former Premier Wen Jiabao 's swift vis it 
to the devastated regi on, the timely responses from the Chinese central and local governments, 
148 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide explanations for the protests in Tibet in March 
2008. It is generally regarded from the following three reasons. First, every March is quite sensitive in 
Tibet because March IO is the anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan revolt against the Chinese central 
government. The revolt prompted the spiritual leader Dalai Lama to flee into exile. Second, the 
migration waves either designed by the central government or prompted by the economic reforms to 
some extent aggravate ethnic tensions between Ti betans and Han Chi nese. Third, there has been 
dissat isfaction amo ng the locals resulti ng from economic-focused development which led lo the 
decline of Tibetan culture and marginalization of traditional Tibetans. After the 2008 riot, there were 
various contested versions of reports from the Chinese and Western media. For instance, see Barry 
Sautman and Li Ying, Public Diplomacy J,-om Below: the 2008 "Pro-C/1ina " Demonstrations in 
Europe and North America (Los Angeles: Figueroa Press, 20 11 ); Kevin Latha m. "Media, the Olympics 
and the search for the ·real China· ," n,e China Quarterly, 197 (March 2009), 25-46. 
149 Cha, "Beijing's Olympic-sized catch-22," 110. 
150 James Mi les. ·'Transcri pt : James Mi les interview on Ti bet;' CNN, March 20, 2008, accessed from: 
http ://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/03/20/tibet.miles.i nterview/; his writ ings on Lhasa riot , 
see James Mi les. ·'Midnight ultimatum for Tibet showdown," nmes Online, March 17, 2008. 
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as well as the strenuous relief effo rt led by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) .152 This 
Chinese rescue operation and worldwide news coverage to a large extent offset the negati ve 
reports of the Tibet issue. 
In addition, the Chinese media went to tremendous lengths to project a pos itive image of 
China to add ress the fo reign media 's "distorted" reports of China fo r both domestic and 
international audiences. One prominent example was the setup of the "anti-CNN" website by 
a Chinese netizen, who offered detailed analysis of Western media coverage of the Tibet 
unrest. 153 The si te pointed out the factual errors of reporting made by well -known Western 
media organizations, such as CNN, the BBC, The Washington Post, The Times, Radio France 
Internationale and Germany's NTV, RTL and Der Spiegel.1l 4 The factual errors included 
misidentification of the location of events, inaccurate captions attached to photographs and 
video clips, as well as misinterpretations of popular opinions. 1ll The work of "anti-CNN" 
drove a new media discourse that paid attention to the "bias" against China in the Western 
media. Chinese people including overseas Chinese thereafter called for understanding of the 
"real China." 156 The "distorted" coverage from the Western media as well as the Chinese 
populace 's efforts to expose the "biased" reports before the Games raised a new wave of 
Chinese nati onalism both in mainland China and overseas Chinese comm unities. Chinese 
efforts in thi s regard were aimed at rebutting negative foreign public opinion toward China 
and supporting the Beijing Games. Different from the stereotypical state-led diplomacy, this 
media engagement conducted by the Chinese populace constituted a clear example of "pub! ic 
diplomacy from below." 157 
5.2 .3.2 Diplo matic engagem ent o f the norm of global " respons ibility" 
Another aspect of China 's "new" diplomacy was Beij ing's efforts to accommodate the norm 
of global "respons ibil ity." The Chinese gove rnment sought to meet international standards 
and respond to outside concerns of the rise of China by bringing itself more into line with the 
152 Wang Yi zhou and Wang Zaibang, "'P ~ , J'e;tJ1.7f3( 2008" (China: cri sis diplomacy in 2008), ti!: 
J'HlliR (World Affairs), no.23 (2008), 18. 
153 It . was set up by a former Tsinghua University student. The website was later changed into 
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2008; '"Anri -CNN' website refl ects Chinese people's condemnation," Xinhua News Agency, March 27, 
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prevailing nonns of the international conununi ty. It wanted to be seen as a responsible partner 
or a " responsible stakeholder··15S within the existi ng international system. Due to the great 
exposure of the Olympics, it became imperative for Beijing to shape its image as a 
responsible globa l player through diplomatic engagement with the burning international 
issues of the day in the run-up to the Games. Particular attention is pa id to Beijing·s mod ified 
diplomatic behaviour in dealing with the so-ca lled "failed states" such as Sudan and Burma. 
In all these hot spots, Beijing had evo lved from a passive spectator and a guardi an of the 
principle of "non-interference" to an acti ve participant in efforts to solve these issues. In 
addition, there fo ll ows a brief discussion about China's embrace of multilaterali sm since the 
mid-I 990s to show its sense of responsibility. 
Firstly, concerning the international criticism of its close relati onship with the Sudanese 
government in the context of human rights violations in Darfur, 159 Beijing moved steadily to 
construct a positi ve image as a leading champion for the conflict resolution process . Beijing 
went on a public relations campaign to demonstrate that it had made great efforts to gain the 
Sudanese government's acceptance of the hybrid peacekeeping operations plan offered by 
fonn er UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. In February 2007, fonner President Hu Jintao 
himself travelled to Sudan and persuaded Sudanese President Omar al -Bashir to comply wi th 
the plan. In May 2007 a spec ial envoy was appointed for Darfur, Liu Guijin, who became the 
public face of China 's efforts to explain China 's about-turn in policies to the world. He made 
several trips to the region to persuade the Sudanese government to accept its ob ligations 
under the UN plan. China also contributed a 3 15-member peacekeeping unit to participate in 
the peacekeeping operation in the area when the action was approved by UN. 160 When Sudan 
accepted the United Nations' deci sion to deploy the largest-ever 26,000-strong UN 
peacekeeping operation to Sudan in December 2007, it was widely accepted that China's 
efforts had been critical to Sudan 's acceptance. The U.S. special envoy fo r Darfur, Andrew 
Natsios, valued Beijing's cri ti cal role and its use of its considerab le leverage to get UN 
peacekeepers into Sudan. 161 
Secondl y, China demonstrated its evolving diplomatic behaviour in its dealings with the 
158 Robert B. Zoellick. "Whither China: from membershi p to responsibi li ty?." Remarks to the National 
Committee on U.S.-China Relations, September 21, 2005 , accessed from 
http: //www.ncuscr.org/fi les/2005Gala RobertZoel\i ck Whither China l.pdf 
159 For the well -known criti cism see Ronan Farrow and Mia Farrow. "The Genoc id e Olympics," Th e 
Wa ll Srreet Journal, March 28 , 2007. 
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Burmese ruling military junta. As Burma's largest trading partner since 2005, Beijing used to 
oppose any attempts by Western states to bring the issue of human rights in Bunna to the US 
Security Council agenda. 162 Responding to a Washington Post column ca lling for an Olympic 
boycott over Bunna in the aftennath of the violent suppression of pro-democracy unrest in 
Burnia in September 2007, the Chinese embassy in Washington decl ared that it was "totally 
irresponsible" to make such a linkage and politicize the Olympics. 163 ln its diplomatic efforts, 
Beijing started to persuade Burma's military rulers to allow UN envoy fbrahim Gambari to 
visit the country and meet the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi. 164 What is more, Chinese 
Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Liu Jianchao even openly spoke of the need to achieve 
"democracy" in Bunna. 165 Some Chinese scholars also began to do research on China's role 
in Burma's democratization. 166 Although China still publicly rejects " interference in other 
countries' domestic affairs," in practice, as shown in Sudan and Burma, there is clear 
evidence of China 's shift in fo re ign policy away from its previous stance on the principle of 
non-interference in internal affairs. 
In addition to the changes in China 's international poli cies in the run-up to the Games, it is 
worth pointing out the general shi ft toward multilateralism in China 's internati onal behaviour 
since the mid- I 990s, which shows China to be a constructive internationa l player. Noticing 
the shifting global environment due to the quickening pace of globali zation in the infonnation 
age, Chinese policy makers and experts on internationa l relations have increasingly reali zed 
that China 's future is closely connected with other countries. China needs to be more active in 
agenda setting and framing in the regional and international organizations. 167 As such, in the 
region , China is a participant in almost all official and track-two institutions and forums, such 
as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC, 1991), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF, 
1994), and ASEAN+3 (1997), j ust to name a few. China's response to the Asian Financi al 
Crisis (1997-98) and its decision not to devalue the Renminbi suggested a sense of 
responsibility for the stabil ity of the regional economic system. 168 China also played a 
162 Cha, "Beijing's Olympic-sized catch-22," 117. 
163 Glenn Kessler, "China rejects attempts to link developments in Burma to Beij ing Olympics," 
Washington Post, October 2, 2007. 
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41-45. 
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leading role in initiating the most influential regional institutions: the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation (SCO, 200 I) and the Six-Party Talks (2003). In its interaction with and 
participation in international organizations, China has also demonstrated its desire to play a 
constructi ve and responsible role. Since the end of the Cold War, China has become more 
active in the UN, for instance, providing financial support and military personnel in UN 
peacekeeping missions.169 More significantly, when Beijing obtained the right to host the 
2008 Summer Olympics in 200 I , it coincided wi th China's access ion to the WTO after 13 
years of protracted and diffi cult negotiations.170 It was a milestone in China 's embrace of 
global multil aterali sm, which in turn accelerated China 's pace of integration into the global 
economy. Furthern10re, in recent years Chinese leaders could be found at many other 
multilateral venues such as the UN, G-8 (Group of 8) and G-20 (Group of 20) Summits, 
Euro-Asia Summit, China-Africa Cooperation Forum, and so on. In these venues, Chinese 
leaders repeatedly emphas ized China's trajectory of "peaceful development." They sought to 
alleviate international worries about China 's ri sing power by emphasizi ng a non-
confrontational way of emergence, deep involvement into various international instituti ons, 
and closer " linkage with the international standards" (yu guoji jiegui). 
In short, China 's evo lving policies toward Sudan and Burma as wel l as multilaterali sm 
represent big changes in China 's internationa l behavio ur. China has been seen as one of 
the finnest supporters of the non-intervention and sovereignty norms, a "champion" of 
illi beral states. Beijing 's assoc iat ion with authoritari an/totali tarian regimes as a means of 
enhancing China's soft power and fostering international clout against the West has provoked 
criticism. 17 1 However, while Beijing did not want to jeopardise its ties wi th developing states 
such as Sudan and Bunna, it did intend to wi n over its Western critics. The Chinese leaders 
saw econom ic development and a stable re lationsh ip with the West as crucia l to Ch ina's on-
going development and stabili ty. Chi na 's evo lving international policies in the post-Cold War 
era in general and in its Olympic moment in particular are attempts by China's "charm 
offens ive" to al lay Western fears about the "China threat" and to accentuate China's image as 
a responsible global actor. 
27:1 (March 2003), 35-75. 
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171 For example, see Kurlantzick, Chann Offensive, 43: Suzuki. "Ch inese soft power." 
184 
5.2.3.3 Institutional effo1ts to public diplomacy 
In addition to China 's media and diplomatic attempts to project an engaged and responsib le 
role in the run-up to the Games, this section also di scusses China's efforts in terms of 
institutional setup and cu ltura l diplomacy to belter sell itself to the rest of the world. These 
efforts constitute an important part of China's mobili zation of its sources of soft power to 
promote itself on the world stage. 
To carry out its " image management" project systematically, Beijing started with tremendous 
efforts to establish new institutions and employ new methods to publicize itself to the 
external world. ln 1991 , the lnfo nnation Office of the State Council (IOSC) was set up to 
publicize policies in various di fferen t govermnental departments and organizations. At the 
same time, Beijing started to release white papers on issues concerning global audiences, 
such as human rights, Chinese policies on minorities and religions, national defence and the 
Taiwan issue. 172 Des igned to exp lain and advance Beijing's posi tion on these sensitive issues 
to the outside world, the white papers themselves represent a big step in China 's engagement 
with international concerns. In 1998, the English name of the Propaganda Department 
(Xuanchuan Bu) was changed into the Publicity Department, which showed Chinese 
authorities' sensitivity of the negative meaning of "propaganda" in English. At the National 
Overseas Propaganda Working Conference held in January 2002, Zhao Qizheng, then 
Director of the IOSC, underlined that, to create favou rab le international public opinion, "we 
must from now on have greater awareness of the need to provide better services, study the 
needs of overseas audiences, provide them with large quanti ties of infonnation, help them 
understand China better, and make it possible for them to make use of various opportunities 
available in China." 173 Moreover, Li Changchun, a Fonner member of the Poli tburo Standing 
Committee in charge of the Party 's propaganda, emphas ized that China should adopt a new 
strategy in which Chinese media needed to "go abroad ," and in the meantime invite foreign 
media to "come in." 174 On March 19, 2004, a new Division for Public Diplomacy was 
established under the Infonnation Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Sheng 
Guofang, then Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, explained that this institutional setup 
was "to enhance the exchanges and interaction with the public in order to guide and win the 
172 A seri es of China's wh.ite papers can be accessed from Xh1'wan et : 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2005-1 0/26/content 3685106.htm 
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understanding and support of the public for fo re ign policies."175 
5.2 .3 .4 Cultural diplomacy 
Along with China 's institutional dedication to public diplomacy, Ch ina's cultura l diplomacy 
serves as a prominent tool to develop cultural exchanges with other countries and enhance 
forei gners' understanding of China. In its promotion of cultural contacts with the external 
world, China re-embraced it s cultural heritage by establi shing Confucius Institutes (Cls) 
globally and encouraged educational and cultura l exchanges with other countries. In thi s 
process, Maoist culture defined by class status almost disappeared. 
Modelled loosely on the British Council , Goethe Institute, and Alliance Franc;aise in 
promoting their national language, in 2004, China began its own exploration through 
estab li shing the Cls globally to propagate Chinese language and culture. Recent years have 
witnessed a rapid growth of C ls around the world and thi s trend will continue with the central 
government's sponsorship. 176 At the Third Conference of Confucius Institutes held at the end 
of 2008, it was stated that there had been 249 Cls and 56 Confucius Classrooms established 
in 78 countries. Among these 305 Cls and Confucius classrooms, there were 90 in Africa, I 03 
in Europe, 81 on the American continent and l O in Oceania. 177 Estimated setup costs were 
about US$! million for each !J1Stitute and operating costs in excess ofUS$200,000 per year, 
which represented a sizable investment in public diplomacy. 178 
In the meantime, China expanded its academic and educational exchange programs. On the 
one hand, China set up programs to cultivate its human ca pital and attract them back home. ln 
the Maoist era, many talen ted Chinese were sent to the Soviet Union or Eastern European 
Sociali st countries. In contrast, since the late 1970s, many more have gone to the advanced 
Western countri es , such as North America , Europe and Australia. However, man y chose not 
to come back. To lure back overseas tal ent, China initiated programs including the "Spring 
Light Program" ( 1997), "Changjiang Scholars Program" ( J 998) and "Thousand Talent 
175 Min istry of Foreign Affairs of th e PRC, "Academi c seminar on China 's public diplomacy,'· March 
19, 2004, accessed from: http: //www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/wshd/t80368. htm 
176 See "tL T·'J':1Bt:&fil1Jil:JoJ ( 2012-2020 'f-) ,. (The development program of Confuci us In stitut es 
(2012-2020)), G11a 11g111 i11g Ribao, February 28, 2013, accessed from: 
http ://www.chinese.cn/news/read/article/2013-02/28/content 486071.htm. ln this report, it is estimated 
that there have been about 500,000 registered students in 358 Cls and 500 Confucius Classrooms set 
up in I 05 countries by 20 11. It suggests that China aims to have 150,000 students in 500 Cls and I 000 
Confucius Classrooms around the world by the year 2015. 
m ":£1* L'.xl'. 305 Yr?L "f"f'P.ftf[i:j'L "f-jjf!'l]):"' (There are 305 Confucius Institutes and Confucius 
Classrooms across the globe), CCTV, December 9, 2008, accessed from: 
http://cctvenchirid ion.cctv.com/special/C22950/20081209/l 07124.shtml 
178 Nicholas Kralev, "Chi na 60 , US 0: cultural centers in other's co unt ry," The Washingron limes , 
Apri l 8. 20 I 0: Ian 1-l all and Frank Sm ith. ·'The struggle fo r soft power in Asia," 4. 
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Program" (2008). 179 The Chinese Ministry of Education reported that from 1978 to the end 
of 2007, 1.21 million Chinese students and scholars had gone abroad to pursue education and 
training; of these, 319,700 had returned to China after they completed their studies. 180 It is 
said that with the economic downturn in the West since 2008, the number of Chinese students 
returning has been increasing. 181 On the other hand, China has attracted a large number of 
foreign students and scholars to come to its universities. According to the China Association 
for International Education , there were 223,499 foreign students from 189 countries and 
regions enrolled in Chinese uni versities by 2008. The biggest sources of foreign students 
were South Korea (66,806), America (19 ,914) , Japan (16,733) , Vietnam (10,396) , Russia 
(8,939) and other Asian countries. 182 China thus hosted the fifth largest number of overseas 
students in the world. 183 In 1999, the central government set up an organization, the China 
Scholarship Council (CSC), to provide scholarships for Chinese students studying abroad and 
foreign students studying in China. It was reported that the CSC recent ly offered funding for 
20,000 international students. 184 
To enhance the exchanges and interaction with the public , the central government as well as 
private sectors organized and took part in numerous cultural events around the world. 
Examples included exhibitions, fe stivals, and Chinese cultural events including the Chinese 
Culture Year and Chinese New Year Receptions held in Chinese embassies around the world. 
For instance, a protracted China-France Culture Year was held in France from October 2003 
to July 2004 and from October 2004 to July 2005 in China. 185 Similar cultural events were 
held between China and Russia in 2007. The 2008 year-long "China Now" festiva l was held 
in the UK. China also participated in various international book fairs including those held in 
Paris, Moscow, Seoul, Cape Town and Frankfurt. Chinese press and publication authorities 
perceived that these book fairs not only provided opportunities for China to engage with the 
foreign public, but more importantly pushed Chinese publishers to go abroad so as to increase 
179 Wang Huiyao, g/jf(,ftf!l/f---..A.,,1-i;!{:Jl.'.filJ'f (National Strategy - Talent Change China) (Beij ing: 
Renmin, 2010). 
180 Quoted from Huiyao Wang et al, "Returnee entrepreneurs: impact on Ch.ina 's globalization 
process," Journal ofContempora,y China 20:70 (2011), 414. 
181 Ibid. 
182 
"2008 :<f-*:!/elieJ"'t:!JEi;-1-ftil\l." (Statistics on Foreign Students in China in 2008), extracted from 
China Education Yearbook 2009 , available at: http://www.cafsa.org.cn/index.php?mid=6&tid=603 
183 Mara Hvistendahl, "China moves up to fifth as importer of students," Chronicle of Higher 
Education , September 19, 2008. 
184 China 's Un iversity and College Admission System, "20,000 quotas for international students 
studying in Chi na with Ch inese Government Scholarship in 2010," avail ab le at: 
http://www.cucas.edu.cnJHomePage/201 0-02-24/page 400.shtml; 
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their internati onal competitiveness in the global book market. 186 In addition , in recent years, 
it was recognized that non-state or less official Chinese actors could play a part in promotion 
of Chinese culture. 187 These actors, such as Chinese arti sts, friendship organizations and 
overseas Chinese associations were encouraged to play a role in promoting Chinese fo lk 
cu lture and traditions such as Chinese New Year celebrations. A good example is the armual 
Chinese-European Cultural Dialogue between the Chinese Academy of Arts and the 
European Union Nationa l Institutes for Culture.188 
To conclude this section, China's hosting the 2008 Olympic Games provided a powerful 
platfonn to examine how China mobili zed key sources identified in the Chinese debate on 
soft power. The key sources of soft power that China utilized and promoted were: ( I) a blend 
of traditional and modem aspects of Chinese culture, (2) its dynamic economy and its path to 
modernization , and (3) an omnidirectional engagement with the outside world through medi a, 
cultural and diplomatic means to demonstrate its "good global citizenship. " These were used 
to attract and impress the world as well as the Chinese people by staging a ·splendid opening 
ceremony, showing China's rich cultura l heritage, stylish modem architecture, the smooth 
organization of the Games, the hospitality of the well-mannered volunteers and the sense of 
responsibility to cope with international issues. On the one hand , Chinese autho1ities 
promoted these sources to target a global audience to announce its arriva l as a civilised, 
modem, renewed and responsible global power. On the other hand, these sources were used 
to talk to Chinese citi zens to raise their pride in their nation and enhance national cohesion 
under the leadership of the CCP. 
5.3 Conclusion 
Hosting an Olympiad had been a dream of the Chinese people for 100 years, and China had 
longed for the moment to demonstrate its arri val on the world stage as a modem, civilised, 
and renewed global power of the global conununity. The 2008 Beijing Olympic Games came 
to China at the culmination of its refonn era after three decades of strenuous dedication to 
economic growth. They provided a unique opportuni ty and a powerful platfonn fo r China to 
ma ke known its global presence as an emerging power and simultaneously a responsible 
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power to earn recognition and respect from the global community by mobilizing and 
projecting its key sources of soft power. 
This chapter argues that the hosting of the 2008 Summer Olympiad in China represented a 
mi lestone in China·s reinterpretation and mobil ization of its key sources of soft power so as 
to present a new image of China. China projected a "cultural China" by re-embracing its 
traditional culture but in a way that blends modern and scientific elements, very much a 
"people's China." The Beijing Games demonstrated a modern and emerging power born of 
on-going refonn and economic development, achieved by opening its economy but with the 
state retaining firm control. China has also sought to build itself up as a responsible global 
power that cooperates with other world powers to solve international issues. By promoting 
key sources of China's soft power in the Beijing Games, China not only proved what it was 
capable of, but also demonstrated its reliability and willingness to engage with and accept the 
global community and international nonns. 
In this sense, China's soft power targeted both domestic and international aud iences. At the 
domestic level , by showing what China was capab le of, it sought to enhance national 
cohesion by reinterpretation of Chinese cultural assets - China 's age-old civili sation and 
dynamic modem culture, and by demonstration of what China had achieved in its economic 
development and emergence as a global power. The mobilization of these sources of China's 
soft power was also utilized to strengthen the CCP 's leadership role in guiding the process of 
China's modernization. 
At the international level, these sources were mobilized to make China appealing, either in 
the sense of providing a worthy model for other societies to emulate, or by demonstrating its 
ancient and dynamic cultural assets. In the meantime, China's soft power was used to ca lm 
anxieties from various quarters about what China might do in international politics with its 
newfound strength. China's promotion of soft power in the post-Cold War era and in its 
Olympic moment in particular was not only to win affection from the "Global South," but to 
attain recognition from the "Global North." China's evolving international policies 
constituted a part of China 's "charm offensive" to al lay Western fears ofa "China threat" and 
shape· the country's image as a responsible global power. The Chinese government conducted 
an omnidirectional engagement with the outside world through media, cultural and 
diplomatic means and projecting China's potential economic development. By doing so, the 
Chinese authorities sought to counteract-negative views from the global public and convince 
the rest of the world that China 's rise would follow the path of "peaceful development," an 
alternative to the previous rising powers who had sought ascendance by might. 
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Finally, the study of China 's soft power at the Beij ing Olympic moment is significant in 
providing a prism to compare and contrast the const itution and mob il ization of China 's soft 
power in the past and present of the PRC, which is the goal of the next chapter. 
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6 China's Soft Power Trajectory: Change and Continuity 
As I have pointed out in my discussion of the concept of soft power, sources of soft power do 
not equal soft power per se; these sources need to be cultivated, interpreted, mobilized and 
projected to a particular audience to let them speak to the target. The key sources of China's 
soft power identified in the contemporary Chinese discourse of soft power are Chinese 
culture, China as a model for development and Chinese foreign policy and diplomacy. The 
preceding two empirical chapters have demonstrated how these sources of soft power are 
interpreted, mobilized and projected by the Chinese authorities in two different historical 
periods, firstly in the first half of the 1960s and secondly during China's hosting of the 2008 
Olympic Games. The first case study is located in the peak stage of revolutionary China and 
the second represents the culmination of China 's refonn to date. There are the two historical 
moments that the PRC has vigorous ly mobilized and projected its sources of soft power. The 
two case studies allow me to compare and contrast these processes of mobilization and 
projection of these key sources of China's soft power in the past and present. They also allow 
me to compare who the state was seeking to attract, for what purposes and through what tool s. 
Following the design of this study, this chapter sets out to compare and contrast the key 
sources of soft power and the way the PRC has mobilized them in two different eras. More 
precisely, it compares and contrasts the two cases by examining the following four factors: 1) 
the international and domestic contexts prevailing at the tin1e, 2) the constitution of China's 
soft power by exploring the interpretations of the key sources, 3) the mobilization of these 
sources by demonstrating how they were projected, and 4) the purpose and target audience of 
soft power deployed in the two contexts. A comparison of these factors between the 
revolutionary China and China during the Beijing Olympics allows me to examine how the 
constitut ion and mobilization of the key sources of China's soft power has varied across time 
and what factors shape these processes. 
The second section of this chapter looks in more depth at how to understand this variation 
and continuity in the way that the PRC has constituted and mobilized its key sources of soft 
power in the two eras. It points out that the change and continuity of China' s soft power 
correlates with Chinese political eli tes ' evolving sense of China 's national identity and with 
the role of China in the world which they seek to project. As demonstrated by the case studies, 
soft power is not new to the PRC. However, it has been understood and used in different 
ways. The dynamic feature of Chi na 's soft power to a large extent is related to the Chinese 
shifting perceptions of China's national identity. In other words, soft power in the PRC has 
been nurtured, moulded, interpreted and reinterpreted in line with China 's perceived national 
identity. There is a sig.nificant relationship between how China sought to represent itself in 
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the world and the way in which China constituted and mobili zed soft power. The constitution 
and mobilization of China' s soft power is both deri vative of and reproductive of that 
representation. 
6.1 A comparison of China's soft power constitution and 
mobilization between Mao's China and contemporary China 
The two case studies in this research - one located at the peak of revolutionary China and the 
other in the hosting 2008 Beijing Olympics in China's reform era - provide me wi th a prism 
to compare and contrast these processes of mobilization and projection of the key sources of 
China 's so ft power in the different contexts. This compari son allows me to better understand 
the nature of China's soft power and what shapes it. This comparison is carried out by 
examining the four key fac tors as mentioned above. It demonstrates that changes and 
continuities are relevant across all these facto rs. The dynamic and multifaceted nature of 
China 's soft power is refl ected in the way in which the sources of so ft power were interpreted 
and mobilized; in the expansion of the target audience; and in the purpose of utili zing soft 
power across the two eras. 
6.1 .1 Changing contexts in the PRC 
The PRC has experienced a significant transition in its international and domestic 
environment from the 1960s to the 2000s. It endured non-engagement and non-recogn ition by 
the post-war international system in the 1950s and 1960s, but has had increasing interaction 
with the international community particularly since the late 1970s. Meanwhile, however, one 
key aspect of China that has remained constant in the domesti c context is that the CCP 
remains in control of the state. 
China in the 1960s was located wi thin the turbu lent Cold War, which featured intense 
competition between the two contending ideologies: liberal democratic capitali sm versus 
socia lism/communism. Accordingly, the two ideo logies separated the world into two leading 
camps - one led by the US and the other led by the USSR. Chi na' s leaning to the Soviet bloc 
immediately after the founding of the PRC resulted in non-recognition and non-engagement 
from the US and American alli es. The PRC was ostracised by the prevai li ng international 
institutions including the UN, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. China' s 
international si tuation was worsened by its deteriorating rel ationship with the USSR since the 
late 1950s. 
The increasing friction between Beijing and Moscow, and the on-going antagonism from the 
US camp from the late 1950s, radicalized Maoist China 's domestic po licies and catalysed an 
over-arching project of "continuous revo lution." The deteriorat ion of China ' s relationship 
with the Soviets prompted Mao's government to pursue a policy of self-reliance. The 
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ambition of catching up with the other major powers and playing a leading role in world 
politics pushed Maoist China to speed up its national development through domestic efforts 
with little international assi stance. Consequently, Mao 's government launched the GLF 
campaign. At the end of the 1950s, Communist China started to build People ' s Communes 
and sought to spread egalitarianism across the country. 
In the meantime, however, the escalating struggles for national independence and 
development in Asia , Africa and Latin America against the rule of colonialism and 
imperialism provided the opportunity and space for the PRC to gain recognition and establish 
prestige. The CCP leaders believed that their particular experience and values, such as their 
path of revolution and building socialism/communism in an underdeveloped country, 
provided an exemplary model for the peoples in colonial or post-colonial societies to emulate. 
In this sense, Maoist China attempted to build itself as a "third pole" in the international 
system and a worthy example in world politics. It propagated a worldwide "continuous 
revolution" for the peoples in the Third World to attain liberation from Western colonialism 
and imperialism as well as full independence from control by the superpowers in the bipolar 
world system. 
In contrast , the PRC in the refonn era which culminated in the 2008 Beijing Olympics has 
generally enjoyed a more peaceful international envirorunent, firstly because it obtained 
broader international recognition after joining the UN in 1971 and secondly owing to the 
collapse of the Cold War at the end of the 1980s. The PRC achieved "legitimate" status in the 
existing international system by replacing the ROC as the only legitimate body representing 
China in the UN - the fulcrum of the post-war international system. Since then, more states 
have established diplomatic relations with the Beijing regime. More significantly, China 's 
adoption of the policies of"reform and opening-up" at the end of the 1970s propelled mutual 
engagement and recognition between the Chinese government and many other international 
forces including a number of international organizations as discussed in the previous chapter. 
China became a member incorporated into the international system, whereas prior to thi s its 
international engagement had been focused more narrowly on the Socialist bloc and 
developing world. 
Furthennore, the end of the Cold War and the fa ll of the USSR had created a new 
international geopolitical context. For China, it produced the welcome disintegration of the 
Soviet adversary - the colossus on its northern borders. China has thus faced a more secure 
international environment, apart from a short period after the 1989 Tianarunen crackdown 
when the relationship between the Chinese government and some Western states soured. The 
PRC has quickened its pace of integrating into the various regional and international 
economic and political institutions since the mid-I 990s, and has assumed a more active role 
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in regiona l and globa l affa irs. This promising international enviromnent combined with 
processes of economic refonn wi thin China contributed to the double-digit growth of China's 
economy in the 1980s and 1990s. At the beginning of the new millennium, China's emergi ng 
material strength and increasing global presence was dri ving the country from the fringes to 
the centre of the world stage. 
At the domestic leve l, Mao ' s successors initiated the policies of "reform and opening up." 
The PRC entered into its refonn era with the CCP still the sole ruling party of the state. The 
basic goa l of reform under the CCP's leadership is to ensure continuing sustained economic 
growth and enrichment for the Chinese population , but to avoid dramatic regime change. 
Guided by thi s economic-driven reform, China's economy has moved from a self-reliant and 
rigid centra lly planned economy in Mao 's period to a more liberal and market-oriented 
system. China has experienced a phenomenal economic growth since the late 1970s. The 
legitimacy of the CCP's leadership role is no long attached to revolution, but is performance-
based. The CCP's economic-driven refonn however has prompted a huge social , cultural and 
political transfonnation of the state, which is reflected in the discussion of the key sources of 
China's soft power in the following section. 
6.1.2 Constitution of China's soft power 
The second factor th is chapter compares and contrasts is the constitution of China 's soft 
power in the two periods. The preceding two chapters have demonstrated that the Chinese 
government have mobili zed and projected Chinese cu lture, China as a model for development, 
and Chinese foreign policy and diplomacy both at the peak of revolutionary China and China 
during the Beijing Olympics located in the refonni st China. In thi s sense, these are the key 
sources that constitute China 's soft power that are relevant in both eras. However, while these 
have been promoted in both eras, one can find both continuity and variation in the 
constituti on of each of the sources that were emphasized and promoted in both periods. 
6.1.2. l Chinese culture 
Firstly, in tenns of cu lture, al though in both eras the Chinese government promoted Chinese 
culture to raise cultural nationalism and hi gh light cu lrura l di versi ty, there were different 
aspects of Chinese culture that Chinese politi ca l elites chose to promote. 
In the Maoist period, culture was moulded by '·class struggle" and the CCP's revolutionary 
political ideology. The Chinese Maoists accordingly advanced the so-called "proletari an 
cu lture" which praised the revolutions carried our by the poor and highlighted the interests of 
the great masses. " Proletarian culture'· was utilized to propagate '·revolution,' · in particu lar, 
how the ·'revolution" had changed the fate of the poor Chinese people, as illustrated by the 
popular movies in the Maoist times. Of equa l importance, thi s cu lture was used to legitimate 
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the CCP' s rule of China and enhance the CCP's image globally. The promotion of a 
"proletari an cu llllre" suggested that the Party was in line with the masses and represented the 
interests of the proletari at. It raised the "altmistic'· nature of the CCP by highlighting the 
differences between itself and ruling parties in Western countries, its predecessors in the 
imperial Chinese dynasti es as well as Chiang Kai-shek's regime, all of whom served the 
interests of the minority privileged classes. 
In addition, Mao 's China recast China's national cu lture according to the Chinese poli tical 
elites ' understanding of Marxist materiali sm defined in a "scientifi c" and "modern" way. 
Mao ' s government placed emphasis on antitheism in political ideology and education. The 
CCP asked the Chinese people to overthrow feuda lism and "old" culture including 
Confucianism which was eu logized in imperial China. It also required Chinese people to 
break down their superstitions. The Chinese Maoists rejected Chinese cultural tradition 
because they regarded it as a hindrance to "continuous revolution" as well as building a "New 
China." During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), one of the stated goals was to bring an 
end to the "Four Olds (si jiu) ," which were "old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old 
habits." ' The promotion of thi s "scientifi c" cu lture was used to reconstruct a new image of 
China, a "new" nation quite different from the old, imperial and feuda l China. 
In China 's international behaviour, the CCP leaders not only stressed the importance of 
cultural cooperation in the underdeveloped world in solidarity with the anti-imperiali st 
revolutionary movements, but also encouraged cu ltural di versity in the non-Western world to 
counteract the dominance of Western culture. 
In short, during the Maoist era, Chinese "proletarian" culture, one the one hand, di scarded 
much of Chinese tradition and promoted a "universalistic" revolution and an image of the 
"New" China. On the other hand, thi s culture promoted cultural nationali sm and diversity in 
the non-Western world . By doing so, Mao ' s China projected China 's political identity as a 
revolutionary state and cul tural identity as a non-Western nation. While today' s Chinese 
culture has little relevance to revolution, China cont inues to highlight its cultural identity and 
appeal for cultural diversity in the non-Western world to neutrali ze the influence of Western 
cufture. 
Since China's initiation of refonn in the late 1970s, China has rehabilitated its traditional 
culture in a way that blends it with modem aspects of Chinese culture. We thus have seen the 
emphasis of traditional Chinese values by the Chinese elites, the reviva l of Confucianism and 
the establishment of Confucius Institutes all qver the world . These changes are directl y linked 
1 
"tllt/=i - l;JJ Lt·.%\l!ttljl" (Sweep away all monsters and demons), RMRB (June 1, 1966), I. 
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to regime legitimacy as well as recasting China's renewed, positi ve and dynamic image in the 
context of China' s ri se. 
Firstl y, the rehabilitation of Chinese tradi tional culture has been used to strengthen national 
cohesion when the ideology of communism and Maoism lost publ ic appeal. As di scussed in 
Chapters Three and Five, the CCP has launched various nati onal patrioti c campaigns by 
advancing so-called "Chinese socialist culture" and Chinese cultural heritage including 
Confuci anism. Whi lst the fonner has been promoted within the Party, the latter has been 
propagated in Chinese society. The rehabili tat ion of Chinese trad iti onal culture has been done 
in a way that has been re-interpreted accordin g to the CCP' s political needs fi rs t and foremost 
to enhance the CCP' s leadership role and the Chinese people ' s be li ef in thi s regime. 2 ln thi s 
sense, Ch inese culture has still been shaped by the Party 's po liti cal need to reta in and 
consolidate its rule in China. 
ln the meantime, Chi nese culture has been re-interpreted by Chinese poli tical eli tes to 
enhance China' s global appea l and to placate certain international worries about China's fast 
materi a l growth. The Chinese elites seek to present a cu ltured and beni gn China. They have 
burrowed into Chinese history to find aspects of traditional Chinese thought that may have 
global appea l. Chinese scholars have pointed out those concepts, such as hann ony, diversity, 
pacifism, morali ty, and inclusiveness, have long been emphasized in Chinese hi story and 
traditi on and these concepts have uni versal chann. 3 These concepts have been endorsed by 
the Chi nese leaders, for instance, building a "harmonious society" or a "harm oni ous world. " 
Accordingly, the Chinese eli tes have made enom10us efforts to project a "cul tural China" 
mix ing with the Chinese traditional cu lture with modem cu lture. Whil st the Chinese 
government still advances cultura l diversity and cu ltural nationali sm, it also puts emphasis on 
concepts such as "harmony without un ifonn ity'· and " peaceful coexistence" by prom oting a 
Chinese culture featuring vital ity, pacifi sm and inclusiveness. 
These deve lopments in the way that China ' s culture was understood and projected were a key 
component of the Beijing Olympics. During Chi na ' s hosting of th e Olympic Games, Chinese 
authori ties projected the idea of a "cu ltural China" into the centre of Chinese dialogue with 
the fo reign public. The "prol etarian'· culture which promoted revo lution and condemned 
2 For example see Yu Dan , T /J ((i{;'ilfY ,(,,ft! (A perception of the Confi ,cian Analects fro m Yu Dan) , 
Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2006. She has built her fame in and outside of China by interpreting 
Co,!f11cia11 Analects in a modem way and maki ng reference to contemporary China. H owever, many 
other scholars have pointed out her cherry-picking of the Analects, see fo r in stance Li Yue, " «i"b8' )) 
uJ ~ liL i#i!;J? ·· (Can the Confucian Analects be an notated randomly?), RMRB (overseas edition, 
February 8, 2007). 4. Some are very blunt that Yti" s way of interpretation alludes to regime legitimacy 
and ra tionale fo r an authoritarian state (interview wi th Chinese historian Zhao Tong , Canberra, 
November 21 , 2011 ). 
3 One recent research is Yan Xuetong1 Ancient Chinese Tho ught, Atfodern Chinese Power (Princeton, 
N.J .: Princeton University Press, 20 11 ). 
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Chinese traditional culture and the image of Chainnan Mao disappeared.4 This interpretation 
of a "cultural China" was used to tell the world that China would not use its newfound wealth 
to launch revolution but that its rich cultural assets could contribute to a "harmonious world ." 
From a comparison of the particular aspects of Chinese culture promoted by Maoist China 
and contemporary China, one can see a clear shift from condemning the traditional culture of 
China to a re-embracing of the culture. The denunciation of China's "old" culture was used to 
serve China' s "continuous revolution." The rehabilitation of Chinese traditional culture is for 
the purpose of creating a dynamic, cultured and benign China. Meanwhile, the CCP has 
consistently used Chinese culture to strengthen its rule over China and to consolidate its 
leadership role by circumspectly monitoring the Chinese free press. 
6.1.2.2 China as a model for development 
In both periods China clearly represented itself as a model for national development , 
particularly for those states in the "Global South," still struggling towards independence and 
development. However the nature of the model of development that China has promoted has 
differed significantly across the two eras. China ' s development model has moved from 
building an example for achieving revolution and communism to·economic-driven refonn. As 
discussed in Chapter Four, the CCP from the late 1950s vigorously promoted its experience 
of waging a war of national liberation against imperialism and colonialism for the benefit of 
the colonial and post-colonial societies. It sought to set an exemplary model for nation 
building for the underdeveloped world. China's effort in thi s regard to some extent was 
motivated by the Sino-Soviet rift and the Chinese perception of the "degeneration" of the 
revolutionary spirit of the CPSU. Chinese Maoists thus thought that they should play a 
leading role in providing support for the struggling peoples in the underdeveloped world 
owing to "proletarian internationalism." Maoist China as a model for revolution and nation 
building was strengthened by its assistance programmes for colonial or post-colonial societies. 
China ' s foreign aid in thi s period constituted not simply a fonn of hard power but also a 
significant source of soft power. It was involved in the exportation of Chinese revolution and 
Maoist ideology, instigating local struggles against colonialists and imperialists as well as 
providing support for national development in the Third World. The example the Maoist 
China sought to build appeal to an alternative moral authority seeking to transfonn the 
international system based on revolution and the ideology of Marxism-Leninism-Mao 
Zedong Thought. 
In recent years, China has also built itself a,s an exemplar for economic development. This 
time China as a model tied to economic-driven refonn started in the late 1970s, which 
4 Barme, "China' s flat earth," 64-86. 
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contrasts radicall y with the communist revolutionary model in Mao's era. Post-M ao China 
has maintained rapid economic growth even when some other countries have been struggling 
with financial cri ses. It has experienced a fa st socio-economic transfonnation with overall 
supervision from a strong state government. As a result, more and more analysts tend to 
extract a "China model'" for economic development. Nonetheless, worldwide opinion on the 
di stinctiveness and integrity of the "China model" is split. Some ana lysts endorse the "China 
model. " They argue that China 's economic refonn and development since the late 1970s 
provide more economic opportw1ities for other countries and represent an alternative to the 
Western neo-liberal model for other similar developing countri es. 5 On the other hand, some 
contend that the "China model" is just a repl ica of "mercantilism" and China actuall y applies 
"neo-colonialism" in regions such as Africa. 6 They are also very sceptical about China's 
political system, arguing that if China represents a model , it actually promotes the 
development of authoritarian regimes. Therefore, the subject of a "China model" is still under 
debate particularl y regarding what it represents and what the implications are for different 
audience. 
Nevertheless, in its Olympic period, China made tremendous efforts to project its economic 
vitality and capacity by projecting a high-tech and en vironment-friendl y China. It brought 
people's attention to a model for development - an opening economy but with the state 
retain ing finn control. Compared to Maoist China, China as a model for development , 
although the CCP remains in charge, is no long self-reliant but opened to the rest of the world . 
lt has shifted from the emphasis of egalita,ianism by bui lding People ' s Communes to market 
economy through gradual refonns, and competition and cooperation. 
6.1.2 .3 Chinese foreign policy and diplomacy 
In both eras, China' s foreign poli cy and diplomacy have been important sites in which soft 
power has been both constituted and mobili zed. They provide a lens for us to investi gate 
continuity as well as contrast in the way China 's soft power is constituted . The PRC has 
made various adjustments to Chinese foreign policy and diplomacy to serve the state's 
interests and enhance its leadership rol e in world politics. 
5 For instance, see Barry Saunnan and Yan Hairong, "Afri can perspectives on Chi na -Afri can li nks," 
n,e China Quarterly, 199 (September 2009), 728-59; Barry Naughton, "China ' s di sti nctive system: 
can it be a model for others?;· in S. Philip Hsu et al ed s .. In Search a/China 's Development Model, 
67-85. 
6 Such a review is referred to various studies, for instance, Chris A Iden, Daniel Large and Ri cardo 
Soares de Oliveira, eds., China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Co111i11ent Embrace (London: 
Hurst & Co., 2008); Ian Taylor, China ·s ,\lew Role in Africa (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Ri enner 
Publi shers, 2009); Special issue of 77,e China Quarterly, " China and Afri ca: emergi ng patterns in 
globali zati on and deve lopment." vo l.1 99 (2009); Yi-Feng Tao, " From a socia li st state to a mercantili st 
state: depoliti cizing centra l banki ng and Chinas economic growth s ince 1993,"' in S. Philip Hsu et al 
eds., /11 Search a/China 's Development Model, 111-127. 
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In the 1960s, China's diplomacy was guided by the "double-anti" foreign policy and the 
strategy of forming the widest "united front" among forces caught in between the two 
superpowers. 1n its rhetoric and diplomatic practices, Maoist China demonstrated that it was 
an independent force and a "third pole" in the bipolar world system and a major player 
fighting against the two hegemons, namely, the US and the USSR. It also attempted to 
promote solidarity in the Third World by providing support for movements of national 
liberation and development. Whether the issues rel ated to China or not, the PRC was the 
finnest fo llower of the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention in dealing with 
international affairs, as demonstrated by the promotion of "Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence" and "Eight Principles of China's Aid" discussed in Chapter Four. 
After China entered into its refonn period, it has dramatically modified its foreign policy and 
diplomatic behaviour to better serve domestic economic development. China no longer 
exports revolution and political ideology. It has become more fl exible and pragmatic, and put 
more emphasis on "peaceful development" through efforts to cooperate with others to 
maintain a stable regional and international environment. Since the end of the Cold War and 
particu larly since the mid-! 990s, China has clearly demonstrated its desire to play a 
cooperative and at times a leadership role in regional or global affairs, as illustrated in 
Chapter Five. More prominent ly, the hosting of the Beijing Games _provided China a great 
platfonn fo r intensive interaction with the rest of the world. It provided a venue for China to 
project a role of benign and responsible power which represented a new pattern of rising 
through peaceful means such as cooperation and engagement with others within the 
internati onal system rather than as a revisionist seeking to overthrow the system. Beijing 
accordingly constructed a leadership role in seeking solving the conflicts in Sudan and Bunna 
in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics. 
In ·short , in di scussing the sources that constitute China's soft power in both eras, one can find 
both consistency and variation. First, we have seen that Chinese culture has been selectively 
interpreted according to political interests . Whi lst traditional culture was largely denounced 
by Mao 's government for the sake of carrying out his "continuous revolution" movement, 
this culture has been rehabilitated in recent decades. Chinese culture has been reinterpreted 
by the Chinese political elites by re-embracing their traditions but in a way blended with 
modernised elements, as staged in the opening ceremony of the Beijing Games to recast 
China ' s image as a dynamic, cultured and renewed nation. The selective use of Chinese 
culture in Mao's era as well as in the refonn era is directly linked to regime legitimacy. 
Second, China as a model for developme~t has gone from serving as an exemplar for 
revolution to being an example of economic-driven development. But in both eras, the China 
model is in contrast to the Western one, and the CCP's leadership role has been projected as a 
finn condition to achieve national development, in particular, to Chinese citizens. Third, 
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China has become more accommodated to the international system in carrying out foreign 
policy and diplomacy than in the Maoist period. At its Olympic moment, it brought global 
attention by projecting a responsible global power image. 
6.1.3 Mobilization of China's soft power 
The third factor that this chapter compares is the mobilization of China' s soft power in 
revolutionary China and reformist China culminating in its hosting of the Beijing Olympics. 
As explored through the two case studies, soft power not only depends on the avai lab le soft 
power sources, but also the purposeful mobilization of these sources. Like the constitution of 
China ' s soft power, there have been both consistent and varying dimensions in the 
mobili zation of soft power sources in the PRC. 
The consistency is seen in a state-centric approach that has been adopted to mobilize and 
project the key sources of soft power in the PRC. In both eras, the Chinese government has 
played a central role in shaping and enhancing China's soft power, whether by cultura l 
interaction, multilateral diplomacy, or foreign aid. For instance, both in the revolutionary 
period and the refonn era, the government has authorized cultural interaction between China 
and foreign countries by media , educationa l, and cu ltura l exchanges. The govenunent has 
assigned cultural interaction a significant role in projecting Ch ina's global role. State-
controlled media has served as an important source in projecting China 's dynami c image and 
promoting Chinese government 's views, actions or policies on specific issues. Educational 
and cultural exchanges supported by the government provide the opportunity for the 
engagement between Chinese and foreign peoples. These constitute Chinese efforts to 
promote China to serve Chinese political interests.7 
This state-centric approach can be best understood by the fact that the PRC is a one-party 
state. The govenunent or the CCP has been very careful in dealing with foreigners , perhaps as 
a result of its late arrival to modern international society. Chinese leaders once claimed that 
" there is no trivial matter concerning foreign affairs," and this mindset still has an impact on 
China·s conduct in foreign affairs today. 8 The CCP's caution and carefulness regarding 
China's foreign affairs since the beginning of the PRC reflect its sensiti vity to fore ign views 
of China. The Chinese political elites know that the legitimacy of the CCP at home is tied to 
how the Party manages China 's international relations. The CCP thus wi ll not loosen its 
control of international affairs. 
7 PRC" s efforts in thi s regard can be seen in Emmanuel John Hevi , An African Studem in China 
(London: Pall Mall Press, 1963); Anne-Marie Brady, Making the Foreign Se1Te China: Managing 
Foreigners in the People 's Republic (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publ ishers, 2003). 
8 Chen Li fen. ·'/hJ,~.;l{;;JcffiiJ!!~i',!jffii.J-i IIl?'~X:'i':f':'f~" (Zhou En la i laid the fo undation for New China 's 
foreign affairs), Jt :1: /11/)K: {Extensive Collection of Party His101y), no.2 (2007), 19-21. 
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There are changes however. The government has expanded its efforts to deploy soft power 
both in terms of the means it employs and the regions it reaches out to. Firstly, Mao' s China 
in the peak of the revolutionary period rejected the majority of the international institutions 
created after World War II. It s multilateral engagement was confined to Asian-African 
regional organizations or activities, such as the Afro-Asian People 's Solidarity Organization 
and the non-aligned movement in the Third World. China's multilateral engagement with 
Western countries in the 1960s was very limited. For instance, the Geneva Conference on a 
settlement of the Laotian question from 1961 to 1962 was one of very few such 
engagements.9 In contrast, China in the refonn era has become more wil ling to participate in 
and engage with regional and international organizations and at times it has shown its 
willingness to play a leadership role such as in the UN. The Chinese government has 
increasingly used multilateralism to address and frame global issues according to its own 
position and project itself as responsible globa l power. Combination of international 
engagement but from a position of strength, the Beijing Olympics served as both a 
demonstration of China's identity as a responsible great power and a platfonn for the 
projection of this identity. 
Secondly, China has intensified its cultural interaction by various means with different 
countries and regions all over the world. In Mao' s times, as discussed in Chapter Four, the 
media was used as a major tool for propaganda and was mainly confined to exporting 
Chinese movies, publications and radio broadcasts to the underdeveloped world. Cultural 
interaction was limited to touring perfonnances, holding and participating in cultural events 
in a few Asian-African countries. Thanks to the revolution in infonnation and technology and , 
more importantly, China's refonn program and growing economic strength, China ' s cu ltural 
interaction has expanded to a large number of countries and regions. China bas scaled up the 
"going out" programmes of its culture. For instance, it has established numerous Confucius 
Institutes to introduce Chinese language and culture across the world. The numbers of 
students and intellectuals in exchange programs have increased enormously as shown in 
Chapter Five. In the run-up to the Beijing Olympics, the Chinese government has al so 
invested a lot in expanding its media programmes to push Chinese media "going abroad" to 
co1npete with other global media in providing Chinese news and infonnation. 
6.1.4 The purpose and audience of mobilizing and projecting China's soft 
power 
The foutih factor to compare and contrast China' s soft power between Mao ' s China and 
today' s China is the purpose and target audience of deploying soft power in the two contexts. 
9 See Xie Yixian ed., Diplomatic His/a,y ofConlempora,y China (1949-2009) , 116-119. 
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China's soft power mobili zat ion and proj ection in the two periods vary in objectives, which 
detem1ine the aud iences that China seeks to win over. In the 1960s, the minimum goal of 
Maoist soft power promotion was to obtain recognition and prestige from the emerging forces 
in the Third World and to break up international iso lation from the two superpowers. The 
maximum objective was to build itself as a political and mora l leader in world affai rs by 
leading a world revolution to overturn the bipolar world order. To break up China ' s 
international isolation, Maoist soft power was vigorously promoted to win the audiences 
caught in the competition between the two superpowers, the US and the USSR. For Mao ' s 
China, the emerging struggles in As ia, Africa and Latin America represented the main forces 
that could undennine the foundations of the rule of imperialism and colonialism, great-power 
chauvinism, and transfonn the outlook of internationa l politics. It thus targeted Third World 
societies that were undertaking anti-imperialist struggles and seeking national independence 
and development. Maoist China made tremendous efforts to demonstrate that it represented 
an alternative to the two superpowers, a worthy example for them to emulate. In pursuit of 
this objective, Maoist foreign policy practices were endowed with a miss ionary quality, 
visible in the manner in which the Chinese Maoists promoted their own way of life (such as 
wea lth distributed equall y, proletarian altruism and so on) to the fo reign public. Chinese 
revolutionary foreign policy was entrenched in a nonnative direction to transfonn the 
international sys tem from hierarchy to equality. This was the begirming of a period wherein 
China vigorously sought to in fluence other states either through demonstra tion or model 
effect, and claimed to be an actua l or potential leader in a moral mission. 
China in the refonn era has sought integration into the existing international system. It 
intends to demonstrate that it is a benign, positive and responsible international actor in the 
global community including both developing world and developed societies. Responding to 
globa l concerns about China ' s rapid wea lth accumulation and worries about whether Chi na 's 
rise will challenge the liberal international order, China has projected its soft power to 
persuade or convince the external world that China can achieve its grea t power status without 
posing a tangible threat to the existing international system. Soft power for contemporary 
China, therefore, represents both a campaign of "charm offensive" and a movement to play 
down fears of a ''China threat.' ' 
That China secured the right to host the 2008 Olympic Games in 200 I provided a great 
opportunity for the Chinese people to project a positive image of China in front of the global 
community. China seized thi s great moment to reach out to a global audience, not on ly the 
··Global South."" but also the "Global Nonh." In thi s international spotlight, China projected 
itself a nomrnl , modem, civili sed and renewed nation. In the meantime, it sought to assuage 
international anxieties about China's rapid growth by engaging with the norm of 
··responsibility."· Facing multiple globa l audiences, the Chinese elites articulated their vision 
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of Chinese history, society, development and relations with the outside world. They 
attempted to send a message that China had tried to play a constructive role and contribute to 
a world of "harmony without conformity." 
During thi s process, however, one central purpose of China' s so ft power projection has not 
been changed: China has always sought to re-attain great power status in the international 
arena. As shown in the case studies, there has been very deliberate international political 
marketing pursued by the PRC. It has striven to "sell China" to achieve the recognition of 
China' s international status as a key player from the international community. Whether it was 
the projection of the PRC as an inspirational beacon for the world revolution in the 1960s, or 
the emphasis on China as a responsible great power in the 2000s, China has attempted to 
demonstrate that it represents a great power on the world stage and to secure international 
recognition of what it sees as its rightful place. This desire is identical to the hi storical 
mission of the Chinese elite in rejuvenating the Chinese nation since the late 19th century, 
reflecting both the "Middle Kingdom" sentiment and a strong China complex as analysed in 
the two case studies. 
Following the above point, there has been a constant reference to the domestic audience in 
China's soft power promotion in both contexts. This is certainly the case in the Maoist era. 
As discussed above as well as in Chapter Four, Maoist China propagated China's new 
"proletarian culture," the People's Communes, the world significance of the Chinese 
revolution and China ' s "proletarian internationali sm," to support revolutions. In thi s process, 
the CCP enhanced its leadership credentials at home by demonstrating its "altruistic" 
qualities and its endeavour to build China as an alternative to the "selfi sh" superpowers. To 
some· extent, this is also true with the hosting of the Beijing Olympics. By staging a 
successful and spectacular Olympic Games and projecting a renewed , civilised and rich 
China on the world stage, the Party sought to show its credibility and competence in leading 
the country to an audience of Chinese citizens. Therefore, in China 's soft power promoti on, 
there has always been a desi re to seek domestic support for the Party' s rule . As such, we can 
see a duali sm between the state and the Party: when perceptions of the country are promoted 
through China' s soft power, thi s has also rai sed the CCP ' s role and leadership credential at 
home and abroad. 
To conclude this section, by comparing and contrasting the key factors, including I) the 
context, 2) the constitution of China' s .soft power, 3) the mobilization, and 4) the purpose and 
target audience of deploying soft power in the two contexts, it demonstrates that changes and 
continuities are relevant across all these factors. 
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6.2 Understanding the nature of China's soft power 
From the above comparison, it can be seen that China' s soft power is dynamic and evolving. 
Thi s study recognizes tha t such a nature of China's soft power is related to the changing 
domestic and in ternational contexts, as di scussed by the first section. At the same time, this 
study argues that the dynamic and evolving nature of China ' s soft power correlates with 
Chinese elites ' shifting perceptions and representations of China's national identity in 
relation to the post-war international system. China' s soft power is shaped by, but al so 
constitutive of, the perceived China' s national identity. 
The PRC' s nati onal identi ty has changed greatl y "from a revolutionary country that rejected 
the existing international regime to a responsible power within the system." Accordingly, 
"China has switched to a di ffe rent strategic paradigm, one that sees the world in cooperative 
rather than confrontational tenns ... the main thrust of Chinese diplomacy today is not to 
create a new international order, but to join the existing order. " 10 This point of view sheds 
light on the understanding of a hi storical change in the way in whi ch China' s soft power is 
constituted and mobilized, which correlates closely with the re-ori entation of China's national 
identity. 
During most of the Maoist period, the PRC faced an unfavourable international envirorunent. 
Maoist China experienced non-recognition and non-engagement from the post-war 
· international system. It was denied membership in the UN and its internationa l legi timacy 
was questioned by many sta tes. Further, perceived ideological differences and conflicts of 
national interests between the PRC and the USSR since the late 1950s alienated China from 
the Soviet bloc. The Chinese perception of the PRC's marginal position in the post-war 
international system reinfo rced the mentali ty of "a century of humili ation ." Th is victim 
menta lity was pervasive among the Chinese politica l elites, particularly when they fe lt that 
China was denied and bullied by the superior powers, and when they contrasted thi s with the 
glory China had enjoyed as "the Middle Kingdom" in ancient times. This mentality and the 
denial of international recognit ion alienated China from the mainstream of the international 
communi ty in the 1960s. Consequently, China felt and posited itself as an "outside r'· with 
respect to the international system in so far as that system was one dominated by the 
superpowers; however it did not view itself as an outsider in relation to the developing world 
but instead saw itself as a revolutionary Third World power. 
The perceptions of itself as an "outsider" of the system but al so a revo lutionary Third World 
power shaped the way in which China constituted and projected its soft power. As an 
··outsider" · of the system, the PRC promoted its differences from the major powers. These 
10 Ni Feng. '·The shaping of Chinas fo reign policy,•· 146-7. 
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differences were found in its past experience of fighting against imperialism and colonialism 
on the pathway to the Chinese revolution; and in its national traits of being "non-white" and 
less developed . The Chinese political elites framed China ' s soft power through highlighting 
these differences, and used them as foundations upon which they sought to restore China's 
rightful place on the world stage. 
From a CCP 's point of view, its victory in 1949 was a victory over internal "reactionaries," 
the KMT; but it was also a triumph over external foes including European and Japanese 
colonialism and American interventionist imperialism. Therefore, the CCP believed that its 
regime legitimacy was deeply rooted in its course of revolution. In the international arena, 
Maoist China ' s cred ibility lay in "a far-reaching i.ntluence on the revolution in the East as 
well as in the whole world." 11 Chinese leaders claimed that "the road that the Chinese people 
have followed .. . is the road that the peoples of many colonial and semi -colonial areas should 
traverse .. It is the Mao Zedong road ... the fundamental road for the people in similar 
colonial and semi-colonial areas." 12 ln the Chinese leadership's perception, the Chinese state 
was born of revolution and its legitimacy was based on the CCP's successful campaign of 
revolution against the reactionary forces. The Maoists believed that the PRC's international 
credibility and appeal lay in its path of revolution and as a model for emulation, as an 
inspirational beacon of world revolution. 
Therefore, "China had a specia l role in the reshaping of a future revolutionary order in the 
world." 13 China ' s revolutionary foreign policy actually reflected and reinforced its national 
identity as a revolutionary Third World power in world politics, as retlected in its support of 
the struggles in colonized non-Western world. The emerging revolutions in Asia, Africa and 
Latin America from the 1950s on "provided both a test and a validation of the PRC national 
identity as a champion of national liberation struggles in colonial and semi-colonial areas." 
These movements "presented the exogenous trigger for national identity mobilization and 
confirmed for the national self and 'others ' that China could stand up for the integrity of its 
self-image as a supporter of national liberation movements against imperialism and 
colonialism."" Therefore, Chaimrnn Mao and his colleagues unswervingly insisted on the 
,visdom and centrality of the Chinese model and experience of revolution. 
However, this revolutionary rhetoric and practice were seen as a great challenge to the 
stability of the post-war international system. American leaders were aware of and frightened 
11 Selected Works of Mao, vol.I: 191 , vol.4: 158. 
12 
··J1JpjSffEiJEiiii~iittI~~ij(J:.i¥J:lf%i.al" °'iu Shaoqi's inauguration speech at the Trade Union 
Conference of Asian and Australasian Countries), RMRB (22/11/1949), I. 
13 Zhai Qiang, China and the Viemam Wars, 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill : University of North Carolina 
Press 2000), 21; Chen Jian, Mao 's China m1d the Cold War, 122. 
14 Zhai Qiang, China and the Vietnam Wars, 21-2. 
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by the challenges from Communist China to their dominant position in the internationa l order. 
Thi s can be seen in the debate over '·who lost China," and the emergence of McCarthyism in 
American politics and the "domino theory" in As ia. To some extent, America's fr ustration , 
fear and resentment of "Red Chi na" trapped American fo rces in Asia, intervening in two wars, 
the Korean War and the Vietnam War, both of which had Chinese backup. 
China's proj ection of "Maoist soft power" and Maoist China' s support of revo lutionary 
movements in the Third World sent Americans' threat perceptions of Communist China 
spiralling. Compared to the USSR, wh ich was viewed by many Westerners as "conservative" 
with its realist realpolitik, " Red China" was perceived as "a more ideologically charged , 
overtl y revoluti onary, face of Communism." 15 Mao 's later elucidation of the concept of the 
" intermediate zone," a part of hi s international united fro nt strategy, was an extension of the 
CCP's revoluti onary experi ence before 1949 to the entire world in the 1960s. In addition , the 
emphasis on "continuous revolution" immediately had internati onal im pl ications and 
appli cations, further contributing to the external perceptions of China. In short, "mutual 
suspicion and mi strust" percepti ons were apparent between China and the West, the US in 
parti cular, and with it "a process of action and reaction" which hardened the positions of both 
sides 16 and frni her cemented PRC's revolutionary identity. 
A ll in all , Chi na 's revo lutionary identity was founded on its past revolutionary experience, 
confinned by Soviet endorsement at the very beginning of the PRC, and reinforced by 
American antagoni sm in the early da ys of the Cold War. This revolutionary identity framed 
China ' s soft power and was reflected in China' s policies. The "double anti " and Third World 
revolutionary policies were the products of thi s identity. These policies further strengthened 
the perceptions of China 's identity as a revolutionary power and an "outside r" of the 
international system, which contributed China's cha ll enge to the CPSU' s leadership in the 
world revolutionary movement in the post-Stalin era. To fu lfil the miss ion of "continuous 
revo lution," the PRC at home launched the GLF, a bold leap to bypass the Soviet path of 
industrialization and to overtake the West. Abroad , it challenged the Soviet proposition of 
.. peacefu l co-existence" between the different regimes. The PRC s simu ltaneous quarre ls with 
both superpowers gave its revolutionary ideological presence global undertones. It thus 
ali gned itself with the so-called ·Third World," and vigorous ly promoted Third World 
solidarity and radical circumvention of the bipolar world order and of its established 
organiza tions by positioning itself in the centre of the world revo lution. On the one hand, 
Mao enthused about "excellent'· revolutionary upsurges around much of the Third World , 
where .. [American] imperialism and [Soviet] revisionism are more iso lated than ever. .. On the 
15 Scott. China Stands Up, 25. 
16 Yongjin Zhang. China in J111ernational Society since 1949, 49. 
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other hand, he insisted that across the Third World "people in countries realize that China's 
road is the on ly road to liberation. China is not only the political centre of world revolution; it 
must also be the centre of world revolution militarily and technically."" Mao 's position on 
the world revolutionary movement and the role he prescribed for China to play in the 
movement infonns what I have conceptualized as "Maoist soft power." Maoist China 
promoted "proletarian culture," China as a model for revolution and development, and a 
revolutionary foreign policy to attract the peoples in the (post)colonized non-Western world . 
The way Maoist soft power was constituted and mobilized in tum reinforced the PRC's 
revolutionary identity. 
However, the PRC's revolutionary identity reached a turning point in the 1970s. First, China 
experienced dramatic changes in the international strategic environment at the beginning of 
the 1970s. The first significant event was the PRC' s admission to the UN as the sole 
representative of China in 1971. It became a legitimate member of the existing international 
system and thi s was followed by more than 50 member states' diplomatic recognition of the 
Beijing government within the decade. 18 Second, the Sino-US rapprochement in 1972 broke 
through the encirclement from the superpowers in the 1960s. The nonnalisation of bilateral 
relations between China and the US culminated in the establishment of a full diplomatic 
relationship in 1979. China thus began to end the situation of non-recognition and non-
engagement between itself and the international system. It was no longer possible for China 
to shape its foreign policy from the point of view of an "outsider"; the changes catalysed a re-
orientation of China's national identity in the post-Mao era. In addition to the changed 
international strategic environment, the abandomnent of China's revolutionary identity al so 
resulted from profound reflections on the Maoist path to attaining international leadership by 
revolution and associated policies, which had undermined China's domestic deve lopment and 
affected the lives and well -being of the people. China' s revo lutionary identity finall y 
collapsed when Deng Xiaoping gained paramount status in the CCP by initiating the project 
of "~eform and opening-up" at the end of 1978. This project was set to transform China 's 
economy, science and technology, education and national defence within the existing 
international system. 
Soon after the decision to "reform and open up," Deng set the tone of China' s role for the 
following decades: " the role we play in international affairs is determined by the extent of our 
economic growth. If our country becomes more developed and prosperous, we will be in a 
17 Mao Zedong, "China should become the arsenal for world revolution (July 7, 1967)," in Classified 
Chinese Communist Docum ent: An Analysis (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, National 
Chengchi University, 1978), 455. 
18 See the website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/ziliao/2 193/ 
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position to play a greater role in internationa l affai rs." 19 Since then , the Chinese govenunent 
has been gi ving priority to economic development. It aims to li ft China from Third World 
socio-economic levels to those found in the First World through opening-up and interaction 
with the outside world , especially the advanced West. 
The changed international environment and Chinese leaders' determination to impl ementing 
" reform and opening-up" have had a significant impact on redefining China's nationa l 
identity. Along with China ' s rapid economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s, it has generated 
new confidence at home but greater concerns and expectations of China abroad . The concept 
of being a responsible great power has come to the fore at the tum of the new century, against 
the backdrop of warnings of a ri sing "China threat. " Addi tionally, due to the development of 
infonnation teclmology since the 1990s, the speed of globa li zation has become faster and the 
scope wider. In thi s context, the Chinese political elite has begun to recogni ze that in the 
globalized world , the destiny of China is tied up with other countries, as evidenced by the 
Asian Financia l Crisis, the spread of terrori sm and epidemics, and the issue of climate change. 
The nature of security has changed dramatically. China senses that its security, traditional or 
non-traditional , is closely connected with the other powers and actors. Therefore, the rise of 
Chi na as a responsible great power within the international community has been said to be 
not onl y a necessary step on China 's path to great power status but also an interna tional 
requirement and aspiration.2° Chi na ' s new identi ty as a responsible great power has been 
under shaping. lt is the result of the Chinese reflection of the tragedies that happened in the 
Maoist period , such as the GLF and the Cultural Revo lution,21 the changing international 
environment as well as the interaction with other actors. These forces together shape China ' s 
internati onal iden ti ty in the 21 " century. 
China's seeking to enhance its international influence by redefining its identity as a 
responsible great power, is a significant fac tor in the reconstitution of China ' s soft power. 
The way in which China ' s soft power is reconstituted leads to the project ion of a quite 
different image of China. In the first place, unlike in th e Mao' s era, the greatness of China 
today has nothing to do with class struggle and revo lution; instead, it re li es on China's soc io-
economic and socio-politica l development within the international community. Accordingly, 
19 Deng Xiaop ing. "g li1JB'Ji!f!rJ-lOff9V (The present situation and the tasks before us, January 16, 
1980). Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol.2: 225. 
'
0 In China, the concept that Chi na is a '·responsible power' has been stressed in Hu Jintao·s and Xi 
Ji nping·s leadership, whereas in 1he US. Chi na ha s been asked to be a "responsible stakeholder" si nce 
it was addressed by US Deputy Secretary of State Roben Zoellick in 2005. For the academi c 
discussion. for instance, see Yongjin Zhang and Greg Austin eds., Power and Responsibility in 
Chinese Foreign Policy, (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2001). 
" See for example Cong Ji n, The Years qf China 's Tortuous Development, 1949-1989, 268-73 ; Luo 
Hanping, China 0 11 the Eve of Cultural Revolution ; Su Tai ren. ·'X]l1J,-'fjznf,1j.'f'fftc§Y'l\1J<'· (Deng 
Xiaoping·s opinion towards Mao Zedong). ;;Ji/J.Jtiff (Co llected Digest), no.22 (201 1); 56-60; Yang 
Jisheng, Tombstone: Th e Great Chinese Famine, 1958-1962, 2012; 
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China ' s socio-economic achievements, and the ideas and means conducive to its perfornrnnce 
have been highly promoted. Many Chinese consider that the way China has conducted its 
modernization has resulted in a dramatic reduction of poverty in China and contributes to the 
growth of world economy. Secondly, the Chinese people have re-embraced and promoted 
Chinese civilisation and traditional culture. They believe that China' s greatness is very much 
rooted in Chinese civilisation, which is significant for national coherence and the fonnation 
of national consciousness.22 They consider that many aspects of Chinese traditional culture 
would facilitate China' s re-emergence and add to China ' s attractiveness around the globe. 
Further, to demonstrate China's responsibility, China has participated in various multilateral 
international organizations, signed numerous international treaties and taken part in a lot of 
international operations since it decided to join the existing international system in the late 
1970s. 23 These changes in China's international behaviour demonstrate China' s sense of 
membership of the international community. China sees its involvement in the multilateral 
international regimes and actions as indicative of its responsibility for managing the ex isting 
international system. 
However, China's identity as a responsible great power is still taking shape. China has not 
established a clear-cut national identity. As argued by Allen -Carlson, "China' s national 
identity is now less well defined, and more contested, than many observers have previously 
thought."24 To understand China' s national identity, it is important to recognize that "there is 
an uneasy, shifting balance of competing forces and identities." 25 In addition to building 
China as a responsible global power, there are other facets of China's national identity. 
Chinese political elites sti ll regard China as a socialist country with Chinese characteri stics 
and as a major developing state following the sovereignty principle in the Westphalia sense.26 
First, the Chinese political elites maintain that China is a sociali st country with Chinese 
characteri stics, although contemporary China ' s socialism is "in sharp distinction with both 
the style in the former Soviet Union and that in the Maoist China."27 This means that China 
22 For instance, see Xiao Gongqin, "flc:Mi ± :X.-':::i rp 00 ~ ~\9 U1 J!Jl 1¥:J :@'. i,'U~~,, (Nationalism and 
Chinese ideology in the transition period), ,'if!/1/ff.EJ!'f.lJ/! (Strategy and Management), no.4 (1996), 21-
22. 
23 See Samuel S. Kim, "China's path to great power status in the globalization era," Asian Persp ective 
27:1 (2003), 35-75; Alastair lain Johnston, " ls China a status quo power?," International Security 27:4 
(2003), 5-56; Lanteigne, China and lntematio11a/ lnstitutio11s . 
24 Carlson, "China's conflicted Olympic moment," 254. 
25 Kim, "Northeast As ia in the local-regional-global nexus," 42. 
26 The most recent official claim of such was made by President Xi Jinping, see "9" l:isl:lil:.@:- fj=:)tilidtl 
~1'f !(Jtfi:,'f" (China is an advocator and practiser, of cooperation and "win-win"), RMRB (December 6, 
2012), l; a lso see Tiejun Zhang, "Self-identity construction of the present China," Comparative 
Strategy 23:3 (2004), 281-301 ; David Shambaugh, "Coping with a conflicted China," Th e Washington 
Quarterly 34:1 (2011), 7-27. 
27 Tiejun Zhang, "Self-identity construction of the present China," 2004, 289 . 
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will pursue gradual economic refonns whilst maintaining the political status quo, which is in 
contrast with "the ' big bang· and ' shock therapy' of Russ ia and Eastern European countries .'· 
28 The emphasis of China ' s socia li st identity means that Chinese leadership seeks to avoid the 
road taken by the fonner Soviet bloc countries, which are viewed by Chinese political elites 
as negative examples of how to pursue refonn. This concern is reflected in the debate of the 
"Ch ina model ," discussed in the Chapter Three. A further point of this official fonnulation of 
China 's national identity as a socia list country with Chinese characteristics is that it 
highlights the CCP's status as the single ruling party and the guarantor fo r maintaining social 
and political stabi lity in China. The CCP believes that this social and political stability will 
ensure continuous economic growth. 
Second, the Chinese leaders have repeatedly pointed out that while China is rising, it still is a 
developing nation. This official representation of China as a developing state has three 
ramifications. This representation, firstly, justifies the government 's continuing focus on 
national economic development, which in turn would consolidate the CCP' s legitimacy that 
is premised upon economic perfonnance. Secondly, identifying China as a developi ng nation 
can be used as a justification not allowing China to assume more international responsibilities, 
such as those required by the US,29 as China ' s capabilities are constrained when seen as a 
developing nation. Thirdly, China's nati onal identi ty as a developing nation can be used to 
enhance the sense of solidarity between the developing nations on particular issues, for 
instance, the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the country's interna l affairs . 
These three facets of China' s identity - a responsible global power, a socialist regime and a 
developing state - are all reflected in the interpretation and mobili zation of China ' s soft 
power. 
To sum up , the different processes through which China ' s soft power is constituted and 
mobilized in the two eras, and the dynamic nature of China' s soft power are correlated to 
Chinese political elites ' evolving perceptions of China 's national identity and China ' s global 
role in the international system. In its global role, China has moved from an "outsider" who 
sought to overturn the post-war international system to an " insider" playing the role of a 
responsible global power role within the system. China 's reposition ing itself within the 
international system shapes the different ways in which China's soft power is constituted and 
mobi li zed. The relationship between China·s national identity and its soft power is 
commensurate with thi s. China' s national identity is strongly reflected in the way in which 
so ft power is constituted and mobilized. In tum, the interpretation and mobili zation of soft 
power sources enhance and even affirm these perceptions of China 's national identity and of 
" [bid. 
29 See Zoellick. '·Whither China : from membership to responsibility?" 
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China's role in the international system. Mao ' s China at the peak of revolutionary and the 
Beijing Olympics provide two valuab le sites at which to explore these processes. 
6.3 Conclusion 
To conclude, this chapter makes a comparison of China' s soft power constitution and 
mobilization by drawing upon the two case studies in the first half of 1960s and the hosting 
of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. This comparison of China's soft power constitution and 
mobilization in two different historical periods is made by exploring these factors: 1) the 
international and domestic contexts, 2) the constitution of China' s soft power by reviewing 
the interpretations of the key sources, 3) the mobilization of these sources by demonstrating 
the way they were projected, and 4) the purpose and target audience of deploying soft power 
in the two contexts. It demonstrates that variations and continuities are relevant across all 
these factors . The way soft power has been constituted and mobilized projects two quite 
different "Chinas" : one radical , revolutionary and revisionist; and the other cooperative, 
flexible and pragmatic. Across these two eras, the state government has played a central role 
in deploying soft power to attain China ' s "rightful" place in world politics . Despite the 
expanded audience from the developing world to multiple global audiences, there has always 
been a constant domestic orientation in China 's soft power deployment so as to consolidate 
the CCP' s leadership role at home. As such, we can see a dualism between the state and the 
Party: when China' s soft power has been mobilized to enhance the charm of the state, it al so 
raised the CCP' s role and leadership credential at home and abroad. 
This chapter a lso argues that the constitution and mobilization of China' s soft power 
correlates with Chinese political e lites' evolving perception of their state ' s national identity in 
the two eras. The re-conception of China's national identity from a revolutionary state that 
sought to overthrow the existing international system to a responsible and rising power within 
the system is strongly reflected in the different ways China ' s soft power is constituted and 
mobilized. 
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7 Conclusion 
This thesis focuses on the constitution and mobilization of soft power in the PRC. It argues 
that soft power is dynamic and multifaceted, and this has been reflected in the study through 
the examination of how key sources of China 's soft power have been interpreted, mobili zed 
and projected over time by the PRC. This research also sheds light on how we should 
understand China's dynamic soft power. 
There has been a burgeoning literature on China 's soft power particularly in the first decade 
of the 21 " century. This research was initially motivated by the puzzles about the nature of 
soft power and whether it is a "new" phenomenon in China. These puzzles drove this study to 
investigate the possibility of "soft power" efforts in the early period of the PRC and to 
compare them with contemporary China's soft power behaviour in international politics. In 
so doing, it allowed me to compare and contrast the degree of variation and consistency of 
China' s soft power in different eras of the PRC. This study is keen to demonstrate the 
dynamic and fluid nature of China ' s soft power, the different ways that thi s power has been 
used by the Chinese government in different contexts, as welt as the factors that have 
influenced the way that soft power has been treated in the PRC. 
This conclusion chapter provides an overview of this study. It reviews the theoretical 
framework of this study, summarizes the main empirical findings , suggests a new perspective 
of the concept of soft power, and provides wider implications for IR and China in the world. 
7.1 Overview of theoretical framework 
This thesi s is underpinned by the central question of How has sofi power been constituted 
and mobilised by the PRC? The secondary question is How has the constitution and 
mobilization of the key sources of China's soft power varied across time and what factors 
shape the way !hat it is constituted and mobilized? 
In order to provide a fuller and more historically nuanced understanding of the nature and 
role of soft power in the PRC, I adopted a longitudinal historical approach. This approach 
allowed me to explore the more specific questions: I) the key sources that constitute China' s 
soft power; 2) whether these sources have been mobilized and promoted by the PRC in the 
early period, and if so, how; 3) whether soft power is "new" to China, its variation and 
continuity; and 4) the way to understand such variation and continuity. 
In answering these questions, I have developed an analytical framework to guide my case 
studies on the mobilization and projection of Chinese sources of soft power in different 
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historical contexts. My analytical framework includes two layers: one is the nature of soft 
power and the other is the key Chinese sources of soft power. 
The first level of my fram ework, which fo llows the constructivist view of power, treats soft 
power as ideational , relational , and social power. In contrast to hard power, it is harder to 
ignore these characteri stics which are entrenched in soft power. First, soft power is an 
ideational fonn of power, which involves ideational factors such as culture, ideologies, 
values, perceptions and in tentions. These ideational elements can frame and infom1 policies, 
rhetoric and actions. Soft power in international relations is dri ven to secure sympathy, 
recognition and approval from other actors. Second, soft power is rel ational and rel ative . It is 
not an absolute term but is defined through the rel ationship - how the actor views its 
relationship with others. Soft power may vary when the subject or the target changes, as in 
these circumstances the sense of self can be different and this can affect how it defines the 
relationship with others as well as the sources of soft power to project. The shift in the sense 
of self and relationship can affect the way it defines and projects power. Therefore, soft 
power is not self-ordained but is shaped by the relationship and interaction , which leads to the 
third dimension of soft power that it is social. Soft power is constituted and mobilized in a 
multi-directional process through various fonns of social interaction such as learning, 
adaptation and socialization. 
Therefore, soft power is not a "hard thing" or a "fixed reality." It is dynamic and may vary 
when the subj ect's sense of itse lf or its relations with others changes . This approach 
conceives that soft power in vo lves relationships not only with others in a certa in context, but 
also with visions of one' s past, present and future. Therefore, thi s thesis has suggested that a 
better way of looking at soft power is to put it into a certain context and observe it in process 
rather than in a fixed situation. By doing so, I show the different ways that soft power is 
constituted and mobilized and factors that have influenced these processes. 
The second leve l of my framework attaches to the understanding of Chinese thinking about 
soft power. 1 have gone to Ch inese di scourse to explore particularly what const itutes China ' s 
soft power in Chinese thinking. I have identified that a large number of Chinese writings 
about China 's soft power have focused on Chinese cultu re, China's model for deve lopment, 
and Chinese ideas of the way of dealing with foreign affairs . Chinese intell ectuals ha ve 
generally regarded that these are the most important soft power sources not only to enhance 
China·s attractiveness in the international arena but also to assuage fore ign anxieti es about 
the rise of China. The discussions of the three Chinese sources of soft power actually tell us 
much about how the Chinese el ites see their country and what they seek to present China ' s 
national identity in the contemporary world. 
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Combining the two levels of thi s analytical framework , I have proceeded with the exploration 
of the PR C's "soft power" effo11s in its international engagement in two different conte;,.1s, 
one being Mao 's China at the peak of revolutionary times and the other China during the 
hosting the 2008 Olympic Games. At these two historical moments , the PRC was remarkably 
active in its interaction with the outside world through the projection of its non-material 
power. 
Thi s study has demonstrated that Mao 's government promoted "Maoist soft power. " This 
power was promoted by the wish to propagate so-called "proletarian culture," China as a 
model for nation building, and Maoist revolutionary foreign policy and diplomacy. 
" Proletarian culture" was utili zed to propagate "revolution" and "class struggle" as well as to 
attack the "old" "feudalist" culture in imperial China. The Maoists took their successful war 
of national liberation as an exemplar of nation building. They also stressed the importance of 
ega litarianism in developing the country. Maoist revolutionary foreign policy and diplomacy 
were used to instigate "continuous revolution" all over the world to overthrow the 
international system dominated by the superpowers. 
In the recent years, the PRC has also employed a soft power strategy to engage with 
international audience, evident at the moment of its hosting of the 2008 Olympic Games. 
However, soft power at thi s time was constituted, interpreted and mobili zed in a different 
way as compared with such in the Maoist period. It promoted a "cultural China" by 
rehabilitating China' s traditional cultural heritage including Confucianism, a "modern China" 
achieved by the "reform and opening-up" policies, and China as a responsible global power 
in the international system. 
After the two case studies , this thesis has compared and contrasted the degree of variation and 
consistency of China ' s "soft power" in the two different eras of the PRC. 1 have examined 
how the constitution and mobilization of the key Chinese sources of soft power varied across 
time and what factors shaped these processes. This study argues that the evoluti on of PRC's 
soft power is rooted in Chinese elites ' evolving perceptions of their country' s national 
identi ty, the role they wou ld like China to play on the world stage, and China' s relations with 
the international system. How thi s state seeks to represent itself on the world stage has shaped 
the way it chooses to interpret, mobilize and project its soft power. 
7.2 Empirical findings 
There are four key empirical findin gs of this study. First, this thesis has demonstrated that, 
although an American post-Cold War invent.ion, the concept of soft power can be a useful 
ana lytical tool to study foreign policy of any states and to explore the antecedents of 
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contemporary soft power. My research has shown that soft power does not represent a ·'new" 
dimension in China 's international engagement. Rather, elements of soft power were 
practised by Maoist China. Second, thi s thesis has demonstrated that, in PRC' s case, soft 
power is not a "passive•· and '·latent" quality, but has been consciously constituted and 
mobilized by the state to speak to particular audiences - both domestic and international. 
Third, this study has shown that there is a degree of variation and consistency in the way 
China' s soft power is constituted and mobi li zed in the two historical contexts of the PRC. 
Fourth, my research has argued that the variation and consistency of China' s soft power 
correlates with Ch ina' s evo lving identity perceived by the Chinese in the past decades. 
To begin with, by an exhaustive collection and ana lysis of primary data, this research has 
shown that the deployment of soft power is not a "new" strategy used by the PRC; rather, 
elements of soft power were practised by the PRC in the early Cold War period. Under Mao, 
the Chinese state active ly promoted China ' s "new" proletarian culture, the notion of China as 
an exemplary model of revolution and nation-building, and China's revolutionary fore ign 
policy through China ' s cu ltu ra l diplomacy and fore ign aid program mes from 1959 to 1965. 
This demonstrates that, although soft power is a concept developed in the post-Cold War era, 
this concept can be a useful analytical tool to investigate the antecedent(s) to contemporary 
soft power. 
Secondly, this study has demonstrated that soft power is not purely passive in its mode of 
operation - others may want to do or fo llow what one wants them to do because of the 
affinity of culture, values and policies. Rather, it can be nurtured, interpreted and 
reinterpreted , and consciously mobilized and projected by the state. The two case stud ies in 
this thesis have revealed that soft power has been intentional ly chosen and purposefu ll y 
promoted by the Chinese government at different times. This finding is important to the 
conceptuali zati on of soft power as well as its utility in the real world. On the questi on of 
whether soft power is natural or nurtured, Joseph Nye, the concept inventor, has been 
ambiguous and inconsistent. Sometimes Nye argues that soft power comes naturally from the 
uni versally attractive culture, pol iti cal va lues and policies.' Other times Nye implies that a 
country' s soft power could ri se and fall and highlights the importance of wielding public 
diplomacy to "convert'' fo reigners to obtain des ired outcomes,2 which suggests that soft 
power can be developed through using certain mechanism. Janice Bially Mattern points out 
that Nye·s "dual'' treatments of soft power sows "confusion about the kinds of practi cal 
expectati ons one can stake on soft power. "3 From the empirical studies of the PRC 's soft 
1 Nye, Soft Power. 11. 
2 Ibid ., 11 1, 128- 134. 
3 Manern. ·'Why ·soft power" isn 't so soft," 591. 
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power in the two different periods , this study argues that soft power is nurtured, from 
purposeful mobilization of non-material sources of power.4 The constitution and 
mobilization of China' s soft power has been a constant strategy not only to obtain 
international recognition and influence but also to enhance CCP' s legitimacy at home and 
abroad. 
Thirdly, following the finding that soft power has been purposefully mobili zed by the 
Chinese government since the Maoist times, this thesis has demonstrated the change and 
continuity of China' s soft power. A big change is that facing multiple international audiences, 
for contemporary China, soft power is not only to make China appealing in the sense of 
providing a successful model for other societies, particularly in the "Global South," to 
emulate, but is also to assuage the fears of China' s rise which may pose a threat to the 
dominant Western states. As analysed in Chapter Six, the overall nature of China' s soft 
power has changed: from revolutionary and revisionist to cooperative and pragmatic. It has 
departed from an overtly subversive approach to the post-war international system to a more 
complex orientation located within the existing international system. 111 detail , the soft power 
the PRC promoted in the two periods varies in content, targeted audiences, tools, and 
purposes (see Chapter Six) . As for the continuity, thi s study finds that in both case studies, a 
state-centric approach was prominent and the Chinese government has always been keen to 
project a (potential) great power role in the international arena . Beijing has unfailingly 
supervised and even controlled the shaping and (re)interpretation of the sources of China' s 
soft power. This makes the Chinese case of soft power an outstanding example of what Brian 
Hocking calls the "state-centred , hierarchical model."5 However, this state-centric approach 
reflects that the CCP - the on ly ruling party in contemporary China - is very sensitive to its 
international image, which attaches importance to its domestic legitimacy. It thus seeks an 
overarching control of dealing with international affairs. Meanwhile, the PRC has al ways 
sought to attain the international recognition of its (potential) great power status whether by 
propagating world revolution or by projecting its civi lization and modernization. This desire 
is identical to the Chinese hi storic mission to rejuvenate the Chinese nation , reflecting both 
the "Middle Kingdom" sentiment and the "making China strong and rich" complex as 
di scussed in Chapters Three and Chapter Four. 
4 ln this regard, Mingjiang Li has the same argument, see Mingjiang Li , "Soft power: nurture not 
nature," in Li ed ., Soft Power, 3. 
5 Brian Hocking, "Rethinking the ' new' public diplomacy"; Ingrid d'Hooghe, ' 'Public diplomacy in the 
People ' s Republic of China," in Jan Meli ssen ed., The New Public Diplomacy : Soft Power in 
lnlernalional Relations , Basingstoke Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, 29, 96 . Also see Ying Fan, "Soft 
power: power of attraction or confusion? ," 150 . 
217 
The fo w1h important finding of thi s study is that the variation and consistency in the way 
China ' s soft power is consti tuted and mobili zed correlates with China's evolving identity 
perceived by the Chinese elites in the past decades. This is what the Chinese elites seeks 
China to represent in the world that frames its soft power, whereas soft power in turn 
manifests and strengthens this representation. Therefore, identity-fonnation affects the 
models of soft power and different national identities can inform different fonn s of soft 
power. In thi s regard, "national identity" becomes an important factor in understanding soft 
power. 
On the one hand, the Chinese perceptions of China's national identity have changed 
enonnously over past decades. The Chinese reflection of their past (its glory and humiliation, 
its mistakes in the Maoist period), learning from others through interaction (with other 
powers and international institutions), and vision of "reality" (ever-changing international 
environment and world order) all together have impacted on the Chinese perceptions of 
China ' s national identity in relation to others. The Chinese perceptions of the PRC's national 
identity have shifted from being an "outs ider" as a "revolutionary great power" to an 
" insider" as a (potential) responsible global power in relation to the post-war international 
system. These two different identities point to two fonns of China's soft power. Each fonn of 
China ' s soft power reflects and strengthens China's national identi ty. 
On the other hand , the CCP 's unchanged views of China as a sociali st country with Chinese 
characteristics and a major developing state requires this state to stick to and project its 
"particularity" in the Western-dominated international community in tenns of its political 
system and non-European culture. Thi s ·'particularity" in part reflects the PRC 's sense of 
insecurity in the transfornrntion of the international system since World War II : the PRC is 
not a liberal democratic state and it has territorial issues to resolve, including Taiwan, the 
Diaoy u (Senkaku) Islands, the South China Sea and the Sino-Indian borders . Chinese 
insecurity in the international system also derives in part from the Chinese historical 
sentiment related to its ·'centrny of humiliation." Therefore, China has often defended the 
principles of sovereignty and non-interference against foreign intervent ion in domestic affairs 
and has promoted these in China·s foreign policy. a key source of China ' s soft power. 
7.3 A new perspective on soft power 
Thi s study of China 's soft power makes two main contribution s: one is to the 
conceptualization of soft power in IR, and the other is to a more nuanced understanding of 
China 's soft power. In terms of theoretical contribution, this study argues that one should not 
hold a fixed view of soft power. Rather, it is dynamic due to its ideational , relational and 
social nature. The dynamic nature of soft power also relates to national identity. A state·s 
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perceived national identity can influenced the way soft power is constituted and mobilized. 
What the state seeks to represent itself in the international conununity enables it to 
" intentionally choose" its soft power. The articulation and promotion of its "chosen" soft 
power is actually both deri vative of and reproductive of that representation. 
Following a constructivist view of power, this study recognizes that soft power is ideational , 
relational, and social. This perspective suggests that soft power be studied by taking into 
account an actor' s role and what social relations the actor is involved in. Soft power therefore 
depends more on the actor' s role in a certain context than hard power does. What then 
becomes important to ask is soft power in what context, and over whom. Although the main 
task of thi s study is not to compare China' s soft power with that of America, in many 
respects, it has indicated that there are different aspects, such as culture, ideas of development 
and nation building, and the ways of dealing with foreign affairs. It thus has demonstrated 
that soft power varies from one country to another. 
Not only does soft power vary when it is put into the context of another country, but it 
evolves within one state over time, as illustrated by the two cases in the PRC. This study 
argues that the evolution of China's soft power over the two periods correlates wi th the 
changing character of China 's national identity, more specifically, Chinese political elites' 
sense of "what China stands for and against." What then makes the understanding of soft 
power crucial is to understand what the state seeks to represent in the world. This 
representation is socially constructed, by its sense of the past, relations with others, and the 
ever changing envirorunent. According to the subjectivity of representation, the state then 
"intentionally" chooses and promotes its soft power strategy. The constitution and 
mobilization of soft power is actually both manifestation and reinforcement of that 
representation. However, if actions deviate from the articulation of what the state represents, 
its soft power is unsustainable. This was what happened to "Maoist soft power" in the 1970s. 6 
ln this situation, it could lead to the political elites ' rethinking of their country's national 
identity; and the state may re-position itself and re-identify its representation in the world, in 
short, a transition of its national identity. This in tum motivates the state to revisit and 
reorient its soft power. Soft power, indeed, issues from and is used to manifest and reinforce 
the state's identity. 7 
The second contribution of this project is that it provides a complement to the current 
academic debate on the particular form of China' s soft power. Recent years have witnessed 
an increasing interest in the research of China's soft power. Whil st acknowledging that the 
6 See Van Ness, "Collapse of moral authority and the end of the civilizer state." 
7 Mattern, "Why 'so ft power' isn 't so soft," 600. 
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existin g academic efforts provides important avenues for readers to understand China ' s soft 
power and its impact, thi s author is not sati sfied with the prevailing idea that soft power is 
something "new" or "given" in Chi na ' s international politics. Therefore this study has 
employed a historical approach to examine if it is the case. It not only has focuses on China ' s 
contemporary soft power by looking at the case of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, but it al so has 
investigated practices from the early days of the PRC. By doing so, this study has explored 
how and why the PRC promoted soft power in different times. 1t has shown the evolving 
nature of China 's soft power and illustrated how we shou ld understand this evolution. From 
thi s historical perspective, thi s study has demonstrated that soft power is not a new dimension 
in China international strategy, but it has been understood and used differently over time 
according to the Chinese elites ' sense of what China is and stands for. Given that China ' s soft 
power has evolved and is still evolving due to what China seeks to represent in the 
international arena, its "choice" of soft power in the context of China' s rise has s ignificant 
implications for IR. 
7.4 The wider implications for IR and China in the world 
Soft power in this thesis is regarded as a manifestation and reinforcement of the Self. This 
argwnent has wider implications for IR. The first implication is how international relations 
looks like when soft power becomes involved in competition in world politics in the 
contemporary era. This is an implication that an anarchical world which featured soft power 
engagements by the states would avoid the relentless competition associated with material 
fom1s of power.8 This may be partly true. However, what is at issue is that when soft power is 
" intentionally chosen" by an actor to ad van ce its Self, it is unlikely to avoid ruthless 
competition in world politics. On the contrary , it compli cates the international competition 
amon g actors, which expands from the level of material resources to the subjective level of 
different "Selves." Soft power competitio n can appear in the fonn of exchanging and 
sociali z ing others with one ·s attracti ve qua li ti es, but a lso can be carri ed out by verbal fi ghting 
with "di ffe rent others" to re inforce one ' s representation so as to attract a potentia l audi ence.9 
This was th e case in the "media war" between the West and China before the 2008 Beijing 
Olympic Games. Soft power competition co uld produce " power clubs", or " insiders" and 
.. out siders'·, as shown in the two case studi es. A lthough tod ay's world is different from th at in 
the bipo lar Cold War, there are still s imilariti es, as demonstrated in America ' s "war on 
te rro ri sm· • - "you are either w ith us or with the terrori sts," or the concept of "axis of evil.' ''0 
8 Nye. 77,e Paradox of American Power, 2002. 
9 ln th is sense, it resonat es w ith Samuel Huntington's v iew of the "clash of c ivili sations." 
'
0 George W. Bush. ""Address to a joint session of congress and the Ameri ca n people," September 20, 
200 I , accessed at : http ://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives. gov/news/releases/200 l /09/200 I 0920-
8.html 
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These examples indicate that in addition to a power politics of material resources, soft power 
promotion as shown in this study of China, can involve a significant "power politics of 
identity" in international relations. 
In addition to a reconsideration of competition in world politics, there is a rethinking of 
strategies for soft power. Given the evolving nature of China's soft power in the past decades 
due to the PRC's repositioning itself in the international system and the shift of national 
identity, this study has demonstrated the variability of soft power. It thus implies that sof1 
power should not be treated as a static attribute or "hard thing" at a government ' s disposal. In 
this sense, perhaps we are unlikely to find a uni versa lly attractive soft power, but rather a 
somewhat confined soft power in tenns of context and target. After all, soft power speaks to 
one 's national identity. Due to the subjectivity and changeability of national identity in an 
anarchical world, a more feasible way of fonnulating soft power strategy is first to understand 
what an actor represents ( or seeks to represent) and who the like-characteristic audience are 
and then to choose certain soft power qualities accordingly. However, as this study mainly 
focuses on the case of China, it admits that future research needs to pay more attention to 
other powers to study the relationship between national identity and soft power. 
Regarding what the evolving nature of China's sof1 power means for the world, generally, it 
is promising to see a major transition from revolutionary Maoist sof1 power to today 's China 
now advancing cooperation and development. The language of radicalism has been replaced 
by moderation and pragmatism. To some extent, it has engaged with the rest of the world in a 
more positive way. Again, the evolution of China's sof1 power is in close relation to China 's 
reflection of its past (its glory, humiliation and mistakes), its relation to and interaction with 
others as well as its vision of the future. Therefore, what matters is not only the impact of its 
growing power, but also to recognize what China represents and seeks to represent in the 
world. As shown in Chapter Five and Six, China recently has sought to play the role of a 
more responsible power in the global communi ty, but China is still in transition and other 
identities have intertwined to influence its international behaviour. As for the international 
community, we can see how important it is to interact with China to encourage positive 
changes. The future of China is increasingly affected by how the outside world sees China's 
role in the international system. In this regard , I agree with G. John lkenberry' s view that 
China should be continuously incorporated into the liberal international order while being 
patiently pressed to continue its changes. 11 While every actor can play the politics of sof1 
power, it is unwise to produce the sense of "ingroup" and "outgroup," which probably 
11 G. John Ikenberry, "The ri se of China and the future of the West," Foreign Affairs 87:l (2008), 23-
37; G. John Ikenberry, "The future of the liberal world order: internationali sm after America," Foreign 
Affairs, May/June 2011, 56-68. 
221 
encourages the aggress ive nationalism within China and leaves little room for the Chinese 
government to positi vely engage with external (hostile) societies. It is more sensible fo r the 
international public to develop a sympathetic understanding of alternative conceptions of 
society, modernity, deve lopment and responsibility. Due to China ' s fast deve lopment in a 
relatively short period, there has emerged a conflicted sense of itself in recent years. 
lnternational participants have a responsibili ty to help shape China' s global identity. As 
David Lampton suggests, "Change in China requires change .. in others in a never-ending 
process of mutua l adaptation and competition." 12 
As for China, it needs to continue to shape its national identity and clarify what it seeks to 
represent in its transitional period. Although there has been a hi storical aspiration to regain 
China ' s great power status, the Chinese people should recognize that the PRC's ri se is 
unprecedented in the context of globali sation. 13 China should not take its rise for granted but 
should view its success as being due to its integrati on into the global economy, as a 
beneficiary of the existing international system. Its success has generated · opportunities for 
other powers as well as challenges, concerns and worries , and thus China needs to understand 
the global impact of its rise. To enhance China 's global image, China needs to understand 
that its image is ti ed to two aspects. In the domestic aspect, China's image will be impacted 
by the state government' s willingness and efforts to deepen China ' s political reform in a 
direction more in accordance with global values such as freedom of speech and more 
attention to indi vidual rights. In the international aspect, China ' s image will be shaped by 
how China posi tions itself in relation to others and how it communicates with the outside 
world. 14 In thi s regard , China also needs to develop its public diplomacy, wh ich should not be 
simply under the contrnl of the government, but should allow more NGOs to take part. The 
outside world needs to understand more about China, whereas China also needs to develop its 
understanding of the world. Through two-way communicat ions, China can develop a better 
understanding of it s role from a global perspective and continue to shape its desired role on 
the world stage. 
" Lampton, Th e Three Faces of Chinese Power, 265. 
13 See Yan Xuetong. "The ri se of China in Chinese eyes," Jou ma I of Co11tempora1y China I 0:26 
(200 I) . 33-39. 
14 Zhou Xinyu. '·i~~!,'~3):J,\iif.i,\A.':fHti'.. ·j;\Uit (Public diplomacy should stall from [understanding] 
·'what is public dip lomacy'·). i'f!::f'f:X."-fEfl} (Public Diplomacy Quarterly), vol.13 (Spring 2013), 
avail able onl ine: http ://www.china.corn.cn/intemational/txt/2013-02/28/content 28087768.htm 
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Interviewees 
Chinese academics: 
Dr Chen Yugang, Associate Professor of International Relations of Fudan University, 
Shanghai , March 15, 20 I 0 
Dong Manyuan, Deputy Director of China Institute of International Studies, Beijing, April 8, 
2010 
Dr Fang Changping, Associate Professor of International Relations of Rerunin University of 
China, Beijing, March 29, 20 I 0 
Prof. Gao Zhongming, Shanghai Politics College, Shanghai, March 16, 20 I 0 
Dr Hui Li wen, China's National Defence University, Beijing, March 23, 20 I 0 
Dr Li Ning, Deputy Director of Department of Phys ical Education of Beijing University, 
Canberra, April 12, 2012 
Dr Liu Feitao, research fellow in American Studies, China Institute of International Studies, 
Beijing, April 8, 2010 
Dr Liu Liyun, Associate Professor of International Relations of Renmin University of China, 
Beijing, March 21 , 2010 
Dr Ni Shixiong, Professor of American Centre of Fudan University, Shanghai, March 11 , 
2010 
Dr Shi Yinhong, Professor of International Politics of Renmin University of China, Beijing, 
March 22, 2010 
Dr Su Changhe, Professor of lnternational Relations at Shanghai International Studies 
University, Shanghai, March 12, 2010 
Dr Ren Xiao, Deputy Dean of Institute of International Studies of Fudan University, 
Canberra, December 4, 2009 
Dr Wu Guanjun , Institute for Advanced Study in Social Science of Fudan University, 
Shanghai , March 11 , 20 I 0 
Dr Xu Xiujun , Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences, March 26, 2010 
Dr Yu Keping, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Translation of the CCP Central Committee, 
Canberra, May 18, 2012 
223 
Yu Xintian , senior research fellow at Shanghai Institutes of International Studies, Shanghai , 
March 10, 2010 
Dr Zha Daoj iong, Professor of International Relations at School of International Studies of 
Beijing University, Auckland, July 2, 2010 
Dr Zhang Qianming, Associate Professor of International Politics of Zhejiang University, 
Canben-a, June 29, 20 I 2 
Anonymous interviewees from the Chinese public services: 
Two Chinese officials of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beij ing, April 16, 20 10 
Two officials of International Department, Central Committee of CCP, April 20, 20 I 0 
Two Chinese dip lomats, Canben-a, May 28, 20 l 0 
An official of General Administration of Sport of China, Beijing, December 9, 2011 
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